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This Appendix specifies the design and the procedures to follow in order to perform the remote communication function (the Communication) as required in Article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 (the Regulation).
It is important to comprehend that this functionality is intended to serve only as a pre-filter in order to select vehicles for closer inspection, and it does not replace the formal inspection process as determined in the provisions of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014. See recital 9 in the preamble of this regulation, stating that remote communication between the tachograph and control authorities for roadside control purposes facilitates targeted roadside checks.
The scope of this Appendix is to specify how agents of the competent control authorities use a specified 5.8 GHz DSRC wireless communication to remotely obtain data (the Data) from a targeted vehicle that identifies that the targeted vehicle is in potential violation of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 and should be targeted for consideration to be stopped for further investigation.
Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 requires that the Data collected shall be limited to data or pertaining to data that identifies a potential infringement, as defined in Article 9 of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014.
[F1In this scenario, the time available for communication is limited, because the Communication is targeted and of a short- range design. Further, the same communication means for remote tachograph monitoring (RTM) may also be used by the competent control authorities for other applications (such as the maximal weights and dimensions for heavy goods vehicles defined in Directive (EU) 2015/719) and such operations may be separate or sequential at the discretion of the competent control authorities.]
Textual Amendments
This Appendix specifies:
The communications equipment, procedures and protocols to be used for the Communication
The Standards and Regulations to which the radio equipment shall comply
The presentation of the Data to the Communication equipment
The enquiry and download procedures and sequence of operations
The Data to be transferred
Potential interpretation of the Data transferred across the Communication
The provisions for security data relating to the Communication
The availability of the Data to the competent control authorities
How the Remote early detection communication reader can request different freight and fleet data concepts
For clarification, this Appendix does not specify:
the collection of the Data operation and management within the VU (which shall be a function of product design unless specified elsewhere within Regulation (EU) No 165/2014)
the form of presentation of collected data to the agent of the competent control authorities, nor the criteria which shall be used by the competent control authorities to decide which vehicles to stop (which shall be a function of product design unless specified elsewhere within Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 or a policy decision of the competent control authorities). For clarification: the Communication only makes the Data available to the competent control authorities in order that they may make informed decisions
Data security provisions (such as encryption) concerning the content of the Data (which shall be specified within Appendix 11 Common Security Mechanisms).
detail of any data concepts other than RTM which may be obtained using the same architecture and equipment
detail of the behaviour and management between VU's and the DSRC-VU, nor the behaviour within the DSRC-VU (other than to provide the Data when so requested by an REDCR).
The following acronyms and definitions specific to this Appendix are used in this appendix:
electrical device which converts electric power into radio waves, and vice versa used in combination with a radio transmitter or radio receiver. In operation, a radio transmitter supplies an electric current oscillating at radio frequency to the antenna's terminals, and the antenna radiates the energy from the current as electromagnetic waves (radio waves). In reception, an antenna intercepts some of the power of an electromagnetic wave in order to produce a tiny voltage at its terminals, that is applied to a receiver to be amplified
exchange of information/data between a DSRC-REDCR and a DSRC-VU according to section 5 in a master-slave relationship to obtain the Data.
secured data of defined format (see 5.4.4) requested by the DSRC-REDCR and provided to the DSRC-REDCR by the DSRC-VU across a 5.8 GHz DSRC link as defined in 5 below
Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on tachographs in road transport, repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 on recording equipment in road transport and amending Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport
Application Identifier
Bluetooth Low Energy
Beacon Service Table
Card insertion while driving
cyclic redundancy check
identifier of a requirement for a specific DSRC appendix
Dedicated Short Range Communication
DSRC — Remote Early Detection Communication Reader.
DSRC — Vehicle Unit. This is the ‘remote early detection facility’ defined in Annex 1C.
Driving without valid card
Element Identifier
Logical Link Control
LLC Protocol Data Unit
Onboard Weighing System
Protocol Data Unit
Remote early detection communication reader. This is the ‘remote early detection communication reader equipment’ defined in Annex 1C.
Remote Tachograph Monitoring
Security Module-Remote early detection communication reader
Telematics Applications for Regulated Vehicles (ISO 15638 series of Standards)
Vehicle Unit
Vehicle Unit Payload Memory
Vehicle Unit Security Module
Vehicle Service Table
Weigh in motion
Weigh on board
The specification defined in this Appendix refers to and depends upon all or parts of the following regulations and standards. Within the clauses of this Appendix the relevant standards, or relevant clauses of standards, are specified. In the event of any contradiction the clauses of this Appendix shall take precedence. In the event of any contradiction where no specification is clearly determined in this Appendix, operating within ERC 70-03 (and tested against the appropriate parameters of EN 300 674-1) shall take precedence, followed in descending order of preference by EN 12795, EN 12253 EN 12834 and EN 13372, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4 and 7.1.
Regulations and standards referenced in this Appendix are:
Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on tachographs in road transport, repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3821/85 on recording equipment in road transport and amending Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport.
Regulation (EC) No 561/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the harmonisation of certain social legislation relating to road transport and amending Council Regulations (EEC) No 3821/85 and (EC) No 2135/98 and repealing Council Regulation (EEC) No 3820/85 (Text with EEA relevance).
ERC 70-03 CEPT: ECC Recommendation 70-03: Relating to the Use of Short Range Devices (SRD)
ISO 15638 Intelligent transport systems — Framework for cooperative telematics applications for regulated commercial freight vehicles (TARV).
EN 300 674-1 Electromagnetic compatibility and Radio spectrum Matters (ERM); Road Transport and Traffic Telematics (RTTT); Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) transmission equipment (500 kbit/s / 250 kbit/s) operating in the 5,8 GHz Industrial, Scientific and Medical (ISM) band; Part 1: General characteristics and test methods for Road Side Units (RSU) and On-Board Units (OBU).
EN 12253 Road transport and traffic telematics — Dedicated short-range communication — Physical layer using microwave at 5.8 GHz.
EN 12795 Road transport and traffic telematics — Dedicated short-range communication — Data link layer: medium access and logical link control.
EN 12834 Road transport and traffic telematics — Dedicated short-range communication — Application layer.
EN 13372 Road transport and traffic telematics — Dedicated short-range communication — Profiles for RTTT applications
ISO 14906 Electronic fee collection — Application interface definition for dedicated short- range communication
Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 provides specific and controlled scenarios within which the Communication is to be used.
The scenarios supported are:
‘Communication Profile 1: Roadside inspection using a short range wireless communication Remote Early Detection Communication Reader instigating a physical roadside inspection (master-:-slave)
Reader Profile 1a: via a hand aimed or temporary roadside mounted and aimed Remote Early Detection Communication
Reader Profile 1b: via a vehicle mounted and directed Remote Early Detection Communication Reader’.
NOTE: In order to understand the context of the preconditions the reader is referred to Figure 14.3 below.U.K.
This profile covers the use case where an agent of the competent control authorities, uses a short range remote communication Remote Early Detection Communication Reader (5.8 GHz DSRC interfaces operating within ERC 70-03, and tested against the appropriate parameters of EN 300 674-1 as described in section 5) (the REDCR) to remotely identify a vehicle which is potentially in violation of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014. Once identified, the agent of the competent control authorities who is controlling the interrogation decides whether the vehicle should be stopped.
In this use case the agent of the competent control authorities is situated at the roadside, and aims a hand held, tripod mounted, or similar portable, REDCR from the roadside towards the centre of the windshield of the targeted vehicle. The interrogation is made using 5.8 GHz DSRC interfaces operating within ERC 70-03, and tested against the appropriate parameters of EN 300 674-1 as described in section 5. See Figure 14.1 (Use Case 1).
In this use case the agent of the competent control authorities is situated within a moving vehicle, and either aims a hand held, portable REDCR from the vehicle towards the centre of the windshield of the targeted vehicle, or the REDCR is mounted within or on the vehicle so as to point towards the centre of the windshield of the targeted vehicle when the Remote Early Detection Communication Reader's vehicle is in a particular position relevant to the targeted vehicle (for example directly ahead in a stream of traffic). The interrogation is made using 5.8 GHz DSRC interfaces operating within ERC 70-03, and tested against the appropriate parameters of EN 300 674-1 as described in section 5. See Figure 14.2. (Use Case 2).
To give the possibility to verify the authenticity and integrity of downloaded data through the remote communication, the secured Data is verified and decrypted in accordance with Appendix 11 Common Security Mechanisms.
The design of the remote communication function in the Smart Tachograph is shown as described in Figure 14.3.
Security Module (VUSM). This function present in the VU is responsible for securing the Data which is to be transmitted from the DSRC-VU to the agent of the competent control authorities via remote communication.
The secured data is stored in the VUSM memory. At intervals determined in 4.1.1.1 (DSC_12), the VU encrypts and replenishes the RTMdata concept (which comprises payload data and security data concept values determined below in this Appendix) held in the memory of the DSRC-VU. The operation of the security module is defined in Appendix 11 Common Security Mechanisms and outwith the scope of this Appendix, save that it shall be required to provide updates to the VU Communication facility each time the VUSM data changes.
The communication between the VU and the DSRC-VU may be a wired communication or a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) communication, and the physical location of the DSRC-VU may be integral with the antenna on the windshield of the vehicle, may be internal to the VU, or located somewhere between.
The DSRC-VU shall have a reliable source of power available at all times. The means by which it is provided with its power is a design decision.
The memory of the DSRC-VU shall be non-volatile in order to maintain the Data in the DSRC-VU even when the vehicle ignition is switched off.
If the communication between the VU and the DSRC-VU is made via BLE and the power source is a non-recharging battery, the power source of the DSRC-VU shall be replaced at every Periodic Inspection, and the manufacturer of the DSRC-VU equipment shall be responsible to ensure that the power supply is adequate to last from one Periodic Inspection to the next Periodic Inspection, maintaining normal access to the data by an REDCR throughout the period without failure or interruption.
VU RTM ‘payload memory’ facility (VUPM). This function present in the VU is responsible for providing and updating the Data. The content of The Data. (‘TachographPayload’) is defined in 5.4.4/5.4.5 below and is updated at the interval determined in 4.1.1.1 (DSC_12).
DSRC-VU. This is the function, within or connected to the antenna and in communication with the VU through a wired or wireless (BLE) connection, which holds the current data (VUPM-data) and manages the response to an interrogation across the 5.8 GHz DSRC medium. Disconnection of the DSRC facility or interference during normal vehicle operation with the functioning of the DSRC facility shall be construed as a violation of Regulation (EU) No 165/2014.
Security module (REDCR) (SM-REDCR) is the function used to decrypt and check integrity of the data originating from the VU. The means by which this is achieved is determined in Appendix 11 Common Security Mechanisms, and is not defined in this Appendix.
The DSRC facility (REDCR) (DSRC-REDCR) function comprises a 5.8 GHz transceiver and associated firmware and software which manages the Communication with the DSRC-VU according to this Appendix.
The DSRC-REDCR interrogates the DSRC-VU of the targeted vehicle and obtains the Data (the targeted vehicle's current VUPM-data) via the DSRC link and processes and stores the received data in its SM-REDCR.
[F1The DSRC-VU antenna shall be positioned at a location where it optimizes the DSRC communication between the vehicle and the roadside reader antenna, when the reader is installed 15 meters distance in front of the vehicle and 2 meters height, targeting the horizontal and vertical centre of the windscreen. For light vehicles an installation corresponding to the upper part of the windscreen is suitable. For all the other vehicles the DSRC antenna shall be installed either near the lower or near the upper part of the windscreen.]
Figure 14.4
Example of positioning of the 5,8 GHz DSRC antenna in the windshield of regulated vehicles
The form factor of the REDCR and its antenna may vary according to the circumstances of the reader (tripod mounted, hand held, vehicle mounted, etc.) and the modus operandi employed by the agent of the competent control authorities.
A display and/or notification function is used to present the results of the remote communication function to the agent of the competent control authorities. A display may be provided on a screen, as a printed output, an audio signal, or a combination of such notifications. The form of such display and/or notification is a matter of the requirements of the agents of the competent control authorities and equipment design and is not specified within this Appendix.
The workflow of operations is represented in Figure 14.5.
The steps are described below:
Whenever the vehicle is in operation (ignition ON) the tachograph is providing data to the VU function. The VU function prepares the Data for the remote communication function (encrypted) and updates the VUPM held in the memory of the DSRC-VU (as defined in 4.1.1.1 — 4.1.1.2). The Data collected shall be formatted as determined in 5.4.4 — 5.4.5 below.
On every occasion that the Data is updated, the timestamp defined in the security data concept shall be updated.
The VUSM function secures the data in accordance with the procedures determined in Appendix 11.
On every occasion that the Data is updated (see 4.1.1.1 — 4.1.1.2), the Data shall be transferred to the DSRC-VU, where it replaces any previous data, in order that updated current data (the Data) shall always be available to be provided in the event of an interrogation by an REDCR. When supplied by the VU to the DSRC-VU the Data shall be identifiable by the filename RTMData or by ApplicationID and Attribute identifiers.
If an agent of the competent control authorities wishes to target a vehicle and collect the Data from the targeted vehicle, the agent of the competent control authorities shall first insert his/her smartcard in the REDCR to enable the Communication and to allow the SM-REDCR to verify its authenticity and decrypt the data.
The agent of the competent control authority then targets a vehicle and requests the data through remote communication. The REDCR opens a 5.8 GHz DSRC interface session with the DSRC-VU of the targeted vehicle, and requests the Data. The Data is transferred to the REDCR through the wireless communication system as a DSRC Attribute using the Application service GET as defined in 5.4. The Attribute contains the encrypted payload data values and the DSRC security data.
The data is analyzed by the REDCR equipment and provided to the agent of the competent control authority.
The agent of the competent control authority uses the data to assist in a decision of whether or not to stop for a detailed inspection, or ask another agent of the competent control authority to stop the vehicle.
Namely:
Downlink parameters
a – Downlink parameters subject to conformance testing in accordance with relevant parameter test from EN 300 674-1. | |||
Item No | Parameter | Value(s) | Remark |
---|---|---|---|
D1 | Downlink Carrier Frequencies | There are four alternatives which may be used by an REDCR:
| Within ERC 70-03. Carrier Frequencies may be selected by the implementer of the roadside system and need not be known in the DSRC-VU (Consistent with EN 12253, EN 13372) |
D1a a | Tolerance of Carrier Frequencies | within ± 5 ppm | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
D2 a | RSU (REDCR) Transmitter Spectrum Mask | Within ERC 70-03. REDCR shall be according to Class B,C as defined in EN 12253. No other specific requirement within this Annex | Parameter used for controlling interference between interrogators in proximity (as defined in EN 12253 and EN 13372). |
D3 | OBU(DSRC-VU) Minimum Frequency Range | 5,795 — 5,815 GHz | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
D4 a | Maximum E.I.R.P. | Within ERC 70-03 (unlicensed) and within National Regulation Maximum + 33 dBm | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
D4a | Angular E.I.R.P. mask | According to declared and published specification of interrogator designer | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
D5 | Polarisation | Left hand circular | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
D5a | Cross-Polarisation | XPD: In bore sight: (REDCR) RSU t ≥ 15 dB (DSRC-VU) OBU r ≥ 10 dB At -3 dB area: (REDCR) RSU t ≥ 10 dB (DSRC-VU) OBU r ≥ 6 dB | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
D6 a | Modulation | Two level amplitude modulation. | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
D6a a | Modulation Index | 0,5 ... 0,9 | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
D6b | Eye Pattern | ≥ 90 % (time) / ≥ 85 % (amplitude) | |
D7 a | Data Coding | FM0 ‘1’ bit has transitions only at the beginning and end of the bit interval. ‘0’ bit has an additional transition in the middle of the bit interval compared to the ‘1’ bit. | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
D8 a | Bit rate | 500 kBit/s | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
D8a | Tolerance of Bit Clock | better than ± 100 ppm | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
D9 a | Bit Error Rate (B.E.R.) for communication | ≤ 10– 6 when incident power at OBU (DSRC-VU) is in the range given by [D11a to D11b]. | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
D10 | Wake-up trigger for OBU (DSRC-VU) | OBU (DSRC-VU) shall wake up on receiving any frame with 11 or more octets (including preamble) | No special wake-up pattern is necessary. DSRC-VU may wake up on receiving a frame with less than 11 octets (Consistent with EN 12253) |
D10a | Maximum Start Time | ≤ 5 ms | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
D11 | Communication zone | Spatial region within which a B.E.R. according to D9a is achieved | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
D11a a | Power Limit for communication (upper). | – 24dBm | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
D11b a | Power Limit for communication (lower). | Incident power:
| (Consistent with EN 12253) Extended requirement for horizontal angles up to ±45°, due to the use cases defined in this annex. |
D12 a | Cut-off power level of (DSRC-VU) | – 60 dBm | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
D13 | Preamble | Preamble is mandatory. | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
D13a | Preamble Length and Pattern | 16 bits ± 1 bit of FM0 coded ‘1’ bits | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
D13b | Preamble Wave form | An alternating sequence of low level and high level with pulse duration of 2 μs. The tolerance is given byD8a | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
D13c | Trailing Bits | The RSU (REDCR) is permitted to transmit a maximum of 8 bits after the end flag. An OBU (DSRC-VU) is not required to take these additional bits into account. | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
Uplink parameters
a – Uplink parameters subject to conformance testing in accordance with relevant parameter test from EN 300 674-1 | |||
Item No. | Parameter | Value(s) | Remark |
---|---|---|---|
U1 a | Sub-carrier Frequencies | A OBU (DSRC-VU) shall support 1,5 MHz and 2,0 MHz An RSU (REDCR) shall support 1,5 MHz or 2,0 MHz or both. U1-0: 1,5 MHz U1-1: 2,0 MHz | Selection of sub-carrier frequency (1,5 MHz or 2,0 MHz) depends on the EN 13372 profile selected. |
U1a a | Tolerance of Sub- carrier Frequencies | within ± 0,1 % | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
U1b | Use of Side Bands | Same data on both sides | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
U2 a | OBU (DSRC-VU) Transmitter Spectrum Mask | According to EN12253 1) Out band power: see ETSI EN 300674-1 2) In band power: [U4a] dBm in 500 kHz 3) Emission in any other uplink channel: U2(3)-1 = – 35 dBm in 500 kHz | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
U4a a | Maximum Single Side Band E.I.R.P. (boresight) | Two options:
| According to declared and published specification of equipment designer |
U4b a | Maximum Single Side Band E.I.R.P. (35°) | Two options:
| According to declared and published specification of equipment designer |
U5 | Polarisation | Left hand circular | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
U5a | Cross Polarisation | XPD: In bore sight: (REDCR) RSU r ≥ 15 dB (DSRC-VU) OBU t ≥ 10 dB At – 3 dB: (REDCR) RSU r ≥ 10 dB (DSRC-VU) OBU t ≥ 6 dB | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
U6 | Sub-Carrier Modulation | 2-PSK Encoded data synchronised with sub-carrier: Transitions of encoded data coincide with transitions of sub- carrier. | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
U6b | Duty Cycle | Duty Cycle: 50 % ± α, α ≤ 5 % | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
U6c | Modulation on Carrier | Multiplication of modulated sub- carrier with carrier. | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
U7 a | Data Coding | NRZI (No transition at beginning of ‘1’ bit, transition at beginning of ‘0’ bit, no transition within bit) | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
U8 a | Bit Rate | 250 kbit/s | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
U8a | Tolerance of Bit Clock | Within ± 1 000 ppm | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
U9 | Bit Error Rate (B.E.R.) for communication | ≤10– 6 | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
U11 | Communication Zone | The spatial region within which the DSRC-VU is situated such that its transmissions are received by the REDCR with a B.E.R. of less than that given by U9a. | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
U12a a | Conversion Gain (lower limit) | 1 dB for each side band Range of angle: Circularly symmetric between bore sight and ± 35° and | |
within – 45° ± 45° Corresponding to the plane parallel to the road surface when the DSRC-VU later is installed in the vehicle (Azimuth) | Greater that the specified value range for horizontal angles up to ± 45°, due to the use cases defined in this annex. | ||
U12b a | Conversion Gain (upper limit) | 10 dB for each side band | Less than the specified value range for each side band within a circular cone around boresight of ± 45° opening angle |
U13 | Preamble | Preamble is mandatory. | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
U13a | Preamble Length and Pattern | 32 to 36 μs modulated with sub- carrier only, then 8 bits of NRZI coded ‘0’ bits. | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
U13b | Trailing Bits | The DSRC-VU is permitted to transmit a maximum of 8 bits after the end flag. A RSU (REDCR) is not required to take these additional bits into account. | (Consistent with EN 12253) |
NOTE The purpose of the initialisation phase (Step 1) is to set up the communication between the REDCR and DSRC-VUs that have entered the 5.8 GHz DSRC (master-slave) transaction zone but have not yet established communication with the REDCR, and to notify the application processes.U.K.
Initialisation. The REDCR sends a frame containing a ‘beacon service table’ (BST) that includes the application identifiers (AIDs) in the service list that it supports. In the RTM application this will simply be the service with the AID value = 2 (Freight&Fleet). The DSRC-VU evaluates the received BST, and shall respond (see below) with the list of the supported applications within the Freight&Fleet domain, or shall not respond if none are supported. If the REDCR does not offer AID=2, the DSRC-VU shall not answer to the REDCR.
The DSRC-VU sends a frame containing a request for a private window allocation.
The REDCR sends a frame containing a private window allocation.
The DSRC-VU uses the allocated private window to send a frame containing its vehicle service table (VST). This VST includes a list of all the different application instantiations that this DSRC-VU supports in the framework of AID=2. The different instantiations shall be identified by means of uniquely generated EIDs, each associated with an Application Context Mark parameter value indicating the application and standard supported.
Next the REDCR analyses the offered VST, and either terminates the connection (RELEASE) since it is not interested in anything the VST has to offer (i.e. it is receiving a VST from a DSRC-VU that is not supporting the RTM transaction), or, if it receives an appropriate VST it starts an app instantiation.
To bring this about, the REDCR shall send a frame containing a command to retrieve the RTM data, identifying the RTM application instantiation by specifying the identifier corresponding to the RTM application instantiation (as specified by the DSRC-VU in the VST), and shall allocate a private window.
The DSRC-VU uses the newly allocated private window to send a frame that contains the addressed identifier corresponding to the RTM application instantiation as provided in the VST, followed by the attribute RtmData (payload element + security element).
If there are multiple services requested, the value ‘n’ is changed to the next service reference number and the process repeated.
The REDCR confirms receipt of the data by sending a frame containing a RELEASE command to the DSRC-VU to terminate the session OR if it has failed to validate a successful receipt of the LDPU goes back to step 6.
See Figure 14.6 for a pictorial description of the transaction protocol.
:
A command, issued from the REDCR in the form of a broadcast with definition of applications that the REDCR supports.
:
An answer from the DSRC-VU confirming the connection and containing a list of supported application instances with characteristics and information how to address them (EID).
:
A command, issued from the REDCR to the DSRC-VU, that specifies the application instantiation to be addressed by means of a defined EID, as received in the VST, instructing the DSRC-VU to send the selected attribute(s) with the Data. The objective of the GET command is for the REDCR to obtain the Data from the DSRC-VU.
:
An answer from the DSRC-VU that contains the Data requested.
:
A command, instructing the DSRC-VU to send back data from the DSRC-VU to the REDCR. The objective of the ECHO command is to enable workshops or type approval test facilities to test that the DSRC link is working without needing access to security credentials.
:
An answer from the DSRC VU on the ECHO command.
:
A command, instructing the DSRC-VU that the transaction is ended. The objective of the RELEASE command is to end the session with the DSRC-VU. On receipt of the RELEASE the DSRC-VU shall not respond to any further interrogations under the current connection. Note that according to EN 12834 a DSRC-VU will not connect twice to the same interrogator unless it has been out of the communication zone for 255 seconds or if the Beacon ID of the interrogator is changed.
Sequence | Sender | Receiver | Description | Action | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | REDCR | > | DSRC-VU | Initialisation of the communication link — Request | REDCR broadcasts BST |
2 | DSRC-VU | > | REDCR | Initialisation of the communication link — Response | If BST supports AID=2 then DSRC-VU Requests a private window |
3 | REDCR | > | DSRC-VU | Grants a private window | Sends Frame containing private window allocation |
4 | DSRC-VU | > | REDCR | Sends VST | Sends Frame comprising VST |
5 | REDCR | > | DSRC-VU | Sends GET.request for data in Attribute for specific EID | |
6 | DSRC-VU | > | REDCR | Sends GET.response with requested Attribute for specific EID | Sends Attribute (RTMData, OWSData….) with data for specific EID |
[F17 | REDCR | > | DSRC-VU | Sends GET.request for data of other Attribute (if appropriate) | ] |
8 | DSRC-VU | > | REDCR | Sends GET.response with requested Attribute | Sends Attribute with data for specific EID |
9 | REDCR | > | DSRC-VU | Acknowledges successful receipt of data | Sends RELEASE command which closes transaction |
10 | DSRC-VU | Closes transaction |
An example of the transaction sequence and contents of the exchanged frames is defined in clauses 5.4.7 and 5.4.8
EncryptedTachographPayload data, which is the encryption of the TachographPayload defined in ASN.1 in section 5.4.5. The method of encryption is described in Appendix 11
DSRCSecurityData, specified in Appendix 11.
The ASN.1 module definition for the DSRC data within the RTM application is defined as follows:
Table 14.3 | |||
Elements of RtmData, actions performed and definitions | |||
(1) RTM Data Element | (2) Action performed by the VU | (3) ASN.1 definition of data | |
---|---|---|---|
RTM1 Vehicle Registration Plate | The VU shall set the value of the tp15638VehicleRegistrationPlate data element RTM1 from the recorded value of the data type VehicleRegistrationIdentification as defined in Appendix 1 VehicleRegistrationIdentification | Vehicle Registration Plate expressed as a string of characters | |
RTM2 Speeding Event | The VU shall generate a boolean value for data element RTM2 tp15638SpeedingEvent. The tp15638SpeedingEvent value shall be calculated by the VU from the number of Over Speeding Events recorded in the VU in the last 10 days of occurrence, as defined in Annex 1C. If there is at least one tp15638SpeedingEvent in the last 10 days of occurrence, the tp15638SpeedingEvent value shall be set to TRUE. ELSE if there are no events in the last 10 days of occurrence, the tp15638SpeedingEvent shall be set to FALSE. | 1 (TRUE) — Indicates irregularities in speed within last 10 days of occurrence | |
RTM3 Driving Without Valid Card | The VU shall generate a boolean value for data element RTM3 tp15638DrivingWithoutValidCard. The VU shall assign a value of True to the tp15638DrivingWithoutValidCard variable if the VU data has recorded at least one event in the last 10 days of occurrence of type ‘Driving without an appropriate card’ event as defined in Annex 1C. ELSE if there are no events in the last 10 days of occurrence, the tp15638DrivingWithoutValidCard variable shall be set to FALSE. | 1 (TRUE) = Indicates invalid card usage | |
RTM4 Valid Driver Card | The VU shall generate a boolean value for data element RTM4 tp15638DriverCard on the basis of the data stored in the VU and defined in Appendix 1. If no valid driver card is present the VU shall set the variable to TRUE ELSE if a valid driver card is present the VU shall set the variable to FALSE | 0 (FALSE) = Indicates a valid driver card | |
RTM5 Card Insertion while Driving | The VU shall generate a boolean value for data element RTM5. The VU shall assign a value of TRUE to the tp15638CardInsertion variable if the VU data has recorded in the last 10 days of occurrence at least one event of type ‘Card insertion while driving.’ as defined in Annex 1C. ELSE if there are no such events in the last 10 days of occurrence, the tp15638CardInsertion variable shall be set to FALSE. | 1 (TRUE) = Indicates card insertion while driving within last 10 days of occurrence | |
RTM6 Motion Data Error | The VU shall generate a boolean value for data element RTM6. The VU shall assign a value of TRUE to the tp15638MotionDataError variable if the VU data has in the last 10 days of occurrence recorded at least one event of type ‘Motion data error’ as defined in Annex 1C. ELSE if there are no such events in the last 10 days of occurrence, the tp15638MotionDataError variable shall be set to FALSE. | 1 (TRUE) = Indicates motion data error within last 10 days of occurrence | |
RTM7 Vehicle Motion Conflict | The VU shall generate a boolean value for data element RTM7. The VU shall assign a value of TRUE to the tp15638vehicleMotionConflict variable if the VU data has in the last 10 days recorded at least one event of type Vehicle Motion Conflict (value ‘0A’H ). ELSE if there are no events in the last 10 days of occurrence, the tp15638vehicleMotionConflict variable shall be set to FALSE. | 1 (TRUE) = Indicates motion conflict within last 10 days of occurrence | |
RTM8 2nd Driver Card | The VU shall generate a boolean value for data element RTM8 on the basis of Annex 1C (‘Driver Activity Data’ CREW and CO-DRIVER). If a 2nd valid driver card is present the VU shall set the variable to TRUE ELSE if a 2nd valid driver card is not present the VU shall set the variable to FALSE | 1 (TRUE) = Indicates a second driver card inserted | |
RTM9 Current Activity | The VU shall generate a boolean value for data element RTM9. If the current activity is recorded in the VU as any activity other than ‘DRIVING’ as defined in Annex 1C the VU shall set the variable to TRUE ELSE if the current activity is recorded in the VU as ‘DRIVING’ the VU shall set the variable to FALSE | 1 (TRUE) = other activity selected; 0 (FALSE) = driving selected | |
RTM10 Last Session Closed | The VU shall generate a boolean value for data element RTM10. If the last card session was not properly closed as defined in Annex 1C the VU shall set the variable to TRUE. ELSE if the last card session was properly closed the VU shall set the variable to FALSE | 1 (TRUE) = improperly closed 0 (FALSE) = properly closed | |
RTM11 Power Supply Interruption | The VU shall generate an integer value for data element RTM11. The VU shall assign a value for the tp15638PowerSupplyInterruption variable equal to the longest power supply interruption according to Article 9, Reg (EU) 165/2014 of type ‘Power supply interruption’ as defined in Annex 1C. ELSE if in the last 10 days of occurrence there are have been no Power supply interruption events the value of the integer shall be set to 0. | —Number of power supply interruptions in last 10 days of occurrence | |
[F1RTM12 Sensor Fault | The VU shall generate an integer value for data element RTM12. The VU shall assign to the variable sensorFault a value of:
| – sensor fault one octet as per data dictionary | ] |
RTM13 Time Adjustment | The VU shall generate an integer value (timeReal from Appendix 1) for data element RTM13 on the basis of the presence of Time Adjustment data as defined in Annex 1C. The VU shall assign the value of time at which the last time adjustment data event has occurred. ELSE if no ‘Time Adjustment’ event. as defined in Annex 1C is present in the VU data it shall set a value of 0 | Time of the last time adjustment | |
RTM14 Security Breach Attempt | The VU shall generate an integer value (timeReal from Appendix 1) for data element RTM14 on the basis of the presence of a Security breach attempt event as defined in Annex 1C. The VU shall set the value of the time of the latest security breach attempt event recorded by the VU. ELSE if no ‘security breach attempt’ event as defined in Annex 1C is present in the VU data it shall set a value of 0x00FF. | Time of last breach attempt —Default value =0x00FF | |
RTM15 Last Calibration | The VU shall generate an integer value (timeReal from Appendix 1) for data element RTM15 on the basis of the presence of Last Calibration data as defined in Annex 1C. The VU shall set the value of time of the latest two calibrations (RTM15 and RTM16), which are set in VuCalibrationData defined in Appendix 1. The VU shall set the value for RTM15 to the timeReal of the latest calibration record. | Time of last calibration data | |
RTM16 Previous Calibration | The VU shall generate an integer value (timeReal from Appendix 1) for data element RTM16 of the calibration record preceding that of the last calibration ELSE if there has been no previous calibration the VU shall set the value of RTM16 to 0. | Time of previous calibration data | |
RTM17 Date Tachograph Connected | For data element RTM17 the VU shall generate an integer value (timeReal from Appendix 1). The VU shall set the value of the time of the initial installation of the VU. The VU shall extract this data from the VuCalibrationData (Appendix 1) from the vuCalibrationRecords with CalibrationPurpose equal to: ‘03’H | Date tachograph connected | |
RTM18 Current Speed | The VU shall generate an integer value for data element RTM18. The VU shall set the value for RTM16 to the last current recorded speed at the time of the latest update of the RtmData. | Last current recorded speed | |
RTM19 Timestamp | For data element RTM19 the VU shall generate an integer value (timeReal from Appendix 1). The VU shall set the value for RTM19 to the time of the latest update of the RtmData. | Timestamp of current TachographPayload record |
Table 14.4 | |
Initialisation — BST frame settings | |
Field | Settings |
---|---|
Link Identifier | Broadcast address |
BeaconId | As per EN 12834 |
Time | As per EN 12834 |
Profile | No extension, 0 or 1 to be used |
MandApplications | No extension, EID not present, Parameter not present, AID= 2 Freight&Fleet |
NonMandApplications | Not present |
ProfileList | No extension, number of profiles in list = 0 |
Fragmentation header | No fragmentation |
Layer 2 settings | Command PDU, UI command |
A practical example of the settings specified in Table 14.4, with an indication of bit encodings, is given in the following Table 14.5.
Table 14.7 provides an example of bit encoding.
Table 14.8 | |
Initialisation — VST frame settings | |
Field | Settings |
---|---|
Private LID | As per EN 12834 |
VST parameters | Fill=0, then for each supported application: EID present, parameter present, AID=2, EID as generated by the OBU |
Parameter | No extension, Contains the RTM Context Mark |
ObeConfiguration | The optional ObeStatus field may be present, but shall not be used by the REDCR |
Fragmentation header | No fragmentation |
Layer 2 settings | Command PDU, UI command |
A practical example of the settings specified in Table 14.8, with an indication of bit encodings, is given in Table 14.9.
Table 14.9 | |||
Initialisation — VST frame contents example | |||
Octet # | Attribute/Field | Bits in octet | Description |
---|---|---|---|
1 | FLAG | Start flag | |
2 | Private LID | Link address of the specific DSRC-VU | |
3 | |||
4 | |||
5 | |||
6 | MAC Control field | Command PDU | |
7 | LLC Control field | UI command | |
8 | Fragmentation header | No fragmentation | |
9 | VST SEQUENCE { | Initialisation response | |
Fill BIT STRING (SIZE(4)) | Unused and set to 0 | ||
10 | Profile INTEGER (0..127,...) Applications SEQUENCE OF { | No extension. Example profile 0 | |
11 | No extension, 1 application | ||
12 | SEQUENCE { | ||
OPTION indicator | EID present | ||
OPTION indicator | Parameter present | ||
AID DSRCApplicationEntityID | No extension. AID= 2 Freight&Fleet | ||
13 | EID Dsrc-EID | Defined within the OBU and identifying the application instance. | |
14 | Parameter Container { | No extension, Container Choice = 02, Octet string | |
15 | No extension, Rtm Context Mark length = 8 | ||
16 | Rtm-ContextMark::= SEQUENCE { StandardIdentifier standardIdentifier | [F1Object Identifier of the supported standard, part, and version. Example: ISO (1) Standard (0) TARV (15638) part9 (9) Version1 (1). First octet is 06H, which is the Object Identifier. Second octet is 06H, which is its length. Subsequent 6 octets encode the example Object Identifier.] | |
17 | |||
18 | |||
19 | |||
20 | |||
21 | |||
22 | |||
23 | |||
24 | ObeConfiguration Sequence { | ||
OPTION indicator | ObeStatus not present | ||
EquipmentClass INTEGER (0..32767) | |||
25 | |||
26 | ManufacturerId INTEGER (0..65535) | Manufacturer identifier for the DSRC-VU as described in ISO 14816 Register | |
27 | |||
28 | FCS | Frame check sequence | |
29 | |||
30 | Flag | End Flag |
Table 14.10 | |
Presentation — GET request frame settings | |
Field | Settings |
---|---|
Invoker Identifier (IID) | Not present |
Link Identifier (LID) | Link address of the specific DSRC-VU |
Chaining | No |
Element Identifier (EID) | As specified in the VST. No extension |
Access Credentials | No |
AttributeIdList | No extension, 1 attribute, AttributeID = 1 (RtmData) |
Fragmentation | No |
Layer2 settings | Command PDU, Polled ACn command |
Table 14.11 shows an example of reading the RTM data.
Table 14.12 | |
Presentation — GET response frame settings | |
Field | Settings |
---|---|
Invoker Identifier (IID) | Not present |
Link Identifier (LID) | As per EN 12834 |
Chaining | No |
Element Identifier (EID) | As specified in the VST. |
Access Credentials | No |
Fragmentation | No |
Layer2 settings | Response PDU, Response available and command accepted, ACn command |
Table 14.13 shows an example of reading the RTM data.
However, the basic DSRC communication can be tested by the command ECHO. Such tests may be required on commissioning, at periodic inspection, or otherwise to the requirement of the competent control authority or Regulation (EU) No 165/2014 (See 6 below)
The REDCR sends a ‘beacon service table’ (BST) that includes the application identifiers (AIDs) in the service list that it supports. In the RTM applications this will simply be the service with the AID value = 2.
The DSRC-VU evaluates the received BST, and where it identifies that the BST is requesting Freight&Fleet (AID = 2), the DSRC-VU shall respond. If the REDCR does not offer AID=2, the DSRC-VU shall shut down its transaction with the REDCR.
The DSRC-VU sends a request for a private window allocation.
The REDCR sends a private window allocation.
The DSRC-VU uses the allocated private window to send its vehicle service table (VST). This VST includes a list of all the different application instantiations that this DSRC-VU supports in the framework of AID=2. The different instantiations shall be identified by means of uniquely EIDs, each associated with a parameter value indicating the instance of the application that is supported.
Next the REDCR analyses the offered VST, and either terminates the connection (RELEASE) since it is not interested in anything the VST has to offer (i.e., it is receiving a VST from a DSRC-VU that is not an RTM VU, or, if it receives an appropriate VST it starts an app instantiation.
The REDCR shall issue a command (ECHO) to the specific DSRC-VU, and allocates a private window.
The DSRC-VU uses the newly allocated private window to send an ECHO response frame.
The following tables give a practical example of an ECHO exchange session.
EncryptedOwsPayload data, which is the encryption of the OwsPayload defined in ASN.1 in section 5.5.5. The method of encryption shall be the same adopted for the RtmData, which is specified in Appendix 11
DSRCSecurityData, calculated with the same algorithms adopted for the RtmData, which is specified in Appendix 11.
The elements of OwsData are defined to support Directive 2015/719/EC on the maximal weights and dimensions for heavy goods vehicles. Their meaning is:
recordedWeight represents the total measured weight of the heavy goods vehicle with a resolution of 10 Kg as defined in EN ISO 14906. For example, a value of 2500, represent a weight of 25 tons.
axlesConfiguration represents the configuration of the heavy goods vehicle as number of axles. The configuration is defined with the bit mask of 20 bits (extended from EN ISO 14906).
A bit mask of 2 bits represents the configuration of an axle with the following format:
Value 00B means that value is ‘non available’ because the vehicle does not have equipment to collect the weight on the axle.
Value 01B means that the axle is not present.
Value 10B means that the axle is present and the weight has been calculated and collected and it is provided in the axlesRecordedWeight field.
Value 11B is reserved for future uses.
The last 4 bits are reserved for future uses.
Number of Axles | ||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Number of axles on tractor unit | Number of axles on trailer | |||||||||
00/01/10/11 | 00/01/10/11 | 00/01/10/11 | 00/01/10/11 | 00/01/10/11 | 00/01/10/11 | 00/01/10/11 | 00/01/10/11 | 00/01/10/11 | 00/01/10/11 | RFU (4 bits) |
axlesRecordedWeight represent the specific weight recorded for each axle with a resolution of 10 Kg. Two octets are used for each axle. For example, a value of 150, represent a weight of 1 500 Kgs.
The other data types are defined in 5.4.5.
using fixed cable of at least 2 meters, using a Straight DIN 41612 H11 Connector — 11 pin approved male connector from the DSRC-VU to match a similar DIN/ISO approved female connector from the VU device,
using Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
using a standard ISO 11898 or SAE J1939 connection
Initialisation of the communication link — Request
Initialisation of the communication link — Response
Send Data with Identifier of the RTM application and Payload defined by RTM Data
Acknowledgment of the data
Termination of the communication link — Request
Termination of the communication link — Response
is used to initialize the communication link. The command is sent by the VU to the DSRC-VU. The LinkIdentifier is set by the VU and communicated to the DSRC-VU to track a specific communication link.
(Note: this is to support future links and other application/modules like Weighing on board).U.K.
is used by the DSRC-VU to provide the response of the request to initialize the communication link. The command is sent by the DSRC-VU to the VU. The command provides the result of the initialisation as answer = 1 (Success) or =0 (Failure).
is used to by the VU to send the signed RCDTData (i.e., the remote communication Data) to the DSRC-VU. The data will be sent every 60 seconds. The DataTransactionId parameter identifies the specific transmission of data. The LinkIdentifier is also used to ensure that the appropriate link is correct.
is sent by the DSRC-VU to provide the feedback to the VU on the reception of the data from a command identified by the DataTransactionId parameter. The Answer parameter is 1 (Success) or =0 (Failure). If a VU receives more than three answers equal to 0 or if the VU does not receive a RCDT Data Acknowledgment for a specific previously sent RCDT- Send Data with a specific DataTransactionId, the VU will generate and record an event.
is sent by the VU to DSRC-VU to terminate a link for a specific LinkIdentifier.
is sent by the DSRC-VU to the VU to confirm the request of termination of the link by the VU for the specific LinkIdentifier.
The DSRC medium is a dynamic wireless communication in an environment of uncertain atmospheric and interference conditions, particularly in the ‘portable REDCR’ and ‘moving vehicle’ combinations involved in this application. It is therefore necessary to ascertain the difference between a ‘read failure’ and an ‘error’ condition. In a transaction across a wireless interface, read failure is common and the consequence is usually to retry, i.e. rebroadcast the BST and reattempt the sequence, which will in most circumstances lead to a successful communication connection and transfer of data, unless the target vehicle moves out of range during the time required to retransmit. (A ‘successful’ instance of a ‘read’ may have involved several attempts and retries).
Read failure may be because the antennas were not paired properly (failure of ‘aiming’); because one of the antennas is shielded — this may be deliberate, but also can be caused by the physical presence of another vehicle; radio interference, especially from circa 5.8 GHz WIFI or other public access wireless communications, or may be caused by radar interference, or difficult atmospheric conditions (e.g. during a thunderstorm); or simply by moving out of the range of the DSRC communication. Individual instances of read failures, by their nature, cannot be recorded, simply because the communication simply did not occur.
However, if the agent of the competent control authority targets a vehicle and attempts to interrogate its DSRC-VU, but no successful transfer of data ensues, this failure could have occurred because of deliberate tampering, and therefore the agent of the competent control authority needs a means to log the failure, and alert colleagues downstream that there may be a violation. The colleagues can then stop the vehicle and carry out a physical inspection. However, as no successful communication has taken place, the DSRC-VU cannot provide data concerning the failure. Such reporting shall therefore be a function of REDCR equipment design.
‘Failure to read’ is technically different to an ‘error’. In this context an ‘error’ is the acquisition of a wrong value.
Data transferred to the DSRC-VU is supplied already secured, therefore must be verified by the supplier of the data (see 5.4).
Data subsequently transferred across the air interface is checked by cyclic redundancy checks at the communications level. If the CRC validates, then the data is correct. If the CRC does not validate, the data is retransmitted. The probability that data could successfully pass through a CRC incorrectly is statistically so highly improbable that it may be discounted.
If the CRC does not validate and there is no time to retransmit and receive the correct data, then the result will not be an error, but an instantiation of a specific type of read failure.
The only meaningful ‘failure’ data that can be recorded is that of the number of successful initiations of transactions that occur, that do not result in a successful transfer of data to the REDCR.
The only meaningful ‘error’ data that can be recorded is the number of occasions where the REDCR fails to decrypt the Data received. However, it should be noted that this will only relate to the efficiency of the REDCR software. Data may be technically decrypted, but make no semantic sense.
An ECHO test to validate the DSRC-REDCR >>-:-<DSRC-VU wireless communication channel.
A End-to-end security test to ensure that a workshop card is able to access the encrypted and signed data content created by the VU and transmitted over the wireless communication channel.
This clause contains provisions specifically made to test only that the DSRC-REDCR >>-:-<DSRC-VU is functionally active.
The objective of the ECHO command is to enable workshops or type approval test facilities to test that the DSRC link is working without needing access to security credentials. The tester's equipment therefore only needs to be able to initialise a DSRC communication (sending a BST with AID=2) and then send the ECHO command, and, assuming the DSRC is working, will receive the ECHO response. See 5.4.8 for details. Assuming it receives this response correctly, the DSRC link (DSRC-REDCR >>-:-<DSRC-VU) may be validated as functioning correctly.