TITLE VII

PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION
CHAPTER 1

Principles of prudential supervision
Section I

Competence and duties of home and host Member States

Competence of the competent authorities of the home and host Member States
Article 49
1
The prudential supervision of an institution, including that of the activities it carries out in accordance with Articles 33 and 34, shall be the responsibility of the competent authorities of the home Member State, without prejudice to those provisions of this Directive which give responsibility to the competent authorities of the host Member State.
2
Paragraph 1 shall not prevent supervision on a consolidated basis.
3
Measures taken by the host Member State shall not allow discriminatory or restrictive treatment on the basis that an institution is authorised in another Member State.

Collaboration concerning supervision
Article 50
1
The competent authorities of the Member States concerned shall collaborate closely in order to supervise the activities of institutions operating, in particular through a branch, in one or more Member States other than that in which their head offices are situated. They shall supply one another with all information concerning the management and ownership of such institutions that is likely to facilitate their supervision and the examination of the conditions for their authorisation, and all information likely to facilitate the monitoring of institutions, in particular with regard to liquidity, solvency, deposit guarantee, the limiting of large exposures, other factors that may influence the systemic risk posed by the institution, administrative and accounting procedures and internal control mechanisms.
2
The competent authorities of the home Member State shall provide the competent authorities of host Member States immediately with any information and findings pertaining to liquidity supervision in accordance with Part Six of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Title VII, Chapter 3 of this Directive of the activities performed by the institution through its branches, to the extent that such information and findings are relevant to the protection of depositors or investors in the host Member State.
3
The competent authorities of the home Member State shall inform the competent authorities of all host Member States immediately where liquidity stress occurs or can reasonably be expected to occur. That information shall also include details about the planning and implementation of a recovery plan and about any prudential supervision measures taken in that context.
4
The competent authorities of the home Member State shall communicate and explain upon request to the competent authorities of the host Member State how information and findings provided by the latter have been taken into account. Where, following communication of information and findings, the competent authorities of the host Member State maintain that no appropriate measures have been taken by the competent authorities of the home Member State, the competent authorities of the host Member State may, after informing the competent authorities of the home Member State and EBA, take appropriate measures to prevent further breaches in order to protect the interests of depositors, investors and others to whom services are provided or to protect the stability of the financial system.
Where the competent authorities of the home Member State disagree with the measures to be taken by the competent authorities of the host Member State, they may refer the matter to EBA and request its assistance in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. Where EBA acts in accordance with that Article, it shall take any decision within one month.
5
The competent authorities may refer to EBA situations where a request for collaboration, in particular to exchange information, has been rejected or has not been acted upon within a reasonable time. Without prejudice to Article 258 TFEU, EBA may, in those situations, act in accordance with the powers conferred on it under Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. EBA may also assist the competent authorities in reaching an agreement on the exchange of information under this Article on its own initiative in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) of that Regulation.
6
EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the information referred to in this Article.
Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
7
EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to establish standard forms, templates and procedures for the information sharing requirements which are likely to facilitate the monitoring of institutions.
Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
8
EBA shall submit the draft technical standards referred to in paragraphs 6 and 7 to the Commission by 1 January 2014.

Significant branches
Article 51
1
The competent authorities of a host Member State may make a request to the consolidating supervisor, where Article 112(1) applies, or to the competent authorities of the home Member State for a branch of an institution other than an investment firm subject to Article 95 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 to be considered as significant.
That request shall provide reasons for considering the branch to be significant with particular regard to the following:
a
whether the market share of the branch in terms of deposits exceeds 2 % in the host Member State;
b
the likely impact of a suspension or closure of the operations of the institution on systemic liquidity and the payment, clearing and settlement systems in the host Member State;
c
the size and the importance of the branch in terms of number of clients within the context of the banking or financial system of the host Member State.
The competent authorities of the home and host Member States, and, where Article 112(1) applies, the consolidating supervisor, shall do everything within their power to reach a joint decision on the designation of a branch as being significant.
If no joint decision is reached within two months of receipt of a request under the first subparagraph, the competent authorities of the host Member State shall take their own decision within a further period of two months on whether the branch is significant. In taking their decision, the competent authorities of the host Member State shall take into account any views and reservations of the consolidating supervisor or the competent authorities of the home Member State.
The decisions referred to in the third and fourth subparagraphs shall be set out in a document containing full reasons, shall be transmitted to the competent authorities concerned and shall be recognised as determinative and applied by the competent authorities in the Member States concerned.
The designation of a branch as being significant shall not affect the rights and responsibilities of the competent authorities under this Directive.
2
The competent authorities of the home Member State shall communicate to the competent authorities of a host Member State where a significant branch is established the information referred to in Article 117(1)(c) and (d) and carry out the tasks referred to in Article 112(1)(c) in cooperation with the competent authorities of the host Member State.
If a competent authority of a home Member State becomes aware of an emergency situation as referred to in Article 114(1), it shall alert without delay the authorities referred to in Article 58(4) and Article 59(1).
The competent authorities of the home Member State shall communicate to the competent authorities of the host Member States where significant branches are established the results of the risk assessments of institutions with such branches referred to in Article 97 and, where applicable, Article 113(2). They shall also communicate decisions under Articles 104 and 105 in so far as those assessments and decisions are relevant to those branches.
The competent authorities of the home Member States shall consult the competent authorities of the host Member States where significant branches are established about operational steps required by Article 86(11), where relevant for liquidity risks in the host Member State's currency.
Where the competent authorities of the home Member State have not consulted the competent authorities of the host Member State, or where, following such consultation, the competent authorities of the host Member State maintain that operational steps required by Article 86(11) are not adequate, the competent authorities of the host Member State may refer the matter to EBA and request its assistance in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
3
Where Article 116 does not apply, the competent authorities supervising an institution with significant branches in other Member States shall establish and chair a college of supervisors to facilitate the cooperation under paragraph 2 of this Article and under Article 50. The establishment and functioning of the college shall be based on written arrangements to be determined, after consulting the competent authorities concerned, by the competent authority of the home Member State. The competent authority of the home Member State shall decide which competent authorities participate in a meeting or in an activity of the college.
The decision of the competent authority of the home Member State shall take account of the relevance of the supervisory activity to be planned or coordinated for those authorities, in particular the potential impact on the stability of the financial system in the Member States concerned referred to in Article 7 and the obligations referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article.
The competent authority of the home Member State shall keep all members of the college fully informed, in advance, of the organisation of such meetings, the main issues to be discussed and the activities to be considered. The competent authority of the home Member State shall also keep all the members of the college fully informed, in a timely manner, of the actions taken in those meetings or the measures carried out.
4
EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards in order to specify general conditions for the functioning of colleges of supervisors.
Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
5
EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards in order to determine the operational functioning of colleges of supervisors.
Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
6
EBA shall submit the draft technical standards referred to in paragraphs 4 and 5 to the Commission by 31 December 2014.

On-the-spot checking and inspection of branches established in another Member State
Article 52
1
Host Member States shall provide that, where an institution authorised in another Member State carries out its activities through a branch, the competent authorities of the home Member State may, after having informed the competent authorities of the host Member State, carry out themselves or through the intermediary of persons they appoint for that purpose on-the-spot checks of the information referred to in Article 50 and inspections of such branches.
2
The competent authorities of the home Member State may also, for the purposes of the inspection of branches, have recourse to one of the other procedures set out in Article 118.
3
The competent authorities of the host Member State shall have the power to carry out, on a case-by-case basis, on-the-spot checks and inspections of the activities carried out by branches of institutions on their territory and require information from a branch about its activities and for supervisory purposes, where they consider it relevant for reasons of stability of the financial system in the host Member State. Before carrying out such checks and inspections, the competent authorities of the host Member State shall consult the competent authorities of the home Member State. After such checks and inspections, the competent authorities of the host Member State shall communicate to the competent authorities of the home Member State the information obtained and findings that are relevant for the risk assessment of the institution or the stability of the financial system in the host Member State. The competent authorities of the home Member State shall duly take into account that information and those findings in determining their supervisory examination programme referred to in Article 99, also having regard to the stability of the financial system in the host Member State.
4
The on-the-spot checks and inspections of branches shall be conducted in accordance with the law of the Member State where the check or inspection is carried out.
Section II

Exchange of information and professional secrecy

Professional secrecy
Article 53
1
Member States shall provide that all persons working for or who have worked for the competent authorities and auditors or experts acting on behalf of the competent authorities shall be bound by the obligation of professional secrecy.
Confidential information which such persons, auditors or experts receive in the course of their duties may be disclosed only in summary or aggregate form, such that individual credit institutions cannot be identified, without prejudice to cases covered by criminal law.
Nevertheless, where a credit institution has been declared bankrupt or is being compulsorily wound up, confidential information which does not concern third parties involved in attempts to rescue that credit institution may be disclosed in civil or commercial proceedings.
2
Paragraph 1 shall not prevent the competent authorities from exchanging information with each other or transmitting information to the ESRB, EBA, or the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) ("ESMA") established by Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council in accordance with this Directive, with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, with other Directives applicable to credit institutions, with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, with Articles 31, 35 and 36 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 and with Articles 31 and 36 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010. That information shall be subject to paragraph 1.
3
Paragraph 1 shall not prevent the competent authorities from publishing the outcome of stress tests carried out in accordance with Article 100 of this Directive or Article 32 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 or from transmitting the outcome of stress tests to EBA for the purpose of the publication by EBA of the results of Union-wide stress tests.

Use of confidential information
Article 54
Competent authorities receiving confidential information under Article 53 shall use it only in the course of their duties and only for any of the following purposes:
1. to check that the conditions governing access to the activity of credit institutions are met and to facilitate monitoring, on a non-consolidated or consolidated basis, of the conduct of such activity, especially with regard to the monitoring of liquidity, solvency, large exposures, and administrative and accounting procedures and internal control mechanisms;
2. to impose penalties;
3. in an appeal against a decision of the competent authority including court proceedings pursuant to Article 72;
4. in court proceedings initiated pursuant to special provisions provided for in Union law adopted in the field of credit institutions.
Article 54a
Articles 53 and 54 shall be without prejudice to the powers of investigation conferred on the European Parliament pursuant to Article 226 TFEU.

Cooperation agreements
Article 55
Member States and EBA, in accordance with Article 33 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, may conclude cooperation agreements, providing for exchanges of information, with the supervisory authorities of third countries or with authorities or bodies of third countries in accordance with Article 56 and Article 57(1) of this Directive only if the information disclosed is subject to a guarantee that professional secrecy requirements at least equivalent to those referred to in Article 53(1) of this Directive are complied with. Such exchange of information shall be for the purpose of performing the supervisory tasks of those authorities or bodies.
Where the information originates in another Member State, it shall only be disclosed with the express agreement of the authorities which have disclosed it and, where appropriate, solely for the purposes for which those authorities gave their agreement.

Exchange of information between authorities
Article 56
Article 53(1) and Article 54 shall not preclude the exchange of information between competent authorities within a Member State, between competent authorities in different Member States or between competent authorities and the following, in the discharge of their supervisory functions:
1. authorities entrusted with the public duty of supervising other financial sector entities and the authorities responsible for the supervision of financial markets;
2. authorities or bodies charged with responsibility for maintaining the stability of the financial system in Member States through the use of macroprudential rules;
3. reorganisation bodies or authorities aiming at protecting the stability of the financial system;
4. contractual or institutional protection schemes as referred to in Article 113(7) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
5. bodies involved in the liquidation and bankruptcy of institutions and in other similar procedures;
6. persons responsible for carrying out statutory audits of the accounts of institutions, insurance undertakings and financial institutions;
7. authorities responsible for supervising the obliged entities listed in points (1) and (2) of Article 2(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council
for compliance with that Directive, and financial intelligence units;
8. competent authorities or bodies responsible for the application of rules on structural separation within a banking group.
Article 53(1) and Article 54 shall not preclude the disclosure to bodies which administer deposit-guarantee schemes and investor compensation schemes of information necessary for the exercise of their functions.
The information received shall in any event be subject to professional secrecy requirements at least equivalent to those referred to in Article 53(1).

Exchange of information with oversight bodies
Article 57
1
Notwithstanding Articles 53, 54 and 55, Member States shall ensure that an exchange of information can take place between the competent authorities and the authorities responsible for oversight:
a
the bodies involved in the liquidation and bankruptcy of institutions and in other similar procedures;
b
contractual or institutional protection schemes as referred to in Article 113(7) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
c
persons charged with carrying out statutory audits of the accounts of institutions, insurance undertakings and financial institutions.
2
In the cases referred to in paragraph 1, Member States shall require fulfilment of at least the following conditions:
a
that the information is exchanged for the purpose of performing the tasks referred to in paragraph 1;
b
that the information received is subject to professional secrecy requirements at least equivalent to those referred to in Article 53(1);
c
where the information originates in another Member State, that it is not disclosed without the express agreement of the competent authorities which have disclosed it and, where appropriate, solely for the purposes for which those authorities gave their agreement.
3
Notwithstanding Articles 53, 54 and 55, Member States may, with the aim of strengthening the stability and integrity of the financial system, authorise the exchange of information between competent authorities and the authorities or bodies responsible under law for the detection and investigation of breaches of company law.
In such cases Member States shall require fulfilment of at least the following conditions:
a
that the information is exchanged for the purpose of detecting and investigating breaches of company law;
b
that the information received is subject to professional secrecy requirements at least equivalent to those referred to in Article 53(1);
c
where the information originates in another Member State, that it is not disclosed without the express agreement of the competent authorities which have disclosed it and, where appropriate, solely for the purposes for which those authorities gave their agreement.
4
Where the authorities or bodies referred to in paragraph 1 perform their task of detection or investigation with the aid, in view of their specific competence, of persons appointed for that purpose and not employed in the public sector, a Member State may extend the possibility of exchanging information provided for in the first subparagraph of paragraph 3 to such persons under the conditions specified in the second subparagraph of paragraph 3.
5
The competent authorities shall communicate to EBA the names of the authorities or bodies which may receive information pursuant to this Article.
6
In order to implement paragraph 4, the authorities or bodies referred to in paragraph 3 shall communicate to the competent authorities which have disclosed the information, the names and precise responsibilities of the persons to whom it is to be sent.

Transmission of information concerning monetary, deposit protection, systemic and payment aspects
Article 58
1
Nothing in this Chapter shall prevent a competent authority from transmitting information to the following for the purposes of their tasks:
a
ESCB central banks and other bodies with a similar function in their capacity as monetary authorities when the information is relevant for the exercise of their respective statutory tasks, including the conduct of monetary policy and related liquidity provision, oversight of payments, clearing and settlement systems and the safeguarding of stability of the financial system;
b
contractual or institutional protection schemes as referred to in Article 113(7) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
c
where appropriate, other public authorities responsible for overseeing payment systems;
d
the ESRB, the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) ("EIOPA"), established by Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council and ESMA, where that information is relevant for the exercise of their tasks under Regulations (EU) No 1092/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010 or (EU) No 1095/2010.
Member States shall take the appropriate measures to remove obstacles preventing competent authorities from transmitting information in accordance with the first subparagraph.
2
Nothing in this Chapter shall prevent the authorities or bodies referred to in paragraph 1 from communicating to the competent authorities such information as the competent authorities may need for the purposes of Article 54.
3
Information received in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be subject to professional secrecy requirements at least equivalent to those referred to in Article 53(1).
4
Member States shall take the necessary measures to ensure that, in an emergency situation as referred to in Article 114(1), the competent authorities communicate, without delay, information to the ESCB central banks where that information is relevant for the exercise of their statutory tasks, including the conduct of monetary policy and related liquidity provision, the oversight of payments, clearing and settlement systems, and the safeguarding of the stability of the financial system, and to the ESRB where such information is relevant for the exercise of its statutory tasks.

Transmission of information to international bodies
Article 58a
1
Notwithstanding Article 53(1) and Article 54, competent authorities may, subject to the conditions set out in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of this Article, transmit or share certain information with the following:
a
the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, for the purposes of assessments for the Financial Sector Assessment Program;
b
the Bank for International Settlements, for the purposes of quantitative impact studies;
c
the Financial Stability Board, for the purposes of its surveillance function.
2
Competent authorities may only share confidential information following an explicit request by the relevant body, where at least the following conditions are met:
a
the request is duly justified in light of the specific tasks performed by the requesting body in accordance with its statutory mandate;
b
the request is sufficiently precise as to the nature, scope, and format of the required information, and the means of its disclosure or transmission;
c
the requested information is strictly necessary for the performance of the specific tasks of the requesting body and does not go beyond the statutory tasks conferred on the requesting body;
d
the information is transmitted or disclosed exclusively to the persons directly involved in the performance of the specific task;
e
the persons having access to the information are subject to professional secrecy requirements at least equivalent to those referred to in Article 53(1).
3
Where the request is made by any of the entities referred to in paragraph 1, competent authorities may only transmit aggregate or anonymised information and may only share other information at the premises of the competent authority.
4
To the extent that the disclosure of information involves processing of personal data, any processing of personal data by the requesting body shall comply with the requirements laid down in Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council .

Transmission of information to other entities
Article 59
1
Notwithstanding Article 53(1) and Article 54, Member States may, by virtue of provisions laid down in national law, authorise the disclosure of certain information to other departments of their central government administrations responsible for law on the supervision of institutions, financial institutions and insurance undertakings and to inspectors acting on behalf of those departments.
However, such disclosures may be made only where necessary for reasons of prudential supervision, and prevention and resolution of failing institutions. Without prejudice to paragraph 2 of this Article, persons having access to the information shall be subject to professional secrecy requirements at least equivalent to those referred to in Article 53(1).
In an emergency situation as referred to in Article 114(1), Member States shall allow competent authorities to disclose information which is relevant to the departments referred to in the first subparagraph of this paragraph in all Member States concerned.
2
Member States may authorise the disclosure of certain information relating to the prudential supervision of institutions to parliamentary enquiry committees in their Member State, courts of auditors in their Member State and other entities in charge of enquiries in their Member State, under the following conditions:
a
that the entities have a precise mandate under national law to investigate or scrutinise the actions of authorities responsible for the supervision of institutions or for laws on such supervision;
b
that the information is strictly necessary for fulfilling the mandate referred to in point (a);
c
the persons with access to the information are subject to professional secrecy requirements under national law at least equivalent to those referred to in Article 53(1);
d
where the information originates in another Member State that it is not disclosed without the express agreement of the competent authorities which have disclosed it and, solely for the purposes for which those authorities gave their agreement.
To the extent that the disclosure of information relating to prudential supervision involves processing of personal data, any processing by the entities referred to in the first subparagraph shall comply with the applicable national laws transposing Directive 95/46/EC.

Disclosure of information obtained by on-the-spot checks and inspections
Article 60
Member States shall ensure that information received under Article 52(3), Article 53(2) and Article 56 and information obtained by means of an on-the-spot check or inspection referred to in Article 52(1) and (2) shall not be disclosed under Article 59 save with the express consent of the competent authorities which disclosed the information or of the competent authorities of the Member State in which such an on-the-spot check or inspection was carried out.

Disclosure of information concerning clearing and settlement services
Article 61
1
Nothing in this Chapter shall prevent the competent authorities of a Member State from communicating the information referred to in Articles 53, 54 and 55 to a clearing house or other similar body recognised under national law for the provision of clearing or settlement services for one of their national markets if they consider that it is necessary to communicate the information in order to ensure the proper functioning of those bodies in relation to defaults or potential defaults by market participants. The information received shall be subject to professional secrecy requirements at least equivalent to those referred to in Article 53(1).
2
Member States shall, however, ensure that information received under Article 53(2) shall not be disclosed in the circumstances referred to in paragraph 1 without the express consent of the competent authorities, which have disclosed it.

Processing of personal data
Article 62
The processing of personal data for the purposes of this Directive shall be carried out in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC and, where relevant, with Regulation (EC) No 45/2001.
Section III

Duty of persons responsible for the legal control of annual and consolidated accounts

Duty of persons responsible for the legal control of annual and consolidated accounts
Article 63
1
Member States shall provide that any person authorised in accordance with Directive 2006/43/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 May 2006 on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts and performing in an institution the tasks described in Article 51 of Council Directive 78/660/EEC of 25 July 1978 on the annual accounts of certain types of companies , Article 37 of Council Directive 83/349/EEC of 13 June 1983 on consolidated accounts Article 73 of Directive 2009/65/EC, or any other statutory task, shall at least have a duty to report promptly to the competent authorities any fact or decision concerning that institution of which that person has become aware while carrying out that task, which is liable to:
a
constitute a material breach of the laws, regulations or administrative provisions which lay down the conditions governing authorisation or which specifically govern pursuit of the activities of institutions;
b
affect the ongoing functioning of the institution;
c
lead to refusal to certify the accounts or to the expression of reservations.
Member States shall provide at least that a person referred to in the first subparagraph shall also have a duty to report any fact or decision of which that person becomes aware in the course of carrying out a task as described in the first subparagraph in an undertaking having close links resulting from a control relationship with the institution within which he is carrying out that task.
Member States shall provide that competent authorities may require the replacement of a person referred to in the first subparagraph if that person acts in breach of his or her obligations under the first subparagraph.
2
The disclosure in good faith to the competent authorities, by persons authorised within the meaning of Directive 2006/43/EC, of any fact or decision referred to in paragraph 1 shall not constitute a breach of any restriction on disclosure of information imposed by contract or by any legislative, regulatory or administrative provision and shall not involve such persons in any liability. Such disclosure shall be made simultaneously to the management body of the institution unless there are compelling reasons not to do so.
Section IV

Supervisory powers, powers to impose penalties and right of appeal

Supervisory powers and powers to impose penalties
Article 64
1
Competent authorities shall be given all supervisory powers to intervene in the activity of institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies that are necessary for the exercise of their function, including in particular the right to withdraw an authorisation in accordance with Article 18, the powers referred to in Articles 18, 102, 104 and 105, and the powers to take the measures referred to in Article 21a(6).
2
Competent authorities shall exercise their supervisory powers and their powers to impose penalties in accordance with this Directive and with national law, in any of the following ways:
a
directly;
b
in collaboration with other authorities;
c
under their responsibility by delegation to such authorities;
d
by application to the competent judicial authorities.
3
The decisions taken by competent authorities in the exercise of their supervisory powers and powers to impose penalties shall state the reasons on which they are based.

Administrative penalties and other administrative measures
Article 65
1
Without prejudice to the supervisory powers of competent authorities referred to in Article 64 and the right of Member States to provide for and impose criminal penalties, Member States shall lay down rules on administrative penalties and other administrative measures in respect of breaches of national provisions transposing this Directive and of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and shall take all measures necessary to ensure that they are implemented. Where Member States decide not to lay down rules for administrative penalties for breaches which are subject to national criminal law they shall communicate to the Commission the relevant criminal law provisions. The administrative penalties and other administrative measures shall be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.
2
Member States shall ensure that where the obligations referred to in paragraph 1 apply to institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies in the event of a breach of national provisions transposing this Directive or of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, penalties may be applied, subject to the conditions laid down in national law, to the members of the management body and to other natural persons who under national law are responsible for the breach.
3
Competent authorities shall have all information gathering and investigatory powers that are necessary for the exercise of their functions. Without prejudice to other relevant provisions laid down in this Directive and in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 those powers shall include:
a
the power to require the following natural or legal persons to provide all information that is necessary in order to carry out the tasks of the competent authorities, including information to be provided at recurring intervals and in specified formats for supervisory and related statistical purposes:
1. institutions established in the Member State concerned;
2. financial holding companies established in the Member State concerned;
3. mixed financial holding companies established in the Member State concerned;
4. mixed-activity holding companies established in the Member State concerned;
5. persons belonging to the entities referred to in points (i) to (iv);
6. third parties to whom the entities referred to in points (i) to (iv) have outsourced operational functions or activities;
b
the power to conduct all necessary investigations of any person referred to in points (a)(i) to (vi) established or located in the Member State concerned where necessary to carry out the tasks of the competent authorities, including:
1. the right to require the submission of documents;
2. to examine the books and records of the persons referred to in points(a)(i) to (vi) and take copies or extracts from such books and records;
3. to obtain written or oral explanations from any person referred to in points (a) (i) to (vi) or their representatives or staff; and
4. to interview any other person who consents to be interviewed for the purpose of collecting information relating to the subject matter of an investigation;
c
the power, subject to other conditions set out in Union law, to conduct all necessary inspections at the business premises of the legal persons referred to in points (a)(i) to (vi) and any other undertaking included in consolidated supervision where a competent authority is the consolidating supervisor, subject to the prior notification of the competent authorities concerned. If an inspection requires authorisation by a judicial authority under national law, such authorisation shall be applied for.

Administrative penalties and other administrative measures for breaches of authorisation requirements and requirements for acquisitions of qualifying holdings
Article 66
1
Member States shall ensure that their laws, regulations and administrative provisions provide for administrative penalties and other administrative measures at least in respect of:
a
carrying out the business of taking deposits or other repayable funds from the public without being a credit institution in breach of Article 9;
b
commencing activities as a credit institution without obtaining authorisation in breach of Article 9;
c
acquiring, directly or indirectly, a qualifying holding in a credit institution or further increasing, directly or indirectly, such a qualifying holding in a credit institution as a result of which the proportion of the voting rights or of the capital held would reach or exceed the thresholds referred to in Article 22(1) or so that the credit institution would become its subsidiary, without notifying in writing the competent authorities of the credit institution in which they are seeking to acquire or increase a qualifying holding, during the assessment period, or against the opposition of the competent authorities, in breach of Article 22(1);
d
disposing, directly or indirectly, of a qualifying holding in a credit institution or reducing a qualifying holding so that the proportion of the voting rights or of the capital held would fall below the thresholds referred to in Article 25 or so that the credit institution would cease to be a subsidiary, without notifying in writing the competent authorities;
e
failing to apply for approval in breach of Article 21a or any other breach of the requirements set out in that Article.
2
Member States shall ensure that in the cases referred to in paragraph 1, the administrative penalties and other administrative measures that can be applied include at least the following:
a
a public statement which identifies the natural person, institution, financial holding company or mixed financial holding company responsible and the nature of the breach;
b
an order requiring the natural or legal person responsible to cease the conduct and to desist from a repetition of that conduct;
c
in the case of a legal person, administrative pecuniary penalties of up to 10 % of the total annual net turnover including the gross income consisting of interest receivable and similar income, income from shares and other variable or fixed-yield securities, and commissions or fees receivable in accordance with Article 316 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the undertaking in the preceding business year;
d
in the case of a natural person, administrative pecuniary penalties of up to EUR 5 000 000, or in the Member States whose currency is not the euro, the corresponding value in the national currency on 17 July 2013;
e
administrative pecuniary penalties of up to twice the amount of the benefit derived from the breach where that benefit can be determined;
f
suspension of the voting rights of the shareholder or shareholders held responsible for the breaches referred to in paragraph 1.
Where the undertaking referred to in point (c) of the first subparagraph is a subsidiary of a parent undertaking, the relevant gross income shall be the gross income resulting from the consolidated account of the ultimate parent undertaking in the preceding business year.

Other provisions
Article 67
1
This Article shall apply at least in any of the following circumstances:
a
an institution has obtained an authorisation through false statements or any other irregular means;
b
an institution, on becoming aware of any acquisitions or disposals of holdings in their capital that cause holdings to exceed or fall below one of the thresholds referred to in Article 22(1) or Article 25, fails to inform the competent authorities of those acquisitions or disposals in breach of the first subparagraph of Article 26(1);
c
an institution listed on a regulated market as referred to in the list to be published by ESMA in accordance with Article 47 of Directive 2004/39/EC does not, at least annually, inform the competent authorities of the names of shareholders and members possessing qualifying holdings and the sizes of such holdings in breach of the second subparagraph of Article 26(1) of this Directive;
d
an institution fails to have in place governance arrangements required by the competent authorities in accordance with the national provisions transposing Article 74;
e
an institution fails to report information or provides incomplete or inaccurate information on compliance with the obligation to meet own funds requirements set out in Article 92 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 to the competent authorities in breach of Article 99(1) of that Regulation;
f
an institution fails to report or provides incomplete or inaccurate information to the competent authorities in relation to the data referred to in Article 101 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
g
an institution fails to report information or provides incomplete or inaccurate information about a large exposure to the competent authorities in breach of Article 394(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
h
an institution fails to report information or provides incomplete or inaccurate information on liquidity to the competent authorities in breach of Article 415(1) and (2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
i
an institution fails to report information or provides incomplete or inaccurate information on the leverage ratio to the competent authorities in breach of Article 430(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
j
an institution repeatedly or persistently fails to hold liquid assets in breach of Article 412 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
k
an institution incurs an exposure in excess of the limits set out in Article 395 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
l
an institution is exposed to the credit risk of a securitisation position without satisfying the conditions set out in Article 405 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
m
an institution fails to disclose information or provides incomplete or inaccurate information in breach of Article 431(1), (2) and (3) or Article 451(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
n
an institution makes payments to holders of instruments included in the own funds of the institution in breach of Article 141 of this Directive or in cases where Article 28, 52 or 63 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 prohibit such payments to holders of instruments included in own funds;
o
an institution is found liable for a serious breach of the national provisions adopted pursuant to Directive 2005/60/EC;
p
an institution allows one or more persons not complying with Article 91 to become or remain a member of the management body;
q
a parent institution, a parent financial holding company or a parent mixed financial holding company fails to take any action that may be required to ensure compliance with the prudential requirements set out in Part Three, Four, Six or Seven of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or imposed under point (a) of Article 104(1) or Article 105 of this Directive on a consolidated or sub-consolidated basis.;
2
Member States shall ensure that in the cases referred to in paragraph 1, the administrative penalties and other administrative measures that can be applied include at least the following:
a
a public statement which identifies the natural person, institution, financial holding company or mixed financial holding company responsible and the nature of the breach;
b
an order requiring the natural or legal person responsible to cease the conduct and to desist from a repetition of that conduct;
c
in the case of an institution, withdrawal of the authorisation of the institution in accordance with Article 18;
d
subject to Article 65(2), a temporary ban against a member of the institution's management body or any other natural person, who is held responsible, from exercising functions in institutions;
e
in the case of a legal person, administrative pecuniary penalties of up to 10 % of the total annual net turnover including the gross income consisting of interest receivable and similar income, income from shares and other variable or fixed-yield securities, and commissions or fees receivable in accordance with Article 316 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the undertaking in the preceding business year;
f
in the case of a natural person, administrative pecuniary penalties of up to EUR 5 000 000, or in the Member States whose currency is not the euro, the corresponding value in the national currency on 17 July 2013;
g
administrative pecuniary penalties of up to twice the amount of the profits gained or losses avoided because of the breach where those can be determined.
Where an undertaking referred to in point (e) of the first subparagraph is a subsidiary of a parent undertaking, the relevant gross income shall be the gross income resulting from the consolidated account of the ultimate parent undertaking in the preceding business year.

Publication of administrative penalties
Article 68
1
Member States shall ensure that the competent authorities publish on their official website at least any administrative penalties against which there is no appeal and which are imposed for breach of the national provisions transposing this Directive or of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, including information on the type and nature of the breach and the identity of the natural or legal person on whom the penalty is imposed, without undue delay after that person is informed of those penalties.
Where Member States permit publication of penalties against which there is an appeal, competent authorities shall, without undue delay, also publish on their official website information on the appeal status and outcome thereof.
2
Competent authorities shall publish the penalties on an anonymous basis, in a manner in accordance with national law, in any of the following circumstances:
a
where the penalty is imposed on a natural person and, following an obligatory prior assessment, publication of personal data is found to be disproportionate;
b
where publication would jeopardise the stability of financial markets or an ongoing criminal investigation;
c
where publication would cause, insofar as it can be determined, disproportionate damage to the institutions or natural persons involved.
Alternatively, where the circumstances referred to in the first subparagraph are likely to cease within a reasonable period of time, publication under paragraph 1 may be postponed for such a period of time.
3
Competent authorities shall ensure that information published under paragraphs 1 or 2 remains on their official website at least five years. Personal data shall be retained on the official website of the competent authority only for the period necessary, in accordance with the applicable data protection rules.
4
By 18 July 2015 EBA shall submit a report to the Commission on the publication of penalties by Member States on an anonymous basis as provided for under paragraph 2, in particular where there have been significant divergences between Member States in this respect. In addition, EBA shall submit a report to the Commission on any significant divergences in the duration of publication of penalties under national law.

Exchange of information on penalties and maintenance of a central database by EBA
Article 69
1
Subject to the professional secrecy requirements referred to in Article 53(1), the competent authorities shall inform EBA of all administrative penalties, including all permanent prohibitions, imposed under Articles 65, 66 and 67 including any appeal in relation thereto and the outcome thereof. EBA shall maintain a central database of administrative penalties communicated to it solely for the purposes of exchanging information between competent authorities. That database shall be accessible to competent authorities only and it shall be updated on the basis of the information provided by competent authorities.
2
Where a competent authority assesses good repute for the purposes of Article 13(1), Article 16(3), Article 91(1) and Article 121, it shall consult the EBA database of administrative penalties. In the event of a change of status or a successful appeal, EBA shall delete or update relevant entries in the database on request by the competent authorities.
3
The competent authorities shall check, in accordance with national law, the existence of a relevant conviction in the criminal record of the person concerned. For those purposes, information shall be exchanged in accordance with Decision 2009/316/JHA and Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA as implemented in national law.
4
EBA shall maintain a website with links to each competent authority's publication of administrative penalties under Article 68 and shall show the time period for which each Member State publishes administrative penalties.

Effective application of penalties and exercise of powers to impose penalties by competent authorities
Article 70
Member States shall ensure that when determining the type of administrative penalties or other administrative measures and the level of administrative pecuniary penalties, the competent authorities shall take into account all relevant circumstances, including, where appropriate:
1. the gravity and the duration of the breach;
2. the degree of responsibility of the natural or legal person responsible for the breach;
3. the financial strength of the natural or legal person responsible for the breach, as indicated, for example, by the total turnover of a legal person or the annual income of a natural person;
4. the importance of profits gained or losses avoided by the natural or legal person responsible for the breach, insofar as they can be determined;
5. the losses for third parties caused by the breach, insofar as they can be determined;
6. the level of cooperation of the natural or legal person responsible for the breach with the competent authority;
7. previous breaches by the natural or legal person responsible for the breach;
8. any potential systemic consequences of the breach.

Reporting of breaches
Article 71
1
Member States shall ensure that competent authorities establish effective and reliable mechanisms to encourage reporting of potential or actual breaches of national provisions transposing this Directive and of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 to competent authorities.
2
The mechanisms referred to in paragraph 1 shall include at least:
a
specific procedures for the receipt of reports on breaches and their follow-up;
b
appropriate protection for employees of institutions who report breaches committed within the institution against retaliation, discrimination or other types of unfair treatment at a minimum;
c
protection of personal data concerning both the person who reports the breaches and the natural person who is allegedly responsible for a breach, in accordance with Directive 95/46/EC;
d
clear rules that ensure that confidentiality is guaranteed in all cases in relation to the person who reports the breaches committed within the institution, unless disclosure is required by national law in the context of further investigations or subsequent judicial proceedings.
3
Member States shall require institutions to have in place appropriate procedures for their employees to report breaches internally through a specific, independent and autonomous channel.
Such a channel may also be provided through arrangements provided for by social partners. The same protection as referred to in points (b), (c) and (d) of paragraph 2 shall apply.

Right of appeal
Article 72
Member States shall ensure that decisions and measures taken pursuant to laws, regulations and administrative provisions adopted in accordance with this Directive or to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 are subject to a right of appeal. Member States shall also ensure that failure to take a decision within six months of submission of an application for authorisation which contains all the information required under the national provisions transposing this Directive, is subject to a right of appeal.
CHAPTER 2

Review Processes
Section I

Internal capital adequacy assessment process

Internal Capital
Article 73
Institutions shall have in place sound, effective and comprehensive strategies and processes to assess and maintain on an ongoing basis the amounts, types and distribution of internal capital that they consider adequate to cover the nature and level of the risks to which they are or might be exposed.
Those strategies and processes shall be subject to regular internal review to ensure that they remain comprehensive and proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of the institution concerned.
Section II

Arrangements, processes and mechanisms of institutions
Sub-Section 1

General principles

Internal governance and recovery and resolution plans
Article 74
1
Institutions shall have robust governance arrangements, which include a clear organisational structure with well-defined, transparent and consistent lines of responsibility, effective processes to identify, manage, monitor and report the risks they are or might be exposed to, adequate internal control mechanisms, including sound administration and accounting procedures, and remuneration policies and practices that are consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management.
The remuneration policies and practices referred to in the first subparagraph shall be gender neutral.
2
The arrangements, processes and mechanisms referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be comprehensive and proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of the risks inherent in the business model and the institution's activities. The technical criteria established in Articles 76 to 95 shall be taken into account.
3
EBA shall issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, on the arrangements, processes and mechanisms referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, taking into account paragraph 2 of this Article.
EBA shall issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, on gender neutral remuneration policies for institutions.
Within two years of the date of publication of the guidelines referred to in the second subparagraph and based on the information collected by the competent authorities, EBA shall issue a report on the application of gender neutral remuneration policies by institutions.

Oversight of remuneration policies
Article 75
1
Competent authorities shall collect the information disclosed in accordance with the criteria for disclosure established in points (g), (h), (i) and (k) of Article 450(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as well as the information provided by institutions on the gender pay gap and shall use that information to benchmark remuneration trends and practices. The competent authorities shall provide EBA with that information.
2
EBA shall issue guidelines on sound remuneration policies which comply with the principles set out in Articles 92 to 95. The guidelines shall take into account the principles on sound remuneration policies set out in Commission Recommendation 2009/384/EC of 30 April 2009 on remuneration policies in the financial services sector .
ESMA shall cooperate closely with EBA to develop guidelines on remuneration policies for categories of staff involved in the provision of investment services and activities within the meaning of point 2 of Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/39/EC.
EBA shall use the information received from the competent authorities in accordance with paragraph 1 to benchmark remuneration trends and practices at Union level.
3
Competent authorities shall collect information on the number of natural persons per institution that are remunerated EUR 1 million or more per financial year, in pay brackets of EUR 1 million, including their job responsibilities, the business area involved and the main elements of salary, bonus, long-term award and pension contribution. That information shall be forwarded to EBA, which shall publish it on an aggregate home Member State basis in a common reporting format. EBA may elaborate guidelines to facilitate the implementation of this paragraph and ensure the consistency of the information collected.
Sub-Section 2

Technical criteria concerning the organisation and treatment of risks

Treatment of risks
Article 76
1
Member States shall ensure that the management body approves and periodically reviews the strategies and policies for taking up, managing, monitoring and mitigating the risks the institution is or might be exposed to, including those posed by the macroeconomic environment in which it operates in relation to the status of the business cycle.
2
Member States shall ensure that the management body devotes sufficient time to consideration of risk issues. The management body shall be actively involved in and ensure that adequate resources are allocated to the management of all material risks addressed in this Directive and in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as well as in the valuation of assets, the use of external credit ratings and internal models relating to those risks. The institution shall establish reporting lines to the management body that cover all material risks and risk management policies and changes thereof.
3
Member States shall ensure that institutions that are significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities establish a risk committee composed of members of the management body who do not perform any executive function in the institution concerned. Members of the risk committee shall have appropriate knowledge, skills and expertise to fully understand and monitor the risk strategy and the risk appetite of the institution.
The risk committee shall advise the management body on the institution's overall current and future risk appetite and strategy and assist the management body in overseeing the implementation of that strategy by senior management. The management body shall retain overall responsibility for risks.
The risk committee shall review whether prices of liabilities and assets offered to clients take fully into account the institution's business model and risk strategy. Where prices do not properly reflect risks in accordance with the business model and risk strategy, the risk committee shall present a remedy plan to the management body.
Competent authorities may allow an institution which is not considered significant as referred to in the first subparagraph to combine the risk committee with the audit committee as referred to in Article 41 of Directive 2006/43/EC. Members of the combined committee shall have the knowledge, skills and expertise required for the risk committee and for the audit committee.
4
Member States shall ensure that the management body in its supervisory function and, where a risk committee has been established, the risk committee have adequate access to information on the risk situation of the institution and, if necessary and appropriate, to the risk management function and to external expert advice.
The management body in its supervisory function and, where one has been established, the risk committee shall determine the nature, the amount, the format, and the frequency of the information on risk which it is to receive. In order to assist in the establishment of sound remuneration policies and practices, the risk committee shall, without prejudice to the tasks of the remuneration committee, examine whether incentives provided by the remuneration system take into consideration risk, capital, liquidity and the likelihood and timing of earnings.
5
Member States shall, in accordance with the proportionality requirement laid down in Article 7(2) of Commission Directive 2006/73/EC , ensure that institutions have a risk management function independent from the operational functions and which shall have sufficient authority, stature, resources and access to the management body.
Member States shall ensure that the risk management function ensures that all material risks are identified, measured and properly reported. They shall ensure that the risk management function is actively involved in elaborating the institution's risk strategy and in all material risk management decisions and that it can deliver a complete view of the whole range of risks of the institution.
Where necessary, Member States shall ensure that the risk management function can report directly to the management body in its supervisory function, independent from senior management, and can raise concerns and warn that body, where appropriate, where specific risk developments affect or may affect the institution, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the management body in its supervisory and/or managerial functions pursuant to this Directive and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
The head of the risk management function shall be an independent senior manager with distinct responsibility for the risk management function. Where the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of the institution do not justify a specially appointed person, another senior person within the institution may fulfil that function, provided there is no conflict of interest.
The head of the risk management function shall not be removed without prior approval of the management body in its supervisory function and shall be able to have direct access to the management body in its supervisory function where necessary.
The application of this Directive shall be without prejudice to the application of Directive 2006/73/EC to investment firms.

Internal Approaches for calculating own funds requirements
Article 77
1
Competent authorities shall encourage institutions that are significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, scale and complexity of their activities to develop internal credit risk assessment capacity and to increase use of the internal ratings based approach for calculating own funds requirements for credit risk where their exposures are material in absolute terms and where they have at the same time a large number of material counterparties. This Article shall be without prejudice to the fulfilment of criteria laid down in Part Three, Title I, Chapter 3, Section 1 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
2
Competent authorities shall, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of institutions' activities, monitor that they do not solely or mechanistically rely on external credit ratings for assessing the creditworthiness of an entity or financial instrument.
3
Competent authorities shall encourage institutions, taking into account their size, internal organisation and the nature, scale and complexity of their activities, to develop internal specific risk assessment capacity and to increase use of internal models for calculating own funds requirements for specific risk of debt instruments in the trading book, together with internal models to calculate own funds requirements for default and migration risk where their exposures to specific risk are material in absolute terms and where they have a large number of material positions in debt instruments of different issuers.
This Article shall be without prejudice to the fulfilment of the criteria laid down in Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 5, Sections 1 to 5, of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
4
EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to further define the notion 'exposures to specific risk which are material in absolute terms' referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 3 and the thresholds for large numbers of material counterparties and positions in debt instruments of different issuers.
EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2014.
Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.

Supervisory benchmarking of internal approaches for calculating own funds requirements
Article 78
1
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions permitted to use internal approaches for the calculation of risk weighted exposure amounts or own fund requirements except for operational risk report the results of the calculations of their internal approaches for their exposures or positions that are included in the benchmark portfolios. Institutions shall submit the results of their calculations, together with an explanation of the methodologies used to produce them, to the competent authorities at an appropriate frequency, and at least annually.
2
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions submit the results of the calculations referred to in paragraph 1 in accordance with the template developed by EBA in accordance with paragraph 8 to the competent authorities and to EBA. Where competent authorities choose to develop specific portfolios, they shall do so in consultation with EBA and ensure that institutions report the results of the calculations separately from the results of the calculations for EBA portfolios.
3
Competent authorities shall, on the basis of the information submitted by institutions in accordance with paragraph 1, monitor the range of risk weighted exposure amounts or own funds requirements, as applicable, except for operational risk, for the exposures or transactions in the benchmark portfolio resulting from the internal approaches of those institutions. At least annually, competent authorities shall make an assessment of the quality of those approaches paying particular attention to:
a
those approaches that exhibit significant differences in own fund requirements for the same exposure;
b
approaches where there is particularly high or low diversity, and also where there is a significant and systematic under-estimation of own funds requirements.
EBA shall produce a report to assist the competent authorities in the assessment of the quality of the internal approaches based on the information referred to in paragraph 2.
4
Where particular institutions diverge significantly from the majority of their peers or where there is little commonality in approach leading to a wide variance of results, competent authorities shall investigate the reasons therefor and, if it can be clearly identified that an institution's approach leads to an underestimation of own funds requirements which is not attributable to differences in the underlying risks of the exposures or positions, shall take corrective action.
5
The competent authorities shall ensure that their decisions on the appropriateness of corrective actions as referred to in paragraph 4 comply with the principle that such actions must maintain the objectives of an internal approach and therefore do not:
a
lead to standardisation or preferred methods;
b
create wrong incentives; or
c
cause herd behaviour.
6
EBA may issue guidelines and recommendations in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 where it considers them necessary on the basis of the information and assessments referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article in order to improve supervisory practices or practices of institutions with regard to internal approaches.
7
EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify:
a
the procedures for sharing assessments made in accordance with paragraph 3 between the competent authorities and with EBA;
b
the standards for the assessment made by competent authorities referred to in paragraph 3.
EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2014.
Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
8
EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify:
a
the template, the definitions and the IT-solutions to be applied in the Union for the reporting referred to in paragraph 2;
b
the benchmark portfolio or portfolios referred to in paragraph 1.
EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2014.
Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
9
The Commission shall, by 1 April 2015 and after consulting EBA, submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the functioning of the benchmarking of internal models including the scope of the model. Where appropriate, the report shall be followed by a legislative proposal.

Credit and counterparty risk
Article 79
Competent authorities shall ensure that:
1. credit-granting is based on sound and well-defined criteria and that the process for approving, amending, renewing, and re-financing credits is clearly established;
2. institutions have internal methodologies that enable them to assess the credit risk of exposures to individual obligors, securities or securitisation positions and credit risk at the portfolio level. In particular, internal methodologies shall not rely solely or mechanistically on external credit ratings. Where own funds requirements are based on a rating by an External Credit Assessment Institution (ECAI) or based on the fact that an exposure is unrated, this shall not exempt institutions from additionally considering other relevant information for assessing their allocation of internal capital;
3. the ongoing administration and monitoring of the various credit risk-bearing portfolios and exposures of institutions, including for identifying and managing problem credits and for making adequate value adjustments and provisions, is operated through effective systems;
4. diversification of credit portfolios is adequate given an institution's target markets and overall credit strategy.

Residual risk
Article 80
Competent authorities shall ensure that the risk that recognised credit risk mitigation techniques used by institutions prove less effective than expected is addressed and controlled including by means of written policies and procedures.

Concentration risk
Article 81
Competent authorities shall ensure that the concentration risk arising from exposures to each counterparty, including central counterparties, groups of connected counterparties, and counterparties in the same economic sector, geographic region or from the same activity or commodity, the application of credit risk mitigation techniques, and including in particular risks associated with large indirect credit exposures such as a single collateral issuer, is addressed and controlled including by means of written policies and procedures.

Securitisation risk
Article 82
1
Competent authorities shall ensure that the risks arising from securitisation transactions in relation to which the credit institutions are investor, originator or sponsor, including reputational risks, such as arise in relation to complex structures or products, are evaluated and addressed through appropriate policies and procedures, to ensure that the economic substance of the transaction is fully reflected in the risk assessment and management decisions.
2
Competent authorities shall ensure that liquidity plans to address the implications of both scheduled and early amortisation exist at institutions which are originators of revolving securitisation transactions involving early amortisation provisions.

Market risk
Article 83
1
Competent authorities shall ensure that policies and processes for the identification, measurement and management of all material sources and effects of market risks are implemented.
2
Where the short position falls due before the long position, competent authorities shall ensure that institutions also take measures against the risk of a shortage of liquidity.
3
The internal capital shall be adequate for material market risks that are not subject to an own funds requirement.
Institutions, which have, in calculating own funds requirements for position risk in accordance with Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 2, of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, netted off their positions in one or more of the equities constituting a stock-index against one or more positions in the stock-index future or other stock-index product shall have adequate internal capital to cover the basis risk of loss caused by the future's or other product's value not moving fully in line with that of its constituent equities. Institutions shall also have such adequate internal capital where they hold opposite positions in stock-index futures which are not identical in respect of either their maturity or their composition or both.
Where using the treatment in Article 345 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, institutions shall ensure that they hold sufficient internal capital against the risk of loss which exists between the time of the initial commitment and the following working day.

Interest risk arising from non-trading book activities
Article 84
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions implement systems to identify, evaluate and manage the risk arising from potential changes in interest rates that affect an institution's non-trading activities.

Operational risk
Article 85
1
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions implement policies and processes to evaluate and manage the exposures to operational risk, including model risk and risks resulting from outsourcing, and to cover low-frequency high-severity events. Institutions shall articulate what constitutes operational risk for the purposes of those policies and procedures.
2
Competent authorities shall ensure that contingency and business continuity plans are in place to ensure an institution's ability to operate on an ongoing basis and limit losses in the event of severe business disruption.

Liquidity risk
Article 86
1
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions have robust strategies, policies, processes and systems for the identification, measurement, management and monitoring of liquidity risk over an appropriate set of time horizons, including intra-day, so as to ensure that institutions maintain adequate levels of liquidity buffers. Those strategies, policies, processes and systems shall be tailored to business lines, currencies, branches and legal entities and shall include adequate allocation mechanisms of liquidity costs, benefits and risks.
2
The strategies, policies, processes and systems referred to in paragraph 1 shall be proportionate to the complexity, risk profile, scope of operation of the institutions and risk tolerance set by the management body and reflect the institution's importance in each Member State in which it carries out business. Institutions shall communicate risk tolerance to all relevant business lines.
3
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of their activities, have liquidity risk profiles that are consistent with and, not in excess of, those required for a well-functioning and robust system.
Competent authorities shall monitor developments in relation to liquidity risk profiles, for example product design and volumes, risk management, funding policies and funding concentrations.
Competent authorities shall take effective action where developments referred to in the second subparagraph may lead to individual institution or systemic instability.
Competent authorities shall inform EBA about any actions carried out pursuant to the third subparagraph.
EBA shall make recommendations where appropriate in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
4
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions develop methodologies for the identification, measurement, management and monitoring of funding positions. Those methodologies shall include the current and projected material cash-flows in and arising from assets, liabilities, off-balance-sheet items, including contingent liabilities and the possible impact of reputational risk.
5
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions distinguish between pledged and unencumbered assets that are available at all times, in particular during emergency situations. They shall also ensure that institutions take into account the legal entity in which assets reside, the country where assets are legally recorded either in a register or in an account and their eligibility and shall monitor how assets can be mobilised in a timely manner.
6
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions also have regard to existing legal, regulatory and operational limitations to potential transfers of liquidity and unencumbered assets amongst entities, both within and outside the European Economic Area.
7
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions consider different liquidity risk mitigation tools, including a system of limits and liquidity buffers in order to be able to withstand a range of different stress events and an adequately diversified funding structure and access to funding sources. Those arrangements shall be reviewed regularly.
8
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions consider alternative scenarios on liquidity positions and on risk mitigants and review the assumptions underlying decisions concerning the funding position at least annually. For those purposes, alternative scenarios shall address, in particular, off-balance sheet items and other contingent liabilities, including those of Securitisation Special Purpose Entities (SSPE) or other special purpose entities, as referred to in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, in relation to which the institution acts as sponsor or provides material liquidity support.
9
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions consider the potential impact of institution-specific, market-wide and combined alternative scenarios. Different time periods and varying degrees of stress conditions shall be considered.
10
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions adjust their strategies, internal policies and limits on liquidity risk and develop effective contingency plans, taking into account the outcome of the alternative scenarios referred to in paragraph 8.
11
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions have in place liquidity recovery plans setting out adequate strategies and proper implementation measures in order to address possible liquidity shortfalls, including in relation to branches established in another Member State. Competent authorities shall ensure that those plans are tested by the institutions at least annually, updated on the basis of the outcome of the alternative scenarios set out in paragraph 8, reported to and approved by senior management, so that internal policies and processes can be adjusted accordingly. Institutions shall take the necessary operational steps in advance to ensure that liquidity recovery plans can be implemented immediately. For credit institutions, such operational steps shall include holding collateral immediately available for central bank funding. This includes holding collateral where necessary in the currency of another Member State, or the currency of a third country to which the credit institution has exposures, and where operationally necessary within the territory of a host Member State or of a third country to whose currency it is exposed.

Risk of excessive leverage
Article 87
1
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions have policies and processes in place for the identification, management and monitoring of the risk of excessive leverage. Indicators for the risk of excessive leverage shall include the leverage ratio determined in accordance with Article 429 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and mismatches between assets and obligations.
2
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions address the risk of excessive leverage in a precautionary manner by taking due account of potential increases in the risk of excessive leverage caused by reductions of the institution's own funds through expected or realised losses, depending on the applicable accounting rules. To that end, institutions shall be able to withstand a range of different stress events with respect to the risk of excessive leverage.
Sub-Section 3

Governance

Governance arrangements
Article 88
1
Member States shall ensure that the management body defines, oversees and is accountable for the implementation of the governance arrangements that ensure effective and prudent management of an institution, including the segregation of duties in the organisation and the prevention of conflicts of interest.
Those arrangements shall comply with the following principles:
a
the management body must have the overall responsibility for the institution and approve and oversee the implementation of the institution's strategic objectives, risk strategy and internal governance;
b
the management body must ensure the integrity of the accounting and financial reporting systems, including financial and operational controls and compliance with the law and relevant standards;
c
the management body must oversee the process of disclosure and communications;
d
the management body must be responsible for providing effective oversight of senior management;
e
the chairman of the management body in its supervisory function of an institution must not exercise simultaneously the functions of a chief executive officer within the same institution, unless justified by the institution and authorised by competent authorities.
Member States shall ensure that the management body monitors and periodically assesses the effectiveness of the institution's governance arrangements and takes appropriate steps to address any deficiencies.
Member States shall ensure that data on loans to members of the management body and their related parties are properly documented and made available to competent authorities upon request.
For the purposes of this Article, the term
‘
related party
’
means:
a
a spouse, registered partner in accordance with national law, child or parent of a member of the management body;
b
a commercial entity, in which a member of the management body or his or her close family member as referred to in point (a) has a qualifying holding of 10 % or more of capital or of voting rights in that entity, or in which those persons can exercise significant influence, or in which those persons hold senior management positions or are members of the management body.
2
Member States shall ensure that institutions which are significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities establish a nomination committee composed of members of the management body who do not perform any executive function in the institution concerned.
The nomination committee shall:
a
identify and recommend, for the approval of the management body or for approval of the general meeting, candidates to fill management body vacancies, evaluate the balance of knowledge, skills, diversity and experience of the management body and prepare a description of the roles and capabilities for a particular appointment, and assess the time commitment expected.
Furthermore, the nomination committee shall decide on a target for the representation of the underrepresented gender in the management body and prepare a policy on how to increase the number of the underrepresented gender in the management body in order to meet that target. The target, policy and its implementation shall be made public in accordance with Article 435(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
b
periodically, and at least annually, assess the structure, size, composition and performance of the management body and make recommendations to the management body with regard to any changes;
c
periodically, and at least annually, assess the knowledge, skills and experience of individual members of the management body and of the management body collectively, and report to the management body accordingly;
d
periodically review the policy of the management body for selection and appointment of senior management and make recommendations to the management body.
In performing its duties, the nomination committee shall, to the extent possible and on an ongoing basis, take account of the need to ensure that the management body's decision making is not dominated by any one individual or small group of individuals in a manner that is detrimental to the interests of the institution as a whole.
The nomination committee shall be able to use any forms of resources that it considers to be appropriate, including external advice, and shall receive appropriate funding to that effect.
Where, under national law, the management body does not have any competence in the process of selection and appointment of any of its members, this paragraph shall not apply.

Country-by-country reporting
Article 89
1
From 1 January 2015 Member States shall require each institution to disclose annually, specifying, by Member State and by third country in which it has an establishment, the following information on a consolidated basis for the financial year:
a
name(s), nature of activities and geographical location;
b
turnover;
c
number of employees on a full time equivalent basis;
d
profit or loss before tax;
e
tax on profit or loss;
f
public subsidies received.
2
Notwithstanding paragraph 1, Member States shall require institutions to disclose the information referred to in paragraph 1(a), (b) and (c) for the first time on 1 July 2014.
3
By 1 July 2014, all global systemically important institutions authorised within the Union, as identified internationally, shall submit to the Commission the information referred to in paragraph 1(d), (e) and (f) on a confidential basis. The Commission, after consulting EBA, EIOPA and ESMA, as appropriate, shall conduct a general assessment as regards potential negative economic consequences of the public disclosure of such information, including the impact on competitiveness, investment and credit availability and the stability of the financial system. The Commission shall submit its report to the European Parliament and to the Council by 31 December 2014.
In the event that the Commission report identifies significant negative effects, the Commission shall consider making an appropriate legislative proposal for an amendment of the disclosure obligations set out in paragraph 1 and may, in accordance with point (h) of Article 145, decide to defer those obligations. The Commission shall review the necessity to extend deferral annually.
4
The information referred to in paragraph 1 shall be audited in accordance with Directive 2006/43/EC and shall be published, where possible, as an annex to the annual financial statements or, where applicable, to the consolidated financial statements of the institution concerned.
5
To the extent that future Union legislative acts for disclosure obligations go beyond those laid down in this Article, this Article shall cease to apply and shall be deleted accordingly.
6
By
1 January 2021
, the Commission, after consulting EBA, EIOPA and ESMA, shall review whether the information referred to in points (a) to (f) of paragraph 1 is still adequate, while taking into account previous impact assessments, international agreements and legislative developments in the Union, and whether further relevant information requirements may be added to paragraph 1.
By
30 June 2021
, the Commission shall, on the basis of the consultation with EBA, EIOPA and ESMA, report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the assessment referred to in this paragraph and, where appropriate, submit a legislative proposal to the European Parliament and to the Council.

Public disclosure of return on assets
Article 90
Institutions shall disclose in their annual report among the key indicators their return on assets, calculated as their net profit divided by their total balance sheet.

Management body
Article 91
1
Institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies shall have the primary responsibility for ensuring that members of the management body are at all times of sufficiently good repute and possess sufficient knowledge, skills and experience to perform their duties. Members of the management body shall, in particular, fulfil the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 8.
Where members of the management body do not fulfil the requirements set out in this paragraph, competent authorities shall have the power to remove such members from the management body. The competent authorities shall in particular verify whether the requirements set out in this paragraph are still fulfilled where they have reasonable grounds to suspect that money laundering or terrorist financing is being or has been committed or attempted, or there is increased risk thereof in connection with that institution.
2
All members of the management body shall commit sufficient time to perform their functions in the institution.
3
The number of directorships which may be held by a member of the management body at the same time shall take into account individual circumstances and the nature, scale and complexity of the institution's activities. Unless representing the Member State, members of the management body of an institution that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities shall, from 1 July 2014, not hold more than one of the following combinations of directorships at the same time:
a
one executive directorship with two non-executive directorships;
b
four non-executive directorships.
4
For the purposes of paragraph 3, the following shall count as a single directorship:
a
executive or non-executive directorships held within the same group;
b
executive or non-executive directorships held within:
1. institutions which are members of the same institutional protection scheme provided that the conditions set out in Article 113(7) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 are fulfilled; or
2. undertakings (including non-financial entities) in which the institution holds a qualifying holding.
5
Directorships in organisations which do not pursue predominantly commercial objectives shall not count for the purposes of paragraph 3.
6
Competent authorities may authorise members of the management body to hold one additional non-executive directorship. Competent authorities shall regularly inform EBA of such authorisations.
7
The management body shall possess adequate collective knowledge, skills and experience to be able to understand the institution's activities, including the main risks. The overall composition of the management body shall reflect an adequately broad range of experience.
8
Each member of the management body shall act with honesty, integrity and independence of mind to effectively assess and challenge the decisions of the senior management where necessary and to effectively oversee and monitor management decision-making. Being a member of affiliated companies or affiliated entities does not in itself constitute an obstacle to acting with independence of mind.
9
Institutions shall devote adequate human and financial resources to the induction and training of members of the management body.
10
Member States or competent authorities shall require institutions and their respective nomination committees to engage a broad set of qualities and competences when recruiting members to the management body and for that purpose to put in place a policy promoting diversity on the management body.
11
Competent authorities shall collect the information disclosed in accordance with Article 435(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and shall use it to benchmark diversity practices. The competent authorities shall provide EBA with that information. EBA shall use that information to benchmark diversity practices at Union level.
12
EBA shall issue guidelines on the following:
a
the notion of sufficient time commitment of a member of the management body to perform his functions, in relation to the individual circumstances and the nature, scale and complexity of activities of the institution;
b
the notion of adequate collective knowledge, skills and experience of the management body as referred to in paragraph 7;
c
the notions of honesty, integrity and independence of mind of a member of the management body as referred to in paragraph 8;
d
the notion of adequate human and financial resources devoted to the induction and training of members of the management body as referred to in paragraph 9;
e
the notion of diversity to be taken into account for the selection of members of the management body as referred to in paragraph 10;
f
the consistent application of the power referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 1.
EBA shall issue those guidelines by 31 December 2015.
13
This Article shall be without prejudice to provisions on the representation of employees in the management body as provided for by national law.

Remuneration policies
Article 92
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2
Member States shall ensure that, when establishing and applying the total remuneration policies, inclusive of salaries and discretionary pension benefits, for categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on the institution's risk profile, institutions comply with the following requirements in a manner that is appropriate to their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities:
a
the remuneration policy is consistent with and promotes sound and effective risk management and does not encourage risk-taking that exceeds the level of tolerated risk of the institution;
aa
the remuneration policy is a gender neutral remuneration policy;
b
the remuneration policy is in line with the business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the institution, and incorporates measures to avoid conflicts of interest;
c
the institution' s management body in its supervisory function adopts and periodically reviews the general principles of the remuneration policy and is responsible for overseeing its implementation;
d
the implementation of the remuneration policy is, at least annually, subject to central and independent internal review for compliance with policies and procedures for remuneration adopted by the management body in its supervisory function;
e
staff engaged in control functions are independent from the business units they oversee, have appropriate authority, and are remunerated in accordance with the achievement of the objectives linked to their functions, independent of the performance of the business areas they control;
f
the remuneration of the senior officers in the risk management and compliance functions is directly overseen by the remuneration committee referred to in Article 95 or, if such a committee has not been established, by the management body in its supervisory function;
g
the remuneration policy, taking into account national criteria on wage setting, makes a clear distinction between criteria for setting:
1. basic fixed remuneration, which should primarily reflect relevant professional experience and organisational responsibility as set out in an employee's job description as part of the terms of employment; and
2. variable remuneration which should reflect a sustainable and risk adjusted performance as well as performance in excess of that required to fulfil the employee's job description as part of the terms of employment.
3
For the purposes of paragraph 2, categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on the institution's risk profile shall, at least, include:
a
all members of the management body and senior management;
b
staff members with managerial responsibility over the institution's control functions or material business units;
c
staff members entitled to significant remuneration in the preceding financial year, provided that the following conditions are met:
1. the staff member's remuneration is equal to or greater than EUR
500 000
and equal to or greater than the average remuneration awarded to the members of the institution's management body and senior management referred to in point (a);
2. the staff member performs the professional activity within a material business unit and the activity is of a kind that has a significant impact on the relevant business unit's risk profile.

Institutions that benefit from government intervention
Article 93
In the case of institutions that benefit from exceptional government intervention, the following principles shall apply in addition to those set out in Article 92(2):
1. variable remuneration is strictly limited as a percentage of net revenue where it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base and timely exit from government support;
2. the relevant competent authorities require institutions to restructure remuneration in a manner aligned with sound risk management and long-term growth, including, where appropriate, establishing limits to the remuneration of the members of the management body of the institution;
3. no variable remuneration is paid to members of the management body of the institution unless justified.

Variable elements of remuneration
Article 94
1
For variable elements of remuneration, the following principles shall apply in addition to, and under the same conditions as, those set out in Article 92(2):
a
where remuneration is performance related, the total amount of remuneration is based on a combination of the assessment of the performance of the individual and of the business unit concerned and of the overall results of the institution and when assessing individual performance, financial and non-financial criteria are taken into account;
b
the assessment of the performance is set in a multi-year framework in order to ensure that the assessment process is based on longer-term performance and that the actual payment of performance-based components of remuneration is spread over a period which takes account of the underlying business cycle of the credit institution and its business risks;
c
the total variable remuneration does not limit the ability of the institution to strengthen its capital base;
d
guaranteed variable remuneration is not consistent with sound risk management or the pay-for-performance principle and shall not be a part of prospective remuneration plans;
e
guaranteed variable remuneration is exceptional, occurs only when hiring new staff and where the institution has a sound and strong capital base and is limited to the first year of employment;
f
fixed and variable components of total remuneration are appropriately balanced and the fixed component represents a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration to allow the operation of a fully flexible policy on variable remuneration components, including the possibility to pay no variable remuneration component;
g
institutions shall set the appropriate ratios between the fixed and the variable component of the total remuneration, whereby the following principles shall apply:
1. the variable component shall not exceed 100 % of the fixed component of the total remuneration for each individual. Member States may set a lower maximum percentage;
2. Members States may allow shareholders or owners or members of the institution to approve a higher maximum level of the ratio between the fixed and variable components of remuneration provided the overall level of the variable component shall not exceed 200 % of the fixed component of the total remuneration for each individual. Member States may set a lower maximum percentage.
Any approval of a higher ratio in accordance with the first subparagraph of this point shall be carried out in accordance with the following procedure:
  - the shareholders or owners or members of the institution shall act upon a detailed recommendation by the institution giving the reasons for, and the scope of, an approval sought, including the number of staff affected, their functions and the expected impact on the requirement to maintain a sound capital base;
  - shareholders or owners or members of the institution shall act by a majority of at least 66 % provided that at least 50 % of the shares or equivalent ownership rights are represented or, failing that, shall act by a majority of 75 % of the ownership rights represented;
  - the institution shall notify all shareholders or owners or members of the institution, providing a reasonable notice period in advance, that an approval under the first subparagraph of this point will be sought;
  - the institution shall, without delay, inform the competent authority of the recommendation to its shareholders or owners or members, including the proposed higher maximum ratio and the reasons therefore and shall be able to demonstrate to the competent authority that the proposed higher ratio does not conflict with the institution's obligations under this Directive and under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, having regard in particular to the institution's own funds obligations;
  - the institution shall, without delay, inform the competent authority of the decisions taken by its shareholders or owners or members, including any approved higher maximum ratio pursuant to the first subparagraph of this point, and the competent authorities shall use the information received to benchmark the practices of institutions in that regard. The competent authorities shall provide EBA with that information and EBA shall publish it on an aggregate home Member State basis in a common reporting format. EBA may elaborate guidelines to facilitate the implementation of this indent and to ensure the consistency of the information collected;
  - staff who are directly concerned by the higher maximum levels of variable remuneration referred to in this point shall not, where applicable, be allowed to exercise, directly or indirectly, any voting rights they may have as shareholders or owners or members of the institution;
3. Member States may allow institutions to apply the discount rate referred to in the second subparagraph of this point to a maximum of 25 % of total variable remuneration provided it is paid in instruments that are deferred for a period of not less than five years. Member States may set a lower maximum percentage.
EBA shall prepare and publish, by 31 March 2014, guidelines on the applicable notional discount rate taking into account all relevant factors including inflation rate and risk, which includes length of deferral. The EBA guidelines on the discount rate shall specifically consider how to incentivise the use of instruments which are deferred for a period of not less than five years;
h
payments relating to the early termination of a contract reflect performance achieved over time and do not reward failure or misconduct;
i
remuneration packages relating to compensation or buy out from contracts in previous employment must align with the long-term interests of the institution including retention, deferral, performance and clawback arrangements;
j
the measurement of performance used to calculate variable remuneration components or pools of variable remuneration components includes an adjustment for all types of current and future risks and takes into account the cost of the capital and the liquidity required;
k
the allocation of the variable remuneration components within the institution shall also take into account all types of current and future risks;
l
a substantial portion, and in any event at least 50 %, of any variable remuneration shall consist of a balance of the following:
1. shares or, subject to the legal structure of the institution concerned, equivalent ownership interests; or share-linked instruments or, subject to the legal structure of the institution concerned, equivalent non-cash instruments;
2. where possible, other instruments within the meaning of Article 52 or 63 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or other instruments which can be fully converted to Common Equity Tier 1 instruments or written down, that in each case adequately reflect the credit quality of the institution as a going concern and are appropriate to be used for the purposes of variable remuneration.
The instruments referred to in this point shall be subject to an appropriate retention policy designed to align incentives with the longer-term interests of the institution. Member States or their competent authorities may place restrictions on the types and designs of those instruments or prohibit certain instruments as appropriate. This point shall be applied to both the portion of the variable remuneration component deferred in accordance with point (m) and the portion of the variable remuneration component not deferred;
m
a substantial portion, and in any event at least 40 %, of the variable remuneration component is deferred over a period which is not less than four to five years and is correctly aligned with the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the staff member concerned. For members of the management body and senior management of institutions that are significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities, the deferral period should not be less than five years.
Remuneration payable under deferral arrangements shall vest no faster than on a pro-rata basis. In the case of a variable remuneration component of a particularly high amount, at least 60 % of the amount shall be deferred. The length of the deferral period shall be established in accordance with the business cycle, the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the staff member concerned;
n
the variable remuneration, including the deferred portion, is paid or vests only if it is sustainable according to the financial situation of the institution as a whole, and justified on the basis of the performance of the institution, the business unit and the individual concerned.
Without prejudice to the general principles of national contract and labour law, the total variable remuneration shall generally be considerably contracted where subdued or negative financial performance of the institution occurs, taking into account both current remuneration and reductions in payouts of amounts previously earned, including through malus or clawback arrangements.
Up to 100 % of the total variable remuneration shall be subject to malus or clawback arrangements. Institutions shall set specific criteria for the application of malus and clawback. Such criteria shall in particular cover situations where the staff member:
1. participated in or was responsible for conduct which resulted in significant losses to the institution;
2. failed to meet appropriate standards of fitness and propriety;
o
the pension policy is in line with the business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the institution.
If the employee leaves the institution before retirement, discretionary pension benefits shall be held by the institution for a period of five years in the form of instruments referred to in point (l). Where an employee reaches retirement, discretionary pension benefits shall be paid to the employee in the form of instruments referred to in point (l) subject to a five-year retention period;
p
staff members are required to undertake not to use personal hedging strategies or remuneration- and liability-related insurance to undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements;
q
variable remuneration is not paid through vehicles or methods that facilitate the non-compliance with this Directive or Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
2
EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the classes of instruments that satisfy the conditions set out in point (l)(ii) of paragraph 1.
EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by
31 March 2014
.
For the purpose of identifying staff whose professional activities have a material impact on the institution's risk profile as referred to in Article 92(3), EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards setting out the criteria to define the following:
a
managerial responsibility and control functions;
b
material business unit and significant impact on the relevant business unit's risk profile; and
c
other categories of staff not expressly referred to in Article 92(3) whose professional activities have an impact on the institution's risk profile comparably as material as that of those categories of staff referred to therein.
EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by
28 December 2019
.
Power is delegated to the Commission to supplement this Directive by adopting the regulatory technical standards referred to in this paragraph in accordance with Article 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
3
By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the requirements set out in points (l) and (m) and in the second paragraph of point (o) of that paragraph shall not apply to:
a
an institution that is not a large institution as defined in point (146) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and the value of the assets of which is on average and on an individual basis in accordance with this Directive and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 equal to or less than EUR 5 billion over the four-year period immediately preceding the current financial year;
b
a staff member whose annual variable remuneration does not exceed EUR
50 000
and does not represent more than one third of the staff member's total annual remuneration.
4
By way of derogation from point (a) of paragraph 3, a Member State may lower or increase the threshold referred to therein, provided that:
a
the institution in relation to which the Member State makes use of this provision is not a large institution as defined in point (146) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and, where the threshold is increased:
1. the institution meets the criteria set out in points (145)(c), (d) and (e) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; and
2. the threshold does not exceed EUR 15 billion;
b
it is appropriate to modify the threshold in accordance with this paragraph taking into account the institution's nature, scope and complexity of its activities, its internal organisation or, if applicable, the characteristics of the group to which it belongs.
5
By way of derogation from point (b) of paragraph 3, a Member State may decide that staff members entitled to annual variable remuneration below the threshold and share referred to in that point shall not be subject to the exemption set out therein because of national market specificities in terms of remuneration practices or because of the nature of the responsibilities and job profile of those staff members.
6
By
28 June 2023
, the Commission, in close cooperation with EBA, shall review and report on the application of paragraphs 3 to 5 and shall submit that report to the European Parliament and to the Council together with a legislative proposal, if appropriate.
7
EBA shall issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, facilitating the implementation of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 and ensuring their consistent application.

Remuneration Committee
Article 95
1
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions that are significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of their activities establish a remuneration committee. The remuneration committee shall be constituted in such a way as to enable it to exercise competent and independent judgment on remuneration policies and practices and the incentives created for managing risk, capital and liquidity.
2
Competent authorities shall ensure that the remuneration committee is responsible for the preparation of decisions regarding remuneration, including those which have implications for the risk and risk management of the institution concerned and which are to be taken by the management body. The Chair and the members of the remuneration committee shall be members of the management body who do not perform any executive function in the institution concerned. If employee representation on the management body is provided for by national law, the remuneration committee shall include one or more employee representatives. When preparing such decisions, the remuneration committee shall take into account the long-term interests of shareholders, investors and other stakeholders in the institution and the public interest.

Maintenance of a website on corporate governance and remuneration
Article 96
Institutions that maintain a website shall explain there how they comply with the requirements of Articles 88 to 95.
Section III

Supervisory review and evaluation process

Supervisory review and evaluation
Article 97
1
Taking into account the technical criteria set out in Article 98, the competent authorities shall review the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by the institutions to comply with this Directive and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and evaluate:
a
risks to which the institutions are or might be exposed;
(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c
risks revealed by stress testing taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of an institution's activities.
2
The scope of the review and evaluation referred to in paragraph 1 shall cover all requirements of this Directive and of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
3
On the basis of the review and evaluation referred to in paragraph 1, the competent authorities shall determine whether the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by institutions and the own funds and liquidity held by them ensure a sound management and coverage of their risks.
4
Competent authorities shall establish the frequency and intensity of the review and evaluation referred to in paragraph 1 having regard to the size, systemic importance, nature, scale and complexity of the activities of the institution concerned and taking into account the principle of proportionality. The review and evaluation shall be updated at least on an annual basis for institutions covered by the supervisory examination programme referred to in Article 99(2).
When conducting the review and evaluation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, competent authorities shall apply the principle of proportionality in accordance with the criteria disclosed pursuant to point (c) of Article 143(1).
4a
Competent authorities may tailor the methodologies for the application of the review and evaluation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article to take into account institutions with a similar risk profile, such as similar business models or geographical location of exposures. Such tailored methodologies may include risk-oriented benchmarks and quantitative indicators, shall allow for due consideration of the specific risks that each institution may be exposed to, and shall not affect the institution-specific nature of measures imposed in accordance with Article 104.
Where competent authorities use tailored methodologies pursuant to this paragraph, they shall notify EBA. EBA shall monitor supervisory practices and issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, specifying how similar risk profiles shall be assessed for the purposes of this paragraph and to ensure the consistent and proportionate application of methodologies across the Union that are tailored to similar institutions.
5
Member States shall ensure that where a review shows that an institution may pose systemic risk in accordance with Article 23 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 the competent authorities inform EBA without delay about the results of the review.
6
Where a review, in particular the evaluation of the governance arrangements, the business model, or the activities of an institution, gives competent authorities reasonable grounds to suspect that, in connection with that institution, money laundering or terrorist financing is being or has been committed or attempted, or there is increased risk thereof, the competent authority shall immediately notify EBA and the authority or body that supervises the institution in accordance with Directive (EU) 2015/849 and is competent for ensuring compliance with that Directive. In the event of potential increased risk of money laundering or terrorist financing, the competent authority and the authority or body that supervises the institution in accordance with Directive (EU) 2015/849 and is competent for ensuring compliance with that Directive shall liaise and notify their common assessment immediately to EBA. The competent authority shall take, as appropriate, measures in accordance with this Directive.

Technical criteria for the supervisory review and evaluation
Article 98
1
In addition to credit, market and operational risks, the review and evaluation performed by competent authorities pursuant to Article 97 shall include at least:
a
the results of the stress test carried out in accordance with Article 177 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 by institutions applying an internal ratings based approach;
b
the exposure to and management of concentration risk by institutions, including their compliance with the requirements set out in Part Four of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Article 81 of this Directive;
c
the robustness, suitability and manner of application of the policies and procedures implemented by institutions for the management of the residual risk associated with the use of recognised credit risk mitigation techniques;
d
the extent to which the own funds held by an institution in respect of assets which it has securitised are adequate having regard to the economic substance of the transaction, including the degree of risk transfer achieved;
e
the exposure to, measurement and management of liquidity risk by institutions, including the development of alternative scenario analyses, the management of risk mitigants (in particular the level, composition and quality of liquidity buffers) and effective contingency plans;
f
the impact of diversification effects and how such effects are factored into the risk measurement system;
g
the results of stress tests carried out by institutions using an internal model to calculate market risk own funds requirements under Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 5 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
h
the geographical location of institutions' exposures;
i
the business model of the institution;
j
the assessment of systemic risk, in accordance with the criteria set out in Article 97.
2
For the purposes of point (e) of paragraph 1, the competent authorities shall regularly carry out a comprehensive assessment of the overall liquidity risk management by institutions and promote the development of sound internal methodologies. While conducting those reviews, the competent authorities shall have regard to the role played by institutions in the financial markets. The competent authorities in one Member State shall duly consider the potential impact of their decisions on the stability of the financial system in all other Member States concerned.
3
Competent authorities shall monitor whether an institution has provided implicit support to a securitisation. If an institution is found to have provided implicit support on more than one occasion the competent authority shall take appropriate measures reflective of the increased expectation that it will provide future support to its securitisation thus failing to achieve a significant transfer of risk.
4
For the purposes of the determination to be made under Article 97(3) of this Directive, competent authorities shall consider whether the valuation adjustments taken for positions or portfolios in the trading book, as set out in Article 105 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, enable the institution to sell or hedge out its positions within a short period without incurring material losses under normal market conditions.
5
The review and evaluation performed by competent authorities shall include the exposure of institutions to the interest rate risk arising from non-trading activities. Measures shall be required at least in the case of institutions whose economic value declines by more than 20 % of their own funds as a result of a sudden and unexpected change in interest rates of 200 basis points or such change as defined in the EBA guidelines.
6
The review and evaluation performed by competent authorities shall include the exposure of institutions to the risk of excessive leverage as reflected by indicators of excessive leverage, including the leverage ratio determined in accordance with Article 429 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. In determining the adequacy of the leverage ratio of institutions and of the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by institutions to manage the risk of excessive leverage, competent authorities shall take into account the business model of those institutions.
7
The review and evaluation conducted by competent authorities shall include governance arrangements of institutions, their corporate culture and values, and the ability of members of the management body to perform their duties. In conducting that review and evaluation, competent authorities shall, at least, have access to agendas and supporting documents for meetings of the management body and its committees, and the results of the internal or external evaluation of performance of the management body.
8
EBA shall assess the potential inclusion in the review and evaluation performed by competent authorities of environmental, social and governance risks (ESG risks).
For the purposes of the first subparagraph, EBA's assessment shall comprise at least the following:
a
the development of a uniform definition of ESG risks, including physical risks and transition risks; the latter shall comprise the risks related to the depreciation of assets due to regulatory changes;
b
the development of appropriate qualitative and quantitative criteria for the assessment of the impact of ESG risks on the financial stability of institutions in the short, medium and long term; such criteria shall include stress testing processes and scenario analyses to assess the impact of ESG risks under scenarios with different severities;
c
the arrangements, processes, mechanisms and strategies to be implemented by the institutions to identify, assess and manage ESG risks;
d
the analysis methods and tools to assess the impact of ESG risks on lending and financial intermediation activities of institutions.
EBA shall submit a report on its findings to the Commission, the European Parliament and to the Council by
28 June 2021
.
On the basis of the outcome of its report, EBA may, if appropriate, issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, regarding the uniform inclusion of ESG risks in the supervisory review and evaluation process performed by competent authorities.

Supervisory examination programme
Article 99
1
The competent authorities shall, at least annually, adopt a supervisory examination programme for the institutions they supervise. Such programme shall take into account the supervisory review and evaluation process under Article 97. It shall contain the following:
a
an indication of how competent authorities intend to carry out their tasks and allocate their resources;
b
an identification of which institutions are intended to be subject to enhanced supervision and the measures taken for such supervision as set out in paragraph 3;
c
a plan for inspections at the premises used by an institution, including its branches and subsidiaries established in other Member States in accordance with Articles 52, 119 and 122.
2
Supervisory examination programmes shall include the following institutions:
a
institutions for which the results of the stress tests referred to in points (a) and (g) of Article 98(1) and Article 100, or the outcome of the supervisory review and evaluation process under Article 97, indicate significant risks to their ongoing financial soundness or indicate breaches of national provisions transposing this Directive and of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c
any other institution for which the competent authorities deem it to be necessary.
3
Where appropriate under Article 97 the following measures shall, in particular, be taken if necessary:
a
an increase in the number or frequency of on-site inspections of the institution;
b
a permanent presence of the competent authority at the institution;
c
additional or more frequent reporting by the institution;
d
additional or more frequent review of the operational, strategic or business plans of the institution;
e
thematic examinations monitoring specific risks that are likely to materialise.
4
Adoption of a supervisory examination programme by the competent authority of the home Member State shall not prevent the competent authorities of the host Member State from carrying out, on a case-by-case basis, on-the-spot checks and inspections of the activities carried out by branches of institutions on their territory in accordance with Article 52(3).

Supervisory stress testing
Article 100
1
The competent authorities shall carry out as appropriate but at least annually supervisory stress tests on institutions they supervise, to facilitate the review and evaluation process under Article 97.
2
EBA shall issue guidelines in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 to ensure that common methodologies are used by the competent authorities when conducting annual supervisory stress tests.

Ongoing review of the permission to use internal approaches
Article 101
1
Competent authorities shall review on a regular basis, and at least every 3 years, institutions' compliance with the requirements regarding approaches that require permission by the competent authorities before using such approaches for the calculation of own funds requirements in accordance with Part Three of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. They shall have particular regard to changes in an institution's business and to the implementation of those approaches to new products. Where material deficiencies are identified in risk capture by an institution's internal approach, competent authorities shall ensure they are rectified or take appropriate steps to mitigate their consequences, including by imposing higher multiplication factors, or imposing capital add-ons, or taking other appropriate and effective measures.
2
The competent authorities shall in particular review and assess whether the institution uses well developed and up-to-date techniques and practices for those approaches.
3
If for an internal market risk model numerous overshootings referred to in Article 366 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 indicate that the model is not or is no longer sufficiently accurate, the competent authorities shall revoke the permission for using the internal model or impose appropriate measures to ensure that the model is improved promptly.
4
If an institution has received permission to apply an approach that requires permission by the competent authorities before using such an approach for the calculation of own funds requirements in accordance with Part Three of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 but does not meet the requirements for applying that approach anymore, the competent authorities shall require the institution to either demonstrate to the satisfaction of the competent authorities that the effect of non-compliance is immaterial where applicable in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or present a plan for the timely restoration of compliance with the requirements and set a deadline for its implementation. The competent authorities shall require improvements to that plan if it is unlikely to result in full compliance or if the deadline is inappropriate. If the institution is unlikely to be able to restore compliance within an appropriate deadline and, where applicable, has not satisfactorily demonstrated that the effect of non-compliance is immaterial, the permission to use the approach shall be revoked or limited to compliant areas or those where compliance can be achieved within an appropriate deadline.
5
In order to promote consistent soundness of internal approaches in the Union, EBA shall analyse internal approaches across institutions, including the consistency of implementation of the definition of default and how those institutions treat similar risks or exposures.
EBA shall develop guidelines in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, which contain benchmarks on the basis of that analysis.
Competent authorities shall take into account that analysis and those benchmarks for the review of the permissions they grant to institutions to use internal approaches.
Section IV

Supervisory measures and powers

Supervisory measures
Article 102
1
Competent authorities shall require an institution to take the necessary measures at an early stage to address relevant problems in the following circumstances:
a
the institution does not meet the requirements of this Directive or of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
b
the competent authorities have evidence that the institution is likely to breach the requirements of this Directive or of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 within the following 12 months.
2
For the purposes of paragraph 1, the powers of competent authorities shall include those referred to in Article 104.

Application of supervisory measures to institutions with similar risk profiles
Article 103 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Supervisory powers
Article 104
1
For the purposes of Article 97, Article 98(4) and (5), Article 101(4) and Article 102 of this Directive and of the application of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, competent authorities shall have at least the power to:
a
require institutions to have additional own funds in excess of the requirements set out in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, under the conditions set out in Article 104a of this Directive;
b
require the reinforcement of the arrangements, processes, mechanisms and strategies implemented in accordance with Articles 73 and 74;
c
require institutions to submit a plan to restore compliance with supervisory requirements pursuant to this Directive and to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and set a deadline for its implementation, including improvements to that plan regarding scope and deadline;
d
require institutions to apply a specific provisioning policy or treatment of assets in terms of own funds requirements;
e
restrict or limit the business, operations or network of institutions or to request the divestment of activities that pose excessive risks to the soundness of an institution;
f
require the reduction of the risk inherent in the activities, products and systems of institutions, including outsourced activities;
g
require institutions to limit variable remuneration as a percentage of net revenues where it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base;
h
require institutions to use net profits to strengthen own funds;
i
restrict or prohibit distributions or interest payments by an institution to shareholders, members or holders of Additional Tier 1 instruments where the prohibition does not constitute an event of default of the institution;
j
impose additional or more frequent reporting requirements, including reporting on own funds, liquidity and leverage;
k
impose specific liquidity requirements, including restrictions on maturity mismatches between assets and liabilities;
l
require additional disclosures.
2
For the purposes of point (j) of paragraph 1, competent authorities may only impose additional or more frequent reporting requirements on institutions where the relevant requirement is appropriate and proportionate with regard to the purpose for which the information is required and the information requested is not duplicative.
For the purposes of Articles 97 to 102, any additional information that may be required from institutions shall be deemed as duplicative where the same or substantially the same information has already been otherwise reported to the competent authority or may be produced by the competent authority.
The competent authority shall not require an institution to report additional information where it has previously received it in a different format or level of granularity and that different format or granularity does not prevent the competent authority from producing information of the same quality and reliability as that produced on the basis of the additional information that would be otherwise reported.
3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Additional own funds requirement
Article 104a
1
Competent authorities shall impose the additional own funds requirement referred to in point (a) of Article 104(1) where, on the basis of the reviews carried out in accordance with Articles 97 and 101, they determine any of the following situations for an individual institution:
a
the institution is exposed to risks or elements of risk that are not covered or not sufficiently covered, as specified in paragraph 2 of this Article, by the own funds requirements set out in Parts Three, Four and Seven of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 of the European Parliament and of the Council ;
b
the institution does not meet the requirements set out in Articles 73 and 74 of this Directive or in Article 393 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and it is unlikely that other supervisory measures would be sufficient to ensure that those requirements can be met within an appropriate timeframe;
c
the adjustments referred to in Article 98(4) are deemed to be insufficient to enable the institution to sell or hedge out its positions within a short period without incurring material losses under normal market conditions;
d
the evaluation carried out in accordance with Article 101(4) reveals that the non-compliance with the requirements for the application of the permitted approach will likely lead to inadequate own funds requirements;
e
the institution repeatedly fails to establish or maintain an adequate level of additional own funds to cover the guidance communicated in accordance with Article 104b(3);
f
other institution-specific situations deemed by the competent authority to raise material supervisory concerns.
The competent authorities shall only impose the additional own funds requirement referred to in point (a) of Article 104(1) to cover the risks incurred by individual institutions due to their activities, including those reflecting the impact of certain economic and market developments on the risk profile of an individual institution.
2
For the purposes of point (a) of paragraph 1 of this Article, risks or elements of risk shall only be considered as not covered or not sufficiently covered by the own funds requirements set out in Parts Three, Four and Seven of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 where the amounts, types and distribution of capital considered adequate by the competent authority, taking into account the supervisory review of the assessment carried out by institutions in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 73 of this Directive, are higher than the own funds requirements set out in Parts Three, Four and Seven of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.
For the purposes of the first subparagraph, competent authorities shall assess, taking into account the risk profile of each individual institution, the risks to which the institution is exposed, including:
a
institution-specific risks or elements of such risks that are explicitly excluded from or not explicitly addressed by the own funds requirements set out in Parts Three, Four and Seven of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402;
b
institution-specific risks or elements of such risks likely to be underestimated despite compliance with the applicable requirements set out in Parts Three, Four and Seven of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.
To the extent that risks or elements of risk are subject to transitional arrangements or grandfathering provisions laid down in this Directive or in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, they shall not be considered risks or elements of such risks likely to be underestimated despite compliance with the applicable requirements set out in Parts Three, Four and Seven of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.
For the purposes of the first subparagraph, the capital considered adequate shall cover all risks or elements of risks identified as material pursuant to the assessment laid down in the second subparagraph of this paragraph that are not covered or not sufficiently covered by the own funds requirements set out in Parts Three, Four and Seven of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.
Interest rate risk arising from non-trading book positions may be considered material at least in the cases referred to in Article 98(5), unless the competent authorities, in performing the review and evaluation, come to the conclusion that the institution's management of interest rate risk arising from non-trading book activities is adequate and that the institution is not excessively exposed to interest rate risk arising from non-trading book activities.
3
Where additional own funds are required to address risks other than the risk of excessive leverage not sufficiently covered by point (d) of Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, competent authorities shall determine the level of the additional own funds required under point (a) of paragraph 1 of this Article as the difference between the capital considered adequate pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article and the relevant own funds requirements set out in Parts Three and Four of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.
Where additional own funds are required to address the risk of excessive leverage not sufficiently covered by point (d) of Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, competent authorities shall determine the level of the additional own funds required under point (a) of paragraph 1 of this Article as the difference between the capital considered adequate pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article and the relevant own funds requirements set out in Parts Three and Seven of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
4
The institution shall meet the additional own funds requirement imposed by the competent authority under point (a) of Article 104(1) to address risks other than the risk of excessive leverage with own funds that satisfy the following conditions:
a
at least three quarters of the additional own funds requirement shall be met with Tier 1 capital;
b
at least three quarters of the Tier 1 capital referred to in point (a) shall be composed of Common Equity Tier 1 capital.
The institution shall meet the additional own funds requirement imposed by the competent authority under point (a) of Article 104(1) to address the risk of excessive leverage with Tier 1 capital.
By way of derogation from the first and the second subparagraphs, the competent authority may require the institution to meet its additional own funds requirement with a higher portion of Tier 1 capital or Common Equity Tier 1 capital, where necessary, and having regard to the specific circumstances of the institution.
Own funds that are used to meet the additional own funds requirement referred to in point (a) of Article 104(1) of this Directive imposed by competent authorities to address risks other than the risk of excessive leverage shall not be used to meet any of the following:
a
own funds requirements set out in points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
b
the combined buffer requirement;
c
the guidance on additional own funds referred to in Article 104b(3) of this Directive where that guidance addresses risks other than the risk of excessive leverage.
Own funds that are used to meet the additional own funds requirement referred to in point (a) of Article 104(1) of this Directive imposed by competent authorities to address the risk of excessive leverage not sufficiently covered by point (d) of Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 shall not be used to meet any of the following:
a
the own funds requirement set out in point (d) of Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
b
the leverage ratio buffer requirement referred to in Article 92(1a) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
c
the guidance on additional own funds referred to in Article 104b(3) of this Directive, where that guidance addresses risks of excessive leverage.
5
The competent authority shall duly justify in writing to each institution the decision to impose an additional own funds requirement under point (a) of Article 104(1), at least by giving a clear account of the full assessment of the elements referred to in paragraphs 1 to 4 of this Article. That justification shall include, in the case set out in point (e) of paragraph 1 of this Article, a specific statement of the reasons for which the imposition of guidance on additional own funds is no longer considered sufficient.

Guidance on additional own funds
Article 104b
1
Pursuant to the strategies and processes referred to in Article 73, institutions shall set their internal capital at an adequate level of own funds that is sufficient to cover all the risks that an institution is exposed to and to ensure that the institution's own funds can absorb potential losses resulting from stress scenarios, including those identified under the supervisory stress test referred to in Article 100.
2
Competent authorities shall regularly review the level of the internal capital set by each institution in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article as part of the reviews and evaluations performed in accordance with Articles 97 and 101, including the results of the stress tests referred to in Article 100.
Pursuant to that review, competent authorities shall determine for each institution the overall level of own funds they consider appropriate.
3
Competent authorities shall communicate their guidance on additional own funds, to institutions.
The guidance on additional own funds shall be the own funds exceeding the relevant amount of own funds required pursuant to Parts Three, Four and Seven of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, point (a) of Article 104(1) and point (6) of Article 128 of this Directive or pursuant to Article 92(1a) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, as relevant, which are needed to reach the overall level of own funds considered appropriate by the competent authorities pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article.
4
Competent authorities' guidance on additional own funds pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article shall be institution-specific. The guidance may cover risks addressed by the additional own funds requirement imposed pursuant to point (a) of Article 104(1) only to the extent that it covers aspects of those risks that are not already covered under that requirement.
5
Own funds that are used to meet the guidance on additional own funds communicated in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article to address risks other than the risk of excessive leverage shall not be used to meet any of the following:
a
the own funds requirements set out in points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
b
the requirement laid down in Article 104a of this Directive imposed by competent authorities to address risks other than the risk of excessive leverage and the combined buffer requirement.
Own funds that are used to meet the guidance on additional own funds communicated in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article to address the risk of excessive leverage shall not be used to meet the own funds requirement set out in point (d) of Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, the requirement laid down in Article 104a of this Directive imposed by competent authorities to address the risk of excessive leverage and the leverage ratio buffer requirement referred to in Article 92(1a) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
6
Failure to meet the guidance referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article where an institution meets the relevant own funds requirements set out in Parts Three, Four and Seven of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, the relevant additional own funds requirement referred to in point (a) of Article 104(1) of this Directive and, as relevant, the combined buffer requirement or the leverage ratio buffer requirement referred to in Article 92(1a) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 shall not trigger the restrictions referred to in Article 141 or 141b of this Directive.

Cooperation with resolution authorities
Article 104c
Competent authorities shall notify the relevant resolution authorities of the additional own funds requirement imposed on institutions pursuant to point (a) of Article 104(1) and of any guidance on additional own funds communicated to institutions in accordance with Article 104b(3).

Specific liquidity requirements
Article 105
For the purposes of determining the appropriate level of liquidity requirements on the basis of the review and evaluation carried out in accordance with Section III, the competent authorities shall assess whether any imposition of a specific liquidity requirement is necessary to capture liquidity risks to which an institution is or might be exposed, taking into account the following:
1. the particular business model of the institution;
2. the institution's arrangements, processes and mechanisms referred to in Section II and in particular in Article 86;
3. the outcome of the review and evaluation carried out in accordance with Article 97.
. . . . .
In particular, without prejudice to Article 67, competent authorities should consider the need to apply administrative penalties or other administrative measures, including prudential charges, the level of which broadly relates to the disparity between the actual liquidity position of an institution and any liquidity and stable funding requirements established at national or Union level.

Specific publication requirements
Article 106
1
Member States shall empower the competent authorities to require institutions:
a
to publish information referred to in Part Eight of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 more than once per year, and to set deadlines for publication;
b
to use specific media and locations for publications other than the financial statements.
2
Member States shall empower competent authorities to require parent undertakings to publish annually, either in full or by way of references to equivalent information, a description of their legal structure and governance and organisational structure of the group of institutions in accordance with Article 14(3), Article 74(1) and Article 109(2).

Consistency of supervisory reviews, evaluations and supervisory measures
Article 107
1
Competent authorities shall inform EBA of:
a
the functioning of their review and evaluation process referred to in Article 97;
b
the methodology used to base decisions referred to in Articles 98, 100, 101, 102, 104 and 105 on the process referred to in point (a).
EBA shall assess the information provided by competent authorities for the purposes of developing consistency in the supervisory review and evaluation process. It may request additional information from competent authorities in order to complete its assessment, on a proportional basis in accordance with Article 35 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
2
EBA shall annually report to the European Parliament and the Council on the degree of convergence of the application of this Chapter between Member States.
In order to increase the degree of such convergence, EBA shall conduct peer reviews in accordance with Article 30 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
3
EBA shall issue guidelines addressed to the competent authorities in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 to further specify, in a manner that is appropriate to the size, the structure and the internal organisation of institutions and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities, the common procedures and methodologies for the supervisory review and evaluation process referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and in Article 97 and for the assessment of the organisation and treatment of the risks referred to in Articles 76 to 87, in particular relating to concentration risk in accordance with Article 81.
Section V

Level of application

Internal capital adequacy assessment process
Article 108
1
Competent authorities shall require every institution which is neither a subsidiary in the Member State where it is authorised and supervised, nor a parent undertaking, and every institution not included in the consolidation pursuant to Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, to meet the obligations set out in Article 73 of this Directive on an individual basis.
Competent authorities may waive the requirements set out in Article 73 of this Directive in regard to a credit institution in accordance with Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
Where the competent authorities waive the application of own funds requirements on a consolidated basis provided for in Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, the requirements of Article 73 of this Directive shall apply on an individual basis.
2
Competent authorities shall require parent institutions in a Member State, to the extent and in the manner prescribed in Part One, Title II, Chapter 2, Sections 2 and 3 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 to meet the obligations set out in Article 73 of this Directive on a consolidated basis.
3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
Competent authorities shall require subsidiary institutions to apply the requirements set out in Article 73 on a sub-consolidated basis if those institutions, or the parent undertaking where it is a financial holding company or mixed financial holding company, have an institution or a financial institution or an asset management company as defined in Article 2(5) of Directive 2002/87/EC as a subsidiary in a third country, or hold a participation in such an undertaking.

Institutions' arrangements, processes and mechanisms
Article 109
1
Competent authorities shall require institutions to meet the obligations set out in Section II of this Chapter on an individual basis, unless competent authorities make use of the derogation provided for in Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
2
Competent authorities shall require the parent undertakings and subsidiaries subject to this Directive to meet the obligations set out in Section II of this Chapter on a consolidated or sub-consolidated basis, to ensure that the arrangements, processes and mechanisms required by Section II of this Chapter are consistent and well-integrated and that any data and information relevant to the purpose of supervision can be produced. In particular, they shall ensure that parent undertakings and subsidiaries subject to this Directive implement those arrangements, processes and mechanisms in their subsidiaries not subject to this Directive, including those established in offshore financial centres. Those arrangements, processes and mechanisms shall also be consistent and well-integrated and those subsidiaries shall also be able to produce any data and information relevant to the purpose of supervision. Subsidiary undertakings that are not themselves subject to this Directive shall comply with their sector-specific requirements on an individual basis.
3
Obligations resulting from Section II of this Chapter concerning subsidiary undertakings that are not themselves subject to this Directive shall not apply if the EU parent institution can demonstrate to the competent authorities that the application of Section II is unlawful under the laws of the third country where the subsidiary is established.
4
The remuneration requirements laid down in Articles 92, 94 and 95 shall not apply on a consolidated basis to either of the following:
a
subsidiary undertakings established in the Union where they are subject to specific remuneration requirements in accordance with other Union legal acts;
b
subsidiary undertakings established in a third country where they would be subject to specific remuneration requirements in accordance with other Union legal acts if they were established in the Union.
5
By way of derogation from paragraph 4 of this Article, and in order to avoid circumvention of the rules set out in Articles 92, 94 and 95, Member States shall ensure that the requirements laid down in Articles 92, 94 and 95 apply to members of staff of subsidiaries that are not subject to this Directive on an individual basis where:
a
the subsidiary is either an asset management company, or an undertaking that provides the investment services and activities listed in points (2), (3), (4), (6) and (7) of Section A of Annex I to Directive 2014/65/EU; and
b
those members of staff have been mandated to perform professional activities that have a direct material impact on the risk profile or the business of the institutions within the group.
6
Notwithstanding paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article, Member States may apply Articles 92, 94 and 95 on a consolidated basis to a broader scope of subsidiary undertakings and their staff.

Review and evaluation and supervisory measures
Article 110
1
Competent authorities shall apply the review and evaluation process referred to in Section III of this Chapter and the supervisory measures referred to in Section IV of this Chapter in accordance with the level of application of the requirements of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 set out in Part One, Title II of that Regulation.
2
Where the competent authorities waive the application of own funds requirements on a consolidated basis as provided for in Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, the requirements of Article 97 of this Directive shall apply to the supervision of investment firms on an individual basis.
CHAPTER 3

Supervision on a consolidated basis
Section I

Principles for conducting supervision on a consolidated basis

Determination of the consolidating supervisor
Article 111
1
Where a parent undertaking is a parent credit institution in a Member State or an EU parent credit institution, supervision on a consolidated basis shall be exercised by the competent authority that supervises that parent credit institution in the Member State or that EU parent credit institution on an individual basis.
Where a parent undertaking is a parent investment firm in a Member State or an EU parent investment firm and none of its subsidiaries is a credit institution, supervision on a consolidated basis shall be exercised by the competent authority that supervises that parent investment firm in the Member State or that EU parent investment firm on an individual basis.
Where a parent undertaking is a parent investment firm in a Member State or an EU parent investment firm, and at least one of its subsidiaries is a credit institution, supervision on a consolidated basis shall be exercised by the competent authority of the credit institution, or where there are several credit institutions, the credit institution with the largest balance sheet total.
2
Where the parent of an institution is a parent financial holding company in a Member State, a parent mixed financial holding company in a Member State, an EU parent financial holding company or an EU parent mixed financial holding company, supervision on a consolidated basis shall be exercised by the competent authority that supervises the institution on an individual basis.
3
Where two or more institutions authorised in the Union have the same parent financial holding company in a Member State, parent mixed financial holding company in a Member State, EU parent financial holding company or EU parent mixed financial holding company, supervision on a consolidated basis shall be exercised by:
a
the competent authority of the credit institution where there is only one credit institution within the group;
b
the competent authority of the credit institution with the largest balance sheet total, where there are several credit institutions within the group; or
c
the competent authority of the investment firm with the largest balance sheet total, where the group does not include any credit institution.
4
Where consolidation is required pursuant to Article 18(3) or (6) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, supervision on a consolidated basis shall be exercised by the competent authority of the credit institution with the largest balance sheet total or, where the group does not include any credit institution, by the competent authority of the investment firm with the largest balance sheet total.
5
By way of derogation from the third subparagraph of paragraph 1, from point (b) of paragraph 3 and from paragraph 4, where a competent authority supervises on an individual basis more than one credit institution within a group, the consolidating supervisor shall be the competent authority that supervises on an individual basis one or more credit institutions within the group where the sum of the balance sheet totals of those supervised credit institutions is higher than that of the credit institutions supervised on an individual basis by any other competent authority.
By way of derogation from point (c) of paragraph 3, where a competent authority supervises on an individual basis more than one investment firm within a group, the consolidating supervisor shall be the competent authority that supervises on an individual basis one or more investment firms within the group with the highest balance sheet total in aggregate.
6
In particular cases, the competent authorities may waive by common agreement the criteria referred to in paragraphs 1, 3 and 4 and appoint a different competent authority to exercise supervision on a consolidated basis where the application of the criteria referred to therein would be inappropriate, taking into account the institutions concerned and the relative importance of their activities in the relevant Member States, or the need to ensure the continuity of supervision on a consolidated basis by the same competent authority. In such cases, the EU parent institution, EU parent financial holding company, EU parent mixed financial holding company or the institution with the largest balance sheet total, as applicable, shall have the right to be heard before the competent authorities take the decision.
7
The competent authorities shall notify the Commission and EBA without delay of any agreement falling within paragraph 6.

Coordination of supervisory activities by the consolidating supervisor
Article 112
1
In addition to the obligations imposed by this Directive and by Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, the consolidating supervisor shall carry out the following tasks:
a
coordination of the gathering and dissemination of relevant or essential information in going concern and emergency situations;
b
planning and coordination of supervisory activities in going-concern situations, including in relation to the activities referred to in Title VII, Chapter 3, in cooperation with the competent authorities involved;
c
planning and coordination of supervisory activities in cooperation with the competent authorities involved, and if necessary with ESCB central banks, in preparation for and during emergency situations, including adverse developments in institutions or in financial markets using, where possible, existing channels of communication for facilitating crisis management.
2
Where the consolidating supervisor fails to carry out the tasks referred to in paragraph 1 or where the competent authorities do not cooperate with the consolidating supervisor to the extent required in carrying out the tasks in paragraph 1, any of the competent authorities concerned may refer the matter to EBA and request its assistance under Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
EBA may also assist the competent authorities in the event of a disagreement concerning the coordination of supervisory activities under this Article on its own initiative in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) of that Regulation.
3
The planning and coordination of supervisory activities referred to in paragraph 1(c) of this Article includes exceptional measures referred to in Article 117(1)(d) and Article 117(4)(b), the preparation of joint assessments, the implementation of contingency plans and communication to the public.

Joint decisions on institution-specific prudential requirements
Article 113
1
The consolidating supervisor and the competent authorities responsible for the supervision of subsidiaries of an EU parent institution or an EU parent financial holding company or EU parent mixed financial holding company shall do everything within their power to reach a joint decision:
a
on the application of Articles 73 and 97 to determine the adequacy of the consolidated level of own funds held by the group of institutions with respect to its financial situation and risk profile and the required level of own funds for the application of point (a) of Article 104(1) to each entity within the group of institutions and on a consolidated basis;
b
on measures to address any significant matters and material findings relating to liquidity supervision, including relating to the adequacy of the organisation and the treatment of risks as required pursuant to Article 86 and relating to the need for institution-specific liquidity requirements in accordance with Article 105;
c
on any guidance on additional own funds referred to in Article 104b(3).
2
The joint decisions referred to in paragraph 1 shall be reached:
a
for the purposes of point (a) of paragraph 1 of this Article, within four months of submission by the consolidating supervisor of a report containing the risk assessment of the group of institutions in accordance with Article 104a to the other relevant competent authorities;
b
for the purposes of point (b) of paragraph 1 of this Article, within four months of submission by the consolidating supervisor of a report containing the assessment of the liquidity risk profile of the group of institutions in accordance with Articles 86 and 105;
c
for the purposes of point (c) of paragraph 1 of this Article, within four months of submission by the consolidating supervisor of a report containing the risk assessment of the group of institutions in accordance with Article 104b.
The joint decisions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall also duly consider the risk assessment of subsidiaries performed by relevant competent authorities in accordance with Articles 73, 97, 104a and 104b.
The joint decisions referred to in points (a) and (b) of paragraph 1 shall be set out in documents containing full reasons which shall be provided to the EU parent institution by the consolidating supervisor. In the event of disagreement, the consolidating supervisor shall at the request of any of the other competent authorities concerned consult EBA. The consolidating supervisor may consult EBA on its own initiative.
3
In the absence of such a joint decision between the competent authorities within the time periods referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, a decision on the application of Articles 73, 86 and 97, point (a) of Article 104(1), Article 104b and Article 105 of this Directive shall be taken on a consolidated basis by the consolidating supervisor after duly considering the risk assessment of subsidiaries performed by relevant competent authorities. If, at the end of the time periods referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, any of the competent authorities concerned has referred the matter to EBA in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, the consolidating supervisor shall defer its decision and await any decision that EBA may take in accordance with Article 19(3) of that Regulation, and shall take its decision in conformity with the decision of EBA. The time periods referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article shall be deemed the conciliation periods within the meaning of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. EBA shall take its decision within one month of receipt of the referral to EBA. The matter shall not be referred to EBA after the end of the four-month period or after a joint decision has been reached.
The decision on the application of Articles 73, 86 and 97, point (a) of Article 104(1), Article 104b and Article 105 of this Directive shall be taken by the respective competent authorities responsible for supervision of subsidiaries of an EU parent credit institution or EU parent financial holding company or EU parent mixed financial holding company on an individual or sub-consolidated basis after duly considering the views and reservations expressed by the consolidating supervisor. If, at the end of any of the time periods referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, any of the competent authorities concerned has referred the matter to EBA in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, the competent authorities shall defer their decision and await any decision that EBA shall take in accordance with Article 19(3) of that Regulation, and shall take their decision in conformity with the decision of EBA. The time periods referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article shall be deemed the conciliation periods within the meaning of that Regulation. EBA shall take its decision within one month of receipt of the referral to EBA. The matter shall not be referred to EBA after the end of the four-month period or after a joint decision has been reached.
The decisions shall be set out in a document containing full reasons and shall take into account the risk assessment, views and reservations of the other competent authorities expressed during the time periods referred to in paragraph 2. The document shall be provided by the consolidating supervisor to all competent authorities concerned and to the EU parent institution.
Where EBA has been consulted, all the competent authorities shall consider its advice, and explain any significant deviation therefrom.
4
The joint decisions referred to in paragraph 1 and the decisions taken by the competent authorities in the absence of a joint decision referred to in paragraph 3 shall be recognised as determinative and applied by the competent authorities in the Member States concerned.
The joint decisions referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and any decision taken in the absence of a joint decision in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article, shall be updated on an annual basis or, in exceptional circumstances, where a competent authority responsible for the supervision of subsidiaries of an EU parent institution or, EU parent financial holding company or EU parent mixed financial holding company makes a written and fully reasoned request to the consolidating supervisor to update the decision on the application of point (a) of Article 104(1), Articles 104b and 105. In those exceptional circumstances, the update may be addressed on a bilateral basis between the consolidating supervisor and the competent authority making the request.
5
EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to ensure uniform conditions of application of the joint decision process referred to in this Article, with regard to the application of Articles 73, 86 and 97, point (a) of Article 104(1), Articles 104b and 105 with a view to facilitating joint decisions.
EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by
1 July 2014
.
Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.

Information requirements in emergency situations
Article 114
1
Where an emergency situation, including a situation as described in Article 18 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 or a situation of adverse developments in markets, arises, which potentially jeopardises the market liquidity and the stability of the financial system in any of the Member State where entities of a group have been authorised or where significant branches referred to in Article 51 are established, the consolidating supervisor shall, subject to Chapter 1, Section 2, and where applicable Articles 54 and 58 of Directive 2004/39/EC, alert as soon as is practicable, EBA and the authorities referred to in Article 58(4) and Article 59 and shall communicate all information essential for the pursuance of their tasks. Those obligations shall apply to all competent authorities.
If an ESCB central bank becomes aware of a situation described in the first subparagraph, it shall alert as soon as is practicable the competent authorities referred to in Article 112, and EBA.
Where possible, the competent authority and the authority referred to in Article 58(4) shall use existing channels of communication.
2
The consolidating supervisor shall, where it needs information which has already been given to another competent authority, contact that authority where possible in order to prevent duplication of reporting to the various authorities involved in supervision.

Coordination and cooperation arrangements
Article 115
1
In order to facilitate and establish effective supervision, the consolidating supervisor and the other competent authorities shall have written coordination and cooperation arrangements in place.
Under those arrangements additional tasks may be entrusted to the consolidating supervisor and procedures for the decision-making process and for cooperation with other competent authorities, may be specified.
2
The competent authorities responsible for authorising the subsidiary of a parent undertaking which is an institution may, by bilateral agreement, in accordance with Article 28 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, delegate their responsibility for supervision to the competent authorities which authorised and supervise the parent undertaking so that they assume responsibility for supervising the subsidiary in accordance with this Directive. EBA shall be kept informed of the existence and content of such agreements. It shall forward such information to the competent authorities of the other Member States and to the European Banking Committee.
3
Where the consolidating supervisor is different from the competent authority in the Member State where a financial holding company or mixed financial holding company that has been granted approval in accordance with Article 21a is established, the coordination and cooperation arrangements referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall also be concluded with the competent authority of the Member State where the parent undertaking is established.

Colleges of supervisors
Article 116
1
The consolidating supervisor shall establish colleges of supervisors to facilitate the exercise of the tasks referred to in Articles 112 and 113 and Article 114(1) and subject to the confidentiality requirements of paragraph 2 of this Article and to Union law, ensure appropriate coordination and cooperation with relevant third-country supervisory authorities where appropriate.
EBA shall contribute to promoting and monitoring the efficient, effective and consistent functioning of colleges of supervisors referred to in this Article in accordance with Article 21 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. To that end, EBA shall participate as appropriate and shall be considered to be a competent authority for that purpose.
Colleges of supervisors shall provide a framework for the consolidating supervisor, EBA and the other competent authorities concerned to carry out the following tasks:
a
exchanging information between each other and with EBA in accordance with Article 21 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010;
b
agreeing on voluntary entrustment of tasks and voluntary delegation of responsibilities where appropriate;
c
determining supervisory examination programmes referred to in Article 99 based on a risk assessment of the group in accordance with Article 97;
d
increasing the efficiency of supervision by removing unnecessary duplication of supervisory requirements, including in relation to the information requests referred to in Article 114 and Article 117(3);
e
consistently applying the prudential requirements under this Directive and under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 across all entities within a group of institutions without prejudice to the options and discretions available in Union law;
f
applying Article 112(1)(c) taking into account the work of other forums that may be established in that area.
1a
To facilitate the tasks referred to in Articles 112(1), 114(1) and 115(1) of this Directive, the consolidating supervisor shall also establish colleges of supervisors where all the cross-border subsidiaries of an EU parent institution, an EU parent financial holding company or an EU parent mixed financial holding company have their head offices in third countries, provided that the third countries' supervisory authorities are subject to confidentiality requirements that are equivalent to the requirements laid down in Section II of Chapter 1 of this Directive and, where applicable, in Articles 76 and 81 of Directive 2014/65/EU.
2
The competent authorities participating in the colleges of supervisors and EBA shall cooperate closely. The confidentiality requirements under Chapter 1, Section II of this Directive, and Articles 54 and 58 of Directive 2004/39/EC shall not prevent the competent authorities from exchanging confidential information within colleges of supervisors. The establishment and functioning of colleges of supervisors shall not affect the rights and responsibilities of the competent authorities under this Directive and under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
3
The establishment and functioning of the colleges shall be based on written arrangements referred to in Article 115, determined after consulting competent authorities concerned by the consolidating supervisor.
4
EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards in order to specify general conditions of functioning of the colleges of supervisors.
EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2014.
Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
5
EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards in order to determine the operational functioning of the colleges of supervisors.
EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 31 December 2014.
Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
6
The competent authorities responsible for the supervision of subsidiaries of an EU parent institution or an EU parent financial holding company or EU parent mixed financial holding company and the competent authorities of a host Member State where significant branches as referred to in Article 51 are established, ESCB central banks as appropriate, and third countries' supervisory authorities where appropriate and subject to confidentiality requirements that are equivalent, in the opinion of all competent authorities, to the requirements under Chapter 1, Section II of this Directive and where applicable, Articles 54 and 58 of Directive 2004/39/EC, may participate in colleges of supervisors.
The competent authority in the Member State where a financial holding company or a mixed financial holding company that has been granted approval in accordance with Article 21a is established may participate in the relevant college of supervisors.
7
The consolidating supervisor shall chair the meetings of the college and shall decide which competent authorities participate in a meeting or in an activity of the college. The consolidating supervisor shall keep all members of the college fully informed, in advance, of the organisation of such meetings, the main issues to be discussed and the activities to be considered. The consolidating supervisor shall also keep all the members of the college fully informed, in a timely manner, of the actions taken in those meetings or the measures carried out.
8
The decision of the consolidating supervisor shall take account of the relevance of the supervisory activity to be planned or coordinated for those authorities, in particular the potential impact on the stability of the financial system in the Member States concerned as referred to in Article 7 and the obligations referred to in Article 51(2).
9
The consolidating supervisor, subject to the confidentiality requirements under Chapter 1, Section II, of this Directive, and where applicable, Articles 54 and 58 of Directive 2004/39/EC, shall inform EBA of the activities of the college of supervisors, including in emergency situations, and communicate to EBA all information that is of particular relevance for the purposes of supervisory convergence.
In the event of a disagreement between competent authorities on the functioning of supervisory colleges, any of the competent authorities concerned may refer the matter to EBA and request its assistance in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
EBA may also assist the competent authorities in the event of a disagreement concerning the functioning of supervisory colleges under this Article on its own initiative in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) of that Regulation.

Cooperation obligations
Article 117
1
The competent authorities shall cooperate closely with each other. They shall provide one another with any information which is essential or relevant for the exercise of the other authorities' supervisory tasks under this Directive and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. In that regard, the competent authorities shall communicate on request all relevant information and shall communicate on their own initiative all essential information.
The competent authorities shall cooperate with EBA for the purposes of this Directive and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
The competent authorities shall provide EBA with all information necessary to carry out its duties under this Directive, under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, and under Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, in accordance with Article 35 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Information referred to in the first subparagraph shall be regarded as essential if it could materially influence the assessment of the financial soundness of an institution or financial institution in another Member State.
In particular, consolidating supervisors of EU parent institutions and institutions controlled by EU parent financial holding companies or EU parent mixed financial holding companies shall provide the competent authorities in other Member States who supervise subsidiaries of those parent undertakings with all relevant information. In determining the extent of relevant information, the importance of those subsidiaries within the financial system in those Member States shall be taken into account.
The essential information referred to in the first subparagraph shall include, in particular, the following items:
a
identification of the group's legal structure and the governance structure including organisational structure, covering all regulated entities, non-regulated entities, non-regulated subsidiaries and significant branches belonging to the group, the parent undertakings, in accordance with Article 14(3), Article 74(1) and Article 109(2), and of the competent authorities of the regulated entities in the group;
b
procedures for the collection of information from the institutions in a group, and the checking of that information;
c
adverse developments in institutions or in other entities of a group, which could seriously affect the institutions;
d
significant penalties and exceptional measures taken by competent authorities in accordance with this Directive, including the imposition of a specific own fund requirement under Article 104 and the imposition of any limitation on the use of the Advanced Measurement Approach for the calculation of the own funds requirements under Article 312(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
2
The competent authorities may refer to EBA any of the following situations:
a
where a competent authority has not communicated essential information;
b
where a request for cooperation, in particular to exchange relevant information, has been rejected or has not been acted upon within a reasonable time.
Without prejudice to Article 258 TFEU, EBA may act in accordance with the powers conferred on it under Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
EBA may also assist the competent authorities in developing consistent cooperation practices on its own initiative in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) of that Regulation.
3
The competent authorities responsible for the supervision of institutions controlled by an EU parent institution shall where possible contact the consolidating supervisor when they need information regarding the implementation of approaches and methodologies set out in this Directive and in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 that may already be available to the consolidating supervisor.
4
The competent authorities concerned shall, before taking a decision, consult each other with regard to the following items, where such a decision is of importance for other competent authorities' supervisory tasks:
a
changes in the shareholder, organisational or management structure of credit institutions in a group, which require the approval or authorisation of competent authorities; and
b
significant penalties or exceptional measures taken by competent authorities, including the imposition of a specific own funds requirement under Article 104 and the imposition of any limitation on the use of the advances measurement approaches for the calculation of the own funds requirements under Article 312(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
For the purposes of point (b), the consolidating supervisor shall always be consulted.
However, a competent authority may decide not to consult other competent authorities in cases of urgency or where such consultation could jeopardise the effectiveness of its decision. In such cases, the competent authority shall, without delay, inform the other competent authorities after taking its decision.
5
Competent authorities, financial intelligence units and authorities entrusted with the public duty of supervising the obliged entities listed in points (1) and (2) of Article 2(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 for compliance with that Directive, shall cooperate closely with each other within their respective competences and shall provide each other with information relevant for their respective tasks under this Directive, Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and under Directive (EU) 2015/849, provided that such cooperation and information exchange do not impinge on an on-going inquiry, investigation or proceedings in accordance with the criminal or administrative law of the Member State where the competent authority, financial intelligence unit or authority entrusted with the public duty of supervising the obliged entities listed in points (1) and (2) of Article 2(1) of Directive (EU) 2015/849 is located.
EBA may assist the competent authorities in the event of a disagreement concerning the coordination of supervisory activities under this Article on its own initiative in accordance with the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
6
By
1 January 2020
, EBA shall issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, specifying the manner for cooperation and information exchange between the authorities referred to in paragraph 5 of this Article, particularly in relation to cross-border groups and in the context of identifying serious breaches of anti-money laundering rules.

Checking information concerning entities in other Member States
Article 118
Where, in applying this Directive and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, the competent authorities of one Member State wish in specific cases to check the information concerning an institution, a financial holding company, a mixed financial holding company, a financial institution, an ancillary services undertaking, a mixed-activity holding company, a subsidiary as referred to in Article 125 or a subsidiary as referred to in Article 119(3), situated in another Member State, they shall ask the competent authorities of that other Member State to have that check carried out. The authorities which receive such a request shall, within the framework of their competence, act upon it either by carrying out the check themselves, by allowing the authorities who made the request to carry it out, or by allowing an auditor or expert to carry it out. The competent authority which made the request may, if it so wishes, participate in the check where it does not carry out the check itself.
Section II

Financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies and mixed-activity holding companies

Inclusion of holding companies in consolidated supervision
Article 119
1
Subject to Article 21a, Member States shall adopt any measures necessary to include financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies in consolidated supervision.
2
Where a subsidiary that is an institution is not included in supervision on a consolidated basis under one of the cases provided for in Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, the competent authorities of the Member State in which that subsidiary is situated may ask the parent undertaking for information which may facilitate their supervision of that subsidiary.
3
Member States shall enable their competent authorities responsible for exercising supervision on a consolidated basis to ask the subsidiaries of an institution, a financial holding company or mixed financial holding company, which are not included within the scope of supervision on a consolidated basis for the information referred to in Article 122. In such a case, the procedures for transmitting and checking the information set out in that Article shall apply.

Supervision of mixed financial holding companies
Article 120
1
Where a mixed financial holding company is subject to equivalent provisions under this Directive and under Directive 2002/87/EC, in particular in terms of risk-based supervision, the consolidating supervisor may, after consulting the other competent authorities responsible for the supervision of subsidiaries, apply only Directive 2002/87/EC to that mixed financial holding company.
2
Where a mixed financial holding company is subject to equivalent provisions under this Directive and under Directive 2009/138/EC, in particular in terms of risk-based supervision, the consolidating supervisor may, in agreement with the group supervisor in the insurance sector, apply to that mixed financial holding company only the provisions of the Directive relating to the most significant financial sector as defined in Article 3(2) of Directive 2002/87/EC.
3
The consolidating supervisor shall inform EBA and EIOPA of the decisions taken under paragraphs 1 and 2.
4
EBA, EIOPA and ESMA shall, through the Joint Committee referred to in Article 54 of Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010, develop guidelines aiming to converge supervisory practices and shall, within three years of the adoption of those guidelines, develop draft regulatory technical standards for the same purpose.
Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010, (EU) No 1094/2010 and (EU) No 1095/2010.

Qualification of directors
Article 121
Member States shall require that the members of the management body of a financial holding company or mixed financial holding company be of sufficiently good repute and possess sufficient knowledge, skills and experience as referred to in Article 91(1) to perform those duties, taking into account the specific role of a financial holding company or mixed financial holding company.

Requests for information and inspections
Article 122
1
Pending further coordination of consolidation methods, Member States shall provide that, where the parent undertaking of one or more institutions is a mixed-activity holding company, the competent authorities responsible for the authorisation and supervision of those institutions shall, by approaching the mixed-activity holding company and its subsidiaries either directly or via subsidiaries that are institutions, require them to supply any information which would be relevant for the purpose of supervising those subsidiaries.
2
Member States shall provide that their competent authorities may carry out, or have carried out by external inspectors, on-the-spot inspections to check information received from mixed-activity holding companies and their subsidiaries. If the mixed-activity holding company or one of its subsidiaries is an insurance undertaking, the procedure set out in Article 125 may also be used. If a mixed-activity holding company or one of its subsidiaries is situated in a Member State other than that in which a subsidiary that is an institution is situated, on-the-spot check of information shall be carried out in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 118.

Supervision
Article 123
1
Without prejudice to Part Four of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Member States shall provide that, where the parent undertaking of one or more institutions is a mixed-activity holding company, the competent authorities responsible for the supervision of those institutions shall exercise general supervision over transactions between the institution and the mixed-activity holding company and its subsidiaries.
2
Competent authorities shall require institutions to have in place adequate risk management processes and internal control mechanisms, including sound reporting and accounting procedures in order to identify, measure, monitor and control transactions with their parent mixed-activity holding company and its subsidiaries appropriately. Competent authorities shall require the reporting by the institution of any significant transaction with those entities other than the one referred to in Article 394 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. Those procedures and significant transactions shall be subject to overview by the competent authorities.

Exchange of information
Article 124
1
Member States shall ensure that there are no legal impediments preventing the exchange, as between undertakings included within the scope of supervision on a consolidated basis, mixed-activity holding companies and their subsidiaries, or subsidiaries as referred to in Article 119(3), of any information which would be relevant for the purposes of supervision in accordance with Article 110 and Chapter 3.
2
Where a parent undertaking and any of its subsidiaries that are institutions are situated in different Member States, the competent authorities of each Member State shall communicate to each other all relevant information which may allow or aid the exercise of supervision on a consolidated basis.
Where the competent authorities of the Member State in which a parent undertaking is situated do not themselves exercise supervision on a consolidated basis pursuant to Article 111, they may be invited by the competent authorities responsible for exercising such supervision to ask the parent undertaking for any information which would be relevant for the purposes of supervision on a consolidated basis and to transmit it to those authorities.
3
Member States shall authorise the exchange between their competent authorities of the information referred to in paragraph 2, on the understanding that, in the case of financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies, financial institutions or ancillary services undertakings, the collection or possession of information shall not imply that the competent authorities are required to play a supervisory role in relation to those institutions or undertakings standing alone.
Similarly, Member States shall authorise their competent authorities to exchange the information referred to in Article 122 on the understanding that the collection or possession of information does not imply that the competent authorities play a supervisory role in relation to the mixed-activity holding company and those of its subsidiaries which are not credit institutions, or to subsidiaries as referred to in Article 119(3).

Cooperation
Article 125
1
Where an institution, financial holding company, mixed financial holding company or a mixed-activity holding company controls one or more subsidiaries which are insurance companies or other undertakings providing investment services which are subject to authorisation, the competent authorities and the authorities entrusted with the public task of supervising insurance undertakings or those other undertakings providing investment services shall cooperate closely. Without prejudice to their respective responsibilities, those authorities shall provide one another with any information likely to simplify their task and to allow supervision of the activity and overall financial situation of the undertakings they supervise.
Where, pursuant to Article 111 of this Directive, the consolidating supervisor of a group with a parent mixed financial holding company is different from the coordinator determined in accordance with Article 10 of Directive 2002/87/EC, the consolidating supervisor and the coordinator shall cooperate for the purpose of applying this Directive and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 on a consolidated basis. In order to facilitate and establish effective cooperation, the consolidating supervisor and the coordinator shall have written coordination and cooperation arrangements in place.
2
Information received, within the framework of supervision on a consolidated basis, and in particular any exchange of information between competent authorities which is provided for in this Directive, shall be subject to professional secrecy requirements at least equivalent to those referred to in Article 53(1) of this Directive for credit institutions or under Directive 2004/39/EC for investment firms.
3
The competent authorities responsible for supervision on a consolidated basis shall establish lists of the financial holding companies or mixed financial holding companies referred to in Article 11 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. Those lists shall be communicated to the competent authorities of the other Member States, to EBA and to the Commission.

Penalties
Article 126
In accordance with Chapter 1, Section IV of this Title, Member States shall ensure that administrative penalties or other administrative measures aiming to end observed breaches or the causes of such breaches may be imposed on financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies, and mixed-activity holding companies, or their effective managers, that breach laws, regulations or administrative provisions transposing this Chapter.

Assessment of equivalence of third countries' consolidated supervision
Article 127
1
Where an institution, the parent undertaking of which is an institution or a financial holding company or mixed financial holding company, the head office of which is in a third country, is not subject to consolidated supervision under Articles 111, the competent authorities shall assess whether the institution is subject to consolidated supervision by a third-country supervisory authority which is equivalent to that governed by the principles set out in this Directive and the requirements of Part One, Title II, Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
The assessment shall be carried out by the competent authority which would be responsible for consolidated supervision if paragraph 3 were to apply, at the request of the parent undertaking or of any of the regulated entities authorised in the Union or on its own initiative. That competent authority shall consult the other competent authorities involved.
2
The Commission may request the European Banking Committee to give general guidance as to whether the consolidated supervision arrangements of supervisory authorities in third countries are likely to achieve the objectives of consolidated supervision as set out in this Chapter, in relation to institutions the parent undertaking of which has its head office in a third country. The European Banking Committee shall keep any such guidance under review and take into account any changes to the consolidated supervision arrangements applied by such competent authorities. EBA shall assist the Commission and the European Banking Committee in carrying out those tasks, including as to assessing whether such guidance should be updated.
The competent authority carrying out the assessment referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 1 shall take into account any such guidance. For that purpose, the competent authority shall consult EBA before adopting a decision.
3
In the absence of such equivalent supervision, Member States shall apply this Directive and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 to the institution mutatis mutandis or shall allow their competent authorities to apply other appropriate supervisory techniques which achieve the objectives of supervision on a consolidated basis of institutions.
Those supervisory techniques shall, after consulting the other competent authorities involved, be agreed upon by the competent authority which would be responsible for consolidated supervision.
Competent authorities may in particular require the establishment of a financial holding company or mixed financial holding company which has its head office in the Union, and apply the provisions on consolidated supervision to the consolidated position of that financial holding company or the consolidated position of the institutions of that mixed financial holding company.
The supervisory techniques shall be designed to achieve the objectives of consolidated supervision as set out in this Chapter and shall be notified to the other competent authorities involved, to EBA and to the Commission.
CHAPTER 4

Capital Buffers
Section I

Buffers

Definitions
Article 128
For the purpose of this Chapter, the following definitions shall apply:
1. 'capital conservation buffer' means the own funds that an institution is required to maintain in accordance with Article 129;
2. 'institution-specific countercyclical capital buffer' means the own funds that an institution is required to maintain in accordance with Article 130;
3. 'G-SII buffer' means the own funds that are required to be maintained in accordance with Article 131(4);
4. 'O-SII buffer' means the own funds that may be required to be maintained in accordance with Article 131(5);
5. 'systemic risk buffer' means the own funds that an institution is or may be required to maintain in accordance with Article 133;
6. 'combined buffer requirement' means the total Common Equity Tier 1 capital required to meet the requirement for the capital conservation buffer extended by the following, as applicable:
  1. an institution-specific countercyclical capital buffer;
  2. a G-SII buffer;
  3. an O-SII buffer;
  4. a systemic risk buffer;
7. 'countercyclical buffer rate' means the rate that institutions must apply in order to calculate their institution-specific countercyclical capital buffer, and that is set in accordance with Article 136, Article 137 or by a relevant third-country authority, as the case may be;
8. 'domestically authorised institution' means an institution that has been authorised in the Member State for which a particular designated authority is responsible for setting the countercyclical buffer rate;
9. 'buffer guide' means a benchmark buffer rate calculated in accordance with Article 135(1).
Institutions shall not use Common Equity Tier 1 capital that is maintained to meet the combined buffer requirement referred to in point (6) of the first paragraph of this Article, to meet any of the requirements set out in points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, the additional own funds requirements imposed pursuant to Article 104a of this Directive to address risks other than the risk of excessive leverage, and the guidance communicated in accordance with Article 104b(3) of this Directive to address risks other than the risk of excessive leverage.
Institutions shall not use Common Equity Tier 1 capital that is maintained to meet one of the elements of its combined buffer requirement to meet the other applicable elements of its combined buffer requirement.
Institutions shall not use Common Equity Tier 1 capital that is maintained to meet the combined buffer requirement referred to in point (6) of the first paragraph of this Article to meet the risk-based components of the requirements set out in Articles 92a and 92b of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and in Articles 45c and 45d of Directive 2014/59/EU.
This Chapter shall not apply to investment firms that are not authorised to provide the investment services listed in points 3 and 6 of Section A of Annex I to Directive 2004/39/EC.

Requirement to maintain a capital conservation buffer
Article 129
1
In addition to the Common Equity Tier 1 capital that is maintained to meet any of the own funds requirements set out in points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Member States shall require institutions to maintain a capital conservation buffer of Common Equity Tier 1 capital equal to 2,5 % of their total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of that Regulation on an individual and on a consolidated basis, as applicable in accordance with Title II of Part One of that Regulation.
2
By way of derogation from paragraph 1, a Member State may exempt small and medium-sized investment firms from complying with the requirements set out in paragraph 1 if such an exemption does not threaten the stability of the financial system of that Member State.
Decisions on the application of the exemption referred to in the first subparagraph shall be fully reasoned, shall include an explanation as to why the exemption does not threaten the stability of the financial system of the Member State and shall contain the exact definition of the small and medium-sized investment firms which are to be exempted.
Member States which decide to apply the exemption referred to in the first subparagraph shall notify the ESRB thereof. The ESRB shall forward such notifications to the Commission, to EBA and to the competent and designated authorities of the Member States concerned without delay.
3
For the purposes of paragraph 2, Member States shall designate an authority to be responsible for the application of this Article. That authority shall be the competent authority or the designated authority.
4
For the purposes of paragraph 2, investment firms shall be categorised as small or medium-sized in accordance with Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC .
5
Where an institution fails to fully meet the requirement set out in paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall be subject to the restrictions on distributions set out in Article 141(2) and (3).

Requirement to maintain an institution-specific countercyclical capital buffer
Article 130
1
Member States shall require institutions to maintain an institution-specific countercyclical capital buffer equivalent to their total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 multiplied by the weighted average of the countercyclical buffer rates calculated in accordance with Article 140 of this Directive on an individual and on a consolidated basis, as applicable in accordance with Title II of Part One of that Regulation. That buffer shall consist of Common Equity Tier 1 capital.
2
By way of derogation from paragraph 1, a Member State may exempt small and medium-sized investment firms from complying with the requirements set out in paragraph 1 if such an exemption does not threaten the stability of the financial system of that Member State.
Decisions on the application of the exemption referred to in the first subparagraph shall be fully reasoned, shall include an explanation as to why the exemption does not threaten the stability of the financial system of the Member State and shall contain the exact definition of small and medium-sized investment firms which are to be exempted.
Member States which decide to apply the exemption referred to in the first subparagraph shall notify the ESRB thereof. The ESRB shall forward such notifications to the Commission, to EBA and to the competent and designated authorities of the Member States concerned without delay.
3
For the purposes of paragraph 2, Member States shall designate an authority to be responsible for the application of this Article. That authority shall be the competent authority or the designated authority.
4
For the purposes of paragraph 2, investment firms shall be categorised as small and medium-sized in accordance with Recommendation 2003/361/EC.
5
Where an institution fails to fully meet the requirement set out in paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall be subject to the restrictions on distributions set out in Article 141(2) and (3).

Global and other systemically important institutions
Article 131
1
Member States shall designate an authority to be responsible for identifying, on a consolidated basis, G-SIIs, and, on an individual, sub-consolidated or consolidated basis, as applicable, other systemically important institutions (O-SIIs), which have been authorised within their jurisdiction. That authority shall be the competent authority or the designated authority. Member States may designate more than one authority.
G-SIIs shall be any of the following:
a
a group headed by an EU parent institution, an EU parent financial holding company, or an EU parent mixed financial holding company; or
b
an institution that is not a subsidiary of an EU parent institution, of an EU parent financial holding company or of an EU parent mixed financial holding company.
O-SIIs may either be an institution or a group headed by an EU parent institution, an EU parent financial holding company, an EU parent mixed financial holding company, a parent institution in a Member State, a parent financial holding company in a Member State or a parent mixed financial holding company in a Member State.
2
The identification methodology for G-SIIs shall be based on the following categories:
a
size of the group;
b
interconnectedness of the group with the financial system;
c
substitutability of the services or of the financial infrastructure provided by the group;
d
complexity of the group;
e
cross-border activity of the group, including cross border activity between Member States and between a Member State and a third country.
Each category shall receive an equal weighting and shall consist of quantifiable indicators.
The methodology shall produce an overall score for each entity as referred to in paragraph 1 assessed, which allows G-SIIs to be identified and allocated into a sub-category as described in paragraph 9.
2a
An additional identification methodology for G-SIIs shall be based on the following categories:
a
the categories referred to in points (a) to (d) of paragraph 2 of this Article;
b
cross-border activity of the group, excluding the group's activities across participating Member States as referred to in Article 4 of Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council .
Each category shall receive an equal weighting and shall consist of quantifiable indicators. For the categories referred to in point (a) of the first subparagraph of this paragraph, the indicators shall be the same as the corresponding indicators determined pursuant to paragraph 2.
The additional identification methodology shall produce an additional overall score for each entity as referred to in paragraph 1 assessed, on the basis of which competent or designated authorities may take one of the measures referred to in point (c) of paragraph 10.
3
O-SIIs shall be identified in accordance with paragraph 1. Systemic importance shall be assessed on the basis of at least any of the following criteria:
a
size;
b
importance for the economy of the Union or of the relevant Member State;
c
significance of cross-border activities;
d
interconnectedness of the institution or group with the financial system.
EBA, after consulting the ESRB, shall issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, by
1 January 2015
on the criteria to determine the conditions of application of this paragraph in relation to the assessment of O-SIIs. Those guidelines shall take into account international frameworks for domestic systemically important institutions and Union and national specificities.
After having consulted the ESRB, EBA shall report to the Commission by
31 December 2020
on the appropriate methodology for the design and calibration of O-SII buffer rates.
4
Each G-SII shall, on a consolidated basis, maintain a G-SII buffer which shall correspond to the sub-category to which the G-SII is allocated. That buffer shall consist of and shall be supplementary to Common Equity Tier 1 capital.
5
The competent authority or the designated authority may require each O-SII, on a consolidated, sub-consolidated or individual basis, as applicable, to maintain an O-SII buffer of up to 3 % of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, taking into account the criteria for the identification of the O-SII. That buffer shall consist of Common Equity Tier 1 capital.
5a
Subject to the Commission authorisation referred to in the third subparagraph of this paragraph, the competent authority or the designated authority may require each O-SII, on a consolidated, sub-consolidated or individual basis, as applicable, to maintain an O-SII buffer higher than 3 % of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. That buffer shall consist of Common Equity Tier 1 capital.
Within six weeks of receipt of the notification referred to in paragraph 7 of this Article, the ESRB shall provide the Commission with an opinion as to whether the O-SII buffer is deemed appropriate. EBA may also provide the Commission with its opinion on the buffer in accordance with Article 34(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Within three months of the ESRB forwarding the notification referred to in paragraph 7 to the Commission, the Commission, taking into account the assessment of the ESRB and EBA, if relevant, and if it is satisfied that the O-SII buffer does not entail disproportionate adverse effects on the whole or parts of the financial system of other Member States or of the Union as a whole forming or creating an obstacle to the proper functioning of the internal market, shall adopt an act authorising the competent authority or the designated authority to adopt the proposed measure.
6
When requiring an O-SII buffer to be maintained the competent authority or the designated authority shall comply with the following:
a
the O-SII buffer must not entail disproportionate adverse effects on the whole or parts of the financial system of other Member States or of the Union as a whole forming or creating an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market;
b
the O-SII buffer must be reviewed by the competent authority or the designated authority at least annually.
7
Before setting or resetting an O-SII buffer, the competent authority or the designated authority shall notify the ESRB one month before the publication of the decision referred to in paragraph 5 and shall notify the ESRB three months before the publication of the decision of the competent authority or the designated authority referred to in paragraph 5a. The ESRB shall forward such notifications to the Commission, to EBA and to the competent and designated authorities of the Member States concerned without delay. Such notifications shall set out in detail:
a
the justification for why the O-SII buffer is considered likely to be effective and proportionate to mitigate the risk;
b
an assessment of the likely positive or negative impact of the O-SII buffer on the internal market, based on information which is available to the Member State;
c
the O-SII buffer rate that the Member State wishes to set.
8
Without prejudice to Article 133 and paragraph 5 of this Article, where an O-SII is a subsidiary of either a G-SII or an O-SII which is either an institution or a group headed by an EU parent institution, and subject to an O-SII buffer on a consolidated basis, the buffer that applies on an individual or sub-consolidated basis for the O-SII shall not exceed the lower of:
a
the sum of the higher of the G-SII or the O-SII buffer rate applicable to the group on a consolidated basis and 1 % of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; and
b
3 % of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, or the rate the Commission has authorised to be applied to the group on a consolidated basis in accordance with paragraph 5a of this Article.
9
There shall be at least five sub-categories of G-SIIs. The lowest boundary and the boundaries between each subcategory shall be determined by the scores in accordance with the identification methodology referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article. The cut-off scores between adjacent sub-categories shall be defined clearly and shall adhere to the principle that there is a constant linear increase of systemic significance, between each sub-category resulting in a linear increase in the requirement of additional Common Equity Tier 1 capital, with the exception of sub-category five and any added higher sub-category. For the purposes of this paragraph, systemic significance is the expected impact exerted by the G-SII's distress on the global financial market. The lowest sub-category shall be assigned a G-SII buffer of 1 % of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and the buffer assigned to each sub-category shall increase in gradients of at least 0,5 % of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of that Regulation.
10
Without prejudice to paragraphs 1 and 9 and using the sub-categories and cut-off scores referred to in paragraph 9, the competent authority or the designated authority may, in the exercise of sound supervisory judgment:
a
re-allocate a G-SII from a lower sub-category to a higher sub-category;
b
allocate an entity as referred to in paragraph 1 that has an overall score as referred to in paragraph 2 that is lower than the cut-off score of the lowest sub-category to that sub-category or to a higher sub-category, thereby designating it as a G-SII;
c
taking into account the Single Resolution Mechanism, on the basis of the additional overall score referred to in paragraph 2a re-allocate a G-SII from a higher sub-category to a lower sub-category.
11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
The competent authority or the designated authority shall notify to the ESRB the names of the G-SIIs and O-SIIs and the respective sub-category to which each G-SII is allocated. The notification shall contain full reasons why supervisory judgment has been exercised or not in accordance with points (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 10. The ESRB shall forward such notifications to the Commission and to EBA without delay, and shall publicly disclose their names. The competent authorities or designated authorities shall publicly disclose the sub-category to which each G-SII is allocated.
The competent authority or the designated authority shall review annually the identification of G-SIIs and O-SIIs and the G-SII allocation into the respective sub-categories and report the result to the systemically important institution concerned, to the ESRB which shall forward the results to the Commission and to EBA without delay. The competent authority or the designated authority shall publicly disclose the updated list of identified systemically important institutions and the sub-category into which each identified G-SII is allocated.
13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14
Where a group, on a consolidated basis, is subject to a G-SII buffer and to an O-SII buffer the higher buffer shall apply.
15
Where an institution is subject to a systemic risk buffer, set in accordance with Article 133, that buffer shall be cumulative with the O-SII buffer or the G-SII buffer that is applied in accordance with this Article.
Where the sum of the systemic risk buffer rate as calculated for the purposes of paragraph 10, 11 or 12 of Article 133 and the O-SII buffer rate or the G-SII buffer rate to which the same institution is subject to would be higher than 5 %, the procedure set out in paragraph 5a of this Article shall apply.
16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
17 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
18
EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify, for the purposes of this Article, the methodologies in accordance with which the competent authority or the designated authority shall identify an institution or a group headed by an EU parent institution, an EU parent financial holding company or by an EU parent mixed financial holding company as a G-SII and to specify the methodology for the definition of the sub-categories and the allocation of G-SIIs in the sub-categories based on their systemic significance, taking into account any internationally agreed standards.
EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by
30 June 2014
.
Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in this paragraph in accordance with Articles 10 to14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.

Reporting
Article 132 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Requirement to maintain a systemic risk buffer
Article 133
1
Each Member State may introduce a systemic risk buffer of Common Equity Tier 1 capital for the financial sector or one or more subsets of that sector on all or a subset of exposures as referred to in paragraph 5 of this Article, in order to prevent and mitigate macroprudential or systemic risks not covered by Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and by Articles 130 and 131 of this Directive, in the meaning of a risk of disruption in the financial system with the potential to have serious negative consequences to the financial system and the real economy in a specific Member State.
2
Institutions shall calculate the systemic risk buffer as follows:
B_{SR} = r_T × E_T + ∑_i r_i × E_i
where:
B
SR
- the systemic risk buffer;
r
T
- the buffer rate applicable to the total risk exposure amount of an institution;
E
T
- the total risk exposure amount of an institution calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
i
- the index denoting the subset of exposures as referred to in paragraph 5;
r
i
- the buffer rate applicable to the risk exposure amount of the subset of exposures i; and
E
i
- the risk exposure amount of an institution for the subset of exposures i calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
3
For the purposes of paragraph 1, Member States shall designate an authority to be responsible for setting the systemic risk buffer and for identifying the exposures and subsets of institutions to which it applies. That authority shall be either the competent authority or the designated authority.
4
For the purposes of paragraph 1 of this Article, the relevant competent or designated authority, as applicable, may require institutions to maintain a systemic risk buffer of Common Equity Tier 1 capital calculated in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article, on an individual, consolidated, or sub-consolidated basis, as applicable in accordance with Title II of Part One of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
5
A systemic risk buffer may apply to:
a
all exposures located in the Member State that sets that buffer;
b
the following sectoral exposures located in the Member State that sets that buffer:
1. all retail exposures to natural persons which are secured by residential property;
2. all exposures to legal persons which are secured by mortgages on commercial immovable property;
3. all exposures to legal persons excluding those specified in point (ii);
4. all exposures to natural persons excluding those specified in point (i);
c
all exposures located in other Member States, subject to paragraphs 12 and 15;
d
sectoral exposures, as identified in point (b) of this paragraph, located in other Member States only to enable recognition of a buffer rate set by another Member State in accordance with Article 134;
e
exposures located in third countries;
f
subsets of any of the exposure categories identified in point (b).
6
EBA shall, after consulting the ESRB, issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, by
30 June 2020
on the appropriate subsets of exposures to which the competent authority or the designated authority may apply a systemic risk buffer in accordance with point (f) of paragraph 5 of this Article.
7
A systemic risk buffer shall apply to all exposures, or a subset of exposures as referred to in paragraph 5 of this Article, of all institutions, or one or more subsets of those institutions, for which the authorities of the Member State concerned are competent in accordance with this Directive and shall be set in steps of adjustment of 0,5 percentage points or multiples thereof. Different requirements may be introduced for different subsets of institutions and of exposures. The systemic risk buffer shall not address risks that are covered by Articles 130 and 131.
8
When requiring a systemic risk buffer to be maintained the competent authority or the designated authority shall comply with the following:
a
the systemic risk buffer does not entail disproportionate adverse effects on the whole or parts of the financial system of other Member States or of the Union as a whole forming or creating an obstacle to the proper functioning of the internal market;
b
the systemic risk buffer is to be reviewed by the competent authority or the designated authority at least every second year;
c
the systemic risk buffer is not to be used to address risks that are covered by Articles 130 and 131.
9
The competent authority or the designated authority, as applicable, shall notify the ESRB before the publication of the decision referred to in paragraph 13. The ESRB shall forward such notifications to the Commission, to EBA and to the competent and designated authorities of the Member States concerned without delay.
Where the institution to which one or more systemic risk buffer rates apply is a subsidiary the parent of which is established in another Member State, the competent authority or the designated authority shall also notify the authorities of that Member State.
Where a systemic risk buffer rate applies to exposures located in third countries, the competent authority or the designated authority, as applicable, shall also notify the ESRB. The ESRB shall forward such notifications without delay to the supervisory authorities of those third countries.
Such notifications shall set out in detail:
a
the macroprudential or systemic risks in the Member State;
b
the reasons why the dimension of the macroprudential or systemic risks threatens the stability of the financial system at national level justifying the systemic risk buffer rate;
c
the justification for why the systemic risk buffer is considered likely to be effective and proportionate to mitigate the risk;
d
an assessment of the likely positive or negative impact of the systemic risk buffer on the internal market, based on information which is available to the Member State;
e
the systemic risk buffer rate or rates that the competent authority or the designated authority, as applicable, intends to impose and the exposures to which such rates shall apply and the institutions which shall be subject to such rates;
f
where the systemic risk buffer rate applies to all exposures, a justification of why the authority considers that the systemic risk buffer is not duplicating the functioning of the O-SII buffer provided for in Article 131.
Where the decision to set the systemic risk buffer rate results in a decrease or no change from the previously set buffer rate, the competent authority or the designated authority, as applicable, shall only comply with this paragraph.
10
Where the setting or resetting of a systemic risk buffer rate or rates on any set or subset of exposures referred to in paragraph 5 subject to one or more systemic risk buffers does not result in a combined systemic risk buffer rate higher than 3 % for any of those exposures, the competent authority or the designated authority, as applicable, shall notify the ESRB in accordance with paragraph 9 one month before the publication of the decision referred to in paragraph 13.
For the purposes of this paragraph, the recognition of a systemic risk buffer rate set by another Member State in accordance with Article 134 shall not count towards the 3 % threshold.
11
Where the setting or resetting of a systemic risk buffer rate or rates on any set or subset of exposures referred to in paragraph 5 subject to one or more systemic risk buffers results in a combined systemic risk buffer rate at a level higher than 3 % and up to 5 % for any of those exposures, the competent authority or the designated authority of the Member State that sets that buffer shall request in the notification submitted in accordance with paragraph 9 the Commission's opinion. The Commission shall provide its opinion within one month of receipt of the notification.
Where the opinion of the Commission is negative, the competent authority or the designated authority, as applicable, of the Member State that sets that systemic risk buffer shall comply with that opinion or give reasons for not doing so.
Where an institution to which one or more systemic risk buffer rates apply is a subsidiary the parent of which is established in another Member State, the competent authority or the designated authority shall request in the notification submitted in accordance with paragraph 9 a recommendation by the Commission and the ESRB.
The Commission and the ESRB shall each provide its recommendation within six weeks of receipt of the notification.
Where the authorities of the subsidiary and of the parent disagree on the systemic risk buffer rate or rates applicable to that institution and in the case of a negative recommendation of both the Commission and the ESRB, the competent authority or the designated authority, as applicable, may refer the matter to EBA and request its assistance in accordance with Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010. The decision to set the systemic risk buffer rate or rates for those exposures shall be suspended until EBA has taken a decision.
12
Where the setting or resetting of a systemic risk buffer rate or rates on any set or subset of exposures referred to in paragraph 5 subject to one or more systemic risk buffers results in a combined systemic risk buffer rate higher than 5 % for any of those exposures, the competent authority or the designated authority, as applicable, shall seek the authorisation of the Commission before implementing a systemic risk buffer.
Within six weeks of receipt of the notification referred to in paragraph 9 of this Article, the ESRB shall provide the Commission with an opinion as to whether the systemic risk buffer is deemed appropriate. EBA may also provide the Commission with its opinion on that systemic risk buffer in accordance with Article 34(1) of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Within three months of receipt of the notification referred to in paragraph 9, the Commission, taking into account the assessment of the ESRB and EBA, where relevant, and where it is satisfied that the systemic risk buffer rate or rates do not entail disproportionate adverse effects on the whole or parts of the financial system of other Member States or of the Union as a whole forming or creating an obstacle to the proper functioning of the internal market, shall adopt an act authorising the competent authority or the designated authority, as applicable, to adopt the proposed measure.
13
Each competent authority, or the designated authority, as applicable, shall announce the setting or resetting of one or more systemic risk buffer rates by publication on an appropriate website. That publication shall include at least the following information:
a
the systemic risk buffer rate or rates;
b
the institutions to which the systemic risk buffer applies;
c
the exposures to which the systemic risk buffer rate or rates apply;
d
a justification for setting or resetting the systemic risk buffer rate or rates;
e
the date from which the institutions shall apply the setting or resetting of the systemic risk buffer; and
f
the names of the countries where exposures located in those countries are recognised in the systemic risk buffer.
Where the publication of the information referred to in point (d) of the first subparagraph could jeopardise the stability of the financial system, that information shall not be included in the publication.
14
Where an institution fails to fully meet the requirement set out in paragraph 1 of this Article, it shall be subject to the restrictions on distributions set out in Article 141(2) and (3).
Where the application of the restrictions on distributions leads to an unsatisfactory improvement of the Common Equity Tier 1 capital of the institution in light of the relevant systemic risk, the competent authorities may take additional measures in accordance with Article 64.
15
Where the competent authority or the designated authority, as applicable, decides to set the systemic risk buffer on the basis of exposures located in other Member States, the buffer shall be set equally on all exposures located within the Union, unless the buffer is set to recognise the systemic risk buffer rate set by another Member State in accordance with Article 134.

Recognition of a systemic risk buffer rate
Article 134
1
Other Member States may recognise a systemic risk buffer rate set in accordance with Article 133 and may apply that rate to domestically authorised institutions for exposures located in the Member State that sets that rate.
2
Where Member States recognise a systemic risk buffer rate for domestically authorised institutions in accordance with paragraph 1, they shall notify the ESRB. The ESRB shall forward such notifications to the Commission, to EBA and to the Member State that sets that rate without delay.
3
When deciding whether to recognise a systemic risk buffer rate in accordance with paragraph 1, a Member State shall take into consideration the information presented by the Member State that sets that rate in accordance with Article 133(9) and (13).
4
Where Member States recognise a systemic risk buffer rate for domestically authorised institutions, that systemic risk buffer may be cumulative with the systemic risk buffer applied in accordance with Article 133, provided that the buffers address different risks. Where the buffers address the same risks, only the higher buffer shall apply.
5
A Member State that sets a systemic risk buffer rate in accordance with Article 133 of this Directive may ask the ESRB to issue a recommendation as referred to in Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 to one or more Member States which may recognise the systemic risk buffer rate.
Section II

Setting and calculating countercyclical capital buffers

ESRB guidance on setting countercyclical buffer rates
Article 135
1
The ESRB may give, by way of recommendations in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, guidance to authorities designated by Member States under Article 136(1) on setting countercyclical buffer rates, including the following:
a
principles to guide designated authorities when exercising their judgment as to the appropriate countercyclical buffer rate, ensure that authorities adopt a sound approach to relevant macro-economic cycles and promote sound and consistent decision-making across Member States;
b
general guidance on:
1. the measurement and calculation of the deviation from long term trends of ratios of credit to gross domestic product (GDP);
2. the calculation of buffer guides required by Article 136(2);
c
guidance on variables that indicate the build-up of system-wide risk associated with periods of excessive credit growth in a financial system, in particular the relevant credit-to-GDP ratio and its deviation from the long-term trend, and on other relevant factors, including the treatment of economic developments within individual sectors of the economy, that should inform the decisions of designated authorities on the appropriate countercyclical buffer rate under Article 136;
d
guidance on variables, including qualitative criteria, that indicate that the buffer should be maintained, reduced or fully released.
2
Where it issues a recommendation under paragraph 1, the ESRB shall duly take into account the differences between Member States and in particular the specificities of Member States with small and open economies.
3
Where it has issued a recommendation under paragraph 1, the ESRB shall keep it under review and update it, where necessary, in the light of experience of setting buffers under this Directive or of developments in internationally agreed practices.

Setting countercyclical buffer rates
Article 136
1
Each Member State shall designate a public authority or body (a 'designated authority') that is responsible for setting the countercyclical buffer rate for that Member State.
2
Each designated authority shall calculate for every quarter a buffer guide as a reference to guide its exercise of judgment in setting the countercyclical buffer rate in accordance with paragraph 3. The buffer guide shall reflect, in a meaningful way, the credit cycle and the risks due to excess credit growth in the Member State and shall duly take into account specificities of the national economy. It shall be based on the deviation of the ratio of credit-to-GDP from its long-term trend, taking into account, inter alia:
a
an indicator of growth of levels of credit within that jurisdiction and, in particular, an indicator reflective of the changes in the ratio of credit granted in that Member State to GDP;
b
any current guidance maintained by the ESRB in accordance with Article 135(1)(b).
3
Each designated authority shall assess the intensity of cyclical systemic risk and the appropriateness of the countercyclical buffer rate for its Member State on a quarterly basis and set or adjust the countercyclical buffer rate, if necessary. In so doing, each designated authority shall take into account:
a
the buffer guide calculated in accordance with paragraph 2;
b
any current guidance maintained by the ESRB in accordance with Article 135(1)(a), (c) and (d) and any recommendations issued by the ESRB on the setting of a buffer rate;
c
other variables that the designated authority considers relevant for addressing cyclical systemic risk.
4
The countercyclical buffer rate, expressed as a percentage of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of institutions that have credit exposures in that Member State, shall be between 0 % and 2,5 %, calibrated in steps of 0,25 percentage points or multiples of 0,25 percentage points. Where justified on the basis of the considerations set out in paragraph 3, a designated authority may set a countercyclical buffer rate in excess of 2,5 % of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 for the purpose set out in Article 140(2) of this Directive.
5
Where a designated authority sets the countercyclical buffer rate above zero for the first time, or where, thereafter, a designated authority increases the prevailing countercyclical buffer rate setting, it shall also decide the date from which the institutions must apply that increased buffer for the purposes of calculating their institution-specific countercyclical capital buffer. That date shall be no later than 12 months after the date when the increased buffer setting is announced in accordance with paragraph 7. If the date is less than 12 months after the increased buffer setting is announced, that shorter deadline for application shall be justified on the basis of exceptional circumstances.
6
If a designated authority reduces the existing countercyclical buffer rate, whether or not it is reduced to zero, it shall also decide an indicative period during which no increase in the buffer is expected. However, that indicative period shall not bind the designated authority.
7
Each designated authority shall publish quarterly at least the following information on its website:
a
the applicable countercyclical buffer rate;
b
the relevant credit-to-GDP-ratio and its deviation from the long-term trend;
c
the buffer guide calculated in accordance with paragraph 2;
d
a justification for that buffer rate;
e
where the buffer rate is increased, the date from which institutions shall apply that increased buffer rate for the purpose of calculating their institution-specific countercyclical capital buffer;
f
where the date referred to in point (e) is less than 12 months after the date of the publication under this paragraph, a reference to the exceptional circumstances that justify that shorter deadline for application;
g
where the buffer rate is decreased, the indicative period during which no increase in the buffer rate is expected, together with a justification for that period.
Designated authorities shall take all reasonable steps to coordinate the timing of that publication.
Designated authorities shall notify each change of the countercyclical buffer rate and the required information specified in points (a) to (g) of the first subparagraph to the ESRB. The ESRB shall publish on its website all such notified buffer rates and related information.

Recognition of countercyclical buffer rates in excess of 2,5 %
Article 137
1
Where a designated authority, in accordance with Article 136(4), or a relevant third-country authority has set a countercyclical buffer rate in excess of 2,5 % of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, the other designated authorities may recognise that buffer rate for the purposes of the calculation by domestically authorised institutions of their institution-specific countercyclical capital buffers.
2
Where a designated authority in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article recognises a buffer rate in excess of 2,5 % of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, it shall announce that recognition by publication on its website. The announcement shall include at least the following information:
a
the applicable countercyclical buffer rate;
b
the Member State or third countries to which it applies;
c
where the buffer rate is increased, the date from which the institutions authorised in the Member State of the designated authority must apply that increased buffer rate for the purposes of calculating their institution-specific countercyclical capital buffer;
d
where the date referred to in point (c) is less than 12 months after the date of the announcement under this paragraph, a reference to the exceptional circumstances that justify that shorter deadline for application.

ESRB recommendation on third country countercyclical buffer rates
Article 138
The ESRB may, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010, issue a recommendation to designated authorities on the appropriate countercyclical buffer rate for exposures to that third country where:
1. a countercyclical buffer rate has not been set and published by the relevant third-country authority for a third country ('relevant third-country authority') to which one or more Union institutions have credit exposures;
2. the ESRB considers that a countercyclical buffer rate which has been set and published by the relevant third-country authority for a third country is not sufficient to protect Union institutions appropriately from the risks of excessive credit growth in that country, or a designated authority notifies the ESRB that it considers that buffer rate to be insufficient for that purpose.

Decision by designated authorities on third country countercyclical buffer rates
Article 139
1
This Article applies irrespective of whether the ESRB has issued a recommendation to designated authorities as referred to in Article 138.
2
In the circumstances referred to in point (a) of Article 138, designated authorities may set the countercyclical buffer rate that domestically authorised institutions must apply for the purposes of the calculation of their institution-specific countercyclical capital buffer.
3
Where a countercyclical buffer rate has been set and published by the relevant third-country authority for a third country, a designated authority may set a different buffer rate for that third country for the purposes of the calculation by domestically authorised institutions of their institution-specific countercyclical capital buffer if they reasonably consider that the buffer rate set by the relevant third-country authority is not sufficient to protect those institutions appropriately from the risks of excessive credit growth in that country.
When exercising the power under the first subparagraph, a designated authority shall not set a countercyclical buffer rate below the level set by the relevant third-country authority unless that buffer rate exceeds 2,5 %, expressed as a percentage of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of institutions that have credit exposures in that third country.
In order to achieve coherence for the buffer settings for third countries the ESRB may give recommendations for such settings.
4
Where a designated authority sets a countercyclical buffer rate for a third country pursuant to paragraph 2 or 3 which increases the existing applicable countercyclical buffer rate, the designated authority shall decide the date from which domestically authorised institutions must apply that buffer rate for the purposes of calculating their institution-specific countercyclical capital buffer. That date shall be no later than 12 months from the date when the buffer rate is announced in accordance with paragraph 5. If that date is less than 12 months after the setting is announced, that shorter deadline for application shall be justified on the basis of exceptional circumstances.
5
Designated authorities shall publish any setting of a countercyclical buffer rate for a third country pursuant to paragraph 2 or 3 on their websites, and shall include the following information:
a
the countercyclical buffer rate and the third country to which it applies;
b
a justification for that buffer rate;
c
where the buffer rate is set above zero for the first time or is increased, the date from which the institutions must apply that increased buffer rate for the purposes of calculating their institution-specific countercyclical capital buffer;
d
where the date referred to in point (c) is less than 12 months after the date of the publication of the setting under this paragraph, a reference to the exceptional circumstances that justify that shorter deadline for application.

Calculation of institution-specific countercyclical capital buffer rates
Article 140
1
The institution-specific countercyclical capital buffer rate shall consist of the weighted average of the countercyclical buffer rates that apply in the jurisdictions where the relevant credit exposures of the institution are located or are applied for the purposes of this Article by virtue of Article 139(2) or (3).
Member States shall require institutions, in order to calculate the weighted average referred to in the first subparagraph, to apply to each applicable countercyclical buffer rate its total own funds requirements for credit risk, determined in accordance with Part Three, Titles II and IV of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, that relates to the relevant credit exposures in the territory in question, divided by its total own funds requirements for credit risk that relates to all of its relevant credit exposures.
2
If, in accordance with Article 136(4), a designated authority sets a countercyclical buffer rate in excess of 2,5 % of total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Member States shall ensure that the following buffer rates apply to relevant credit exposures located in the Member State of that designated authority ('Member State A') for the purposes of the calculation required under paragraph 1 including, where relevant, for the purposes of the calculation of the element of consolidated capital that relates to the institution in question:
a
domestically authorised institutions shall apply that buffer rate in excess of 2,5 % of total risk exposure amount;
b
institutions that are authorised in another Member State shall apply a countercyclical buffer rate of 2,5 % of total risk exposure amount if the designated authority in the Member State in which they have been authorised has not recognised the buffer rate in excess of 2,5 % in accordance with Article 137(1);
c
institutions that are authorised in another Member State shall apply the countercyclical buffer rate set by the designated authority of Member State A if the designated authority in the Member State in which they have been authorised has recognised the buffer rate in accordance with Article 137.
3
If the countercyclical buffer rate set by the relevant third-country authority for a third country exceeds 2,5 % of total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Member States shall ensure that the following buffer rates apply to relevant credit exposures located in that third country for the purposes of the calculation required under paragraph 1 including, where relevant, for the purposes of the calculation of the element of consolidated capital that relates to the institution in question:
a
institutions shall apply a countercyclical buffer rate of 2,5 % of total risk exposure amount if the designated authority in the Member State in which they have been authorised has not recognised the buffer rate in excess of 2,5 % in accordance with Article 137(1);
b
institutions shall apply the countercyclical buffer rate set by the relevant third-country authority if the designated authority in the Member State in which they have been authorised has recognised the buffer rate in accordance with Article 137.
4
Relevant credit exposures shall include all those exposure classes, other than those referred to in points (a) to (f) of Article 112 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, that are subject to:
a
the own funds requirements for credit risk under Part Three, Title II of that Regulation;
b
where the exposure is held in the trading book, own funds requirements for specific risk under Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 2 of that Regulation or incremental default and migration risk under Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 5 of that Regulation;
c
where the exposure is a securitisation, the own funds requirements under Part Three, Title II, Chapter 5 of that Regulation.
5
Institutions shall identify the geographical location of a relevant credit exposure in accordance with regulatory technical standards adopted in accordance with paragraph 7.
6
For the purposes of the calculation required under paragraph 1:
a
a countercyclical buffer rate for a Member State shall apply from the date specified in the information published in accordance with Article 136(7)(e) or Article 137(2)(c) if the effect of that decision is to increase the buffer rate;
b
subject to point (c), a countercyclical buffer rate for a third country shall apply 12 months after the date on which a change in the buffer rate was announced by the relevant third-country authority, irrespective of whether that authority requires institutions incorporated in that third country to apply the change within a shorter period, if the effect of that decision is to increase the buffer rate;
c
where the designated authority of the home Member State of the institution sets the countercyclical buffer rate for a third country pursuant to Article 139(2) or (3), or recognises the countercyclical buffer rate for a third country pursuant to Article 137, that buffer rate shall apply from the date specified in the information published in accordance with Article 139(5)(c) or Article 137(2)(c), if the effect of that decision is to increase the buffer rate;
d
a countercyclical buffer rate shall apply immediately if the effect of that decision is to reduce the buffer rate.
For the purposes of point (b), a change in the countercyclical buffer rate for a third country shall be considered to be announced on the date that it is published by the relevant third-country authority in accordance with the applicable national rules.
7
EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the method for the identification of the geographical location of the relevant credit exposures referred to in paragraph 5.
EBA shall submit those draft regulatory standards to the Commission by 1 January 2014.
Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
Section III

Capital conservation measures

Restrictions on distributions
Article 141
1
An institution that meets the combined buffer requirement shall not make a distribution in connection with Common Equity Tier 1 capital to an extent that would decrease its Common Equity Tier 1 capital to a level where the combined buffer requirement is no longer met.
2
An institution that fails to meet the combined buffer requirement shall calculate the maximum distributable amount (MDA) in accordance with paragraph 4 and shall notify the competent authority thereof.
Where the first subparagraph applies, the institution shall not undertake any of the following actions before it has calculated the MDA:
a
make a distribution in connection with Common Equity Tier 1 capital;
b
create an obligation to pay variable remuneration or discretionary pension benefits or pay variable remuneration if the obligation to pay was created at a time when the institution failed to meet the combined buffer requirement; or
c
make payments on Additional Tier 1 instruments.
3
Where an institution fails to meet or exceed its combined buffer requirement, it shall not distribute more than the MDA calculated in accordance with paragraph 4 through any action referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of the second subparagraph of paragraph 2.
4
Institutions shall calculate the MDA by multiplying the sum calculated in accordance with paragraph 5 by the factor determined in accordance with paragraph 6. The MDA shall be reduced by any amount resulting from any of the actions referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) of the second subparagraph of paragraph 2.
5
The sum to be multiplied in accordance with paragraph 4 shall consist of:
a
any interim profits not included in Common Equity Tier 1 capital pursuant to Article 26(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, net of any distribution of profits or any payment resulting from the actions referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) of the second subparagraph of paragraph 2 of this Article;
plus
b
any year-end profits not included in Common Equity Tier 1 capital pursuant to Article 26(2) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 net of any distribution of profits or any payment resulting from the actions referred to in point (a), (b) or (c) of the second subparagraph of paragraph 2 of this Article;
minus
c
amounts which would be payable by tax if the items specified in points (a) and (b) of this paragraph were to be retained.
6
The factor shall be determined as follows:
a
where the Common Equity Tier 1 capital maintained by the institution which is not used to meet any of the own funds requirements set out in points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and the additional own funds requirement addressing risks other than the risk of excessive leverage set out in point (a) of Article 104(1) of this Directive, expressed as a percentage of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of that Regulation, is within the first (that is, the lowest) quartile of the combined buffer requirement, the factor shall be 0;
b
where the Common Equity Tier 1 capital maintained by the institution which is not used to meet any of the own funds requirements set out in points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and the additional own funds requirement addressing risks other than the risk of excessive leverage set out in point (a) of Article 104(1) of this Directive, expressed as a percentage of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of that Regulation, is within the second quartile of the combined buffer requirement, the factor shall be 0,2;
c
where the Common Equity Tier 1 capital maintained by the institution which is not used to meet the own funds requirements set out in points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and the additional own funds requirement addressing risks other than the risk of excessive leverage set out in point (a) of Article 104(1) of this Directive, expressed as a percentage of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of that Regulation, is within the third quartile of the combined buffer requirement, the factor shall be 0,4;
d
where the Common Equity Tier 1 capital maintained by the institution which is not used to meet the own funds requirements set out in points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and the additional own funds requirement addressing risks other than the risk of excessive leverage set out in point (a) of Article 104(1) of this Directive, expressed as a percentage of the total risk exposure amount calculated in accordance with Article 92(3) of that Regulation, is within the fourth (that is, the highest) quartile of the combined buffer requirement, the factor shall be 0,6.
The lower and upper bounds of each quartile of the combined buffer requirement shall be calculated as follows:
Lower bound of quartile = (Combined buffer requirement)/4 × (Q_n − 1)
Upper bound of quartile = (Combined buffer requirement)/4 × Q_n
where:
Q
n
- the ordinal number of the quartile concerned.
7
The restrictions imposed by this Article shall only apply to payments that result in a reduction of Common Equity Tier 1 capital or in a reduction of profits, and where a suspension of payment or failure to pay does not constitute an event of default or a condition for the commencement of proceedings under the insolvency regime applicable to the institution.
8
Where an institution fails to meet the combined buffer requirement and intends to distribute any of its distributable profits or undertake an action referred to in points (a), (b) and (c) of the second subparagraph of paragraph 2, it shall notify the competent authority and provide the following information:
a
the amount of capital maintained by the institution, subdivided as follows:
1. Common Equity Tier 1 capital,
2. Additional Tier 1 capital,
3. Tier 2 capital;
b
the amount of its interim and year-end profits;
c
the MDA calculated in accordance with paragraph 4;
d
the amount of distributable profits it intends to allocate between the following:
1. dividend payments,
2. share buybacks,
3. payments on Additional Tier 1 instruments,
4. the payment of variable remuneration or discretionary pension benefits, whether by creation of a new obligation to pay, or payment pursuant to an obligation to pay created at a time when the institution failed to meet its combined buffer requirements.
9
Institutions shall maintain arrangements to ensure that the amount of distributable profits and the MDA are calculated accurately, and shall be able to demonstrate that accuracy to the competent authority on request.
10
For the purposes of paragraphs 1 and 2, a distribution in connection with Common Equity Tier 1 capital shall include the following:
a
a payment of cash dividends;
b
a distribution of fully or partly paid bonus shares or other capital instruments referred to in Article 26(1)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
c
a redemption or purchase by an institution of its own shares or other capital instruments referred to in Article 26(1)(a) of that Regulation;
d
a repayment of amounts paid up in connection with capital instruments referred to in Article 26(1)(a) of that Regulation;
e
a distribution of items referred to in points (b) to (e) of Article 26(1) of that Regulation.

Failure to meet the combined buffer requirement
Article 141a
An institution shall be considered as failing to meet the combined buffer requirement for the purposes of Article 141 where it does not have own funds in an amount and of the quality needed to meet at the same time the combined buffer requirement and each of the following requirements in:
1. point (a) of Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and the additional own funds requirement addressing risks other than the risk of excessive leverage under point (a) of Article 104(1) of this Directive;
2. point (b) of Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and the additional own funds requirement addressing risks other than the risk of excessive leverage under point (a) of Article 104(1) of this Directive;
3. point (c) of Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and the additional own funds requirement addressing risks other than the risk of excessive leverage under point (a) of Article 104(1) of this Directive.

Capital Conservation Plan
Article 142
1
Where an institution fails to meet its combined buffer requirement, it shall prepare a capital conservation plan and submit it to the competent authority no later than five working days after it identified that it was failing to meet that requirement, unless the competent authority authorises a longer delay up to 10 days.
Competent authorities shall grant such authorisations only on the basis of the individual situation of an institution and taking into account the scale and complexity of the institution's activities.
2
The capital conservation plan shall include the following:
a
estimates of income and expenditure and a forecast balance sheet;
b
measures to increase the capital ratios of the institution;
c
a plan and timeframe for the increase of own funds with the objective of meeting fully the combined buffer requirement;
d
any other information that the competent authority considers to be necessary to carry out the assessment required by paragraph 3.
3
The competent authority shall assess the capital conservation plan, and shall approve the plan only if it considers that the plan, if implemented, would be reasonably likely to conserve or raise sufficient capital to enable the institution to meet its combined buffer requirements within a period which the competent authority considers appropriate.
4
If the competent authority does not approve the capital conservation plan in accordance with paragraph 3, it shall impose one or both of the following:
a
require the institution to increase own funds to specified levels within specified periods;
b
exercise its powers under Article 102 to impose more stringent restrictions on distributions than those required by Article 141.
OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 84.
Directive (EU) 2015/849 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
20 May 2015
on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 2006/70/EC (
OJ L 141, 5.6.2015, p. 73
).
OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 48.
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
27 April 2016
on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) (
OJ L 119, 4.5.2016, p. 1
).
OJ L 157, 9.6.2006, p. 87.
OJ L 222, 14.8.1978, p. 11.
OJ L 193, 18.7.1983, p. 1.
OJ L 120, 15.5.2009, p. 22.
Commission Directive 2006/73/EC of 10 August 2006 implementing Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards organisational requirements and operating conditions for investment firms and defined terms for the purposes of that Directive (OJ L 241, 2.9.2006, p. 26).
Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
12 December 2017
laying down a general framework for securitisation and creating a specific framework for simple, transparent and standardised securitisation, and amending Directives 2009/65/EC, 2009/138/EC and 2011/61/EU and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 648/2012 (
OJ L 347, 28.12.2017, p. 35
).
Commission Recommendation 2003/361/EC of
6 May 2003
concerning the definition of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (
OJ L 124, 20.5.2003, p. 36
).
Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
15 July 2014
establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (
OJ L 225, 30.7.2014, p. 1
).
Substituted by Directive (EU) 2019/878 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards exempted entities, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies, remuneration, supervisory measures and powers and capital conservation measures (Text with EEA relevance).
Inserted by Directive (EU) 2019/878 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards exempted entities, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies, remuneration, supervisory measures and powers and capital conservation measures (Text with EEA relevance).
Substituted by Corrigendum to Directive (EU) 2019/878 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards exempted entities, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies, remuneration, supervisory measures and powers and capital conservation measures (Official Journal of the European Union L 150 of 7 June 2019).
Substituted by Corrigendum to Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (Official Journal of the European Union L 176 of 27 June 2013).
Inserted by Directive 2014/17/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 February 2014 on credit agreements for consumers relating to residential immovable property and amending Directives 2008/48/EC and 2013/36/EU and Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 (Text with EEA relevance).
Substituted by Directive (EU) 2018/843 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 30 May 2018 amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the prevention of the use of the financial system for the purposes of money laundering or terrorist financing, and amending Directives 2009/138/EC and 2013/36/EU (Text with EEA relevance).
Deleted by Directive (EU) 2019/878 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards exempted entities, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies, remuneration, supervisory measures and powers and capital conservation measures (Text with EEA relevance).