The Iran (Restrictive Measures) (Overseas Territories) Order 2012

Offences related to goods and technology listed in Annex I or II

10.—(1) A person to whom this Order applies (“P”) commits an offence if P knowingly —

(a) sells, supplies, transfers or exports (directly or indirectly) goods or technology listed in Annex I or II to the Council Regulation to any Iranian person, entity or body or for use in Iran;

(b) purchases, imports or transports from Iran (directly or indirectly) goods or technology listed in Annex I or II to the Council Regulation, whether or not the item concerned originated in Iran;

(c) provides (directly or indirectly) technical assistance or brokering services related to goods or technology listed in Annex I or II to the Council Regulation, or related to the provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of goods listed in either of those Annexes, to any Iranian person, entity or body or for use in Iran; or

(d) provides (directly or indirectly) financing or financial assistance related to goods or technology listed in Annex I or II to the Council Regulation (including in particular grants, loans and export credit insurance) for any sale, supply, transfer or export of such items, or for any provision of related technical assistance, to any Iranian person, entity or body or for use in Iran.

(2) Paragraph (1) does not apply if P is acting under the authority of a licence granted by the Governor under this Order.

(3) A licence may be granted to authorise a transaction in relation to goods or technology referred to in paragraph (1)(a), or assistance or brokering services referred to in paragraph (1)(c) or (d), if—

(a) the goods, technology, assistance or brokering services are for food, agricultural, medical or other humanitarian purposes, and

(b) in those cases where the transaction concerns goods or technology contained in the Nuclear Suppliers Group or Missile Technology Control Regime lists, the Sanctions Committee established pursuant to paragraph 18 of the Security Council Resolution has determined in advance and on a case-by-case basis that the transaction would clearly not contribute to the development of technologies in support of Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon development delivery systems.