It is necessary to point out that the burden of proof lies with the producer wishing to claim MET under Article 2(7)(b) of the basic Regulation. To that end, the first subparagraph of Article 2(7)(c) provides that the claim submitted by such a producer must contain sufficient evidence, as laid down in that provision, that the producer operates under market economy conditions. Accordingly, there is no obligation on the Union institutions to prove that the producer does not satisfy the conditions laid down for the recognition of such status. On the contrary, it is for the Union institutions to assess whether the evidence supplied by the producer concerned is sufficient to show that the criteria laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation are fulfilled in order to grant it MET and it is for the Union judicature to examine whether that assessment is vitiated by a manifest error (paragraph 32 of the judgment in Case C-249/10 P and paragraph 24 of the judgment in Case C-247/10 P).

In accordance with Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation, all five criteria listed in this article should be met so that an exporting producer can be granted MET. Therefore, the Commission considered that the failure to meet at least one criterion was enough to reject the MET request.

With regard to criterion 2 (Accounting), Companies 8, 10, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 24 and 25 in addition failed to demonstrate that they had a set of basic accounting records independently audited in line with international accounting standards. In particular, the MET assessments revealed that these companies either failed to provide the Commission with an independent auditor opinion/report, or their accounts were not audited, or lacked explicative notes on several items of the balance sheet and income statement.

Regarding criterion 3 (Assets and ‘carry-over’), Companies 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23 and 25 failed to demonstrate that no distortions are carried over from the non-market economy system. In particular, these companies failed to provide essential and complete information, inter alia, about the assets owned by the company, and the terms and the value of the land use-rights.

Lastly, and considering the reasons set out in recital (49), the Commission did not assess criteria 4 (Bankruptcy and property laws) and 5 (Exchange rate conversions) for any of the exporting producers concerned. The Commission informed the exporting producers concerned of the MET findings and invited them to provide comments. No comments were received.

Pursuant to Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation prior to its amendment, where Article 2(7)(a) of the same regulation applies, an individual duty shall however be specified for the exporters which can demonstrate that they meet all criteria set out in Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation prior to its amendment.

As mentioned in recital (48) it is necessary to point out that the burden of proof lies with the producer wishing to claim IT under Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation prior to its amendment. To that end, the first subparagraph of Article 9(5) provides that the claim submitted must be properly substantiated. Accordingly, there is no obligation on the Union institutions to prove that the exporter does not satisfy the conditions laid down for the recognition of such status. On the contrary, it is for the Union institutions to assess whether the evidence supplied by the exporter concerned is sufficient to show that the criteria laid down in Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation prior to its amendment are fulfilled in order to grant IT.

In accordance with Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation prior to its amendment, exporters should demonstrate on the basis of a properly substantiated claim that all five criteria listed therein are met so that they can be granted IT. Therefore, the Commission considered that the failure to meet at least one criterion was enough to reject the IT claim.

1. (1)

   in the case of wholly or partly foreign owned firms or joint ventures, exporters are free to repatriate capital and profits;

2. (2)

   export prices and quantities, and conditions and terms of sale are freely determined;

3. (3)

   the majority of the shares belong to private persons; state officials appearing on the board of directors or holding key management positions shall either be in minority or it must be demonstrated that the company is nonetheless sufficiently independent from State interference;

4. (4)

   exchange rate conversions are carried out at the market rate; and

5. (5)

   State interference is not such as to permit circumvention of measures if individual exporters are given different rates of duty.

All 19 exporting producers concerned that requested MET claimed also IT in the event that they would not be granted MET. The Commission therefore assessed the IT claims of each exporting producer concerned.

Regarding criterion 1 (Repatriation of capital and profits), Companies 9 and 20 failed to provide evidence showing that they were free to repatriate capital and profits and did thus not demonstrate that this criterion was fulfilled.

With regard to criterion 2 (Export sales and prices freely determined), the Commission concluded that Companies 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24, had failed to prove that business decisions such as export prices and quantities, and conditions and terms of sale were freely determined in response to market signals, as the evidence analysed, such as articles of association or business licences, showed a limitation in output and/or on the sales quantities of footwear in specific markets.

As regards criterion 3 (Company — key management and shares — is sufficiently independent from State interference), Companies 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 22, 23 and 25 failed to provide the necessary information to demonstrate that they were sufficiently independent from State interference. inter alia, no information was provided on how the land use right were transferred to these companies and at what terms and conditions.

In addition, companies 8, 10, 17, 18 and 25 also failed to prove that they fulfilled the requirements of criterion 5 (Circumvention) on the basis that no information was provided as to how decisions were taken within the company.

Lastly, considering the provisions referred to in recital (56) the Commission did not assess criterion 4 (exchange rate conversions are carried out at the market rate) for any of the exporting producers concerned.

None of the 19 exporting producers concerned fulfilled the conditions set out in Article 9(5) of the basic Regulation prior to its amendment and IT was therefore denied to all of them. The Commission informed the exporting producers concerned accordingly and invited them to provide comments. No comments were received.

The residual anti-dumping duty applicable to China and Vietnam, of 16,5 % and 10 % respectively, should therefore be imposed for exports made by the 19 exporting producers concerned for the period of application of Regulation (EC) No 1472/2006. The period of application of that regulation was initially from 7 October 2006 until 7 October 2008. Following the initiation of an expiry review, it was prolonged on 30 December 2009 until 31 March 2011. The illegality identified in the judgments is that the Union institutions failed to establish whether the products produced by the exporting producers concerned should be subject to the residual duty or to an individual duty. On the basis of the illegality identified by the Court, there is no legal ground for completely exempting the products produced by the exporting producers concerned from paying any anti-dumping duty. A new act remedying the illegality identified by the Court therefore only needs to reassess the applicable anti-dumping duty rate, and not the measures themselves.

Since it is concluded that the residual duty applicable to China and Vietnam respectively should be re-imposed in respect of the exporting producers concerned at the same rate as originally imposed by the contested Regulation and Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1294/2009, no changes are required to Regulation (EC) No 388/2008. That latter regulation remains valid.

FESI and the Footwear Coalition submitted that the approach followed by the Commission with regard to the companies listed in Annex III was illegal. Thus, by listing in Annex III companies that were related to companies already assessed in the context of Implementing Regulations (EU) 2016/1395, (EU) 2016/1647, (EU) 2016/1731 or (EU) 2016/2257, the Commission had breached the concept of ‘single economic entity’ however applied in the original investigation. In addition, such approach would lead to legal inconsistencies as via the previously mentioned Regulations the Commission re-imposed anti-dumping duties on these companies, while in Annex III the same companies are listed as companies that appear not have submitted any MET/IT claim in the original investigation.

As for unrelated traders, as they had no legal requirement to file MET/IT claims during the original investigation it would in any event not be required to list them in Annex III.

Finally, for companies related to Chinese or Vietnamese suppliers that had filed an MET/IT claim in the original investigation, but have not yet been assessed in any regulation referred to in recital (63), in the context of the implementation of the judgments referred to in recital (12), FESI and the Footwear Coalition argued that those should also not have been listed in Annex III. In particular, it was claimed that such an approach would prevent the Commission in future to assess any MET/IT claim of their related suppliers in China or Vietnam. The same parties also claimed that it would be the Commission's obligation to identify from the list of companies notified by the national customs authorities those companies/traders belonging to the same company group and whether they form part of any of the Chinese or Vietnamese exporting producers that filed a MET/IT claim during the original investigation but that were not sampled during the original investigation. Otherwise, the Commission would create an impossible burden of proof for the interested parties.

As mentioned in recital (34), following disclosure, FESI and the Footwear Coalition, identified indeed companies that were related to Chinese or Vietnamese exporting producers that had submitted a MET/IT claim form during the original investigation, but were not sampled and that had also not been assessed in previous implementation exercises mentioned in recitals (18) to (20) and (25). The information in the file confirmed the information received by these interested parties, so that the MET/IT requests of these companies will be assessed. The outcome of this assessment will be subject to a separate legal act. The request with regard to these companies was therefore granted and these companies are not listed in Annex III.

With regard to traders that claimed re-imbursement of the duties paid (related or unrelated to Chinese or Vietnamese suppliers), the Commission considers that the burden of proof lies with these traders.

None of the traders listed in Annex III provided, however, information or proof of their suppliers in China or Vietnam (with the exception of the ones mentioned in recital (76)).

The Commission recognises, however, that not all importers that bought footwear from those traders may have been aware of the need to inform the Commission of the names of the exporting producers from which those traders acquired their footwear. In order to ensure full respect of their rights of defence, the Commission therefore has decided to specifically contact the importers in question and make them aware of the situation and their burden of proof. In order to provide for the time necessary to implement this decision, the examination of the companies listed in Annex III is temporarily suspended until the Commission has contacted the relevant importers and given them time to react. The deadline of eight months for assessing MET/IT claims will start on the day the importer informs the Commission of the names and addresses of the exporting producers concerned, or, where no reply is received within the time period determined by the Commission, from the date of expiry of that time period.

FESI and the Footwear Coalition argued also that in the interest of legal certainty, the Commission should not adopt and publish any further legal acts regarding the implementation of the judgment of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases C-659/13 and C-34/14, until the Court of Justice rules on an ongoing preliminary rulings on the validity of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/223 referred to in recital (23) and the validity of Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1647 referred to in recital (19) and Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/1731 referred to in (20). In this respect, it was argued that Article 278 TFEU, whereas a legal action against legal acts adopted by the institutions does not have suspensive effect, is not applicable in the current case because the claim made in this regard is not to suspend Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/223, but to refrain to adopt further Regulations re-imposing the definitive anti-dumping duties on imports of footwear from China and Vietnam. For the same reasons, it was also argued that the judgments in the Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen/Altana were not a legally relevant reference.

Regarding Article 278 TFEU and the Zuckerfabrik Süderdithmarschen/Altana judgments, the Commission agrees with FESI and the Footwear Coalition that that case-law is not applicable to assess whether or not to suspend the implementation of the judgment of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases C-659/13 and C-34/14. However, the Commission considers that it is obliged to implement that judgment in a reasonable time-frame, and that ongoing proceedings concerning earlier acts implementing that judgment do not constitute a valid reason for not finalising the implementation of the judgment. In particular, it considers that doing so would deprive interested parties other than FESI and the Footwear Coalition from exercising their rights in the administrative procedure and in a possible court procedure.

Regarding the validity of Implementing Regulations (EU) 2016/1647 and (EU) 2016/1731, FESI and the Footwear Coalition claimed that given that the latter and any new Regulation re-imposing definitive duties on imports of footwear originating in China and Vietnam have the same legal basis, approach and reasoning of the Commission and the invalidation of Implementing Regulations (EU) 2016/1647 and (EU) 2016/1731 would also entail that any further similar Regulation would be equally invalid. The Commission's approach would therefore not reflect a good faith effort in implementing the judgment in the Joined Cases C-659/13 C & J Clark International and C-34/14 Puma referred to in recital (12).

Finally, FESI and the Footwear Coalition argued that the implementation of the above judgment would not be subject to any deadlines imposed by the Court of Justice, would have a negative impact on the importers in the Union, while on the other hand would not have any fiscal advantage for the Union. For these reasons the Commission should refrain from implementing the judgment, pending the outcome of the Court cases mentioned in recital (80).

The Commission refers to the reasons set out above at recital (81).

FESI and the Footwear Coalition claimed that the burden of proof when assessing MET/IT claims lies with the Commission, as the Chinese and Vietnamese exporting producers had discharged the burden by submitting the MET/IT claims in the original investigation. FESI and the Footwear Coalition also claimed that the same procedural rights should have been granted to the exporting producers concerned by the current implementation as those granted to the sampled exporting producers during the original investigation. FESI and the Footwear Coalition argued in particular, that only a desk analysis had been carried out rather than on-spot verification visits, and that the Chinese and Vietnamese exporting producers were not provided any opportunity to complement their MET/IT claim forms via deficiency letters.

FESI and the Footwear Coalition further argued that the exporting producers concerned by this implementation were not provided with the same procedural guarantees than those applied in standard anti-dumping investigations, but stricter standards were applied. FESI and the Footwear Coalition claimed that the Commission has not taken into account the time lag between the filing of the MET/IT request in the original investigation and the assessment of these claims. In addition, exporting producers during the original investigation were only provided 15 days in order to fill in the MET/IT requests, instead of the usual 21 days.

On this basis, FESI and the Footwear Coalition claimed that the fundamental legal principle of granting interested parties full opportunity to exercise their rights of defence laid down in Article 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union, was not respected. On this basis, it was argued that by not giving the exporting producers the opportunity to complete incomplete information the Commission misused its powers and effectively reversed the burden of proof at the stage of the implementation.

Finally, FESI and the Footwear Coalition also claimed that this approach would be discriminatory vis-à-vis the Chinese and Vietnamese exporting producers that were sampled in the original investigation, but also other exporting producers in non-market economy countries that were subject to an anti-dumping investigation and filed MET/IT claims in that investigation. Thus, the Chinese and Vietnamese companies concerned by the current implementation should not be made subject to the same information provision threshold as applied in a normal 15 months investigation and should not be subject to stricter procedural standards.

FESI and the Footwear Coalition also claimed that the Commission applied de facto facts available within the meaning of Article 18(1) of the basic Regulation, while the Commission did not comply with the procedural rules set out in Article 18(4) of the basic Regulation.

The Commission recalls that according to the case-law, the burden of proof lies with the producer wishing to claim MET/IT under Article 2(7)(b) of the basic Regulation. To that end, the first subparagraph of Article 2(7)(c) provides that the claim submitted by such a producer must contain sufficient evidence, as laid down in that provision, that the producer operates under market economy conditions. Accordingly, as held by the Court in the judgments in Brosmann and Aokang, there is no obligation on the institutions to prove that the producer does not satisfy the conditions laid down for the recognition of such status. On the contrary, it is for the Commission to assess whether the evidence supplied by the producer concerned is sufficient to show that the criteria laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation are fulfilled in order to grant it MET/IT (see recital (48)). In that regard, it is recalled that there is no obligation for the Commission to request the exporting producer to complement the MET/IT claim. The Commission may base its assessment on the information submitted by the exporting producer.

Concerning the claim that the rights of defence were not appropriately respected through the Commission's decision not to send deficiency letters, it is, first of all, recalled that rights of defence are subjective rights, and that FESI and the Footwear Coalition cannot rely on a violation of a subjective right of other companies. Second, the Commission contests the assertion that there is a practice by the Commission that significant exchange of information and a detailed deficiency completion process is carried out when use is made of desk analysis alone as opposed to desk analysis plus on-site verification. Indeed, FESI and the Footwear Coalition have not been able to provide evidence to the contrary.

Regarding Article 18(1) of the basic Regulation, in the current case, the Commission accepted the information provided by the exporting producers concerned, it did not reject this information and based its assessment on it. Therefore, the Commission did not apply Article 18. It follows that there was no need to follow the procedure under Article 18(4) of the Basic Regulation. The procedure under Article 18(4) is followed in cases where the Commission intends to reject certain information provided by the interested party and to use facts available instead.

FESI and the Footwear Coalition argued that the Commission would be in breach of Article 266 TFEU, as this article does not provide it with the legal basis to reopen the investigation with respect to an expired measure. FESI and the Footwear Coalition also reiterated that Article 266 TFEU does not allow for the imposition of anti-dumping duties retroactively, which would also be confirmed by the ruling of the Court of Justice in case C-458/98P IPS v Council.

In addition, the same parties argued that there would also not be any grounds in the basic Regulation which would allow the Commission to re-open the anti-dumping investigation.

Finally, it was claimed that the Commission has not provided any reasoning or prior jurisprudence to support of the use of Article 266 TFEU as a legal basis for the re-opening of the procedure.

Those differences are as follows: The illegality identified by the Court does not concern the findings on dumping, injury, and Union interest, and therefore the principle of the imposition of the duty, but only the precise duty rate. The previous annulments relied on by the interested parties, on the contrary, concerned the findings on dumping, injury and Union interest. The institutions are therefore permitted to recalculate the precise duty rate for the exporting producers concerned.

In particular, in the present case, there was no need to seek additional information from interested parties. Rather, the Commission had to assess information that had been filed, but not assessed before the adoption of Regulation (EC) No 1472/2006. In any event, as noted in recital (100) above, previous practice in other cases does not constitute precise and unconditional assurance for the present case.

Finally, all parties against which the proceeding is directed, i.e. the exporting producers concerned, as well as the parties in the Court cases and the association representing one of those parties, have been informed by the disclosure of the relevant facts on the basis of which the Commission intends to adopt the present MET/IT assessment. Hence, their rights of defence are safeguarded. In that regard, it is to be noted in particular that unrelated importers do not enjoy, in an antidumping proceeding, rights of defence, as those proceedings are not directed against them.

As regards the claim that the measures in question expired on 31 March 2011, the Commission fails to see why the expiry of the measure would be of any relevance for the possibility for the Commission to adopt a new act to replace the annulled act following a judgment annulling the initial act. According to the case-law referred to in recital (15) above, the administrative procedure should be resumed at the point in time where the illegality occurred.

The anti-dumping proceedings are hence, as a result of the annulment of the act concluding the proceedings, still open. The Commission is under an obligation to close those proceedings; Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation provides that an investigation has to be closed by an act of the Commission.

FESI and the Footwear Coalition also submitted that the procedure adopted to reopen the investigation and retroactively impose the duty amounts to an abuse of powers by the Commission and violates of the TEU. FESI and the Footwear Coalition sustain in this regard that the Commission does not have the authority to interfere with Article 236(1) of the Community Customs Code by preventing the repayment of the anti-dumping duties. They argued that it was up to the national customs authorities to draw the consequences from an invalidation of an act imposing anti-dumping duties and that the national customs authorities would also be obliged to reimburse those duties that had been declared invalid by the Court.

In this regard, FESI and the Footwear Coalition claimed that Article 14(3) of the basic Regulation does not allow the Commission to derogate from Article 236 of the Community Customs Code, as both legislations are of an equal legal order and the basic Regulation cannot be seen as a lex specialis of the Community Customs Code.

Furthermore, the same parties continued Article 14(3) of the basic Regulation does not refer to Article 236 of the Community Customs Code and only states that special provisions may be adopted by the Commission, but no derogations to the Community Customs Code.

This transposition does not require a full application of all the provisions of the Union's customs legislation. Article 14(3) of the basic Regulation explicitly envisages special provisions with regard to the common definition of the concept of origin, a good example of where deviation from the provisions of the Union's customs legislation occurs. It is on that basis that the Commission made use of the powers arising from Article 14(3) of the basic Regulation and required that national customs authorities refrain temporarily from any reimbursement. This does not challenge the exclusive competence that national customs authorities have in relation to disputes concerning customs debt: the decision-making authority remains with the customs authorities of the Member States. The Member States customs authorities still decide, on the basis of the conclusions reached by the Commission vis-à-vis the MET and IT claims, whether reimbursement should be granted or not.

Thus, while it is true that nothing in the Union's customs legislation allows for an obstacle to the reimbursement of erroneously paid customs duties to be erected, no such sweeping statement can be made in relation to the reimbursement of anti-dumping duties. Accordingly, and with the overarching necessity to protect the Union's own resources from unjustified requests for repayment and the related difficulty this would have caused pursuing unjustified repayments thereafter, the Commission had to deviate temporarily from the Union's customs legislation by making use of its powers under Article 14(3) of the basic Regulation.

FESI and the Footwear Coalition also argued that in violation of Article 296 TFEU, the Commission failed to provide adequate statement of reasons and indication of the legal basis on which duties were re-imposed retroactively and therefore the reimbursement of duties denied to the importers concerned by the current implementation. Accordingly, FESI and the Footwear coalition claimed that the Commission had breached the right to effective judicial protection of interested parties.

The Commission considers that the extensive legal reasoning provided in the general disclosure document and in this Regulation duly motivates the latter.

FESI and the Footwear Coalition claimed further that the retroactive correction of expired measures violates the principle of protection of legitimate expectations. FESI argued that first, parties including importers, would have received assurance that the measures expired on 31 March 2011 and that given the time elapsed since the original investigation, parties were entitled to have justified expectations that the original investigation will not be resumed or reopened. Likewise, the Chinese and Vietnamese exporting producers were entitled to have justified legitimate expatiations that their MET/IT claims provided in the original investigation would not be reviewed anymore by the Commission, based on the mere fact that these claims were no assessed within the three-month period applicable during the original investigation.

Regarding legitimate expectations of interested parties that anti-dumping measures expired and that the investigation will not be re-opened anymore, reference is made to recitals (104) and (105) where these claims had been addressed in detail.

Regarding the legitimate expectations of Chinese and Vietnamese exporting producers not to have their MET/IT claims reviewed, reference is made to recital (100) above, where this has equally been addressed in light of the case-law of the Court on this matter.

FESI and the Footwear Coalition submitted that the imposition of anti-dumping measures with retroactive effects constitutes discrimination of (i) the importers concerned by the current implementation vis-à-vis importers concerned by the implementation of the Brosmann and Aokang judgments referred to in recital (6) that were reimbursed duties paid on imports of footwear from the five exporting producers concerned by these judgments; as well as (ii) a discrimination of the exporting producers concerned by the current implementation vis-à-vis the five exporting producers concerned by the Brosmann and Aokang judgments which were not made subject of any duty following Implementing Decision 2014/149/EU.

Regarding the claim on discrimination, the Commission recalls first of all the requirements for discrimination, as set out in recital (93) above.

Then, it is noted that the difference between importers concerned by the current implementation and those concerned by the implementation of the Brosmann and Aokang judgments is that the latter decided to challenge Regulation (EC) No 1472/2006 in the General Court, whereas the former did not.

This procedural principle of Union law necessarily creates two groups: those which challenged a Union measure and who may have gained a favourable position as a result (like Brosmann and the other four exporting producers), and those who did not. Yet, that does not mean that the Commission has treated the two parties unequally in violation of the principle of equal treatment. An acknowledgement that a party falls into the latter category because of a conscious decision not to challenge a Union measure does not discriminate against that group.

So, all interested parties did enjoy judicial protection in the Union courts at all times.

Insofar as it concerns the alleged discrimination of the exporting producers concerned by the current implementation which were not made subject of any duty following Implementing Decision 2014/149/EU, it should be noted that the decision of the Council not to re-impose duties was clearly taken with regard to the particular circumstances of the specific situation as it stood at the time the Commission made its proposal for the re-imposition of those duties and in particular on the grounds that the anti-dumping duties concerned had already been reimbursed, and to the extent that the original communication of the debt to the debtor in question had been withdrawn following the judgments in Brosmann and Aokang. According to the Council, this reimbursement had created legitimate expectations on the part of the importers concerned. Since no comparable reimbursement took place for other importers, these are not in a comparable situation to those importers concerned by the Council decision.

In any event, the fact that the Council chose to act in a certain way, given the particular circumstances of the case before it, cannot bind the Commission to implement another judgment in the exact same way.

That claim, however, focuses on the date of initiation of the investigation (which is indeed relevant in relation to the other substantive amendments that were made to the basic Regulation) but fails to note that Regulation (EU) No 37/2014 uses a different criterion (that is, the initiation of the procedure for adoption of measures). The position of FESI and the Footwear Coalition is therefore based on an incorrect interpretation of the transitional rule in Regulation (EU) No 37/2014.

Indeed, given the reference in Article 3 of Regulation (EU) No 37/2014 to ‘procedures initiated for the adoption of measures’, which sets out the transitional rules for the changes to the decision-making procedures for the adoption of anti-dumping measures, and given the meaning of ‘procedure’ in the basic Regulation, for an investigation that was initiated prior to the entry into force of Regulation (EU) No 37/2014, but where the Commission had not launched the consultation of the relevant committee with a view to adopting measures prior to that entry into force, the new rules apply to the procedure for adopting said anti-dumping measures. The same holds true for proceedings where measures had been imposed on the basis of the old rules and come up for review, or for measures where provisional duties had been imposed on the basis of the old rules, but the procedure for adopting definitive measures had not been launched yet when Regulation (EU) No 37/2014 entered into force. In other words, Regulation (EU) No 37/2014 applies to a specific ‘procedure for adoption’ and not to the entire period of a given investigation or even proceeding.

Accordingly, the decision-making procedure introduced by the Omnibus I Regulation was the correct one to apply.

With regard to Cortina, it first claimed that the Commission has no legal basis to investigate the MET/IT claims submitted by exporting producers in the original investigation. Cortina argued that the proceeding, which was closed by the expiry of the measures on 31 March 2011, was not invalidated by the judgment in Joined Cases C-659/13 and C-34/14, and that therefore, it cannot be re-opened.

In reply to this comment, the Commission refers to the explanation provided in recitals (104) and (105) above.

Second, Cortina claimed that the current proceeding is in breach of the principles of non-retroactivity and legal certainty enshrined in Article 10 of the basic Regulation.

As to the claim concerning retroactivity based on Article 10 of the basic Regulation and Article 10 of the WTO Anti-Dumping Agreement (‘WTO ADA’), Article 10(1) of the basic Regulation, which follows the text of Article 10(1) of the WTO ADA, stipulates that provisional measures and definitive anti-dumping duties shall only be applied to products which enter free circulation after the time when the decision taken pursuant to Article 7(1) or 9(4) of the basic Regulation, as the case may be, enters into force. In the present case, the anti-dumping duties in question are only applied to products which entered into free circulation after the provisional and the contested (definitive) Regulation taken pursuant to 7(1) and 9(4) of the basic Regulation respectively had entered into force. Retroactivity in the sense of Article 10(1) of the basic Regulation, however, refers only to a situation where the goods were introduced into free circulation before measures were introduced, as can be seen from the very text of that provision as well as from the exception for which Article 10(4) of the basic Regulation provides.

The Commission also observes that there is neither violation of the principle of retroactivity, nor violation of legal certainty and legitimate expectations involved in the present case.

This Regulation constitutes immediate application to the future effects of a situation that is ongoing: The duties on footwear have been levied by national customs authorities. As a result of the requests for reimbursement, which have not been decided in a definitive way, they constitute an ongoing situation. This Regulation sets out the duty rate applicable to those imports, and hence regulates the future effects of an ongoing situation.

In any event, even if there was retroactivity in the sense of Union law, quod non, such retroactivity would be justified, for the following reason:

In the present case, the purpose is to comply with the obligation of the Commission pursuant to Article 266 TFEU. Since, in the judgments referred to in recital (12) above, the Court only found an illegality with regard to the determination of the applicable duty rate, and not with regard to the imposition of the measures themselves (that is, with regard to the finding of dumping, injury, causation and Union interest), the exporting producers concerned could not have legitimately expected that no definitive anti-dumping measures would be imposed. Consequently, that imposition, even if it was retroactive, quod non, cannot be construed as breaching legitimate expectations.

Third, Cortina claimed that the Commission's statement in recital (46) that the Court of Justice annulled the contested Regulation and Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1294/2009 with regard to exports of certain footwear from certain Chinese and Vietnamese exporting producers is incorrect, insofar as judgment in cases C-659/13 and C-34/14 did not annul Regulation (EC) No 1472/2006 and Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1294/2009 with regard to the 19 exporting producers concerned, but it had annulled these regulations with erga omnes effect. According to Cortina, if the Commission were to re-impose an anti-dumping duty only on imports from the 19 exporting producers concerned, and not on imports from other exporting producers equally affected by the judgment of the Court of Justice in Joined Cases C-659/13 and C-34/14 C & J Clark International Limited and Puma SE, it would constitute unjustifiable discrimination vis-à-vis imports of these other exporting producers, and it would also be in breach of Article 266 TFEU.

Regarding the claim of discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis imports of other exporting producers affected by the judgment of the Court of Justice in the Joined Cases C-659/13 and C-34/14 C & J Clark International Limited and Puma SE, the Commission observes that exporting producers and certain importers concerned by this Regulation enjoy judicial protection in the Union courts against it. Other importers enjoy such protection via the national courts and tribunals, which act as judges of ordinary Union law.

As mentioned in recital (21), in view of the implementation of the judgment in Joined Cases C-659/13 and C-34/14 C & J Clark International Limited and Puma SE, the Commission adopted Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/223. In Article 1 of that regulation the Commission instructed national customs authorities to forward all requests for reimbursement of the definitive anti-dumping duties paid on imports of footwear originating in China and Vietnam made by importers based on Article 236 of the Community Customs Code and based on the fact that a non-sampled exporting producer had requested MET or IT in the original investigation. The Commission will assess the relevant MET or IT claim and re-impose the appropriate duty rate. On this basis the national customs authorities will subsequently decide on the request for repayment and remission of the anti-dumping duties.

Therefore, for all imports of footwear where the above criteria are fulfilled the Commission will examine the MET and IT claims and anti-dumping duties will be re-imposed based on the objective criteria laid down in Articles 2(7)(b) and 9(5) of the basic Regulation prior to its amendment. Therefore, all other non-sampled exporting producers from the PRC and Vietnam and their importers will be treated in the same fashion at a later stage pursuant to the procedure set out in Implementing Regulation (EU) 2016/223. It is only where there are no outstanding national procedures that no assessment of the MET and IT claims will be carried out, as it would serve no practical purpose.

Fourth, Cortina claimed that it would be discriminatory to re-impose an anti-dumping duty on the 19 exporting producers concerned, given that no anti-dumping duty was re-imposed following the Brosmann and Aokang judgments.

This claim is unfounded. Importers that have imported from Brosmann and the other four exporting producers concerned by the judgments in cases C-247/10 P and C-249/10 P, are in a different factual and legal situation, because their exporting producers decided to challenge the contested Regulation and because they were reimbursed their duties, so that they are protected by Article 221(3) of the Community Customs Code. No such challenge and no such reimbursement have taken place for others. See, in this regard, also recitals (118) to (122) above.

Fifth, Cortina alleged that there were several procedural irregularities resulting from this investigation. In the first place, they argued that the exporting producers concerned may no longer be in a position to provide meaningful comments or adduce additional evidence to support their MET/IT claims that they made several years ago. For example, the companies may no longer exist or relevant documents may no longer be available.

In addition, Cortina argued that unlike during the original investigation, the Commission's measures would de facto and de jure affect only importers, whereas they have no means of providing any meaningful input and cannot require their suppliers to cooperate with the Commission.

The Commission observes that nothing in the basic Regulation requires the Commission to give exporting companies claiming MET/IT the possibility to complete lacking factual information. It recalls that according to the case-law, the burden of proof lies with the producer wishing to claim MET/IT under Article 2(7)(b) of the basic Regulation. To that end, the first subparagraph of Article 2(7)(c) provides that the claim submitted by such a producer must contain sufficient evidence, as laid down in that provision, that the producer operates under market economy conditions. Accordingly, as held by the Court in the judgments in Brosmann and Aokang, there is no obligation on the institutions to prove that the producer does not satisfy the conditions laid down for the recognition of such status. On the contrary, it is for the Commission to assess whether the evidence supplied by the producer concerned is sufficient to show that the criteria laid down in the first subparagraph of Article 2(7)(c) of the basic Regulation are fulfilled in order to grant it MET/IT (see above recital (44). The right to be heard concerns the assessment of those facts, but does not comprise the right to remedy deficient information. Otherwise, the exporting producer could prolong indefinitely the assessment, by providing information piece by piece.

In that regard, it is recalled that there is no obligation, for the Commission, to request the exporting producer to complement the MET/IT claim. As mentioned in the preceding recital, the Commission may base their assessment on the information submitted by the exporting producer. In any event, the exporting producers concerned have not contested the assessment of their MET/IT claims by the Commission, and they have not identified which documents or which people they have no longer been able to rely upon. The allegation is therefore so abstract that the institutions cannot take into account those difficulties when carrying out the assessment of the MET/IT claims. As that argument is based on speculation and not supported by precise indications as to which documents and which people are no longer available and as to what the relevance of those documents and people for the assessment of the MET/IT claim is, that argument is rejected.

Regarding the claim that an importer would have no means to provide any meaningful input, the Commission observes the following: first, importers do not enjoy rights of defence, as the anti-dumping measure is not directed against them, but against the exporting producers. Second, importers had the opportunity to comment on that point already during the administrative procedure prior to the adoption of the contested Regulation. Third, if importers thought that there was an irregularity in that regard, they had to take the necessary contractual arrangements with their suppliers to ensure to dispose of the necessary documentation. Therefore, the claim has to be rejected.

Sixth, Cortina argued that the Commission failed to examine whether the imposition of the anti-dumping duties would be in the Union interest and argued that the measures would be against the Union interest because (i) the measures already had their intended effect when first imposed; (ii) the measures would not cause additional benefit for the Union industry; (iii) the measures would not affect the exporting producers; and (iv) the measures would impose an important cost on the importers in the Union.

The present case only concerns the MET/IT requests, because this is the only point on which a legal error has been identified by the Union Courts. For Union interest, the assessment in Regulation (EC) No 1472/2006 remains fully valid. Furthermore, the present measure is justified in order to protect the financial interest of the Union.

Seventh, Cortina claimed that the anti-dumping duty, if re-imposed, could no longer be collected because of the statute of limitations of Article 221(3) of the Community Customs Code (now Article 103(1) of the Union Customs Code) had expired. According to Cortina, this situation would constitute an abuse of power by the Commission.

The Commission recalls that according to Article 221(3) of the Community Customs Code/103(1) of the Union Customs Code, the statute of limitations does not apply where an appeal pursuant to Article 243 of the Community Customs Code/Article 44(2) of the Union Customs Code is lodged, as in all the present cases, which concern appeals on the basis of Article 236 of the Community Customs Code/Article 119 of the Union Customs Code. An appeal within the meaning of Article 103(3) of the Union Customs Code, pursuant to the clarification in Article 44(2) of the same regulation, extends from the initial challenge to the decision by the national customs authorities imposing the duties up to the final judgment rendered by the national court, including, where necessary, a reference for a preliminary ruling. The three year period is consequently stayed from the date the challenge is filed.

Lastly, Cortina claimed that, following the expiry of paragraph 15(a)(ii) of China's WTO Protocol of Accession on 11 December 2016, the Commission can no longer rely on the methodology used to determine normal value for Chinese exporters in the original investigation (i.e. the analogue country methodology under Article 2(7)(a) of the basic Regulation).

The contested regulation was adopted in 2006. The relevant legislation applicable to this proceeding is Regulation (EU) 2016/1036. Therefore, this claim is rejected.

This Regulation is in accordance with the opinion of the Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036,