http://www.legislation.gov.uk/eur/2012/978/article/15Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008Regulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the CouncilRegulation (EU) No 978/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 applying a scheme of generalised tariff preferences and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No 732/2008King's Printer of Acts of Parliamenthttps://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/eu-exit/https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:02012R0978-20200812texttext/xmlen2024-05-192020-08-12 CHAPTER III <Strong>SPECIAL INCENTIVE ARRANGEMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND GOOD GOVERNANCE</Strong> Article 15 1 The special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance shall be withdrawn temporarily, in respect of all or of certain products originating in a GSP+ beneficiary country, where in practice that country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in points (d), (e) and (f) of Article 9(1), or the GSP+ beneficiary country has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in point (c) of Article 9(1). 2 The burden of proof for compliance with its obligations resulting from binding undertakings as referred to in points (d), (e) and (f) of Article 9(1), and its situation as referred to in point (c) of Article 9(1), shall be on the GSP+ beneficiary country. 3 Where, either on the basis of the conclusions of the report referred to in Article 14 or on the basis of the evidence available, the Commission has a reasonable doubt that a particular GSP+ beneficiary country does not respect its binding undertakings as referred to in points (d), (e) and (f) of Article 9(1), or has formulated a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in point (c) of Article 9(1), it shall, in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2), adopt an implementing act to initiate the procedure for the temporary withdrawal of the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. The Commission shall inform the European Parliament and the Council thereof. 4 The Commission shall publish a notice in the Official Journal of the European Union and notify the GSP+ beneficiary country concerned thereof. The notice shall: a state the grounds for the reasonable doubt as to the fulfilment of the binding undertakings made by the GSP+ beneficiary country as referred to in points (d), (e) and (f) of Article 9(1), or as to the existence of a reservation which is prohibited by any of the relevant conventions or which is incompatible with the object and purpose of that convention as established in point (c) of Article 9(1), which may call into question its right to continue to enjoy the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance; and b specify the period, which may not exceed six months from the date of publication of the notice, within which a GSP+ beneficiary country shall submit its observations. 5 The Commission shall provide the beneficiary country concerned with every opportunity to cooperate during the period referred to in point (b) of paragraph 4. 6 The Commission shall seek all information it considers necessary including, inter alia, the conclusions and recommendations of the relevant monitoring bodies. In drawing its conclusions, the Commission shall assess all relevant information. 7 Within three months after expiry of the period specified in the notice, the Commission shall decide: a to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure; or b to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance. 8 Where the Commission considers that the findings do not justify temporary withdrawal, it shall adopt an implementing act to terminate the temporary withdrawal procedure in accordance with the advisory procedure referred to in Article 39(2). That implementing act shall be based, inter alia, on evidence received. 9 Where the Commission considers that the findings justify temporary withdrawal for the reasons referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall be empowered, in accordance with Article 36, to adopt delegated acts to amend Annex III in order to temporarily withdraw the tariff preferences provided under the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance referred to in point (b) of Article 1(2). 10 Where the Commission decides on temporary withdrawal, such delegated act shall take effect six months after its adoption. 11 Where the reasons justifying temporary withdrawal no longer apply before the delegated act referred to in paragraph 9 of this Article takes effect, the Commission shall be empowered to repeal the adopted act to temporarily withdraw tariff preferences in accordance with the urgency procedure referred to in Article 37. 12 The Commission shall be empowered to adopt delegated acts, in accordance with Article 36, to establish rules related to the procedure for temporary withdrawal of the special incentive arrangement for sustainable development and good governance in particular with respect to deadlines, rights of parties, confidentiality and review.