The Personal Equity Plan (Amendment No. 2) Regulations 1996
1.
(1)
These Regulations may be cited as the Personal Equity Plan (Amendment No. 2) Regulations 1996 and shall come into force on 23rd May 1996.
(2)
Regulations 2, 3 and 4 have effect in relation to transfers of, or renunciations of rights to, shares to a plan manager after these Regulations come into force.
2.
3.
“(aa)
that the shares were not allotted or allocated to the qualifying individual in the circumstances specified in paragraph (3A);”.
4.
“(3A)
The circumstances specified in this paragraph are where—
(a)
the allotment or allocation of the shares was connected with the allotment or allocation of—
(i)
shares in the company of a different class, or
(ii)
rights to shares in the company of a different class, or
(iii)
shares or rights to shares in another company, or
(iv)
securities or rights to securities of the company or of another company,
to that individual or to any other person; and
(b)
the terms on which the shares were offered were significantly more favourable to the qualifying individual than they would have been if their allotment or allocation had not been connected as described in sub-paragraph (a).”
These Regulations, which come into force on 23rd May 1996, further amend the Personal Equity Plan Regulations 1989 (S.I. 1989/469, amended by S.I. 1990/678, 1991/733, 2774, 1992/623, 1993/756, 1995/1539, 3287 and 1996/846).
The effect of the amendments is to introduce a further condition when an individual subscribes to a personal equity plan by transferring to a plan manager shares issued in consequence of a public offer. The condition is that the shares must not have allotted or allocated in circumstances where the allotment or allocation was connected with the allotment or allocation of shares (or rights to shares) of a different class in the same company, or of shares (or rights to shares) in another company, or of securities (or rights to securities) of the same or another company, to that individual or to any other person, and the terms of the public offer for the shares were significantly more favourable to the individual than they would have been if the allotment or allocation of the shares had not been connected in that way.