Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799Show full title

9.1. Asymmetric Key Pairs and Public Key Certificates U.K.

9.1.1 General U.K.

Note: the keys described in this section are used for mutual authentication and secure messaging between vehicle units and tachograph cards and between vehicle units and external GNSS facilities. These processes are described in detail in chapters 10 and 11 of this Appendix. U.K.

CSM_51 Within the European Smart Tachograph system, ECC key pairs and corresponding certificates shall be generated and managed through three functional hierarchical levels: U.K.

• European level,

• Member State level,

• Equipment level.

CSM_52 Within the entire European Smart Tachograph system, public and private keys and certificates shall be generated, managed and communicated using standardized and secure methods. U.K.

9.1.2 European Level U.K.

CSM_53 At European level, a single unique ECC key pair designated as EUR shall be generated. It shall consist of a private key (EUR.SK) and a public key (EUR.PK). This key pair shall form the root key pair of the entire European Smart Tachograph PKI. This task shall be handled by a European Root Certificate Authority (ERCA), under the authority and responsibility of the European Commission. U.K.

CSM_54 The ERCA shall use the European private key to sign a (self-signed) root certificate of the European public key, and shall communicate this European root certificate to all Member States. U.K.

CSM_55 The ERCA shall use the European private key to sign the certificates of the Member States public keys upon request. The ERCA shall keep records of all signed Member State public key certificates. U.K.

CSM_56 As shown in Figure 1 in section 9.1.7, the ERCA shall generate a new European root key pair every 17 years. Whenever the ERCA generates a new European root key pair, it shall create a new self-signed root certificate for the new European public key. The validity period of a European root certificate shall be 34 years plus 3 months. U.K.

Note: The introduction of a new root key pair also implies that ERCA will generate a new motion sensor master key and a new DSRC master key, see sections 9.2.1.2 and 9.2.2.2. U.K.

CSM_57 Before generating a new European root key pair, the ERCA shall conduct an analysis of the cryptographic strength that is needed for the new key pair, given it should stay secure for the next 34 years. If found necessary, the ERCA shall switch to a cipher suite that is stronger than the current one, as specified in CSM_50. U.K.

[F1 CSM_58 Whenever it generates a new European root key pair, the ERCA shall create a link certificate for the new European public key and sign it with the previous European private key. The validity period of the link certificate shall be 17 years plus 3 months. This is shown in Figure 1 in section 9.1.7 as well.] U.K.

Note: Since a link certificate contains the ERCA generation X public key and is signed with the ERCA generation X-1 private key, a link certificate offers equipment issued under generation X-1 a method to trust equipment issued under generation X. U.K.

Textual Amendments

F1 Substituted by Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2018/502 of 28 February 2018 amending Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/799 laying down the requirements for the construction, testing, installation, operation and repair of tachographs and their components (Text with EEA relevance).

CSM_59 The ERCA shall not use the private key of a root key pair for any purpose after the moment a new root key certificate becomes valid. U.K.

CSM_60 At any moment in time, the ERCA shall dispose of the following cryptographic keys and certificates: U.K.

• The current EUR key pair and corresponding certificate

• All previous EUR certificates to be used for the verification of MSCA certificates that are still valid

• Link certificates for all generations of EUR certificates except the first one

9.1.3 Member State Level U.K.

CSM_61 At Member State level, all Member States required to sign tachograph card certificates shall generate one or more unique ECC key pairs designated as MSCA_Card. All Member States required to sign certificates for vehicle units or external GNSS facilities shall additionally generate one or more unique ECC key pairs designated as MSCA_VU-EGF. U.K.

CSM_62 The task of generating Member State key pairs shall be handled by a Member State Certificate Authority (MSCA). Whenever a MSCA generates a Member State key pair, it shall send the public key to the ERCA in order to obtain a corresponding Member State certificate signed by the ERCA. U.K.

CSM_63 An MSCA shall choose the strength of a Member State key pair equal to the strength of the European root key pair used to sign the corresponding Member State certificate. U.K.

CSM_64 An MSCA_VU-EGF key pair, if present, shall consist of private key MSCA_VU-EGF.SK and public key MSCA_VU-EGF.PK. An MSCA shall use the MSCA_VU-EGF.SK private key exclusively to sign the public key certificates of vehicle units and external GNSS facilities. U.K.

CSM_65 An MSCA_Card key pair shall consist of private key MSCA_Card.SK and public key MSCA_Card.PK. An MSCA shall use the MSCA_Card.SK private key exclusively to sign the public key certificates of tachograph cards. U.K.

CSM_66 An MSCA shall keep records of all signed VU certificates, external GNSS facility certificates and card certificates, together with the identification of the equipment for which each certificate is intended. U.K.

CSM_67 The validity period of an MSCA_VU-EGF certificate shall be 17 years plus 3 months. The validity period of an MSCA_Card certificate shall be 7 years plus 1 month. U.K.

CSM_68 As shown in Figure 1 in section 9.1.7, the private key of a MSCA_VU-EGF key pair and the private key of a MSCA_Card key pair shall have a key usage period of two years. U.K.

CSM_69 An MSCA shall not use the private key of an MSCA_VU-EGF key pair for any purpose after the moment its usage period has ended. Neither shall an MSCA use the private key of an MSCA_Card key pair for any purpose after the moment its usage period has ended. U.K.

CSM_70 At any moment in time, an MSCA shall dispose of the following cryptographic keys and certificates: U.K.

• The current MSCA_Card key pair and corresponding certificate

• All previous MSCA_Card certificates to be used for the verification of the certificates of tachograph cards that are still valid

• The current EUR certificate necessary for the verification of the current MSCA certificate

• All previous EUR certificates necessary for the verification of all MSCA certificates that are still valid

CSM_71 If an MSCA is required to sign certificates for vehicle units or external GNSS facilities, it shall additionally dispose of the following keys and certificates: U.K.

• The current MSCA_VU-EGF key pair and corresponding certificate

• All previous MSCA_VU-EGF public keys to be used for the verification of the certificates of VUs or external GNSS facilities that are still valid

9.1.4 Equipment Level: Vehicle Units U.K.

[F1 CSM_72 Two unique ECC key pairs shall be generated for each vehicle unit, designated as VU_MA and VU_Sign. This task is handled by VU manufacturers. Whenever a VU key pair is generated, the party generating the key shall send the public key to its MSCA, in order to obtain a corresponding VU certificate signed by the MSCA. The private key shall be used only by the vehicle unit.] U.K.

CSM_73 The VU_MA and VU_Sign certificates of a given vehicle unit shall have the same Certificate Effective Date. U.K.

CSM_74 A VU manufacturer shall choose the strength of a VU key pair equal to the strength of the MSCA key pair used to sign the corresponding VU certificate. U.K.

CSM_75 A vehicle unit shall use its VU_MA key pair, consisting of private key VU_MA.SK and public key VU_MA.PK, exclusively to perform VU Authentication towards tachograph cards and external GNSS facilities, as specified in sections 10.3 and 11.4 of this Appendix. U.K.

CSM_76 A vehicle unit shall be capable of generating ephemeral ECC key pairs and shall use an ephemeral key pair exclusively to perform session key agreement with a tachograph card or external GNSS facility, as specified in sections 10.4 and 11.4 of this Appendix. U.K.

CSM_77 A vehicle unit shall use the private key VU_Sign.SK of its VU_Sign key pair exclusively to sign downloaded data files, as specified in chapter 14 of this Appendix. The corresponding public key VU_Sign.PK shall be used exclusively to verify signatures created by the vehicle unit. U.K.

CSM_78 As shown in Figure 1 in section 9.1.7, the validity period of a VU_MA certificate shall be 15 years and 3 months. The validity period of a VU_Sign certificate shall also be 15 years and 3 months. U.K.

Notes: U.K.

— The extended validity period of a VU_Sign certificate allows a Vehicle Unit to create valid signatures over downloaded data during the first three months after it has expired, as required in Regulation (EU) No 581/2010. U.K.

— The extended validity period of a VU_MA certificate is needed to allow the VU to authenticate to a control card or a company card during the first three months after it has expired, such that is it possible to perform a data download. U.K.

CSM_79 A vehicle unit shall not use the private key of a VU key pair for any purpose after the corresponding certificate has expired. U.K.

CSM_80 The VU key pairs (except ephemeral keys pairs) and corresponding certificates of a given vehicle unit shall not be replaced or renewed in the field once the vehicle unit has been put in operation. U.K.

Notes: U.K.

— Ephemeral key pairs are not included in this requirement, as a new ephemeral key pair is generated by a VU each time Chip Authentication and session key agreement is performed, see section 10.4. Note that ephemeral key pairs do not have corresponding certificates. U.K.

— This requirement does not forbid the possibility of replacing static VU key pairs during a refurbishment or repair in a secure environment controlled by the VU manufacturer. U.K.

CSM_81 When put in operation, vehicle units shall contain the following cryptographic keys and certificates: U.K.

• The VU_MA private key and corresponding certificate

• The VU_Sign private key and corresponding certificate

• The MSCA_VU-EGF certificate containing the MSCA_VU-EGF.PK public key to be used for verification of the VU_MA certificate and VU_Sign certificate

• The EUR certificate containing the EUR.PK public key to be used for verification of the MSCA_VU-EGF certificate

• The EUR certificate whose validity period directly precedes the validity period of the EUR certificate to be used to verify the MSCA_VU-EGF certificate, if existing

• The link certificate linking these two EUR certificates, if existing

CSM_82 In addition to the cryptographic keys and certificates listed in CSM_81, vehicle units shall also contain the keys and certificates specified in Part A of this Appendix, allowing a vehicle unit to interact with first-generation tachograph cards. U.K.

9.1.5 Equipment Level: Tachograph Cards U.K.

[F1 CSM_83 One unique ECC key pair, designated as Card_MA, shall be generated for each tachograph card. A second unique ECC key pair, designated as Card_Sign, shall additionally be generated for each driver card and each workshop card. This task may be handled by card manufacturers or card personalisers. Whenever a card key pair is generated, the party generating the key shall send the public key to its MSCA, in order to obtain a corresponding card certificate signed by the MSCA. The private key shall be used only by the tachograph card.] U.K.

CSM_84 The Card_MA and Card_Sign certificates of a given driver card or workshop card shall have the same Certificate Effective Date. U.K.

CSM_85 A card manufacturer or card personaliser shall choose the strength of a card key pair equal to the strength of the MSCA key pair used to sign the corresponding card certificate. U.K.

CSM_86 A tachograph card shall use its Card_MA key pair, consisting of private key Card_MA.SK and public key Card_MA.PK, exclusively to perform mutual authentication and session key agreement towards vehicle units, as specified in sections 10.3 and 10.4 of this Appendix. U.K.

CSM_87 A driver card or workshop card shall use the private key Card_Sign.SK of its Card_Sign key pair exclusively to sign downloaded data files, as specified in chapter 14 of this Appendix. The corresponding public key Card_Sign.PK shall be used exclusively to verify signatures created by the card. U.K.

[F1 CSM_88 The validity period of a Card_MA certificate shall be as follows: U.K.

• For driver cards: 5 years

• For company cards: 5 years

• For control cards: 2 years

• For workshop cards: 1 year]

CSM_89 The validity period of a Card_Sign certificate shall be as follows: U.K.

— For driver cards:	5 years and 1 month
— For workshop cards:	1 year and 1 month

Note: the extended validity period of a Card_Sign certificate allows a driver card to create valid signatures over downloaded data during the first month after it has expired. This is necessary in view of Regulation (EU) No 581/2010, which requires that a data download from a driver card must be possible up to 28 days after the last data has been recorded. U.K.

CSM_90 The key pairs and corresponding certificates of a given tachograph card shall not be replaced or renewed once the card has been issued. U.K.

CSM_91 When issued, tachograph cards shall contain the following cryptographic keys and certificates: U.K.

• The Card_MA private key and corresponding certificate

• For driver cards and workshop cards additionally: the Card_Sign private key and corresponding certificate

• The MSCA_Card certificate containing the MSCA_Card.PK public key to be used for verification of the Card_MA certificate and Card_Sign certificate

• The EUR certificate containing the EUR.PK public key to be used for verification of the MSCA_Card certificate.

• The EUR certificate whose validity period directly precedes the validity period of the EUR certificate to be used to verify the MSCA_Card certificate, if existing.

• The link certificate linking these two EUR certificates, if existing.

• [F2 Additionally, for control cards, company cards and workshop cards only, and only if such cards are issued during the first three months of the validity period of a new EUR certificate: the EUR certificate that is two generations older, if existing.

Note to last bullet: For example, in the first three months of the ERCA(3) certificate (see Figure 1), the mentioned cards shall contain the ERCA(1) certificate. This is needed to ensure that these cards can be used to perform data downloads from ERCA(1) VUs whose normal 15-year life period plus the 3-months data downloading period expires during these months; see the last bullet of requirement 13) in Annex IC.] U.K.

CSM_92 In addition to the cryptographic keys and certificates listed in CSM_91, tachograph cards shall also contain the keys and certificates specified in Part A of this Appendix, allowing these cards to interact with first-generation VUs. U.K.

9.1.6 Equipment Level: External GNSS Facilities U.K.

[F1 CSM_93 One unique ECC key pair shall be generated for each external GNSS facility, designated as EGF_MA. This task is handled by external GNSS facility manufacturers. Whenever an EGF_MA key pair is generated, the party generating th e key shall send the public key to its MSCA in order to obtain a corresponding EGF_MA certificate signed by the MSCA. The private key shall be used only by the external GNSS facility.] U.K.

CSM_94 An EGF manufacturer shall choose the strength of an EGF_MA key pair equal to the strength of the MSCA key pair used to sign the corresponding EGF_MA certificate. U.K.

[F1 CSM_95 An external GNSS facility shall use its EGF_MA key pair, consisting of private key EGF_MA.SK and public key EGF_MA.PK, exclusively to perform mutual authentication and session key agreement towards vehicle units, as specified in section 11.4 of this Appendix.] U.K.

CSM_96 The validity period of an EGF_MA certificate shall be 15 years. U.K.

CSM_97 An external GNSS facility shall not use the private key of its EGF_MA key pair for coupling to a vehicle unit after the corresponding certificate has expired. U.K.

Note: as explained in section 11.3.3, an EGF may potentially use its private key for mutual authentication towards the VU it is already coupled to, even after the corresponding certificate has expired. U.K.

CSM_98 The EGF_MA key pair and corresponding certificate of a given external GNSS facility shall not be replaced or renewed in the field once the EGF has been put in operation. U.K.

Note: This requirement does not forbid the possibility of replacing EGF key pairs during a refurbishment or repair in a secure environment controlled by the EGF manufacturer. U.K.

CSM_99 When put in operation, an external GNSS facility shall contain the following cryptographic keys and certificates: U.K.

• The EGF_MA private key and corresponding certificate

• The MSCA_VU-EGF certificate containing the MSCA_VU-EGF.PK public key to be used for verification of the EGF_MA certificate

• The EUR certificate containing the EUR.PK public key to be used for verification of the MSCA_VU-EGF certificate

• The EUR certificate whose validity period directly precedes the validity period of the EUR certificate to be used to verify the MSCA_VU-EGF certificate, if existing

• The link certificate linking these two EUR certificates, if existing

9.1.7 Overview: Certificate Replacement U.K.

Figure 1 below shows how different generations of ERCA root certificates, ERCA link certificates, MSCA certificates and equipment (VU and card) certificates are issued and used over time:

[F1 Figure 1 Issuance and usage of different generations of ERCA root certificates, ERCA link certificates, MSCA certificates and equipment certificates] U.K.

Notes to Figure 1: U.K.

1. Different generations of the root certificate are indicated by a number in brackets. E.g. ERCA (1) is the first generation of ERCA root certificate; ERCA (2) is the second generation, etc. U.K.

2. Other certificates are indicated by two numbers in brackets, the first one indicating the root certificate generation under which they are issued, the second one the generation of the certificate itself. E.g. MSCA_Card (1-1) is the first MSCA_Card certificate issued under ERCA (1); MSCA_Card (2-1) is the first MSCA_Card certificate issued under ERCA (2); MSCA_Card (2-last) is the last MSCA_Card certificate issued under ERCA (2); Card_MA(2-1) is the first Card certificate for mutual authentication that is issued under ERCA (2), etc. U.K.

3. The MSCA_Card (2-1) and MSCA_Card (1-last) certificates are issued at almost but not exactly the same date. MSCA_Card (2-1) is the first MSCA_Card certificate issued under ERCA (2) and will be issued slightly later than MSCA_Card (1-last), the last MSCA_Card certificate under ERCA (1). U.K.

4. As shown in the figure, the first VU and Card certificates issued under ERCA (2) will appear almost two years before the last VU and Card certificates issued under ERCA (1) will appear. This is because of the fact that VU and Card certificates are issued under an MSCA certificate, not directly under the ERCA certificate. The MSCA (2-1) certificate will be issued directly after ERCA (2) becomes valid, but the MSCA (1-last) certificate will be issued only slightly before that time, at the last moment the ERCA (1) certificate is still valid. Therefore, these two MSCA certificates will have almost the same validity period, despite the fact that they are of different generations. U.K.

5. The validity period shown for cards is the one for driver cards (5 years). U.K.

[F1 6. To save space, the difference in validity period between the Card_MA and Card_Sign certificates is shown only for the first generation.] U.K.