Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 484/2014Show full title

Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 484/2014

of 12 May 2014

laying down implementing technical standards with regard to the hypothetical capital of a central counterparty according to Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council

(Text with EEA relevance)

THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of 4 July 2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories(1), and in particular the third subparagraph of Article 50a(4) and the third subparagraph of Article 50c(3) thereof,

Whereas:

(1) In accordance with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council(2) institutions established in the Union are currently reporting their compliance with the own funds requirements on a quarterly basis. In order to minimise inconsistencies between the reference dates set for institutions and the dates set for central counterparties (CCPs) for the calculation and reporting of the information related to the hypothetical capital, the reference dates set for CCPs should cover at least the reference dates already set for institutions. However, a higher frequency of reporting of the information related to the hypothetical capital would also accommodate the fact that clearing members established in third countries can have different reporting dates. Furthermore, there might be large variations in own funds requirements and for them to have an updated view of those requirements, clearing members and their competent authorities might want to monitor those exposures more frequently than quarterly.

(2) In normal situations, the reporting dates for CCPs should not be delayed by more than one week with respect to the date of calculation. A week provides CCPs with sufficient time in order to perform all the internal controls and complete the necessary approval process before reporting the required data. If a CCP develops a fully automated system the reporting date can be close to the calculation date. Currently, however, CCPs might not have the capability to complete the entire process within this time and might therefore need to develop their internal processes and infrastructures in order to be able to do so. Against this background, a transitional provision should be introduced to give CCPs sufficient time to develop the necessary internal processes and infrastructures and, at the same time, to start reporting the information related to the hypothetical capital to their clearing members.

(3) Pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 the losses following the default of a clearing member would, in the first instance, be covered by the initial margin and by the default fund contribution of the defaulting member itself. Where those prove to be insufficient, the losses are covered by the pre-funded financial resources that are contributed by CCPs to their respective default waterfalls and by the pre-funded default fund contributions of the non-defaulting members. During this period, the frequency of reporting should be increased in order to keep the other non-defaulting clearing members and the competent authorities updated on all the information related to the hypothetical capital needed to calculate the clearing members' own fund requirements. CCPs should have the technical capabilities and the internal processes in place in order to compute and deliver the information related to the hypothetical capital under those stress situations.

(4) Pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, a CCP has to replenish its pre-funded own financial resources in the default waterfall within one month. For this reason, the frequencies of calculation and reporting in these situations should be higher than the norm. Daily reporting of the information related to hypothetical capital could be less meaningful because it might take time to establish the total size of the losses following the clearing member's default. Given that they may face a broad range of different scenarios, competent authorities should also have the option to request a higher frequency in periods of stress based on an assessment of the situation that should take into account the degree of actual or foreseen depletion of the pre-funded financial resources available to the CCP (both those contributed by the CCP itself and those contributed by clearing members). The higher frequency should apply until those resources are restored to levels required by the relevant legislation.

(5) The high frequency of reporting in periods of stress can be very demanding given the newly introduced reporting requirement. This may pose challenges as regards the technical implementation for at least some CCPs. To mitigate this, it is appropriate to have a later date of application for the requirements of higher frequency of reporting. That will allow CCPs to improve their internal processes and upgrade their systems.

(6) The provisions in this Regulation are closely linked, since they deal with the calculation and reporting of the hypothetical capital of a CCP. To ensure coherence between those provisions, which should enter into force at the same time, and to facilitate a comprehensive view and compact access to them by persons subject to those obligations, it is desirable to include all the relevant implementing technical standards required by Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 in a single Regulation.

(7) This Regulation is based on the draft implementing technical standards submitted by the European Banking Authority to the Commission.

(8) The European Banking Authority has conducted open public consultations on the draft implementing technical standards on which this Regulation is based, analysed the potential related costs and benefits and requested the opinion of the Banking Stakeholder Group established in accordance with Article 37 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council(3),

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Modifications etc. (not altering text)

C1 The “appropriate regulator” has power to make such provision as they consider appropriate by means of an instrument in writing to prevent, remedy or mitigate any failure of the provisions of this Regulation to operate effectively or any other deficiency arising from the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU, see The Financial Regulators' Powers (Technical Standards etc.) (Amendment etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018 (S.I. 2018/1115), regs. 2, 3, Sch. Pt. 3 (with saving on IP completion day by S.I. 2019/680, regs. 1(2), 11; 2020 c. 1, Sch. 5 para. 1(1))

C2 Regulation: power to modify conferred (11.7.2023) by Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (c. 29), ss. 3, 86(3), Sch. 1 Pts. 1, 3; S.I. 2023/779, reg. 2(d)

(1)

OJ L 201, 27.7.2012, p. 1.

(2)

Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 (OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 1).

(3)

Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12).