CHAPTER III

ALLOCATION OF FIRM CAPACITY PRODUCTS

Allocation methodology
Article 8
1
Auctions shall be used for the allocation of capacity at interconnection points, except where the alternative allocation methodology pursuant to Article 30 is applied.
2
At all interconnection points the same auction design is to apply. The relevant auction processes are to start simultaneously for all concerned interconnection points. Each auction process, relating to a single standard capacity product, must allocate capacity independently of every other auction process except where incremental capacity is offered or where, subject to the agreement of the directly involved transmission system operators and, if applicable, agreement of any directly involved non-UK TSO, and the approval of the national regulatory authorities, competing capacity is allocated. In considering whether to grant approval, the national regulatory authorities must consider any representations made by a non-UK regulatory authority of any adjacent and affected country. In case incremental capacity is offered, the independent allocation is not to apply to the simultaneous auction processes for the respective offer levels, since these are dependent on each other, as only one offer level can be allocated.
3
The standard capacity products shall follow a logical order by which products covering yearly capacity shall be offered first, followed by the product with the next shortest duration for use during the same period. The timing of the auctions provided for in Articles 11 to 15 shall be consistent with this principle.
4
The rules on standard capacity products as set out in Article 9 and auctions as set out in Articles 11 to 15 shall apply to bundled capacity and unbundled capacity at an interconnection point.
5
For a given auction, the availability of the relevant standard capacity products shall be communicated in accordance with Articles 11 to 15 and according to the auction calendar.
6
An amount at least equal to 20 % of the existing technical capacity at each interconnection point shall be set aside and offered in accordance with paragraph 7. If the available capacity is less than the proportion of technical capacity to be set aside, the whole of any available capacity shall be set aside. This capacity shall be offered in accordance with point (b) of paragraph 7, while any remaining capacity set aside shall be offered in accordance with point (a) of paragraph 7.
7
Any capacity set aside pursuant to paragraph 6 shall be offered, subject to the following provisions:
a
an amount at least equal to 10 % of the existing technical capacity at each interconnection point shall be offered no earlier than in the annual yearly capacity auction as provided for in Article 11 held in accordance with the auction calendar during the fifth gas year preceding the start of the relevant gas year; and
b
a further amount at least equal to 10 % of the existing technical capacity at each interconnection point shall first be offered no earlier than the annual quarterly capacity auction as provided for in Article 12, held in accordance with the auction calendar during the gas year preceding the start of the relevant gas year.
8
In the case of incremental capacity, an amount at least equal to 10 % of the incremental technical capacity at the concerned interconnection point shall be set aside and offered no earlier than the annual quarterly capacity auction as provided for in Article 12, held in accordance with the auction calendar during the gas year preceding the start of the relevant gas year.
9
The exact proportion of capacity to be set aside pursuant to paragraphs 6 and 8 shall be subject to a stakeholder consultation, alignment between transmission system operators and approval by national regulatory authorities at each interconnection point. If there is a directly involved non-UK TSO, transmission system operators must endeavour to cooperate with the non-UK TSO to agree on alignment. National regulatory authorities shall in particular consider setting aside higher shares of capacity with a shorter duration to avoid foreclosure of downstream supply markets.
10
Capacity created via non-market based procedures and for which the final investment decision has been taken without prior commitments from network users shall be offered and allocated as available standard capacity products as set out in this Regulation.

Standard capacity products
Article 9
1
Transmission system operators shall offer yearly, quarterly, monthly, daily and within-day standard capacity products.
2
Yearly standard capacity products shall be the capacity which may be applied for, in a given amount, by a network user for all gas days in a particular gas year (starting on 1 October).
3
Quarterly standard capacity products shall be the capacity which may be applied for, in a given amount, by a network user for all gas days in a particular quarter (starting on 1 October, 1 January, 1 April or 1 July respectively).
4
Monthly standard capacity products shall be the capacity which may be applied for, in a given amount, by a network user for all gas days in a particular calendar month (starting on the first day of each month).
5
Daily standard capacity products shall be the capacity which may be applied for, in a given amount, by a network user for a single gas day.
6
Within-day standard capacity products shall be the capacity which may be applied for, in a given amount, by a network user from a start time within a particular gas day until the end of the same gas day.

Applied capacity unit
Article 10
The capacity offered shall be expressed in energy units per unit of time. The following units shall be used: kWh/h or kWh/d. In case of kWh/d a flat flow rate over the gas day is assumed.

Annual yearly capacity auctions
Article 11
1
The yearly capacity auctions shall be held once a year.
2
Capacity for each yearly standard capacity product shall be auctioned through the annual yearly capacity auction using an ascending-clock auction algorithm in accordance with Article 17.
3
The auction process shall offer capacity at least for the upcoming 5 gas years and for no longer than the upcoming 15 gas years for existing capacity. When offering incremental capacity, the offer levels may be offered in yearly capacity auctions for a maximum of 15 years after the start of operational use.
4
As from 2018, annual yearly capacity auctions shall start on the first Monday of July each year unless otherwise specified in the auction calendar.
5
During the annual yearly capacity auction network users shall be able to participate in one or several concurrent auctions in relation to each interconnection point in order to apply for standard capacity products.
6
The capacity to be offered during the annual yearly capacity auction shall be equal to:
- A – B C + D + E – F
- Where:
A
  - is the transmission system operator's technical capacity for each of the standard capacity products;
B
  - for annual yearly auctions offering capacity for the next 5 years, is the amount of technical capacity (A) set aside in accordance with Article 8(7); for annual yearly auctions for capacity beyond the first 5 years, is the amount of technical capacity (A) set aside in accordance with Article 8(7);
C
  - is the previously sold technical capacity, adjusted by the capacity which is re-offered in accordance with applicable congestion management procedures;
D
  - is additional capacity, for such year, if any.
E
  - is the incremental capacity for such year included in a respective offer level, if any;
F
  - is the amount of incremental capacity (E), if any, set aside in accordance with Article 8(8) and (9).
7
The capacity to be offered may be either bundled capacity or unbundled capacity in accordance with Article 19. This also applies to all other auctions as set out in Articles 12 to 15.
8
At least 1 month before the auction starts, transmission system operators shall notify network users about the amount of firm capacity to be offered for each year for the upcoming annual yearly capacity auction.
9
The bidding rounds of each auction shall take place between 8.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. on all relevant gas days. Bidding rounds shall be opened and closed within each gas day, as specified in Article 17(2).
10
The allocation results of the auction shall be made available, as soon as reasonably possible, and no later than the next business day after the closing of the bidding round, simultaneously to individual network users participating in the respective auction.
In case of incremental capacity, the binding commitments of network users for contracting capacity, including whether the conditions for a repeated auction pursuant to Article 29(3) are met, shall be made available no later than the next business day after the closing of the bidding round, simultaneously to individual network users participating in the respective auction. The results of the economic tests shall be made available no later than 2 business days after the closing of the bidding round, simultaneously to individual network users participating in the respective auction.
11
Aggregated information on auction results shall be published to the market.

Annual quarterly capacity auctions
Article 12
1
Four annual quarterly capacity auctions shall be held during each gas year.
2
Capacity for each quarterly standard capacity product shall be auctioned through the annual quarterly capacity auctions using an ascending-clock auction algorithm in accordance with Article 17.
3
Capacity for quarters of the upcoming gas year shall be auctioned via concurrent auctions for each quarter and in relation to each interconnection point as follows:
a
for quarters one (October-December) through four (July-September) in the first annual quarterly capacity auction;
b
for quarters two (January-March) through four (July-September) in the second annual quarterly capacity auction;
c
for quarters three (April-June) through four (July-September) in the third annual quarterly capacity auction;
d
for the last quarter (July-September) in the fourth annual quarterly capacity auction.
For each annual quarterly auction network users shall be able to participate in all of the concurrent auctions.
4
Each gas year the annual quarterly capacity auctions shall start on the following days, unless otherwise specified in the auction calendar:
a
the first annual quarterly capacity auctions shall start on the first Monday of August;
b
the second annual quarterly capacity auctions shall start on the first Monday of November;
c
the third annual quarterly capacity auctions shall start on the first Monday of February;
d
the fourth annual quarterly capacity auction shall start on the first Monday of May.
5
The capacity to be offered in all annual quarterly capacity auctions shall be equal to:
- A – C + D
- Where:
A
  - is the transmission system operator's technical capacity for each of the standard capacity products;
C
  - is the previously sold technical capacity, adjusted by the capacity which is re-offered in accordance with applicable congestion management procedures;
D
  - is additional capacity, for such quarter, if any.
6
Two weeks before the auctions start, transmission system operators shall notify network users about the amount of capacity to be offered for each quarter for the upcoming annual quarterly capacity auction.
7
The bidding rounds of each auction, shall take place between 8.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. on all relevant gas days. Bidding rounds shall be opened and closed within each gas day, as specified in Article 17(2).
8
The allocation results of the auction shall be published, as soon as reasonably possible, and no later than the next business day after the closing of the bidding round, simultaneously to individual network users participating in the respective auction.
9
Aggregated information on the auction results shall be published to the market.

Rolling monthly capacity auctions
Article 13
1
The rolling monthly capacity auction shall be held once a month.
2
Capacity for each monthly standard capacity product shall be auctioned through the rolling monthly capacity auction using an ascending-clock auction algorithm according to Article 17. Each month, the monthly standard capacity product for the following calendar month shall be auctioned.
3
During the rolling monthly capacity auction network users shall be able to apply for one monthly standard capacity product.
4
Rolling monthly capacity auctions shall start on the third Monday of each month for the following monthly standard capacity product unless otherwise specified in the auction calendar.
5
The capacity to be offered in the rolling monthly capacity auction shall be, each month, equal to:
- A – C + D
- Where:
A
  - is the transmission system operator's technical capacity for each of the standard capacity products;
C
  - is the previously sold technical capacity, adjusted by the capacity which is re-offered in accordance with applicable congestion management procedures;
D
  - is additional capacity, for such month, if any.
6
One week before the auction starts, transmission system operators shall notify network users about the amount of capacity to be offered for the upcoming rolling monthly capacity auction.
7
The bidding rounds of each auction shall take place between 8.00 a.m. to 5.00 p.m. on all relevant gas days. Bidding rounds shall be opened and closed within each gas day, as specified in Article 17(2).
8
The allocation results of the auction shall be published, as soon as reasonably possible, and no later than the next business day after the closing of the bidding round, simultaneously to individual network users participating in the respective auction.
9
Aggregated information on the auction results shall be published to the market.

Rolling day-ahead capacity auctions
Article 14
1
The rolling day-ahead capacity auction shall be held once a day.
2
Every day, a standard capacity product for the following gas day shall be auctioned through the rolling day-ahead capacity auction.
3
Capacity for each daily standard capacity product shall be auctioned through the rolling day-ahead capacity auction using a uniform price auction algorithm according to Article 18. Each day, the daily standard capacity product for the following gas day shall be auctioned.
4
During the rolling day-ahead capacity auction network users shall be able to apply for capacity for one daily standard capacity product.
5
The bidding round shall open every day at 3.30 p.m.
6
A capacity bid for the daily standard capacity product for the rolling day-ahead capacity auction shall be handled as follows: submission, withdrawal or amendment from 3.30 p.m. to 4.00 p.m.
7
The capacity to be offered in the rolling day-ahead capacity auction shall be, each day, equal to:
- A – C + D
- Where:
A
  - is the transmission system operator's technical capacity for each of the standard capacity products;
C
  - is the previously sold technical capacity, adjusted by the capacity which is re-offered in accordance with applicable congestion management procedures;
D
  - is additional capacity, for such day, if any.
8
At the time the bidding round opens, transmission system operators shall notify network users about the amount of capacity to be offered for the upcoming rolling day-ahead capacity auction.
9
The allocation results of the auction shall be published, no later than 30 minutes after the closing of the bidding round, simultaneously to individual network users participating in the respective auction.
10
Aggregated information on the auction results shall be published to the market.

Within-day capacity auctions
Article 15
1
Subject to capacity being made available, a within-day capacity auction shall be held every hour during gas day using a uniform price auction algorithm in accordance with Article 18.
2
The first bidding round shall open directly on the next hour bar following the publication of results of the last day-ahead auction (including interruptible capacity if offered) in accordance with Article 14. The first bidding round closes at 1.30 a.m. before the gas day. The allocation of successful bids shall be effective from 5.00 a.m. on the relevant gas day.
3
The last bidding round shall close at 0.30 a.m. on the relevant gas day.
4
Network users shall be entitled to place, withdraw or amend bids from the opening of each bidding round until closure of that bidding round.
5
Each hour on the relevant gas day, capacity effective from the hour + 4 shall be auctioned as within-day capacity.
6
Each bidding round shall open at the start of every hour on the relevant gas day.
7
The duration of each bidding round shall be 30 minutes as of the opening of the bidding round.
8
The capacity to be offered in the within-day capacity auction shall be, each hour, equal to:
- A – C + D
- Where:
A
  - is the transmission system operator's technical capacity for each of the standard capacity products;
C
  - is the previously sold technical capacity, adjusted by the capacity which is re-offered in accordance with applicable congestion management procedures;
D
  - is additional capacity, if any.
9
Transmission system operators shall publish the available amount of within-day firm capacity on offer, after closure of the last day-ahead auction and in accordance with Article 32(9).
10
Transmission system operators shall provide network users who bid in the day-ahead auctions with the option to have valid unsuccessful bids automatically entered into the subsequent within-day auction.
11
The capacity shall be allocated within 30 minutes of the closure of the bidding round provided that the bids are accepted and the transmission system operator runs the allocation process.
12
The results of the auction shall be made available simultaneously to individual network users.
13
Aggregated information on the auction results shall be published at least at the end of each day.

Auction algorithms
Article 16
1
If several standard capacity products are offered during an auction, the respective allocation algorithm shall be applied separately for each standard capacity product when it is being allocated. Bids for the different standard capacity products shall be considered independently from each other in the application of the auction algorithm.
2
For annual yearly, annual quarterly and rolling monthly capacity auctions, an ascending clock auction algorithm, with multiple bidding rounds, as provided for in Article 17, shall be applied.
3
For rolling day-ahead capacity auctions and within-day capacity auctions, a uniform-price auction algorithm, with a single bidding round, shall be applied in accordance with Article 18.

Ascending clock auction algorithm
Article 17
1
Ascending clock auctions shall enable network users to place volume bids against escalating prices announced in consecutive bidding rounds, starting at the reserve price P0.
2
The first bidding round, with an associated price equal to the reserve price P0, shall have a duration of 3 hours. Subsequent bidding rounds shall have a duration of 1 hour. There shall be a period of 1 hour between bidding rounds.
3
A bid shall specify:
a
the identity of the network user applying;
b
the concerned interconnection point and direction of the flow;
c
the standard capacity product for which the capacity is applied for;
d
per price step, the amount of capacity for the respective standard capacity product applied for;
e
where incremental capacity is offered, the concerned offer level.
4
A bid shall be considered valid if it is submitted by a network user and complies with all provisions of this Article.
5
In order for network users to participate in an auction, it shall be mandatory for network users to place a volume bid in the first bidding round.
6
Transmission system operators shall provide network users with the option to enter bids automatically against any price step.
7
Once the relevant bidding round closes, no modification, withdrawal or variation to valid bids shall be accepted. All valid bids shall become binding commitments of a network user to book capacity to the amount requested per announced price, provided the clearing price of the auction is that which is announced in the relevant bidding round.
8
The volume bid in any bidding round per network user shall be equal or smaller to the capacity offered in a specific auction. The volume bid per network user at a specific price shall be equal to or less than the volume bid placed by this network user in the previous round, except where paragraph 16 applies.
9
Bids may be freely entered, modified and withdrawn during a bidding round, providing all bids comply with paragraph 8. Valid bids shall remain valid until modified or withdrawn.
10
A large price step and a small price step shall be defined per interconnection point and per standard capacity product and shall be published in advance of the relevant auction. The small price step shall be set such that an increase by an integer number of small price steps is equal to an increase by a large price step.
11
The determination of the large price step shall seek to minimise, as far as reasonably possible, the length of the auction process. The determination of the small price step shall seek to minimise, as far as reasonably possible, the level of unsold capacity where the auction closes at a price higher than the reserve price.
12
If the aggregate demand across all network users is less than or equal to the capacity offered at the end of the first bidding round, the auction shall close.
13
If the aggregate demand across all network users is greater than the capacity offered at the end of the first bidding round or a subsequent bidding round, a further bidding round shall be opened with a price equal to the price in the previous bidding round, plus the large price step.
14
If the aggregate demand across all network users is equal to the capacity offered at the end of the second bidding round or a subsequent bidding round, the auction shall close.
15
If a first-time undersell occurs, a price reduction shall take place and a further bidding round shall be opened. The further bidding round will have a price equal to the price applicable in the bidding round preceding the first-time undersell, plus the small price step. Further bidding rounds with increments of the small price step shall then be opened until the aggregate demand across all network users is less than or equal to the capacity offered, at which point the auction shall close.
16
The volume bid per network user in all bidding rounds where small price steps are applied shall be equal to or less than the volume bid placed by this network user in the bidding round which preceded the first-time undersell. The volume bid per network user for a specific small price step shall be equal to or smaller than the volume bid placed by this network user in the previous bidding round of small price steps. The volume bid per network user in all bidding rounds where small price steps are applied shall be equal to or greater than the volume bid placed by this network user during the bidding round in which the first-time undersell occurred.
17
If the aggregate demand across all network users is greater than the capacity offered in the bidding round with a price equal to that which led to the first-time undersell, minus one small price step, the auction shall close. The clearing price shall be the price that led to the first-time undersell and the successful bids shall be those submitted during the original bidding round in which the first-time undersell occurred.
18
After each bidding round, the demand of all network users in a specific auction shall be published as soon as reasonably possible in an aggregated form.
19
The price announced for the last bidding round in which the auction closes shall be considered as the clearing price of the specific auction, except cases where paragraph 17 applies.
20
All network users who have placed valid volume bids at the clearing price shall be allocated the capacity according to their volume bids at the clearing price. Where incremental capacity is offered, the allocation of incremental capacity shall be subject to the outcome of the economic test according to Article 22. Successful network users shall pay the clearing price of the specific auction, which may be a fixed or a floating payable price approach set out in Article 24 of Regulation (EU) 2017/460, and any other possible charges applicable at the time when the capacity allocated to them can be used.
21
Following every closed auction, the final auction result including the aggregation of allocated capacities and the clearing price shall be published. Successful network users shall be informed about the amount of capacities they are allocated, individual information shall be communicated only to concerned parties. Where incremental capacity is allocated, this paragraph shall only apply to the auction results of the offer level offering the largest amount of capacity that resulted in a positive economic test according to Article 22(3).
22
If an ascending clock auction has not ended by the scheduled starting point (according to the auction calendar) of the next auction for capacity covering the same period, the first auction shall close and no capacity shall be allocated. The capacity shall be offered in the next relevant auction.

Uniform-price auction algorithm
Article 18
1
In a uniform-price auction, there is a single bidding round in which the network user bids price as well as quantity.
2
During the bidding round of a given auction, network users may submit up to 10 bids. Each bid shall be treated independently from other bids. After the closure of the bidding round, remaining bids may not be modified or withdrawn.
3
A bid shall specify:
a
the identity of the network user applying;
b
the concerned interconnection point and direction of the flow;
c
the standard capacity product for which the capacity is applied for;
d
the amount of capacity for the respective standard capacity product applied for, which shall be equal to or smaller than the capacity offered in a specific auction;
e
the minimum amount of capacity for the respective standard capacity product which the network user is willing to be allocated according to the relevant algorithm in case the network user is not allocated the amount requested in accordance with point (d);
f
the bid prices, which shall not be less than the reserve price applicable for the relevant standard capacity product, which the network user is willing to pay in respect of the capacity applied for. Bids with a bid price below the reserve price shall not be accepted.
4
The transmission system operator shall rank all bids relating to a given standard capacity product according to their bid price, the highest price ranking first.
5
All remaining bids at bidding round closing time shall be considered as binding on those network users that are allocated at least the minimum amount of capacity requested in accordance with point (e) of paragraph 3.
6
Following the ranking of the bids in accordance with paragraph 4, and subject to paragraphs 7 to 10, capacity shall be allocated to the bids in function of their price ranking. All bids for which capacity is allocated shall be considered as successful. After the allocation of capacity, the remaining unallocated capacity shall be reduced by such quantity.
7
Following the application of paragraph 6 and subject to paragraph 9, where the amount of capacity bid for by a network user exceeds the remaining unallocated capacity (after capacity has been allocated to network users placing higher bids), this network user shall be allocated capacity equal to the remaining unallocated capacity.
8
Following the application of paragraph 7 and subject to paragraph 9, where each of two or more bids specifies the same bid price, and the amount of relevant capacity remaining applied for in aggregate under such bids exceeds the remaining unallocated amount, the remaining unallocated amount shall be allocated pro rata to the amounts applied for in each such bid.
9
Where the amount to be allocated in respect of a bid pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7 or 8 is less than the minimum amount of capacity according to point (e) of paragraph 3, the bid shall be considered unsuccessful, and a revised allocation shall be made between remaining equal price bid(s) under paragraph 8, or an allocation shall be made in respect of the next priced bid, pursuant to paragraph 6.
10
Where the remaining amount to be allocated in respect of any bid pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7, 8 or 9 is equal to zero, no further capacity shall be allocated to the remaining bids. Those bids shall be considered unsuccessful.
11
The clearing price shall be defined as the price of the lowest successful bid, if the demand exceeds the offer at the reserve price. In all other cases, the clearing price shall be equal to the reserve price. Successful network users shall pay the clearing price of the specific auction, which may be a fixed or floating payable price approach as set out in Article 24 of Regulation (EU) 2017/460 and any other possible charges applicable at the time when the capacity allocated to them can be used.
Art. 8(2) substituted (31.12.2020) by The Gas (Security of Supply and Network Codes) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/531), reg. 1(2), Sch. 4 para. 8(2); 2020 c. 1, Sch. 5 para. 1(1)
Words in Art. 8(3) inserted (31.12.2020) by The Gas (Security of Supply and Network Codes) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/531), reg. 1(2), Sch. 4 para. 8(3); 2020 c. 1, Sch. 5 para. 1(1)
Words in Art. 11(9) substituted (31.12.2020) by The Gas (Security of Supply and Network Codes) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/531), reg. 1(2), Sch. 4 para. 9; 2020 c. 1, Sch. 5 para. 1(1)
Words in Art. 12(7) substituted (31.12.2020) by The Gas (Security of Supply and Network Codes) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/531), reg. 1(2), Sch. 4 para. 10; 2020 c. 1, Sch. 5 para. 1(1)
Words in Art. 13(7) substituted (31.12.2020) by The Gas (Security of Supply and Network Codes) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/531), reg. 1(2), Sch. 4 para. 11; 2020 c. 1, Sch. 5 para. 1(1)
Words in Art. 14(5) substituted (31.12.2020) by The Gas (Security of Supply and Network Codes) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/531), reg. 1(2), Sch. 4 para. 12(2); 2020 c. 1, Sch. 5 para. 1(1)
Words in Art. 14(6) substituted (31.12.2020) by The Gas (Security of Supply and Network Codes) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/531), reg. 1(2), Sch. 4 para. 12(3); 2020 c. 1, Sch. 5 para. 1(1)
Word in Art. 15(2) substituted (31.12.2020) by The Gas (Security of Supply and Network Codes) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/531), reg. 1(2), Sch. 4 para. 13(2)(a); 2020 c. 1, Sch. 5 para. 1(1)
Word in Art. 15(2) substituted (31.12.2020) by The Gas (Security of Supply and Network Codes) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/531), reg. 1(2), Sch. 4 para. 13(2)(b); 2020 c. 1, Sch. 5 para. 1(1)
Word in Art. 15(3) substituted (31.12.2020) by The Gas (Security of Supply and Network Codes) (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019 (S.I. 2019/531), reg. 1(2), Sch. 4 para. 13(3); 2020 c. 1, Sch. 5 para. 1(1)