CHAPTER IIIU.K. ALLOCATION OF FIRM CAPACITY PRODUCTS

Article 18U.K.Uniform-price auction algorithm

1.In a uniform-price auction, there is a single bidding round in which the network user bids price as well as quantity.

2.During the bidding round of a given auction, network users may submit up to 10 bids. Each bid shall be treated independently from other bids. After the closure of the bidding round, remaining bids may not be modified or withdrawn.

3.A bid shall specify:

(a)the identity of the network user applying;

(b)the concerned interconnection point and direction of the flow;

(c)the standard capacity product for which the capacity is applied for;

(d)the amount of capacity for the respective standard capacity product applied for, which shall be equal to or smaller than the capacity offered in a specific auction;

(e)the minimum amount of capacity for the respective standard capacity product which the network user is willing to be allocated according to the relevant algorithm in case the network user is not allocated the amount requested in accordance with point (d);

(f)the bid prices, which shall not be less than the reserve price applicable for the relevant standard capacity product, which the network user is willing to pay in respect of the capacity applied for. Bids with a bid price below the reserve price shall not be accepted.

4.The transmission system operator shall rank all bids relating to a given standard capacity product according to their bid price, the highest price ranking first.

5.All remaining bids at bidding round closing time shall be considered as binding on those network users that are allocated at least the minimum amount of capacity requested in accordance with point (e) of paragraph 3.

6.Following the ranking of the bids in accordance with paragraph 4, and subject to paragraphs 7 to 10, capacity shall be allocated to the bids in function of their price ranking. All bids for which capacity is allocated shall be considered as successful. After the allocation of capacity, the remaining unallocated capacity shall be reduced by such quantity.

7.Following the application of paragraph 6 and subject to paragraph 9, where the amount of capacity bid for by a network user exceeds the remaining unallocated capacity (after capacity has been allocated to network users placing higher bids), this network user shall be allocated capacity equal to the remaining unallocated capacity.

8.Following the application of paragraph 7 and subject to paragraph 9, where each of two or more bids specifies the same bid price, and the amount of relevant capacity remaining applied for in aggregate under such bids exceeds the remaining unallocated amount, the remaining unallocated amount shall be allocated pro rata to the amounts applied for in each such bid.

9.Where the amount to be allocated in respect of a bid pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7 or 8 is less than the minimum amount of capacity according to point (e) of paragraph 3, the bid shall be considered unsuccessful, and a revised allocation shall be made between remaining equal price bid(s) under paragraph 8, or an allocation shall be made in respect of the next priced bid, pursuant to paragraph 6.

10.Where the remaining amount to be allocated in respect of any bid pursuant to paragraphs 6, 7, 8 or 9 is equal to zero, no further capacity shall be allocated to the remaining bids. Those bids shall be considered unsuccessful.

11.The clearing price shall be defined as the price of the lowest successful bid, if the demand exceeds the offer at the reserve price. In all other cases, the clearing price shall be equal to the reserve price. Successful network users shall pay the clearing price of the specific auction, which may be a fixed or floating payable price approach as set out in Article 24 of Regulation (EU) 2017/460 and any other possible charges applicable at the time when the capacity allocated to them can be used.