Subsequent to the disclosure of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which a provisional anti-dumping duty was imposed (‘the provisional disclosure’), the complainant and the sole Belarusian exporting producer made written submissions making known their views on the provisional findings. The parties who so requested were granted an opportunity to be heard.

Hearings took place with the Belarusian exporting producer and with Union producers.

The Commission considered the oral and written comments submitted by the interested parties and, where appropriate, modified the provisional findings.

1. a)

   Unrelated importer in the Union:

   • Duferco Deutschland GmbH, Germany

2. b)

   Union users:

   • ATG Deutschland GmbH, Germany

   • Tilts Ltd, Latvia

The Commission informed all parties of the essential facts and considerations on the basis of which it intends to impose a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of rebars (‘the definitive disclosure’). All parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on the definitive disclosure. After definitive disclosure, in the light of the findings as established in recitals (18) to (24) of the General Disclosure Document the Commission analysed injury indicators excluding data pertaining to the Italian market for which all parties were informed (the additional final disclosure). Subsequently, all parties were granted a period within which they could make comments on the additional disclosure. The comments submitted by the interested parties were considered and taken into account where appropriate.

In the absence of comments concerning the method of sampling, the provisional findings set out in recitals (7) to (10) of the provisional Regulation are confirmed.

In the absence of comments concerning the investigation period (‘IP’) and the period considered, the periods established in recital (14) of the provisional Regulation are confirmed.

The correction of the figures above did not have any impact on the injury assessment. Indeed, the trends observed were the same and therefore the Commission's findings in recitals (62) to (66) of the provisional Regulation are confirmed.

As described in recital (132) of the provisional Regulation, the Belarusian exporting producer and one of the non-sampled Union importers raised the issue of alleged price-fixing among the Union producers, which would have rendered the injury data unreliable. This claim was further developed by the Belarusian company in its submission after provisional disclosure. The Belarusian exporting producer indicated that a cartel investigation was currently being conducted by Italian Competition Authority (Autorità Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato (‘AGCM’)) with regard to certain companies located in Northern Italy. One of the companies concerned is part of the sample of the Union producers in the current antidumping investigation.

Following this claim, the Commission requested relevant information from AGCM to evaluate whether and to what extent those facts influence the reliability of the injury data of the Union industry in the present anti-dumping proceedings.

The information submitted by AGCM shows that the product concerned in this investigation, rebars, overlaps with the products subject to the antitrust investigation, and also that the alleged cartel was in force during the whole investigation period. In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the data of the sampled Italian producer is not reliable for the purpose of the injury analysis.

1. (a)

   Union consumption

   	2012	2013	2014	IP
   Consumption (in tonnes)	7 400 363	7 241 202	7 917 877	8 149 861
   Index (2012 = 100)	100	98	107	110

2. (b)

   Volume and market share of the imports concerned

   	2012	2013	2014	IP
   Volume (tonnes)	159 395	140 970	236 109	457 755
   Index (2012 = 100)	100	88	148	287
   Market share on EU consumption (%)	2,2	1,9	3,0	5,6
   Index (2012 = 100)	100	90	138	261

1. (a)

   Production, production capacity and capacity utilisation

   	2012	2013	2014	IP
   Production volume (tonnes)	10 108 006	9 652 130	10 283 598	9 605 712
   Index (2012 = 100)	100	95	102	95
   Production capacity (tonnes)	13 850 553	14 047 161	14 173 253	13 910 700
   Index (2012 = 100)	100	101	102	100
   Capacity utilisation (%)	73	69	73	69
   Index (2012 = 100)	100	94	99	95

2. (b)

   Sales volume, market share and growth

   	2012	2013	2014	IP
   Sales volume unrelated (tonnes)	6 358 083	6 177 049	6 232 069	6 229 333
   Index (2012 = 100)	100	97	98	98
   Market share unrelated sales (%)	86	85	79	76
   Index (2012 = 100)	100	99	92	89
   Sales volume related (tonnes)	355 888	361 542	730 267	625 858
   Index (2012 = 100)	100	102	205	176
   Market share related sales (%)	5	5	9	8
   Index (2012 = 100)	100	104	192	160

3. (c)

   Employment and productivity

   	2012	2013	2014	IP
   Number of employees	4 314	4 103	4 278	4 189
   Index (2012 = 100)	100	95	99	97
   Productivity (MT/employee)	2 343	2 353	2 404	2 293
   Index (2012 = 100)	100	100	103	98

1. (a)

   Average unit selling prices on the Union market and unit cost of production

   	2012	2013	2014	IP
   Average unit selling price in the Union to unrelated customers (EUR/tonne)
   Index (2012 = 100)	100	93	89	78
   Unit cost of goods sold (EUR/tonne)
   Index (2012 = 100)	100	96	91	81

2. (b)

   Profitability, cash flow, investments, return on investments and ability to raise capital

   	2012	2013	2014	IP
   Profitability of sales in the Union to unrelated customers (% of sales turnover)
   Index (2012 = 100)	100	– 593	– 435	– 603
   Cash flow (EUR)
   Index (2012 = 100)	100	35	51	14
   Investments (EUR)
   Index (2012 = 100)	100	83	79	72
   Return on investments
   Index (2012 = 100)	100	– 606	– 500	– 645

3. (c)

   Stocks

   	2012	2013	2014	IP
   Closing stocks (tonnes)
   Index (2012 = 100)	100	85	106	73

4. (d)

   Labour costs

   	2012	2013	2014	IP
   Average labour costs per employee (EUR)
   Index (2012 = 100)	100	100	104	103

On that basis, the Commission notes that the development of the injury indicators without the data pertaining to Italy is practically the same to the one reflecting the whole Union market including Italy. It can therefore be concluded that following the exclusion of data relating to the Italian market from the injury analysis, the situation of the Union industry is still one of material injury within the meaning of Article 3(5) of the basic Regulation

As far as undercutting is concerned, the Commission first notes that the undercutting margin found at provisional stage was 4,5 %. The Commission has re-examined the existence of undercutting in the light of the findings above in recitals (19) to (23). Undercutting is established by using data from the sampled companies. Hence, the Commission has excluded from the undercutting calculations the data relating to the Italian producer that is part of the sample. The undercutting margin based on all sampled companies minus the Italian one remains significant at a level of 4,4 %.

The Belarussian exporting producer also claimed that the undercutting (and underselling) calculations should not be done by comparison to the prices of all transactions of the sampled Union producers but only in comparison to those happening where the competition with Belarusian import takes place. Undercutting calculations are normally performed on the basis of dumped imports of the product concerned into the Union with all comparable sales of the Union industry. However, given the specific circumstances of this case and the particular characteristics of the product concerned, the Commission has also calculated an undercutting margin by limiting the analysis to those Member States where the Belarusian products were first sold, mainly in the Netherlands, Germany, Poland, and Lithuania. This approach is based on the conservative assumption that the immediate and direct pressure exercised by the dumped imports on Union sales prices first took place in those Member States. Any subsequent trickling through of the effect to other Member States has thus deliberately been ignored. Under this scenario, the duly adjusted weighted average sales prices of the Belarusian dumped imports were compared to the corresponding sales prices of the sampled Union producers, excluding the one located in Italy, charged to unrelated customers in those regions where direct competition with Belarusian products occurred. This resulted in an undercutting margin of 2,8 %, instead of the 4,5 % margin as established in recital (68) of the provisional Regulation.

The product concerned by this investigation can be considered a commodity product, which is very price sensitive. It is therefore concluded that even an undercutting margin of 2,8 % is significant and sufficient to cause price depression as explained in recitals (83), (84) and (98) of the provisional Regulation.

Following final disclosure, the Belarussian exporting producer also claimed that the findings above in recitals (19) to (23) would most likely have spill-over effects on other Member States, especially in France, where the parent company of one of the Italian producers has a subsidiary holding a strong market position. However, with respect to the alleged anti-competitive conduct in Italy, AGCM has defined the relevant geographic market as national. Moreover, the evidence of the file summarized in recitals (19) to (23) on its own does not support such a claim. This claim is therefore rejected.

In the absence of any additional comments with regard to injury to the Union industry, the provisional findings and conclusions set out in recitals (70) to (95) of the provisional Regulation are confirmed.

In the absence of any comments with regard to the effect of dumped imports on the economic situation of the Union industry, the findings and conclusions set out in recitals (97) to (100) of the provisional Regulation are confirmed.

In summary, the Commission considers that none of the arguments put forward by the interested parties after the provisional disclosure were able to alter the provisional findings which established a causal link between the dumped imports and the material injury suffered by the Union industry during the IP. Thus, the conclusions set out in recitals (112) to (115) of the provisional Regulation are confirmed.

The Commission has found that the only other factor that may have had an impact on the situation of the Union industry was imports from third countries, as stated in the recital (104) of the provisional Regulation. However, the Commission concluded that those imports could not break the causal link between Belarusian dumped imports and the material injury found to the Union industry and that the dumped imports from Belarus remained the main cause of injury.

Based on the above analysis, which distinguished and separated the effects of all known factors on the situation of the Union industry from the injurious effects of the dumped imports, it is concluded that the dumped imports from Belarus caused material injury to the Union industry within the meaning of Article 3(6) of the basic Regulation.

In the absence of any comments with regard to the interest of the Union industry, the conclusions set out in recitals (117) to (122) of the provisional Regulation are confirmed.

The Belarusian exporting producer claimed in its submissions that the Commission's assessment of Union interest did not take into account particular problems of importers and users located in the Baltic States. It claimed that, due to logistic reasons (such as, railway connections or certificate requirements), Belarus is the only source of supply of rebars for those companies.

In this regard, the Commission confirmed that the only cooperating user located in the Baltic States experienced certain technical problems with deliveries from the Union producers (none of them being located in the Baltic States). On the other hand, this company stated that purchases from Belarus could be, and in the post IP period effectively were, replaced by purchases from Russia and to some extent also from Ukraine.

Furthermore, the Commission received very low cooperation from the companies located in the Baltic States, which seems to indicate that they do not perceive that they would be negatively affected by potential antidumping measures concerning Belarusian imports of the product concerned.

In the absence of other comments with regard to the interest of the users and importers, the conclusions set out in recitals (123) to (131) and recital (134) of the provisional Regulation are confirmed.

In its submission after the provisional disclosure, the complainant claimed that the level of antidumping duty proposed at provisional stage (12,5 %) would not be sufficient, as the measure could easily be absorbed by the Belarusian exporting producer, which is a state-owned company, located in a non-market economy country with alleged favourable access to the subsidized raw material metal scrap.

With regard to this claim, it should be stressed that the potential absorption can only be a matter of a separate anti-absorption investigation on the basis of Article 12 of the basic Regulation and cannot affect in advance the level of antidumping measures imposed in the original investigation. Furthermore, the evidence available in this investigation does not support the allegation of the easy access to a subsidized raw material by the Belarusian producer; in fact, the Commission found that the company purchases most of its raw material from Russia and Ukraine, countries considered as market economies.

In its submission after the provisional disclosure, the Belarussian exporting producer and the Belarussian authorities referred to the strategic importance of the cooperation with the EU in the steel sector, and the fact that measures may negatively affect Belarusian purchases of capital equipment in the Union, the establishment of network of related trading companies in the Union, and any cooperation with European financial institutions.

In response to this point, the Commission underlines that the measures have as sole purpose to restore a level playing field on the Union market. It is not of a punitive nature. If the exporting producer increases its prices durably, so that dumping ceases to exist, it can ask for a refund and an interim review. Therefore, the Commission does not consider those considerations to be relevant for the assessment of Union interest.

In summary, none of the arguments put forward by the interested parties demonstrates that there are compelling reasons against the imposition of measures on imports of the product concerned from Belarus. Any negative effects on unrelated users and importers can be mitigated by the availability of alternative sources of supply. Moreover, when considering the overall impact of the anti-dumping measures on the Union market, the positive effects, in particular on the Union industry, appear to outweigh the potential negative impacts on the other interested parties. Thus, the conclusions set out in recitals (135) to (137) of the provisional Regulation are confirmed.

In view of the conclusions reached with regard to dumping, injury, causation and Union interest, and in accordance with Article 9(4) of the basic Regulation, definitive anti-dumping measures should be imposed on the imports of the product concerned at the level of the injury margin, in accordance with the lesser duty rule.

After final disclosure the Belarussian exporting producer claimed that the circumstances of the case justified the imposition of measures under the form of a partial duty free amount, i.e. that the first 200 000 tons imported would be free of duty, and that the duration of the measures should be limited to two years.

It is recalled that dumping results from price discrimination and therefore the remedy should consist of anti-dumping duties or a price undertaking. A duty free quota as requested by the Belarussian exporter does not contain any price element which would remedy injurious dumping and can therefore not be accepted. In this case there is also no justification for reducing the period of application of the measures. Should the circumstances change, the Belarussian has the possibility to request a review of the measures pursuant to Article 11(3) of the basic Regulation. The claims are therefore rejected. It is also recalled that the Commission may revisit the findings should the cartel investigation put in question the definitive findings set out in this regulation.

In view of the dumping margins found and given the level of the injury caused to the Union industry, the amounts secured by way of the provisional anti-dumping duty, imposed by the provisional Regulation, should be definitively collected.

The Committee established by Article 15(1) of Regulation (EU) 2016/1036 did not deliver an opinion,