Section 777(13) of ICTA: “receivable”
2270.Section 777(13) of ICTA provides:
“For the purposes of the relevant provisions … any amount in money or money’s worth shall not be regarded as having become receivable by some person until that person can effectively enjoy or dispose of it.”
2271.Section 777(1) of ICTA defines “the relevant provisions” as sections 775 to 777 of ICTA. On the face of it, therefore, the qualification of “receivable” in section 777(13) of ICTA applies to section 776 of ICTA. But the word “receivable” is not actually used in section 776.
2272.In Yuill v Wilson (1980), 52 TC 674 HL(8) and Yuill v Fletcher (1984), 58 TC 145 CA(9) the courts interpreted “realised” in section 776(3) of ICTA consistently with the explanation of “receivable” in section 777(13) of ICTA. In the House of Lords in Yuill v Wilson, Viscount Dilhorne said (52 TC 674 at page 714):
““I have based my conclusions on the meaning which I think should be given to the expression “the gain is realised”. Section [777] of the Act is as I have said intended to supplement sections [775] and [776]. Subsection (13) of section [777] is a definition subsection and, inter alia, states that for the purposes of sections [775] and [776] “any amount in money or money’s worth shall not be regarded as having become receivable by some person until that person can effectively enjoy or dispose of it.” The operation of [section 776] does not depend on whether money or money’s worth is receivable. One does not find in it any reference to money or money’s worth being receivable. It depends on whether a gain is obtained or realised. So the operation of this definition is, to say the least, obscure in relation to section [776]. It, however, accords with the meaning which I think should be given to the word “realised”, that is to say, that a gain is not realised until it can be effectively enjoyed or disposed of.””
2273.Lord Salmon agreed with Viscount Dilhorne. Other judges interpreted “realised” in the same way as Viscount Dilhorne, but relied on what is now section 777(13) of ICTA to do so(10).
2274.Following Viscount Dilhorne and Lord Salmon, this Act does not rewrite the explanation of “receivable” for the purposes of this Chapter. This omission does not change the law.
[1980] STC 460.
[1984] STC 401.
In the Court of Appeal, Buckley LJ and Goff LJ had used the explanation of “receivable” to interpret “realised” and in the House of Lords so too did Lord Russell of Killowen and Lord Keith of Kinkel. Lord Edmund-Davies did not express an opinion on this point. In Yuill v Fletcher, the Special Commissioners noted this difference of approach, and inferred that the application of what is now section 777(13) of ICTA to what is now section 776 of ICTA could “be legitimately regarded as an open question, or at least as containing open questions”: (paragraph 9.9 of the Decision: 58 TC 145 at page 163). Neither the High Court nor the Court of Appeal expressed any view on this point; the Court of Appeal held that the House of Lords’ decision in Yuill v Wilson should be followed as either a binding precedent or of the highest persuasive authority.
