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ANNEX IGUIDELINES ON

2.Principles of capacity-allocation mechanisms and congestion-management procedures concerning transmission system operators and their application in the event of contractual congestion

2.1.Principles of capacity-allocation mechanisms and congestion-management procedures concerning transmission system operators

1.Capacity-allocation mechanisms and congestion-management procedures shall facilitate the development of competition and liquid trading of capacity and shall be compatible with market mechanisms including spot markets and trading hubs. They shall be flexible and capable of adapting to evolving market circumstances.
2.Those mechanisms and procedures shall take into account the integrity of the system concerned as well as security of supply.
3.Those mechanisms and procedures shall neither hamper the entry of new market participants nor create undue barriers to market entry. They shall not prevent market participants, including new market entrants and companies with a small market share, from competing effectively.
4.Those mechanisms and procedures shall provide appropriate economic signals for efficient and maximum use of technical capacity and facilitate investment in new infrastructure.
5.Network users shall be advised about the type of circumstance that could affect the availability of contracted capacity. Information on interruption should reflect the level of information available to the transmission system operator.
6.Should difficulties in meeting contractual delivery obligations arise due to system integrity reasons, transmission system operators should notify network users and seek a non-discriminatory solution without delay.

Transmission system operators shall consult network users regarding procedures prior to their implementation and agree them with the regulatory authority.

2.2.Congestion-management procedures in the event of contractual congestion

1.In the event that contracted capacity goes unused, transmission system operators shall make that capacity available on the primary market on an interruptible basis via contracts of differing duration, as long as that capacity is not offered by the relevant network user on the secondary market at a reasonable price.
2.Revenues from released interruptible capacity shall be split according to rules laid down or approved by the relevant regulatory authority. Those rules shall be compatible with the requirement of an effective and efficient use of the system.
3.A reasonable price for released interruptible capacity may be determined by the relevant regulatory authorities taking into account the specific circumstances prevailing.
4.Where appropriate, transmission system operators shall make reasonable endeavours to offer at least parts of the unused capacity to the market as firm capacity.