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In this configuration, the GNSS receiver is a part of the external GNSS facility.
A commercial GNSS receiver to provide the position data through the GNSS data interface. For example, the GNSS data interface can be NMEA standard V4.10 where The GNSS receiver acts as a talker and transmit NMEA sentences to the GNSS Secure Transceiver with a frequency of 1Hz for the pre-defined set of NMEA sentences, which must include at least the RMC and GSA sentences. The implementation of the GNSS data interface is a choice of the manufacturers of the external GNSS facility.
A transceiver unit (GNSS Secure Transceiver) with the capability to support standard ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 (see 4.2.1) to communicate with the vehicle unit and support the GNSS data interface to the GNSS receiver. The unit is provided with a memory to store the identification data of the GNSS receiver and external GNSS facility.
An enclosure system with tamper detection function, which encapsulate both the GNSS receiver and the GNSS Secure Transceiver. The tamper detection function shall implement the security protection measures as requested in the Protection Profile of the Smart Tachograph.
A GNSS antenna installed on the vehicle and connected to the GNSS receiver through the enclosure system.
the interface to the GNSS antenna installed on the vehicle truck, if an external antenna is used.
the interface to the Vehicle Unit.
the EGF_MA key pair and corresponding certificate,
the MSCA_VU-EGF certificate containing the MSCA_VU-EGF.PK public key to be used for verification of the EGF_MA certificate,
the EUR certificate containing the EUR.PK public key to be used for verification of the MSCA_VU-EGF certificate,
the EUR certificate whose validity period directly precedes the validity period of the EUR certificate to be used to verify the MSCA_VU-EGF certificate, if existing,
the link certificate linking these two EUR certificates, if existing,
the extended serial-number of the external GNSS facility,
operating system identifier of the GNSS facility,
type approval number of the external GNSS facility;
Identifier of the security component of the external GNSS module.
The collection and distribution of GNSS data (e.g., position, timing, speed),
The collection of the configuration data of the external GNSS facility,
The management protocol to support the coupling, mutual authentication and session key agreement between the external GNSS facility and the VU.
Textual Amendments
The mapping of record numbers and data is provided in Table 1. Note that there are five GSA sentences for the GNSS constellations and Satellite-Based Augmentation System (SBAS).]
Table 1 | ||||
File Structure | ||||
Access conditions | ||||
---|---|---|---|---|
File | File ID | Read | Update | Encrypted |
MF | 3F00 | |||
EF.ICC | 0002 | ALW | NEV (by VU) | No |
DF GNSS Facility | 0501 | ALW | NEV | No |
EF EGF_MACertificate | C100 | ALW | NEV | No |
EF CA_Certificate | C108 | ALW | NEV | No |
EF Link_Certificate | C109 | ALW | NEV | No |
EF.EGF | 2F2F | SM-MAC | NEV (by VU) | No |
File / Data element | Record no | Size (bytes) | Default values | |
---|---|---|---|---|
Min | Max | |||
MF | 552 | 1 031 | ||
EF.ICC | ||||
sensorGNSSSerialNumber | 8 | 8 | ||
DF GNSS Facility | 612 | 1 023 | ||
EF EGF_MACertificate | 204 | 341 | ||
EGFCertificate | 204 | 341 | {00..00} | |
EF CA_Certificate | 204 | 341 | ||
MemberStateCertificate | 204 | 341 | {00..00} | |
EF Link_Certificate | 204 | 341 | ||
LinkCertificate | 204 | 341 | {00..00} | |
EF.EGF | ||||
RMC NMEA Sentence | ‘01’ | 85 | 85 | |
1st GSA NMEA Sentence | ‘02’ | 85 | 85 | |
2nd GSA NMEA Sentence | ‘03’ | 85 | 85 | |
3rd GSA NMEA Sentence | ‘04’ | 85 | 85 | |
4th GSA NMEA Sentence | ‘05’ | 85 | 85 | |
5th GSA NMEA Sentence | ‘06’ | 85 | 85 | |
Extended serial-number of the external GNSS facility defined in Appendix 1 as SensorGNSSSerialNumber. | ‘07’ | 8 | 8 | |
Operating system identifier of the GNSS Secure Transceiver defined in Appendix 1 as SensorOSIdentifier. | ‘08’ | 2 | 2 | |
Type approval number of the external GNSS facility defined in Appendix 1 as SensorExternalGNSSApprovalNumber. | ‘09’ | 16 | 16 | |
Identifier of the security component of the external GNSS facility defined in Appendix 1 as SensorExternalGNSSSCIdentifier | ‘10’ | 8 | 8 | |
RFU — Reserved for Future Use | From ‘11’ to ‘FD’ |
The coupling process has been completed as described in Appendix 11. Common security mechanisms.
The periodic mutual authentication and session key agreement between the VU and the external GNSS facility also described in Appendix 11. Common security mechanisms has been executed with the indicated frequency.
The VU requests location data from the External GNSS facility together with Dilution of Precision data (from the GSA NMEA sentence). The VU Secure Transceiver shall use the ISO/IEC 7816-4:2013 SELECT and READ RECORD(S) command in secure messaging authentication-only mode as described in Appendix 11 section 11.5 with the file identifier ‘2F2F’ and RECORD number equal to ‘01’ for RMC NMEA sentence and ‘02’,‘03’,‘04’,‘05’,‘06’ for GSA NMEA sentence.
The last location data received is stored in the EF with identifier ‘2F2F’ and the records described in Table 1 in the GNSS secure transceiver as the GNSS secure transceiver receives NMEA data with a frequency of at least 1 Hz from the GNSS receiver through the GNSS data interface.
The GNSS Secure Transceiver sends the response to the VU Secure Transceiver by using the APDU response message in secure messaging authentication-only mode as described in Appendix 11 section 11.5.
The VU Secure Transceiver checks the authenticity and integrity of the received response. In case of positive outcome, the location data is transferred to the VU processor through the GNSS data interface.
[F1The VU processor checks the received data extracting the information (e.g., latitude, longitude, time) from the RMC NMEA sentence. The RMC NMEA sentence includes the information if the position is valid. If the position is not valid, the location data is not available yet and it cannot be used to record the position of the vehicle. If the position is valid, the VU processor also extracts the values of HDOP from GSA NMEA sentences and calculate the minimum value on the available satellite systems (i.e., when the fix is available).]
The VU processor stores the received and processed information such as latitude, longitude, time and speed in the VU in the format defined in Appendix 1 Data Dictionary as GeoCoordinates together with the value of HDOP calculated as the minimum of the HDOP values collected on the available GNSS systems.
This section describes in detail the structure of the Read Record command. Secure messaging (authentication-only mode) is added as described in Appendix 11 Common security mechanisms.
Byte | Length | Value | Description |
---|---|---|---|
CLA | 1 | ‘0Ch’ | Secure messaging asked. |
INS | 1 | ‘B2h’ | Read Record |
P1 | 1 | ‘XXh’ | Record number (‘00’ references the current record) |
P2 | 1 | ‘04h’ | Read the record with the record number indicated in P1 |
Le | 1 | ‘XXh’ | Length of data expected. Number of Bytes to be read. |
Byte | Length | Value | Description |
---|---|---|---|
#1-#X | X | ‘XX..XXh’ | Data read |
SW | 2 | ‘XXXXh’ | Status Words (SW1,SW2) |
If the command is successful, the GNSS secure transceiver returns ‘9000’.
If the current file is not record oriented, the GNSS secure transceiver returns ‘6981’.
If the command is used with P1 = ‘00’ but there is no current EF the GNSS secure transceiver returns ‘6986’ (command not allowed).
If the record is not found, the GNSS secure transceiver returns ‘6A 83’.
If the external GNSS facility has detected tampering, it shall return status words ‘66 90’.
Command | Reference |
---|---|
Select | Appendix 2 chapter 3.5.1 |
Read Binary | Appendix 2 chapter 3.5.2 |
Get Challenge | Appendix 2 chapter 3.5.4 |
PSO: Verify Certificate | Appendix 2 chapter 3.5.7 |
External Authenticate | Appendix 2 chapter 3.5.9 |
General Authenticate | Appendix 2 chapter 3.5.10 |
MSE:SET | Appendix 2 chapter 3.5.11 |
The coupling, mutual authentication and session key agreement of the external GNSS facility with the vehicle unit is described in Appendix 11. Common security mechanisms, Chapter 11.
This section describes how potential error conditions by the external GNSS facility are addressed and recorded in the VU.