At the outset, the Commission observed that all sampled companies purchased soybeans domestically from either related or unrelated companies to process into soybean oil and then biodiesel. The sampled exporting producers did not purchase soybean oil to further process into biodiesel, as they crushed the soybeans into soybean oil themselves as an intermediate step for the production of biodiesel. Therefore, the analysis in the following sub-sections focuses on whether the GOA provided soybeans (rather than soybean oil) for less than adequate remuneration.

Article 3(1)(a)(iv), second indent, of the basic Regulation states that a financial contribution exists if a government: ‘entrusts or directs a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in points (i), (ii) and (iii) which would normally be vested in the government, and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practise normally followed by governments’. The type of functions described by Article 3(1)(a)(iii) of the basic Regulation occurs where ‘a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or purchases goods …’. Those provisions mirror paragraphs (iii) and (iv) of Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement and should be interpreted and applied in the light of the relevant WTO case law.

In line with those WTO rulings, not all government measures capable of conferring benefits equate to a financial contribution under Article 3 of the basic Regulation and Article 1.1(a) of the SCM Agreement. There must be evidence of a government policy or programme to promote the industry under investigation (in this particular case the biodiesel/biofuels industry), by exercising authority over or giving responsibility to public or private bodies (here the soybean growers) to provide soybeans for less than adequate remuneration to the biodiesel industry.

1. (i)
   the determination of whether there is a ‘financial contribution’ under Article 1.1(a)(1) of the SCM Agreement should focus on the nature of the government action, rather than on the effects or the results of the government action20. In other words, it is well-acknowledged that governments intervene in the market as regulators and, when so doing, they cause effects on the market and its operators. In this sense, e.g. a government may impose export taxes legitimately in order to generate revenue in case of a very competitive commodity in the international markets. In contrast, there is no such legitimate imposition of export restrictions when it becomes evident that the use of such instrument together with other mechanisms to keep commodities domestically and force suppliers to sell below market prices is part of a broader scheme engineered by the government to support a particular industry or set of industries to boost their competitiveness. Thus, the nature of the government action, including its context, object and purpose, is relevant in assessing the ‘financial contribution’ element;
2. (ii)
   ‘entrustment’ or ‘direction’ would involve an explicit and affirmative action addressed to a particular party in relation to a particular task or duty, this being very different from the situation in which a government intervenes in the market in some way, which may or may not have a particular result given the factual circumstances and exercise of free choice by the actors in that market. Ultimately, the key question behind the concepts of entrustment or direction is whether the conduct in question, i.e. the financial contribution in the form of provision of goods for less than adequate remuneration, can be attributed to the government or still is the free choice of the private operators in view of market considerations, such as regulatory constraints21;
3. (iii)
   Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement is, in essence, an anti-circumvention provision and, thus, a finding of entrustment or direction requires that the government gives responsibility to a private body or exercises its authority over a private body in order to effectuate a financial contribution. In most cases, one would expect entrustment or direction of a private body to involve some form of threat or inducement, which could, in turn, serve as evidence of entrustment or direction22. However, governments are likely to have other means at their disposal to exercise authority over a private body some of which may be ‘more subtle’ than a command or may not involve the same degree of compulsion23;
4. (iv)
   there must be ‘a demonstrable link’ between the government act and the conduct of the private body24. There is no reason why a case of government entrustment or direction should not be premised on circumstantial evidence (such as implicit and informal acts of delegation or command), provided that such evidence is probative and compelling25. In this respect, evidence of the government's intention to support the downstream industry (for example, through publicly stated policies or government decisions, or other governmental actions), or the existence of other government measures ensuring a particular result on the market (e.g. an export restraint together with a government measure preventing operators subject to those restraints from stocking their products), may be relevant to determine the existence of a ‘financial contribution’ under Article 1.1(a)(1)(iv) of the SCM Agreement (in particular as an indirect manner for the government to provide goods, as provided in subparagraph (iii)). In some circumstances, ‘guidance’ by a government can constitute direction26. The presence of particular effects in the market (such as reduction of prices) may also be a factor to be taken into account together with all other available evidence, including the possibility of anticipating those effects in a particular context. Finally, depending on the circumstances, a private body may decide not to carry out a function with which it was so entrusted or directed, despite the possible negative consequences that may follow. This does not show, however, on its own, that the private body was not entrusted or directed27.

In line with that case-law, the Commission has reviewed very carefully the nature of the GOA's intervention (whether the GOA's intervention involves the entrustment of or direction to soybean growers?), the nature of the entrusted bodies (are soybean growers private bodies within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation?), and the action of the entrusted or directed bodies (did the entrusted or directed soybean growers provide soybeans to the Argentinian biodiesel industry for less than adequate remuneration and hence act as a proxy for the GOA?). Moreover, the Commission has verified whether the function carried out would normally be vested in the government (is the provision of soybeans for less than adequate remuneration to soybean oil-producing companies in Argentina a normal government activity?) and whether such function does not, in real sense, differ from the practices normally followed by governments (does the actual provision of soybeans by growers, in real sense, differ from what the government would have done itself?).

In view of the WTO case-law referred to in recitals (77) to (82), the Commission analysed first whether the GOA's support to the Argentinian biodiesel industry is effectively an objective of a government policy and not merely a ‘side effect’ of the exercise of general regulatory powers. The investigation examined in particular whether the price distortions found were part of the governments' objectives, or whether the lower prices of soybeans were rather an ‘inadvertent’ by-product of general governmental regulation. In line with the conclusions reached in recital (64), the Commission decided to partially use facts available to determine whether there has been an entrustment or direction of the soybeans growers by the GOA.

A number of documents show that the GOA explicitly pursued the support and development of the biodiesel industry as a policy objective, in particular by seeking to reduce the domestic price of the input materials (soybeans) and thereby providing a financial contribution to the production of biodiesel.

The GOA claimed that none of the publications of the OECD, IRENA and the World Bank referred to an explicit objective of the GOA to support the Argentinian biodiesel industry. However, the GOA did not contradict the correctness of the citations found by the Commission. Contrary to the GOA, the Commission considered that the analyses made in those publications support its finding that the GOA explicitly supports the Argentinian biodiesel industry.

Argentina has had an export tax in place for soybeans since 1994, fixed at the rate of 3,5 %. As will be illustrated with all the changes of the legislation described in recitals (91) to (100), the measures used to adjust the export tax beyond the initial rate demonstrate the GOA's explicit objective of reducing domestic prices in the context of rising world market prices. During the investigation the GOA claimed that the export tax on soybeans and soybean oil has been in place for revenue raising reasons. Despite multiple requests of the Commission to provide documents supporting this claim, the GOA did not provide any.

Furthermore, none of the legislative acts since 2002 related to the export tax adjustments on soybeans, soybean oil or biodiesel give the raising of revenue as a reason for the level of the export tax. Rather, as explained in recitals (91) to (100), those legislative acts state that the purpose of the export tax is to induce soybean suppliers to keep selling domestically at below international prices. Thus, rather than a fiscal revenue measure, the GOA uses export taxes on soybeans as a tool to support the development of the domestic biodiesel industry.

Resolution 125/2008 stated the following policy therein: ‘ Cereal grains and oilseeds international prices have significantly increased over the last years, with a high volatility of their inter-annual variation rates. The continuance of such a scenario could have negative effects on the economy as a whole, such as higher domestic prices, lower fairness in the distribution of wealth and growing uncertainty as to investment decisions in the agriculture and livestock industry. The proposed amendment to the scheme of export duties applicable to a key subgroup of cereal grains and oilseeds is an appropriate tool to solve the aforementioned problems.’ (emphasis added).

After disclosure of the information document, the GOA and CARBIO reiterated their claim that any effect on biodiesel production of the export taxes applied to soybeans if such effect exists at all, clearly constitutes at best a side-effect of a revenue collection measure.

The Commission did not agree with this statement. The decrees, as cited in recitals (91) to (100), cannot be considered just ‘mere policy pronouncements’. This legislation repeatedly reflects the GOA's intention to support the biodiesel industry, while, contrary to the GOA's beliefs, the decrees do not state revenue collection as the purpose of the export tax on soybeans. None of the legislation the GOA brought forward in its submission referred to a revenue-raising function for the export tax on soybeans.

By imposing export taxes on soybeans, the GOA puts Argentinian soybean growers into an economically irrational situation, which induces them to selling their goods domestically for a lower price than they could obtain in the absence of those export taxes. They are therefore deprived of a rational choice and induced to comply with the policy objective behind the export tax.

This irrational situation was amplified by other export restraints, such as export quotas on agricultural products other than soybeans from 2006 until 2015, discouraging the export of other crops and directing growers toward continuing the production of soybeans (as opposed to other grains), and lowering the domestic price even further. Soybean growers also continued to produce and sell their production locally since stockpiling is not appropriate in relation to this agricultural product and cannot be maintained in the medium to long-term.

They are prevented from maximising their income that they would be able to get in the absence of the export tax on soybeans (e.g. by exporting their production to benefit from higher prices or by increasing domestic prices) as well as other similarly restrictive measures.

This is further supported by Decree 133/2015 and Decree 640/2016 in which the GOA takes specific measures to help the soybean industry and its associated value chain to reverse the occurred decline in the competitiveness and profitability of its entire associated value chain. Thus, soybean growers are encouraged or directed by the GOA to maintain production to supply the domestic market even if a rational supplier would adapt its output and prices in a situation where exports have been disincentivised.

Therefore, through those measures the GOA induces the soybean growers to keep the soybeans in Argentina because they cannot sell at better prices which would prevail in Argentina absent those measures.

In this sense, the input producers are ‘entrusted’ or ‘directed’ by the GOA to provide goods to the domestic users of soybeans, i.e. biodiesel producers, for less than adequate remuneration. The soybean growers are given the responsibility to create an artificial, compartmentalised, low-priced domestic market in Argentina.

In other words, when applying the set of measures described, the GOA knows how the soybean growers will respond to the measures and what consequences will result from them. While the soybean growers may lower their domestic production slightly to respond to the export taxes and other restrictive measures, the evidence shows that production did not stop, nor did it significantly decrease (see Table 1 below and explained further in recital (139)). The Commission concluded that this is a result of the GOA entrusting and directing the soybean growers to continue production and export.

As explained, in the soybean growing sector the adaptation of the production will remain moderate, which results in lower domestic prices. In this regard, the effects are established on an ex ante, not ex post basis and are therefore not ‘inadvertent’. There is a clear ‘demonstrable link’ between the policy and the conduct of private bodies involved, which are acting as a proxy for the GOA to carry out its policy of providing soybeans for less than adequate remuneration to the biodiesel industry.

In conclusion, the Commission found that the GOA had entrusted or directed the soybean growers to carry out its policy to create a compartmentalised domestic market and to provide soybeans to the domestic biodiesel industry for less than adequate remuneration.

Following the disclosure of the information document, the GOA claimed that the Commission expanded the scope of entrustment or direction, placing an emphasis on the terms inducement and guidance, while the requirements by the WTO imply that the attribution of responsibility must constitute an explicit and affirmative action, be addressed to a particular party and have as its object a particular task or duty. Mere statements of policy by a government cannot constitute an order and the alleged order or entrustment cannot be inadvertent or a mere by-product of governmental regulation.

The Commission disagreed. As stated in recital (117), in view of the WTO case-law referred to in recital (93), the Commission found substantial evidence to conclude that the GOA has taken explicit and affirmative action to entrust or direct the soybean growers to sell their soybeans for less than adequate remuneration to the biodiesel industry. There is ‘a demonstrable link’ between the government's actions and the conduct of the soybean farmers so that their actions can be attributed to the GOA. The GOA did not substantiate its claim that the evidence found by the Commission could solely be considered as mere statements of policy by the GOA. In particular, the GOA did not dispute the existence of the stated policy objectives, as emanating from those statements; nor did the GOA deny statements celebrating the success of the restrictive measures in achieving the policy goals of supporting the Argentinian biodiesel industry. Therefore, that claim was rejected.

Furthermore, the GOA claimed that the Commission's conclusion that the existence of different mechanisms within a broader scheme engineered by the GOA to support a particular industry is relevant to determine the nature of the action is manifestly wrong, as export taxes are not included in paragraphs (i) to (iii) of Article 3 of the basic Regulation (or the SCM Agreement) and do not fall under paragraph (iv) of Article 3 of the basic Regulation.

The sole fact that export taxes as such are not explicitly mentioned in Article 3(1)(a) of the basic Regulation does not exclude them from having the potential nature of a financial contribution and would therefore fall within the definition of a subsidy under the basic Regulation and the SCM Agreement. The Commission provided ample evidence that the export tax on soybeans was used as a tool, together with other instruments, to induce soybean growers to comply with the stated policy objectives in a manner amounting to a countervailable subsidy as specified under Article 3(1)(a) of the basic Regulation. As the GOA did not substantiate the claim of why the export tax on soybeans could not be considered a countervailable subsidy, the Commission rejected the claim.

Following final disclosure, the GOA did not agree with the Commission's finding in recital (121) that the GOA did not substantiate its claim of why the export tax on soybeans could not be considered a countervailable subsidy.

Although throughout the investigation the GOA claimed that the imposition of export taxes has an objective of revenue generation, the GOA failed to provide evidence in support of this statement in respect to any of the legislative acts imposing or modifying the level of the export tax on soybeans. In fact, on the basis of the evidence available, the Commission considered that the export taxes are tools among others that the GOA employed to support the development of the biodiesel industry. Therefore, the Commission came to a different conclusion explained in recitals (89) to (90) above and rejected the initial claim of the GOA.

CARBIO claimed that the Commission ignored the high standard required to prove entrustment or direction. Soybean growers remain free to decide whether to produce, sell and export their soybeans. No element of the export tax on soybeans entrusts or directs soybean producers to take any of these decisions.

The Commission disagreed that the entrustment or direction standard, as spelled out in recital (82), is not met in this case. Moreover, the claim of CARBIO that soybean growers are free to set the price of soybeans is incorrect. During the verification visit, the GOA explained how the FOB price of soybeans for exports is set by the government. As both the export price and the domestic price of soybeans are far below the world market price, soybean growers are limited in their freedom to set their price. Finally, CARBIO ignores that the export tax is not the only tool devised by the GOA to direct soybean growers. Therefore, this claim was rejected.

Therefore, the Commission reiterated the conclusion that soybean growers are induced to continue growing and selling soybeans in Argentina without allowing them to sell at better prices, which would prevail in Argentina absent these measures.

• there is no set of measures inducing the domestic soybean growers to sell soybeans locally at less than adequate remuneration,

• soybean growers are free to set the price of their soybeans,

• no financial contribution occurs through export taxes on soybeans; that any effect of the export taxes applied to soybeans on biodiesel production constitutes, at best, a side effect of a revenue-collection measure,

• the nature and revenue-collection purpose of the export taxes on soybeans has nothing to do with the alleged entrustment or direction, and

• no benefit is thereby conferred.

The GOA and CARBIO further did not agree with the Commission's legal interpretation of the terms ‘entrust’ and ‘direct’. The GOA claimed that the Commission's assessment of the financial contribution strongly resembles the so-called ‘effects based approach’, which was explicitly and categorically rejected by WTO jurisprudence.

CARBIO further claimed that the current world market price of soybeans does not reflect what would be the domestic price of soybeans in Argentina in the absence of the export tax.

As the GOA or CARBIO merely repeated the arguments made previously but failed to substantiate any of these claims, the Commission rejected them.

The Commission then assessed whether the soybean growers in Argentina are private bodies entrusted or directed by the GOA within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation.

The sampled Argentinian exporting producers were purchasing all of the soybeans used in the production of biodiesel from domestic sources. These were purchased from private soybean farms, apart from minor volumes of soybeans sourced from the state-owned company YPF.

Therefore, the Commission considered that, on the basis of the information available, all soybean growers are private bodies which were entrusted by the GOA within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(iv) of the basic Regulation to provide soybeans for less than adequate remuneration.

In the next step, the Commission verified whether the soybean growers actually carried out the Argentinian governmental policy to provide soybeans for less than adequate remuneration. That necessitated a detailed analysis of the market developments in Argentina against an appropriate benchmark. In line with the conclusions reached in recital (64), the Commission decided to partially use facts available to determine whether there had been a provision of soybeans by soybean growers for less than adequate remuneration.

Through the set of measures described in recitals (84) to (116), the GOA induced the soybean growers to sell locally at lower prices than otherwise (i.e. absent those measures, the soybean growers would have exported the soybeans at the much higher world market price or simply they would have adjusted their supply to the market constraints). In contrast, the soybean growers did not do so because of the GOA's policy to boost the development of the downstream biodiesel industry.

Table 1 and Graph 2 demonstrate that practically all of the soybean production that was consumed domestically went into crushing and the domestic consumption of the resulting soybean oil was predominantly used for the production of biodiesel.

Following final disclosure, CARBIO claimed that the Commission was asserting that all soybeans sold domestically were used exclusively for producing biodiesel. The Commission specified that this is not the case. As set out in recital (141), soybeans are sold domestically for crushing into soybean oil and soybean meal. The resulting soybean oil is used to make biodiesel, as there is no significant domestic market for soybean oil in Argentina. Some soybean oil and soybean meal is exported.

Moreover, exports of soybeans only take place when domestic consumption for both soybean crushing and production of biodiesel is fully satisfied. Table 1 and Graph 2 also show the inexistent or very limited imports of soybeans over the years of application of the export restraints. This is also confirmed by the business model observed with the sampled exporting producers. Indeed, none of them imported soybeans for the production of biodiesel. Rather, they imported the soybeans exclusively for use in their crushing facilities and then exported all of the resulting soybean oil and meal outside Argentina.

Consequently, the primary objective of the GOA's measures has been achieved: domestically produced soybeans have fully satisfied domestic demand for an input for domestic biodiesel production to the detriment of the soybean producers who would rather optimise their profits and either export all of their produce or sell domestically at higher prices but for the export restraints.

According to the relevant WTO case-law, as explained in particular at recitals (78), in most cases there should be some form of threat or inducement by the government to the suppliers of inputs to evidence the existence of entrustment and direction. Leaving a margin of discretion does not automatically discard that finding. This case-by-case analysis is evidence-based. In this case, the fact that the exports are rather limited in a highly international commodity market whereby Argentina is one of the leading soybeans world producers is remarkable, especially considering that the price in international markets is significantly higher than the domestic price in Argentina (see Graph 3 in recital (158).

The evidence contained in the Argentinian legislation (see recitals (91) to (99) shows that the GOA's policy objective is to develop and favour the higher added-value downstream industries, including biodiesel. In addition, the GOA clearly stated its objective to shield the downstream industries from the rise of international prices.

After disclosure of the information document, CARBIO claimed that the Commission failed to provide any evidence for the statement that soybean producers would rather optimise their profits.

Since the Commission did not receive direct information from the soybean growers, as explained in recitals (61) to (64), the Commission assumed that soybean growers are rational economic operators in a market economy that would optimise their benefits whenever possible. Therefore, it is considered an irrational decision to increase the production of soybeans when prices are decreased because of an increased export tax. The fact that soybean growers continue to supply soybeans despite the various restrictive measures adopted by the GOA is the result of the actions adopted by the GOA to induce soybean growers as entities implementing the stated policy objectives to support the biodiesel industry. Therefore, the claim was rejected.

The GOA claimed no evidence has been shown that the processing of soybeans in Argentina has been altered in any way as a result of the export taxes on soybeans.

The Commission disagreed. At the outset, the Commission recalls that the GOA did not assist the Commission in obtaining the necessary information from the soybean growers to better assess their behaviour. Thus, the Commission considered that, on the basis of the information available, the GOA's measures (including the export tax) altered the soybean growers' behaviour to achieve the effects intended by the GOA. As can been seen in Table 1, despite an increase in the export tax on soybeans in 2007, i.e. at the start of large-scale production of biodiesel, the production of soybeans increased significantly. On top of that, the export of soybean oil has been significantly replaced by the export of biodiesel during the same period, showing that the GOA's measures have incentivised a structural change to improve the competitiveness of the biodiesel industry. Consequently, the claim was rejected.

It is also clear that the countless small soybeans farmers (approximately 64 000), even though not formally prevented by the GOA from exporting their products, are induced by these policies to sell domestically almost all of their production and at lower prices that they would have otherwise achieved in the international markets. There is no evidence on file that the GOA is in any way trying to encourage and/or actively support directly or indirectly an increase of exports and hence a maximisation of profits for the soybeans farmers despite the known difficulties of small farmers to find clients abroad, communicate in a foreign language, and arrange all the burdensome administrative formalities for exports.

In the absence of other evidence to the contrary on file, and given the lack of sufficient cooperation by the GOA to provide relevant evidence and information in this respect, the Commission concluded that this evidence shows the inducement of soybean growers to sell their production domestically for the benefit of the downstream industries (including the biodiesel producers) rather than maximising their returns, such as by finding other ways such as adapting their production output or even switching to other type of production (e.g. other grains).

Further, the Commission analysed the impact of the supply of soybeans due to the GOA's measures on the domestic price of soybeans in Argentina, if any.

The Commission used the average domestic price of soybeans in Argentina which is based on monthly data from Buenos Aires Grain Exchange for Rosario, Bahia Blanca, and Quequen provided by the Ministry of Agribusiness at a country level.

The sampled exporting producers did import some soybeans. Although the companies did not use these imports for the production of biodiesel — they were used to make soybean oil which was then exported, the price of these imports could be considered representative, as the soybeans were imported to be crushed and re-exported as soybean oil and their price mirrored the world market price of soybeans.

The domestic price was compared to the average FOB import price of soybeans by the sampled exporting producers on a monthly basis.

Graph 3 shows a price difference between the Argentinian domestic price and the world market price which can be explained mainly by the export tax on soybeans. The directing policy of the GOA prevents the soybean growers from realising profits based on world market prices. The soybean growers are effectively deprived of a rational choice to sell on international markets at much higher prices.

Instead, they are achieving comparable profits on both the domestic and international market, at the expense of reducing domestic prices by the amount of the export tax. Thereby, the GOA suppresses the domestic prices to the benefit of the domestic processing industry.

The GOA directs by withholding a rational choice from the soybean growers. In addition, as can be observed from the chart, the price difference between domestic prices and international prices has not only remained substantial, but has also shielded the biodiesel industry and all other downstream industries (such as the crushers, mainly integrated with biodiesel producers) from the highest price increases on the international market.

Consequently, the GOA's set of measures have achieved their pre-defined goal, namely to reduce domestic prices in the context of rising international prices to the benefit of the domestic value added industry, including biodiesel.

In light of the foregoing, the Commission concluded that the soybean growers in Argentina were entrusted or directed to provide soybeans to the domestic biodiesel industry for less than adequate remuneration.

Following disclosure of the information document, CARBIO objected to the Commission's decision that a State must be held accountable for the decisions taken by privately owned suppliers of soybeans cultivated within that State. In order to fulfil the ‘normally vested’ criterion, CARBIO claimed, that all decisions regarding soybeans must be taken for a public purpose. However, as CARBIO stated in its submission, ‘a State may elect to take action regarding its natural resources.’ This confirms the Commission's stance that such sovereignty normally translates into a regulatory governmental power to organise the exploitation of a state's natural resources. Therefore, it is not necessary that all decisions regarding soybeans must be taken for a public purpose in order to fulfil the ‘normally vested’ criterion. Otherwise, such entities could be considered as ‘public bodies’ and attribute their actions to the State, which is not the case under the entrustment or direction scenario. Under this latter case, there is no need that all actions from private bodies can be attributed to the State, but only the specific action examined (i.e. the provision of inputs for less than adequate remuneration). Consequently, the Commission rejected the claim and concluded that the provision of raw materials, such as soybeans, in pursuing objectives of public interests (such as the development of the biodiesel industry) is a function which is normally vested in the government.

Following final disclosure, the GOA and CARBIO claimed that the Commission failed to provide any evidence showing that decisions taken by privately owned suppliers on the production and sales of soybeans, cultivated on privately owned land in Argentina, reflect a function that is normally vested in the GOA.

As the Commission set out in recital (164), it considered that the provision of raw materials located within a country to national companies is a function which is normally vested in the government. The GOA or CARBIO did not provide any substantive arguments or evidence rebutting this conclusion and therefore this claim was rejected. The GOA uses soybean growers to achieve a particular policy objective which does not differ to a situation where the GOA itself were the grower of the soybeans directly.

Through a set of measures, including export taxes, quantitative restrictions, subsidies to domestic producers, and public policy statements, the GOA induced the domestic soybean growers to sell soybeans locally and ‘entrusted’ or ‘directed’ them to provide this raw material in Argentina for less than adequate remuneration. The measures at issue achieved the desired effect to distort the domestic market of soybeans in Argentina and to depress the price to an artificially low level to the advantage of the downstream biodiesel industry. The function to provide soybeans for less than adequate remuneration is normally vested in the government in view of the public objective to support the biodiesel industry and the practice of the soybean growers producing companies to carry it out does not, in any real sense, differ from practices normally followed by governments when pursing similar policy objectives through other forms of support (such as grants or revenue foregone).

The Commission thus concluded that the GOA provided an indirect financial contribution within the meaning of Article 3(1)(a)(iv) and (iii) of the basic Regulation, as interpreted and applied in line with the relevant WTO standard under Article 1.1(a)(iv) and (iii) of the SCM Agreement.

Article XVI of the GATT 1994 covers ‘any subsidy including any form of income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, its territory’.

Finally, the reference ‘in the sense of Article XVI of the GATT 1994’ implies all forms of income or price support that directly or indirectly increase exports of ‘any product’ from a WTO Member's territory or reduce imports of this product within its territory. This effect, potential or actual, is explicitly contemplated in Article XVI:1 of the GATT 1994: ‘… including any form of income or price support, which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to reduce imports of any product into, its territory’.

In line with this interpretation, in addition to examining whether the set of measures adopted by the GOA could be characterised as ‘financial contribution’ in the form of provision of goods for less than adequate remuneration, the Commission also analysed whether the GOA's set of measures could also be characterised as income or price support falling under Article 3(1)(b) of the basic Regulation. In so doing, the Commission first examined whether the GOA intends to support the creation and development of the biodiesel industry; second, what kind of measures the GOA adopted to support the biodiesel industry; and third, whether those measures qualified as ‘any form of income/price support’ in the sense of Article XVI of GATT 1994.

Following disclosure of the information document, the GOA and CARBIO claimed that the Commission based itself on an inadmissibly broad interpretation of the terms ‘any form of income or price support’ used in Article 3(1)(b) of the basic Regulation, by arguing that it encompasses ‘all forms that directly or indirectly provide income or price support’ and ‘any way or manner in which the government provides income or price support to someone’.

Following final disclosure, the GOA did not agree with the Commission's interpretation that the categories of ‘financial contribution’/‘income or price support’ are not mutually exclusive, because of the conjunction ‘or’ in Article 1.1.(a)(2) of the SCM Agreement.

In recital (171), the Commission explained why it did not consider these categories mutually exclusive. The simple linguistic explanation of the word ‘or’ in the text of the SCM Agreement did not alter the Commission's reasoning and therefore the claim was rejected.

The GOA reiterated its claim that the Commission's findings are inappropriately based on an inadmissibly broad interpretation of the terms ‘any form of income or price support’ as used in Article 1.1.(a)(2) of the SCM Agreement and that in order for the export tax regime to fall within the provisions of Article 1.1.(a)(2), the Commission applies an ‘effect-based approach’, which is inconsistent with WTO jurisprudence.

As the GOA did not bring any new supporting evidence to rebut the Commission's conclusions, the Commission rejected the claims.

The Commission considered that CARBIO's reference to the case-law from China — GOES is not relevant in the present case where the conclusions on income/price support are not based on indirect price effects, but on actions attributable to the GOA which are designed, and which have as their objective, price effects that support the biodiesel industry. This claim is therefore rejected.

As discussed in recitals (265) to (267), the GOA did not sign any Biodiesel Supply Agreements after 2015 but continued to allocate quotas and set the price at which the blending companies have to purchase biodiesel. The quota was based upon the expected quantity required by the domestic market to fulfil the blending mandate. The rest of the Argentinian production could only be exported.

None of the sampled groups of exporting producers received a quota and supplied the domestic market during the investigation period. However, the average set prices on the domestic market appear to be higher than the average export price, especially for the small, medium, and large non-integrated biodiesel producers. Therefore, by artificially setting the price of domestic biodiesel at an artificially high level, the GOA pursued a policy of providing price support to the small and medium-sized biodiesel industry selling on the domestic market.

Following the disclosure of the information document, the GOA disputed the finding that the domestic price of biodiesel is set at an artificially high level.

The Commission disagreed. To assess the domestic price level of biodiesel the Commission used public data provided by the GOA. That public data showed that the domestic price is set by the GOA and thus is not left to market forces. The GOA did not dispute that it sets the domestic biodiesel prices. Furthermore, the public data showed that prices on the domestic market paid by the companies having access to that market (i.e. the small and medium-sized companies) were higher, as a matter of fact, than the export price. The GOA did not dispute that price difference either. Therefore, the Commission concluded that the domestic price of biodiesel is set at an artificially high level. Consequently, that claim was rejected.

Following the disclosure of the information document, the GOA claimed that the causality connection between the alleged income or price support and a subsequent effect of export increase or import reduction is not positively ascertained and that the largest producers are obstructed to sell domestically.

The Commission rejected this claim. By regulating the domestic biodiesel market and giving a quota only to the smaller biodiesel companies, the GOA established an industry where the largest producers are obstructed to sell domestically and thus are fully export-oriented, thereby encouraging the export competitiveness of the biodiesel industry. Moreover, Table 2 in recital (209) provides data on the Argentinian production of biodiesel since 2008 (when Argentina started production on a large scale) and the export of biodiesel. Table 2 shows that the income support to the biodiesel industry has had a positive effect on exports due to the fact that this has been created as an export oriented industry and remains so until today.

As explained in recitals (186) to (191), the GOA had manifestly the intention to support the entire domestic biodiesel industry, irrespective of whether it is domestically and export-oriented. However, none of the sampled exporting producers had any relevant domestic sales during the investigation period. All sampled exporting producers explained that with the supply of small and medium companies who were given quotas by the GOA, the domestic demand was satisfied. The fact that a special price was set for large companies did not alter the fact that none of the large companies sold on the domestic market during the investigation period. As a result, by impeding the biodiesel industry from selling domestically, the GOA propelled the export performance of the Argentinian biodiesel industry.

Therefore, the Commission concluded that the GOA's intention to support the creation and development of the Argentinian biodiesel industry is manifest.

Moreover, the GOA has put mandatory blending requirements in place so that fuel companies in Argentina have to purchase biodiesel at artificially high prices set by the GOA. As explained in Section 3.3, the Commission does not countervail the Biodiesel Supply Agreements since the exporting producers did not benefit from this measure during the investigation period. However, the fact that the system is in place indicates that the GOA also provides price support to the biodiesel industry.

Therefore, the Commission concluded that through the set of measures mentioned above the GOA directly or indirectly provides income or price support to the biodiesel industry, thereby contributing to its competitiveness.

Moreover, as mentioned in recitals (199) and (200), the Argentinian biodiesel industry is a sector that was set up as export-oriented where world market prices prevail.

Therefore, the support to the domestic biodiesel industry favoured exports of biodiesel whereby the biodiesel producers were able to unfairly compete with biodiesel producers in other countries not benefiting from lower input prices. Lower costs resulted in higher incomes, which could either be transformed into additional profit or used to reduce the price, or both. The Argentinian biodiesel industry remains as having export markets, and in particular the Union market, as its main focus.

Following final disclosure, the GOA disagreed with the finding of the Commission that a ‘set of measures’ adopted by the GOA qualifies as ‘any form of income or price support’ in the sense of Article XIV of the GATT 1994 and Article 1.1(a)(2) of the SCM Agreement, resulting in an increase of exports of biodiesel.

As the GOA did not provide any further reasoning to support this statement, the Commission rejected this claim.

Therefore, the Commission concluded that through a set of measures, the GOA directly or indirectly provided income/price support to the biodiesel industry resulting in an increase of exports of biodiesel, within the meaning Article 3(1)(b) of the basic Regulation.

Having established that the set of measures constitutes a financial contribution by the GOA by means of entrustment or direction of private bodies and/or income/price support, the Commission calculated the amount of subsidisation in terms of the benefit conferred on the recipient, which was found to exist during the investigation period, in accordance with Article 3(2) and Article 5 of the basic Regulation.

Because most of the GOA's measures aimed at artificially lowering the domestic price of soybeans resulting in higher income for Argentinian biodiesel producers, the Commission examined whether the GOA's support to the biodiesel industry conferred a benefit by reference to the difference between the prices paid by domestic biodiesel producers and a benchmark based on the prevailing market conditions in Argentina for soybeans.

The Commission assumed that such a difference resulted in higher profits obtained by the Argentinian biodiesel producers and thus at the very least equalled the benefits obtained through the GOA's income/price support. This comparative method also ensured that there was no double counting of other subsidies countervailed in the present investigation and which also provide income/price support to Argentinian biodiesel producers.

The Commission first calculated the weighted average purchase price of soybeans paid by the sampled Argentinian producers during the investigation period. The weighted average was calculated month-by-month and as delivered from the soybeans growers to the biodiesel plant in Argentina.

The average purchase price was based on the prices, net of VAT, and quantities indicated in transaction-by-transaction listings of invoices submitted by the companies and verified during the verification visits.

Soybeans are a commodity, and soybeans imported into Argentina are comparable to domestically grown soybeans. The sampled exporting producers imported all of the soybeans on the basis of CIF, having on average the same price level regardless of the origin. The actual import prices delivered on CIF terms to the crushing plants were on the same price level as the world market price, which is quoted as FOB Gulf of Mexico. Purchases of domestically grown soybeans were found to be made on several Incoterms. However, the significant majority of purchases of domestically grown soybeans were also delivered to domestic crushing plants. Imports of soybeans represented a significant volume of the sampled exporting producers' purchases, namely 4,6 %. Those purchases were spread over hundreds of transactions. Although the sampled exporting producers had different suppliers from several neighbouring countries, the import price was found to be on average at the same level, as described in recital (223).

The fact that those imports by the sampled exporting producers were not used for the production of biodiesel but for producing soybean oil does not alter this conclusion, because during the investigation period the demand for soybeans for producing biodiesel in Argentina was fully covered by the domestic supply of soybeans. At the same time there are no differences in quality between the different soybeans available that would render the imported soybeans not usable for producing biodiesel. Consequently the Commission considered that those purchases constitute an appropriate benchmark.

On that basis, the Commission used the actual price at which the sampled exporting producers imported soybeans into Argentina, which all came from neighbouring countries, as the closest possible proxy for undistorted Argentinian domestic prices for these products. Indeed, those prices were at the same level as world market prices and were at an average price of 6 043 ARS/MT during the investigation period.

The Commission then compared the price paid for domestically grown soybeans by the Argentinian producers with the weighted average actual import price for soybeans on a month-by-month basis. These imports were all done under a temporary importation regime and were therefore not subject to import duties and the actual price paid by the sampled exporting producers is considered to be adequate in the prevailing market terms and conditions in Argentina.

The total amount of the difference represents the ‘savings’ obtained by the Argentinian producers of biodiesel which purchase soybeans in the Argentinian distorted market compared to the price which they would have paid in the absence of distortions. Ultimately, this total amount represents the benefit conferred on the Argentinian producers by the GOA during the investigation period.

In accordance with Article 7(2) of the basic Regulation, the Commission allocated those subsidy amounts over the total turnover of the soybean-based production of the sampled exporting producers during the investigation period as appropriate denominator, because the subsidy granted a benefit to the entire production of soybean-based products and not only to the product concerned or the production destined to exports.

The Commission therefore concludes that a benefit will remain to be conferred after the investigation period in accordance with Article 15(1) second sentence of the basic Regulation.

Following disclosure of the information document, the GOA and CARBIO claimed that the benchmark of imported soybeans does not reflect market conditions in Argentina.

The GOA's argument that the import price reflects an alternative market benchmark shows an incorrect interpretation of the facts. In fact, the Commission used as a benchmark the import price of soybeans actually paid by the sampled exporting producers. The Commission considered this price an appropriate benchmark for the specific reason that this price reflected the market conditions in Argentina unaffected by the GOA's measures (as verified when comparing those import prices with international prices). The Commission considered the CIF import price adequate, as this reflected the price at the crushing plant, located at the port.

The Commission acknowledged that the benchmark should respect any comparative advantage of the prevailing country. However, neither the GOA nor CARBIO substantiate or give any evidence to support the allegation that the chosen in-country benchmark does not reflect the market conditions prevailing in Argentina. Consequently, those claims were rejected.

Following final disclosure, the GOA and CARBIO disagreed that the price paid for imported soybeans constituted an appropriate benchmark since it did not reflect the market conditions in Argentina.

The Commission explained extensively in recitals (220) and (232) to (233) why it considered the imported soybeans both representative and purchased on the basis of the prevailing market conditions in Argentina. As the GOA or CARBIO did not provide any supporting evidence for their disagreement with this conclusion, the Commission rejected the claim.

Following the disclosure of the information document, the sampled exporting producers claimed that a benchmark price that is based on the price of the same commodity in a completely different region is unreliable. The Commission noted that the sampled exporting producers only imported soybeans from neighbouring countries. Therefore, that data was the closest proxy to the undistorted price in Argentina absent the GOA's support and the most reliable. Consequently, that claim was rejected.

Following the disclosure of the information document, CARBIO further claimed that because the export tax on soybeans has been reduced from 30 % to 18 % there is no longer a benefit.

The Commission noted that CARBIO's understanding of the level of the export tax is incorrect. Decree 793/2018 set the level of the export at 18 % but also implemented an additional export tax of 12 %, with a cap of 4 ARS per USD exported. Effectively, this means that the export tax was set at around 28 %, compared to 30 % during the investigation period.

The Commission observed that that change took place after the investigation period for subsidisation. Under Article 11(1) of the basic Regulation, information relating to a period subsequent to the investigation period is not, normally, to be taken into account. CARBIO did not provide any compelling reasons why this information should be taken into account.

Furthermore, CARBIO did not provide any evidence for its claim that any allegation of subsidy or benefit due to the existence of the export tax on soybeans is no longer warranted. The Commission concluded that a slight decrease of around 2 % on the export tax of soybeans did not demonstrate that the subsidies no longer confer any benefit on the exporters involved. The Commission considered that any effect of a further reduction or suppression of the export tax on soybeans should be examined in the context of a review, as opposed to the current investigation.

CARBIO furthermore claimed that any alleged benefit conferred to the Argentinian producers by the increase in the tax on soybeans would be offset by the increase in the direct export tax on biodiesel and should therefore, following Article 7(1)(b) of the basic Regulation, be deducted from the amount of the total subsidy calculated.

CARBIO did not provide any justification that the export tax levied on the biodiesel that was exported to the Union was specifically intended to offset the subsidy, as stated in Article 7(1)(b) of the basic Regulation. CARBIO also failed to show how the actual export tax on biodiesel offsets the support conferred by the GOA's measures, including through the export tax on soybeans. Therefore, the Commission rejected that claim.

CARBIO specifically made further comments regarding the changes to the export tax system after the end of the investigation period, including the increase of export tax on biodiesel, and the changes to the export tax on soybeans. The Commission rejected the assertion that these changes made any difference to the Commission's conclusions.

Firstly the export tax on biodiesel imposed after the end of the investigation period has had no obvious effect on the amount of the benefit provided to the biodiesel producers based on the provision of soybeans for less than adequate remuneration.

Secondly there is still an export tax on soybeans, and no evidence has been provided that after the investigation period the price of soybeans in Argentina has increased, thereby theoretically lowering the benefit amount.

Following final disclosure, the GOA stressed that Article 81 of the Budget Law does not increase to 33 % any ‘cap on the overall export tax introduced by Decree 783/2018 in September’, as Article 83 established a limit of the export tax rate to 30 % of the taxable value or the official FOB price.

Even if the export tax was limited to 30 %, the Commission's conclusion that a benefit will remain to be conferred after the investigation period, in accordance with Article 15(1) second sentence of the basic Regulation, still stands.

Following the disclosure of the information document, the sampled exporting producers submitted comments regarding the calculation of the benefit provided by the supply of soybeans for less than adequate remuneration. These comments were company specific and mainly referred to clerical errors or further claims for adjustment.

Where a clerical error was found the error was corrected, for example the inclusion of zero-quantity transactions to ensure that the price per kg purchased was correct. However, where a company requested that data that had been verified be changed after their verifications on spot, such a request was denied since the Commission was not in a position to confirm the accuracy of the new unverified data.

Following final disclosure the two exporting producers who had requested that verified data be changed again made the same claim, and this was again rejected for the same reasons as before.

At a hearing following the disclosure of the information document, CARBIO claimed that for calculating the benefit the Commission should reject those purchases of soybeans made from related companies for calculating the purchase price in Argentina. The Commission noted that the purchases of soybeans in Argentina made by the exporting producers during the investigation period were made from both related and unrelated suppliers, and the prices were the same. This is a clear indication that the purchases from related suppliers were made at arm's length. The Commission therefore saw no reason not to use these transactions to calculate the benefit to the biodiesel producer, which was calculated on the basis of monthly averages per kilo of soybeans purchased. Consequently, this claim was rejected.

The GOA's set of measures were directed to benefit certain industries, including the domestic biodiesel industry. Indeed, even though the distortions on soybeans also benefit downstream products other than biodiesel, the benefit is available only to certain industries in Argentina, being those in the soya value chain. Moreover, even if the GOA's support granted to biodiesel through several measures is also granted to other biofuels, those measures are limited to a group of enterprises or industries. They are, therefore, specific under Article 4(2)(a) of the basic Regulation.

The production capacity steadily increased by 10 % throughout the period considered, to take account of the growing demand.

Similarly, as in the case of the information on production, the EBB compiles data concerning capacity from its members, including national associations, and with regard to non-members, it gathers the information concerning capacity from other publicly available sources.

The production capacity figures do not include a significant part of capacity that is considered idle. The EBB explained that a number of installed biodiesel plants have not been operational for several years and should be considered as long-term-out-of-production. These plants, although nominally installed, would only be able to restart the production after investment in technical adaptation and after a significant period.

Capacity utilisation of the Union industry increased by 5 % (or 4 percentage points) from 75 % to 79 % in the period considered. The industry achieved the highest level of capacity utilisation during the investigation period.

The Union industry's sales decreased by 4 % between 2014 and 2016, and then increased in the investigation period by 18 percentage points, i.e. 14 % higher than in 2014.

The factors driving the sales are the same factors driving consumption, which are described in recitals (324) to (328). Imports did not affect the sales level to a significant extent in the years 2014-2016, which was a reason for the stable levels of both sales and market share.

It was the reduction of duties from Argentina in 2017 that changed the picture of the market. Despite of the fact that imports started only towards the end of the year, the Union industry has lost 3,8 percentage points of market share compared to 2014. As explained in recital (333) this significant decrease of market share coincides with the imports of the product concerned entering the Union market in the last four months of the investigation period.

Following the disclosure of the information document CARBIO submitted a comment with regard to the market share of the Union industry established for the years 2015 to 2016, indicating that although there were no imports from Argentina, the Union industry was losing market share in that period.

The Commission verified the subject data and identified an error in calculating the Union consumption in the information document, which led to incorrect market shares of the Union industry. This error was corrected, and Tables 7 and 13 contain the corrected figures.

As a result of that correction, the Union market share in years 2015 to 2016 remained stable and decreased only during the investigation period due to increased volumes of Argentinian imports.

While the Union consumption grew by 19 % during the period considered, the sales and production of the Union industry increased by only 14 % and 15 % respectively. The Union industry was therefore not fully able to benefit from the market growth during the period considered, since a significant part of this growth was absorbed by increasing quantities of subsidised Argentinian imports during the investigation period.

Employment in the Union developed differently to trends in production, sales and consumption. The relatively high increase of the employment happened in 2015, when it grew by 15 % year-to-year. Since then, it remained at a stable level, including the investigation period.

The increase of 2015 should be regarded as a reaction of the Union industry to an improving condition of the biodiesel market and expectation of future improvement. At the same time, the small decrease of employment in the investigation period does not yet represent the reaction to the increased imports from Argentina. The Union industry did not yet reduce capacity during the investigation period, and therefore employment remained stable.

The impact of the subsidised imports from the country concerned on the Union industry was substantial, given the significant volumes and low prices of these imports.

On 26 November 2013 the Union imposed definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of biodiesel from, inter alia, Argentina. The duties were based on the injury elimination level ranging between 22 % and 25,7 %.

As stated in recital (332), those anti-dumping duties were significantly reduced in September 2017 and as a result, biodiesel imports from Argentina started to notably increase. As noted in recital (330) the estimated market share of Argentinian biodiesel imports in the Union reached 2,8 % in the investigation period. The estimated market share of Argentinian biodiesel imports in the Union for the last quarter of 2017 is above 10 %. Imports of biodiesel from Argentina into the Union continued to increase after the investigation period, and in spite of the registration of imports, the estimated market share of Argentinian imports in the Union for the first half of 2018 remained at above 10 %.

Import statistics for the period following the investigation period referred to in detail in recital (335) shows that level of imports until August 2018 continued, and even further increased, in spite of the registration of imports as of 18 May 2018.

The significant and rapid increase of biodiesel imports from Argentina into the Union started in September 2017 and imports continued in spite of the registration of imports. As a consequence of their low prices significantly undercutting the Union industry's prices, the Union industry lost market share and was not able to fully benefit from the market growth.

The weighted average unit sales price of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers decreased significantly in 2015 by 13 %. Prices subsequently increased in 2016 and the investigation period to reach a level 2 % above that of 2014.

The average unit sales price and unit cost concern the sampled Union producers, but are not directly comparable. This is because prices concern only sales to unrelated customers in the Union, while costs are for the total production.

The evolution of the price of biodiesel is linked to the market price evolution of the feedstock, which is either the agricultural produce or the oil. The cost of feedstock constitutes the main cost factor and extensively determines the total cost of production, and as a result, the market sales price.

Following the disclosure of the information document the Commission received comments from the GOA concerning the weighted average unit sales price of the sampled Union producers to unrelated customers. The GOA stated that this price decreased significantly in 2015 by 13 % and that the Commission had not made any analysis in order to dissociate other causes of possible injury, even though it was irrefutable that Argentinian imports during 2015 represented only a 0,5 % market share.

The average labour costs were stable, with the exception of 2015 when they were higher than in the other years. This was the year when the Union industry started significantly increasing the level of employment. As can be observed, in the following periods, 2016 and the investigation period, where the steady increase of employment was happening throughout the full year, the average labour costs remain at a very similar, stable level.

Stock levels of the sampled Union producers were highest in 2014. They decreased by 27 % between 2014 and 2015 and were at a comparable level since then. The level of stocks did not follow the increased production and sales in the investigation period. Given that the product under investigation is sold in bulk, a single delivery can comprise a significant volume of more than 10 000 tonnes. Therefore, a single delivery can have a significant impact on the stock level, depending on the precise transaction date. Therefore, the level of stocks is a less meaningful indicator for the Union industry.

The Commission established the profitability of the three sampled Union producers by expressing the pre-tax net profit of the sales of the like product to unrelated customers in the Union as a percentage of the turnover of those sales. The profitability is based on cost of goods sold.

The profitability was low in the whole period considered. Only in 2014 it reached 5 %, whereas there was no profit in 2015 and it did not exceed 1 % in 2016 and the investigation period. The higher profitability in 2014 was mainly due to the extraordinary and financial income of one of the sampled Union producers. Without those items, the profitability of the Union industry in 2014 would be comparable with the other years of the period considered.

The profitability of the Union industry decreased further in the period following the investigation period and for the first six months of 2018 turned into a loss of 1,7 %.

In spite of low profit levels, the Union industry was generating a positive cash flow from its operations in the whole period considered. It was able to self-finance its activities. But also in the case of cash flow, the Union industry generated the highest level in 2014, and did not exceed 37 % of that level in any of the following years.

The Union industry continued to invest during the whole period considered, reaching their highest level of investments during the investigation period. Therefore, the sudden arrival of subsidised imports from Argentina towards the end of the investigation period has not yet negatively affected the level of investments carried out by the Union industry.

The return on investments is the profit in percentage of the net book value of investments. The return on investment significantly decreased by 79 % during the period considered, largely reflecting the trend of profitability.

The financial performance of the Union Industry in terms of profits during the investigation period limited its ability to raise capital.

Following the disclosure of the information document, the GOA claimed that the low profitability of the Union industry during the whole period between 2014 and the investigation period cannot be the result of the imports from Argentina that resumed only in September 2017. In this context, the unrelated importer, Gunvor, also commented following the disclosure of the information document that the Union industry is not suffering from material injury.

Following final disclosure, the GOA and CARBIO reiterated their comments with regard to the performance of the Union industry and made reference to a number of performance indicators that developed positively. The GOA also reiterated its conclusion that in the absence of imports from Argentina the economic situation of the Union industry was not affected by the imports from Argentina.

The Commission observed that the trends, including the trends of profitability, show that the Union industry appears not to have fully recovered from the effects of past dumping. This refers to the period between 2014 and the investigation period that the GOA indicated in its comment. In addition, although imports from Argentina indeed resumed only in September 2017, the fact that they reached an estimated market share of more than 10 % in the last quarter of 2017 cannot be unrelated to the Union industry reaching only 0,8 % profitability during the investigation period (and ultimately losses afterwards). Consequently, that claim was rejected.