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STATUTORY INSTRUMENTS

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**2019 No. 600**

The Republic of Belarus (Sanctions)  
(EU Exit) Regulations 2019

**PART 5**

Trade

CHAPTER 2

[<sup>F1</sup>Exports to Belarus and related activities]

**Technical assistance relating to [<sup>F1</sup>certain goods and technology]**

**25.**—(1) A person must not directly or indirectly provide technical assistance relating to [<sup>F2</sup>goods or technology to which this paragraph applies] —

- (a) to a person connected with Belarus, or
- (b) for use in Belarus.

[<sup>F3</sup>(1A) Paragraph (1) applies to—

- [<sup>F4</sup>(a) chemical and biological weapons-related goods and chemical and biological weapons-related technology;
- (b) critical-industry goods and critical-industry technology;
- (c) dual-use goods and dual-use technology;
- (d) interception and monitoring goods and interception and monitoring technology;
- (e) internal repression goods and internal repression technology;
- (f) machinery-related goods and machinery-related technology;
- (g) military goods and military technology;
- (h) oil refining goods and oil refining technology;
- (i) quantum computing and advanced materials goods and quantum computing and advanced materials technology.]]

(2) Paragraph (1) is subject to Part 6 (Exceptions and licences).

(3) A person who contravenes a prohibition in paragraph (1) commits an offence, but—

- (a) it is a defence for a person charged with the offence of contravening paragraph (1)(a) (“P”) to show that P did not know and had no reasonable cause to suspect that the person was connected with Belarus;
- (b) it is a defence for a person charged with the offence of contravening paragraph (1)(b) to show that the person did not know and had no reasonable cause to suspect that the goods or technology were for use in Belarus.

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**Changes to legislation:** There are currently no known outstanding effects for the The Republic of Belarus (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, Section 25. (See end of Document for details)

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#### Textual Amendments

- F1** Words in [reg. 25](#) heading substituted (5.7.2022) by [The Republic of Belarus \(Sanctions\) \(EU Exit\) \(Amendment\) Regulations 2022 \(S.I. 2022/748\)](#), regs. 1(2), **17(f)(i)**
- F2** Words in [reg. 25\(1\)](#) substituted (5.7.2022) by [The Republic of Belarus \(Sanctions\) \(EU Exit\) \(Amendment\) Regulations 2022 \(S.I. 2022/748\)](#), regs. 1(2), **17(f)(ii)**
- F3** [Reg. 25\(1A\)](#) inserted (5.7.2022) by [The Republic of Belarus \(Sanctions\) \(EU Exit\) \(Amendment\) Regulations 2022 \(S.I. 2022/748\)](#), regs. 1(2), **17(f)(iii)**
- F4** [Reg. 25\(1A\)\(a\)-\(i\)](#) substituted for [reg. 25\(1A\)\(a\)-\(g\)](#) (9.6.2023) by [The Republic of Belarus \(Sanctions\) \(EU Exit\) \(Amendment\) Regulations 2023 \(S.I. 2023/616\)](#), regs. 1(2), **8(e)**

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#### Commencement Information

- I1** [Reg. 25](#) not in force at made date, see [reg. 1\(2\)](#)
- I2** [Reg. 25](#) in force at 31.12.2020 by [S.I. 2019/627](#), **reg. 12(2)**; 2020 c. 1, **Sch. 5 para. 1(1)**

**Changes to legislation:**

There are currently no known outstanding effects for the The Republic of Belarus (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, Section 25.