Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the CouncilShow full title

CHAPTER III U.K. SPECIAL INCENTIVE ARRANGEMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE

Article 9 U.K.

1. A GSP beneficiary country may benefit from the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in point (b) of Article 1(2) if:

(a) it is considered to be vulnerable due to a lack of diversification and insufficient integration within the international trading system, as defined in Annex VII;

(b) it has ratified all the conventions listed in Annex VIII (the ‘relevant conventions’) and the most recent available conclusions of the monitoring bodies under those conventions (the ‘relevant monitoring bodies’) do not identify a serious failure to effectively implement any of those conventions;

(c) in relation to any of the relevant conventions, it has not formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of those conventions or which is for the purposes of this Article considered to be incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention.

For the purposes of this Article, reservations shall not be considered to be incompatible with the object and purpose of a convention unless:

(i)

a process explicitly set out for that purpose under the convention has so determined; or

(ii)

in the absence of such a process, the Union where a party to the convention, and/or a qualified majority of Member States party to the convention, in accordance with their respective competences as established in the Treaties, objected to the reservation on the grounds that it is incompatible with the object and purpose of the convention and opposed the entry into force of the convention as between them and the reserving state in accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties;

(d) it gives a binding undertaking to maintain ratification of the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof;

(e) it accepts without reservation the reporting requirements imposed by each convention and gives a binding undertaking to accept regular monitoring and review of its implementation record in accordance with the provisions of the relevant conventions; and

(f) it gives a binding undertaking to participate in and cooperate with the monitoring procedure referred to in Article 13.

2. Where Annex II is amended, the Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 36 to amend Annex VII in order to review the vulnerability threshold listed in point 1(b) of Annex VII so as to maintain proportionally the same weight of the vulnerability threshold as calculated in accordance with Annex VII.

Article 10 U.K.

1. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance shall be granted if the following conditions are met:

(a) a GSP beneficiary country has made a request to that effect; and

(b) examination of the request shows that the requesting country fulfils the conditions laid down in Article 9(1).

2. The requesting country shall submit its request to the Commission in writing. The request shall provide comprehensive information concerning the ratification of the relevant conventions and shall include the binding undertakings referred to in points (d), (e) and (f) of Article 9(1).

3. After receiving a request, the Commission shall notify the European Parliament and the Council thereof.

4. After examining the request, the Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to establish or to amend Annex III in order to grant a requesting country the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance by adding that country to the list of GSP+ beneficiary countries.

5. Where a GSP+ beneficiary country no longer fulfils the conditions referred to in points (a) or (c) of Article 9(1), or withdraws any of its binding undertakings referred to in points (d), (e) and (f) of Article 9(1), the Commission shall be empowered to adopt a delegated act, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex III in order to remove that country from the list of GSP+ beneficiary countries.

6. The Commission shall notify the requesting country of a decision taken in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article after Annex III is amended and published in the Official Journal of the European Union. Where the requesting country is granted the special incentive arrangement, it shall be informed of the date on which the respective delegated act enters into force.

7. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to establish rules related to the procedure for granting the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance in particular with respect to deadlines and the submission and processing of requests.

Article 11 U.K.

1. The products included in the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance are listed in Annex IX.

2. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex IX to take into account amendments to the Combined Nomenclature affecting the products listed in that Annex.

Article 12 U.K.

1. The Common Customs Tariff ad valorem duties on all products listed in Annex IX which originate in a GSP+ beneficiary country shall be suspended.

2. Common Customs Tariff specific duties on products referred to in paragraph 1 shall be suspended entirely, except for products for which the Common Customs Tariff duties include ad valorem duties. For products with Combined Nomenclature code 1704 10 90, the specific duty shall be limited to 16 % of the customs value.

Article 13 U.K.

1. As of the date of the granting of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance, the Commission shall keep under review the status of ratification of the relevant conventions and shall monitor their effective implementation, as well as cooperation with the relevant monitoring bodies, by examining the conclusions and recommendations of those monitoring bodies.

2. In this context, a GSP+ beneficiary country shall cooperate with the Commission and provide all information necessary to assess its respect of binding undertakings referred to in points (d), (e) and (f) of Article 9(1) and its situation as regards point (c) of Article 9(1).

Article 14 U.K.

1. By 1 January 2016, and every two years thereafter, the Commission shall present to the European Parliament and to the Council a report on the status of ratification of the relevant conventions, the compliance of the GSP+ beneficiary countries with any reporting obligations under those conventions and the status of the effective implementation thereof.

2. That report shall include:

(a) the conclusions or recommendations of relevant monitoring bodies in respect of each GSP+ beneficiary country; and

(b) the Commission’s conclusions on whether each GSP+ beneficiary country respects its binding undertakings to comply with reporting obligations, to cooperate with relevant monitoring bodies in accordance with the relevant conventions and to ensure the effective implementation thereof.

The report may include any information the Commission considers appropriate.

3. In drawing its conclusions concerning effective implementation of the relevant conventions, the Commission shall assess the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies, as well as, without prejudice to other sources, information submitted by third parties, including civil society, social partners, the European Parliament or the Council.

Article 15 U.K.

1. The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance shall be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a GSP+ beneficiary country, where in practice that country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in points (d), (e) and (f) of Article 9(1), or the GSP+ beneficiary country has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in point (c) of Article 9(1).

2. The burden of proof for compliance with its obligations resulting from binding undertakings as referred to in points (d), (e) and (f) of Article 9(1), and its situation as referred to in point (c) of Article 9(1), shall be on the GSP+ beneficiary country.

3. Where, either on the basis of the conclusions of the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in points (d), (e) and (f) of Article 9(1), or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in point (c) of Article 9(1), it shall, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council thereof.

4. The Commission shall publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union and notify the GSP+ beneficiary country concerned thereof. The notice shall:

(a) state the grounds for the reasonable doubt as to the fulfilment of the binding undertakings made by the GSP+ beneficiary country as referred to in points (d), (e) and (f) of Article 9(1), or as to the existence of a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in point (c) of Article 9(1), which may call into question its right to continue to enjoy the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance; and

(b) specify the period, which may not exceed six months from the date of publication of the notice, within which a GSP+ beneficiary country shall submit its observations.

5. The Commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate during the period referred to in point (b) of paragraph 4.

6. The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary including, inter alia, the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information.

7. Within three months after expiry of the period specified in the notice, the Commission shall decide:

(a) to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure; or

(b) to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance.

8. Where the Commission considers that the findings do not justify temporary withdrawal, it shall adopt an implementing act to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). That implementing act shall be based, inter alia, on evidence received.

9. Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall be empowered, in accordance with Article 36, to adopt delegated acts to amend Annex III in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in point (b) of Article 1(2).

10. Where the Commission decides on temporary withdrawal, such delegated act shall take effect six months after its adoption.

11. Where the reasons justifying temporary withdrawal no longer apply before the delegated act referred to in paragraph 9 of this Article takes effect, the Commission shall be empowered to repeal the adopted act to temporarily withdraw tariff preferences in accordance with the urgency procedure referred to in Article 37.

12. The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to establish rules related to the procedure for temporary withdrawal of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance in particular with respect to deadlines, rights of parties, confidentiality and review.

Article 16 U.K.

Where the Commission finds that the reasons justifying a temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences, as referred to in Article 15(1), no longer apply, it shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to amend Annex III in order to reinstate the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance.