TITLE VII

PRUDENTIAL SUPERVISION
CHAPTER 2

Review Processes
Section I

Internal capital adequacy assessment process

Internal Capital
Article 73
Institutions shall have in place sound, effective and comprehensive strategies and processes to assess and maintain on an ongoing basis the amounts, types and distribution of internal capital that they consider adequate to cover the nature and level of the risks to which they are or might be exposed.
Those strategies and processes shall be subject to regular internal review to ensure that they remain comprehensive and proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of the institution concerned.
Section II

Arrangements, processes and mechanisms of institutions
Sub-Section 1

General principles

Internal governance and recovery and resolution plans
Article 74
1
Institutions shall have robust governance arrangements, which include a clear organisational structure with well-defined, transparent and consistent lines of responsibility, effective processes to identify, manage, monitor and report the risks they are or might be exposed to, adequate internal control mechanisms, including sound administration and accounting procedures, and remuneration policies and practices that are consistent with and promote sound and effective risk management.
The remuneration policies and practices referred to in the first subparagraph shall be gender neutral.
2
The arrangements, processes and mechanisms referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be comprehensive and proportionate to the nature, scale and complexity of the risks inherent in the business model and the institution's activities. The technical criteria established in Articles 76 to 95 shall be taken into account.
3
EBA shall issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, on the arrangements, processes and mechanisms referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, taking into account paragraph 2 of this Article.
EBA shall issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, on gender neutral remuneration policies for institutions.
Within two years of the date of publication of the guidelines referred to in the second subparagraph and based on the information collected by the competent authorities, EBA shall issue a report on the application of gender neutral remuneration policies by institutions.

Oversight of remuneration policies
Article 75
1
Competent authorities shall collect the information disclosed in accordance with the criteria for disclosure established in points (g), (h), (i) and (k) of Article 450(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as well as the information provided by institutions on the gender pay gap and shall use that information to benchmark remuneration trends and practices. The competent authorities shall provide EBA with that information.
2
EBA shall issue guidelines on sound remuneration policies which comply with the principles set out in Articles 92 to 95. The guidelines shall take into account the principles on sound remuneration policies set out in Commission Recommendation 2009/384/EC of 30 April 2009 on remuneration policies in the financial services sector .
ESMA shall cooperate closely with EBA to develop guidelines on remuneration policies for categories of staff involved in the provision of investment services and activities within the meaning of point 2 of Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/39/EC.
EBA shall use the information received from the competent authorities in accordance with paragraph 1 to benchmark remuneration trends and practices at Union level.
3
Competent authorities shall collect information on the number of natural persons per institution that are remunerated EUR 1 million or more per financial year, in pay brackets of EUR 1 million, including their job responsibilities, the business area involved and the main elements of salary, bonus, long-term award and pension contribution. That information shall be forwarded to EBA, which shall publish it on an aggregate home Member State basis in a common reporting format. EBA may elaborate guidelines to facilitate the implementation of this paragraph and ensure the consistency of the information collected.
Sub-Section 2

Technical criteria concerning the organisation and treatment of risks

Treatment of risks
Article 76
1
Member States shall ensure that the management body approves and periodically reviews the strategies and policies for taking up, managing, monitoring and mitigating the risks the institution is or might be exposed to, including those posed by the macroeconomic environment in which it operates in relation to the status of the business cycle.
2
Member States shall ensure that the management body devotes sufficient time to consideration of risk issues. The management body shall be actively involved in and ensure that adequate resources are allocated to the management of all material risks addressed in this Directive and in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 as well as in the valuation of assets, the use of external credit ratings and internal models relating to those risks. The institution shall establish reporting lines to the management body that cover all material risks and risk management policies and changes thereof.
3
Member States shall ensure that institutions that are significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities establish a risk committee composed of members of the management body who do not perform any executive function in the institution concerned. Members of the risk committee shall have appropriate knowledge, skills and expertise to fully understand and monitor the risk strategy and the risk appetite of the institution.
The risk committee shall advise the management body on the institution's overall current and future risk appetite and strategy and assist the management body in overseeing the implementation of that strategy by senior management. The management body shall retain overall responsibility for risks.
The risk committee shall review whether prices of liabilities and assets offered to clients take fully into account the institution's business model and risk strategy. Where prices do not properly reflect risks in accordance with the business model and risk strategy, the risk committee shall present a remedy plan to the management body.
Competent authorities may allow an institution which is not considered significant as referred to in the first subparagraph to combine the risk committee with the audit committee as referred to in Article 41 of Directive 2006/43/EC. Members of the combined committee shall have the knowledge, skills and expertise required for the risk committee and for the audit committee.
4
Member States shall ensure that the management body in its supervisory function and, where a risk committee has been established, the risk committee have adequate access to information on the risk situation of the institution and, if necessary and appropriate, to the risk management function and to external expert advice.
The management body in its supervisory function and, where one has been established, the risk committee shall determine the nature, the amount, the format, and the frequency of the information on risk which it is to receive. In order to assist in the establishment of sound remuneration policies and practices, the risk committee shall, without prejudice to the tasks of the remuneration committee, examine whether incentives provided by the remuneration system take into consideration risk, capital, liquidity and the likelihood and timing of earnings.
5
Member States shall, in accordance with the proportionality requirement laid down in Article 7(2) of Commission Directive 2006/73/EC , ensure that institutions have a risk management function independent from the operational functions and which shall have sufficient authority, stature, resources and access to the management body.
Member States shall ensure that the risk management function ensures that all material risks are identified, measured and properly reported. They shall ensure that the risk management function is actively involved in elaborating the institution's risk strategy and in all material risk management decisions and that it can deliver a complete view of the whole range of risks of the institution.
Where necessary, Member States shall ensure that the risk management function can report directly to the management body in its supervisory function, independent from senior management, and can raise concerns and warn that body, where appropriate, where specific risk developments affect or may affect the institution, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the management body in its supervisory and/or managerial functions pursuant to this Directive and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
The head of the risk management function shall be an independent senior manager with distinct responsibility for the risk management function. Where the nature, scale and complexity of the activities of the institution do not justify a specially appointed person, another senior person within the institution may fulfil that function, provided there is no conflict of interest.
The head of the risk management function shall not be removed without prior approval of the management body in its supervisory function and shall be able to have direct access to the management body in its supervisory function where necessary.
The application of this Directive shall be without prejudice to the application of Directive 2006/73/EC to investment firms.

Internal Approaches for calculating own funds requirements
Article 77
1
Competent authorities shall encourage institutions that are significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, scale and complexity of their activities to develop internal credit risk assessment capacity and to increase use of the internal ratings based approach for calculating own funds requirements for credit risk where their exposures are material in absolute terms and where they have at the same time a large number of material counterparties. This Article shall be without prejudice to the fulfilment of criteria laid down in Part Three, Title I, Chapter 3, Section 1 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
2
Competent authorities shall, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of institutions' activities, monitor that they do not solely or mechanistically rely on external credit ratings for assessing the creditworthiness of an entity or financial instrument.
3
Competent authorities shall encourage institutions, taking into account their size, internal organisation and the nature, scale and complexity of their activities, to develop internal specific risk assessment capacity and to increase use of internal models for calculating own funds requirements for specific risk of debt instruments in the trading book, together with internal models to calculate own funds requirements for default and migration risk where their exposures to specific risk are material in absolute terms and where they have a large number of material positions in debt instruments of different issuers.
This Article shall be without prejudice to the fulfilment of the criteria laid down in Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 5, Sections 1 to 5, of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
4
EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to further define the notion 'exposures to specific risk which are material in absolute terms' referred to in the first subparagraph of paragraph 3 and the thresholds for large numbers of material counterparties and positions in debt instruments of different issuers.
EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2014.
Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.

Supervisory benchmarking of internal approaches for calculating own funds requirements
Article 78
1
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions permitted to use internal approaches for the calculation of risk weighted exposure amounts or own fund requirements except for operational risk report the results of the calculations of their internal approaches for their exposures or positions that are included in the benchmark portfolios. Institutions shall submit the results of their calculations, together with an explanation of the methodologies used to produce them, to the competent authorities at an appropriate frequency, and at least annually.
2
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions submit the results of the calculations referred to in paragraph 1 in accordance with the template developed by EBA in accordance with paragraph 8 to the competent authorities and to EBA. Where competent authorities choose to develop specific portfolios, they shall do so in consultation with EBA and ensure that institutions report the results of the calculations separately from the results of the calculations for EBA portfolios.
3
Competent authorities shall, on the basis of the information submitted by institutions in accordance with paragraph 1, monitor the range of risk weighted exposure amounts or own funds requirements, as applicable, except for operational risk, for the exposures or transactions in the benchmark portfolio resulting from the internal approaches of those institutions. At least annually, competent authorities shall make an assessment of the quality of those approaches paying particular attention to:
a
those approaches that exhibit significant differences in own fund requirements for the same exposure;
b
approaches where there is particularly high or low diversity, and also where there is a significant and systematic under-estimation of own funds requirements.
EBA shall produce a report to assist the competent authorities in the assessment of the quality of the internal approaches based on the information referred to in paragraph 2.
4
Where particular institutions diverge significantly from the majority of their peers or where there is little commonality in approach leading to a wide variance of results, competent authorities shall investigate the reasons therefor and, if it can be clearly identified that an institution's approach leads to an underestimation of own funds requirements which is not attributable to differences in the underlying risks of the exposures or positions, shall take corrective action.
5
The competent authorities shall ensure that their decisions on the appropriateness of corrective actions as referred to in paragraph 4 comply with the principle that such actions must maintain the objectives of an internal approach and therefore do not:
a
lead to standardisation or preferred methods;
b
create wrong incentives; or
c
cause herd behaviour.
6
EBA may issue guidelines and recommendations in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 where it considers them necessary on the basis of the information and assessments referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Article in order to improve supervisory practices or practices of institutions with regard to internal approaches.
7
EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify:
a
the procedures for sharing assessments made in accordance with paragraph 3 between the competent authorities and with EBA;
b
the standards for the assessment made by competent authorities referred to in paragraph 3.
EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2014.
Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
8
EBA shall develop draft implementing technical standards to specify:
a
the template, the definitions and the IT-solutions to be applied in the Union for the reporting referred to in paragraph 2;
b
the benchmark portfolio or portfolios referred to in paragraph 1.
EBA shall submit those draft implementing technical standards to the Commission by 1 January 2014.
Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
9
The Commission shall, by 1 April 2015 and after consulting EBA, submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the functioning of the benchmarking of internal models including the scope of the model. Where appropriate, the report shall be followed by a legislative proposal.

Credit and counterparty risk
Article 79
Competent authorities shall ensure that:
1. credit-granting is based on sound and well-defined criteria and that the process for approving, amending, renewing, and re-financing credits is clearly established;
2. institutions have internal methodologies that enable them to assess the credit risk of exposures to individual obligors, securities or securitisation positions and credit risk at the portfolio level. In particular, internal methodologies shall not rely solely or mechanistically on external credit ratings. Where own funds requirements are based on a rating by an External Credit Assessment Institution (ECAI) or based on the fact that an exposure is unrated, this shall not exempt institutions from additionally considering other relevant information for assessing their allocation of internal capital;
3. the ongoing administration and monitoring of the various credit risk-bearing portfolios and exposures of institutions, including for identifying and managing problem credits and for making adequate value adjustments and provisions, is operated through effective systems;
4. diversification of credit portfolios is adequate given an institution's target markets and overall credit strategy.

Residual risk
Article 80
Competent authorities shall ensure that the risk that recognised credit risk mitigation techniques used by institutions prove less effective than expected is addressed and controlled including by means of written policies and procedures.

Concentration risk
Article 81
Competent authorities shall ensure that the concentration risk arising from exposures to each counterparty, including central counterparties, groups of connected counterparties, and counterparties in the same economic sector, geographic region or from the same activity or commodity, the application of credit risk mitigation techniques, and including in particular risks associated with large indirect credit exposures such as a single collateral issuer, is addressed and controlled including by means of written policies and procedures.

Securitisation risk
Article 82
1
Competent authorities shall ensure that the risks arising from securitisation transactions in relation to which the credit institutions are investor, originator or sponsor, including reputational risks, such as arise in relation to complex structures or products, are evaluated and addressed through appropriate policies and procedures, to ensure that the economic substance of the transaction is fully reflected in the risk assessment and management decisions.
2
Competent authorities shall ensure that liquidity plans to address the implications of both scheduled and early amortisation exist at institutions which are originators of revolving securitisation transactions involving early amortisation provisions.

Market risk
Article 83
1
Competent authorities shall ensure that policies and processes for the identification, measurement and management of all material sources and effects of market risks are implemented.
2
Where the short position falls due before the long position, competent authorities shall ensure that institutions also take measures against the risk of a shortage of liquidity.
3
The internal capital shall be adequate for material market risks that are not subject to an own funds requirement.
Institutions, which have, in calculating own funds requirements for position risk in accordance with Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 2, of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, netted off their positions in one or more of the equities constituting a stock-index against one or more positions in the stock-index future or other stock-index product shall have adequate internal capital to cover the basis risk of loss caused by the future's or other product's value not moving fully in line with that of its constituent equities. Institutions shall also have such adequate internal capital where they hold opposite positions in stock-index futures which are not identical in respect of either their maturity or their composition or both.
Where using the treatment in Article 345 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, institutions shall ensure that they hold sufficient internal capital against the risk of loss which exists between the time of the initial commitment and the following working day.

Interest risk arising from non-trading book activities
Article 84
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions implement systems to identify, evaluate and manage the risk arising from potential changes in interest rates that affect an institution's non-trading activities.

Operational risk
Article 85
1
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions implement policies and processes to evaluate and manage the exposures to operational risk, including model risk and risks resulting from outsourcing, and to cover low-frequency high-severity events. Institutions shall articulate what constitutes operational risk for the purposes of those policies and procedures.
2
Competent authorities shall ensure that contingency and business continuity plans are in place to ensure an institution's ability to operate on an ongoing basis and limit losses in the event of severe business disruption.

Liquidity risk
Article 86
1
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions have robust strategies, policies, processes and systems for the identification, measurement, management and monitoring of liquidity risk over an appropriate set of time horizons, including intra-day, so as to ensure that institutions maintain adequate levels of liquidity buffers. Those strategies, policies, processes and systems shall be tailored to business lines, currencies, branches and legal entities and shall include adequate allocation mechanisms of liquidity costs, benefits and risks.
2
The strategies, policies, processes and systems referred to in paragraph 1 shall be proportionate to the complexity, risk profile, scope of operation of the institutions and risk tolerance set by the management body and reflect the institution's importance in each Member State in which it carries out business. Institutions shall communicate risk tolerance to all relevant business lines.
3
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions, taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of their activities, have liquidity risk profiles that are consistent with and, not in excess of, those required for a well-functioning and robust system.
Competent authorities shall monitor developments in relation to liquidity risk profiles, for example product design and volumes, risk management, funding policies and funding concentrations.
Competent authorities shall take effective action where developments referred to in the second subparagraph may lead to individual institution or systemic instability.
Competent authorities shall inform EBA about any actions carried out pursuant to the third subparagraph.
EBA shall make recommendations where appropriate in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
4
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions develop methodologies for the identification, measurement, management and monitoring of funding positions. Those methodologies shall include the current and projected material cash-flows in and arising from assets, liabilities, off-balance-sheet items, including contingent liabilities and the possible impact of reputational risk.
5
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions distinguish between pledged and unencumbered assets that are available at all times, in particular during emergency situations. They shall also ensure that institutions take into account the legal entity in which assets reside, the country where assets are legally recorded either in a register or in an account and their eligibility and shall monitor how assets can be mobilised in a timely manner.
6
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions also have regard to existing legal, regulatory and operational limitations to potential transfers of liquidity and unencumbered assets amongst entities, both within and outside the European Economic Area.
7
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions consider different liquidity risk mitigation tools, including a system of limits and liquidity buffers in order to be able to withstand a range of different stress events and an adequately diversified funding structure and access to funding sources. Those arrangements shall be reviewed regularly.
8
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions consider alternative scenarios on liquidity positions and on risk mitigants and review the assumptions underlying decisions concerning the funding position at least annually. For those purposes, alternative scenarios shall address, in particular, off-balance sheet items and other contingent liabilities, including those of Securitisation Special Purpose Entities (SSPE) or other special purpose entities, as referred to in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, in relation to which the institution acts as sponsor or provides material liquidity support.
9
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions consider the potential impact of institution-specific, market-wide and combined alternative scenarios. Different time periods and varying degrees of stress conditions shall be considered.
10
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions adjust their strategies, internal policies and limits on liquidity risk and develop effective contingency plans, taking into account the outcome of the alternative scenarios referred to in paragraph 8.
11
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions have in place liquidity recovery plans setting out adequate strategies and proper implementation measures in order to address possible liquidity shortfalls, including in relation to branches established in another Member State. Competent authorities shall ensure that those plans are tested by the institutions at least annually, updated on the basis of the outcome of the alternative scenarios set out in paragraph 8, reported to and approved by senior management, so that internal policies and processes can be adjusted accordingly. Institutions shall take the necessary operational steps in advance to ensure that liquidity recovery plans can be implemented immediately. For credit institutions, such operational steps shall include holding collateral immediately available for central bank funding. This includes holding collateral where necessary in the currency of another Member State, or the currency of a third country to which the credit institution has exposures, and where operationally necessary within the territory of a host Member State or of a third country to whose currency it is exposed.

Risk of excessive leverage
Article 87
1
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions have policies and processes in place for the identification, management and monitoring of the risk of excessive leverage. Indicators for the risk of excessive leverage shall include the leverage ratio determined in accordance with Article 429 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and mismatches between assets and obligations.
2
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions address the risk of excessive leverage in a precautionary manner by taking due account of potential increases in the risk of excessive leverage caused by reductions of the institution's own funds through expected or realised losses, depending on the applicable accounting rules. To that end, institutions shall be able to withstand a range of different stress events with respect to the risk of excessive leverage.
Sub-Section 3

Governance

Governance arrangements
Article 88
1
Member States shall ensure that the management body defines, oversees and is accountable for the implementation of the governance arrangements that ensure effective and prudent management of an institution, including the segregation of duties in the organisation and the prevention of conflicts of interest.
Those arrangements shall comply with the following principles:
a
the management body must have the overall responsibility for the institution and approve and oversee the implementation of the institution's strategic objectives, risk strategy and internal governance;
b
the management body must ensure the integrity of the accounting and financial reporting systems, including financial and operational controls and compliance with the law and relevant standards;
c
the management body must oversee the process of disclosure and communications;
d
the management body must be responsible for providing effective oversight of senior management;
e
the chairman of the management body in its supervisory function of an institution must not exercise simultaneously the functions of a chief executive officer within the same institution, unless justified by the institution and authorised by competent authorities.
Member States shall ensure that the management body monitors and periodically assesses the effectiveness of the institution's governance arrangements and takes appropriate steps to address any deficiencies.
Member States shall ensure that data on loans to members of the management body and their related parties are properly documented and made available to competent authorities upon request.
For the purposes of this Article, the term
‘
related party
’
means:
a
a spouse, registered partner in accordance with national law, child or parent of a member of the management body;
b
a commercial entity, in which a member of the management body or his or her close family member as referred to in point (a) has a qualifying holding of 10 % or more of capital or of voting rights in that entity, or in which those persons can exercise significant influence, or in which those persons hold senior management positions or are members of the management body.
2
Member States shall ensure that institutions which are significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities establish a nomination committee composed of members of the management body who do not perform any executive function in the institution concerned.
The nomination committee shall:
a
identify and recommend, for the approval of the management body or for approval of the general meeting, candidates to fill management body vacancies, evaluate the balance of knowledge, skills, diversity and experience of the management body and prepare a description of the roles and capabilities for a particular appointment, and assess the time commitment expected.
Furthermore, the nomination committee shall decide on a target for the representation of the underrepresented gender in the management body and prepare a policy on how to increase the number of the underrepresented gender in the management body in order to meet that target. The target, policy and its implementation shall be made public in accordance with Article 435(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
b
periodically, and at least annually, assess the structure, size, composition and performance of the management body and make recommendations to the management body with regard to any changes;
c
periodically, and at least annually, assess the knowledge, skills and experience of individual members of the management body and of the management body collectively, and report to the management body accordingly;
d
periodically review the policy of the management body for selection and appointment of senior management and make recommendations to the management body.
In performing its duties, the nomination committee shall, to the extent possible and on an ongoing basis, take account of the need to ensure that the management body's decision making is not dominated by any one individual or small group of individuals in a manner that is detrimental to the interests of the institution as a whole.
The nomination committee shall be able to use any forms of resources that it considers to be appropriate, including external advice, and shall receive appropriate funding to that effect.
Where, under national law, the management body does not have any competence in the process of selection and appointment of any of its members, this paragraph shall not apply.

Country-by-country reporting
Article 89
1
From 1 January 2015 Member States shall require each institution to disclose annually, specifying, by Member State and by third country in which it has an establishment, the following information on a consolidated basis for the financial year:
a
name(s), nature of activities and geographical location;
b
turnover;
c
number of employees on a full time equivalent basis;
d
profit or loss before tax;
e
tax on profit or loss;
f
public subsidies received.
2
Notwithstanding paragraph 1, Member States shall require institutions to disclose the information referred to in paragraph 1(a), (b) and (c) for the first time on 1 July 2014.
3
By 1 July 2014, all global systemically important institutions authorised within the Union, as identified internationally, shall submit to the Commission the information referred to in paragraph 1(d), (e) and (f) on a confidential basis. The Commission, after consulting EBA, EIOPA and ESMA, as appropriate, shall conduct a general assessment as regards potential negative economic consequences of the public disclosure of such information, including the impact on competitiveness, investment and credit availability and the stability of the financial system. The Commission shall submit its report to the European Parliament and to the Council by 31 December 2014.
In the event that the Commission report identifies significant negative effects, the Commission shall consider making an appropriate legislative proposal for an amendment of the disclosure obligations set out in paragraph 1 and may, in accordance with point (h) of Article 145, decide to defer those obligations. The Commission shall review the necessity to extend deferral annually.
4
The information referred to in paragraph 1 shall be audited in accordance with Directive 2006/43/EC and shall be published, where possible, as an annex to the annual financial statements or, where applicable, to the consolidated financial statements of the institution concerned.
5
To the extent that future Union legislative acts for disclosure obligations go beyond those laid down in this Article, this Article shall cease to apply and shall be deleted accordingly.
6
By
1 January 2021
, the Commission, after consulting EBA, EIOPA and ESMA, shall review whether the information referred to in points (a) to (f) of paragraph 1 is still adequate, while taking into account previous impact assessments, international agreements and legislative developments in the Union, and whether further relevant information requirements may be added to paragraph 1.
By
30 June 2021
, the Commission shall, on the basis of the consultation with EBA, EIOPA and ESMA, report to the European Parliament and to the Council on the assessment referred to in this paragraph and, where appropriate, submit a legislative proposal to the European Parliament and to the Council.

Public disclosure of return on assets
Article 90
Institutions shall disclose in their annual report among the key indicators their return on assets, calculated as their net profit divided by their total balance sheet.

Management body
Article 91
1
Institutions, financial holding companies and mixed financial holding companies shall have the primary responsibility for ensuring that members of the management body are at all times of sufficiently good repute and possess sufficient knowledge, skills and experience to perform their duties. Members of the management body shall, in particular, fulfil the requirements set out in paragraphs 2 to 8.
Where members of the management body do not fulfil the requirements set out in this paragraph, competent authorities shall have the power to remove such members from the management body. The competent authorities shall in particular verify whether the requirements set out in this paragraph are still fulfilled where they have reasonable grounds to suspect that money laundering or terrorist financing is being or has been committed or attempted, or there is increased risk thereof in connection with that institution.
2
All members of the management body shall commit sufficient time to perform their functions in the institution.
3
The number of directorships which may be held by a member of the management body at the same time shall take into account individual circumstances and the nature, scale and complexity of the institution's activities. Unless representing the Member State, members of the management body of an institution that is significant in terms of its size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of its activities shall, from 1 July 2014, not hold more than one of the following combinations of directorships at the same time:
a
one executive directorship with two non-executive directorships;
b
four non-executive directorships.
4
For the purposes of paragraph 3, the following shall count as a single directorship:
a
executive or non-executive directorships held within the same group;
b
executive or non-executive directorships held within:
1. institutions which are members of the same institutional protection scheme provided that the conditions set out in Article 113(7) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 are fulfilled; or
2. undertakings (including non-financial entities) in which the institution holds a qualifying holding.
5
Directorships in organisations which do not pursue predominantly commercial objectives shall not count for the purposes of paragraph 3.
6
Competent authorities may authorise members of the management body to hold one additional non-executive directorship. Competent authorities shall regularly inform EBA of such authorisations.
7
The management body shall possess adequate collective knowledge, skills and experience to be able to understand the institution's activities, including the main risks. The overall composition of the management body shall reflect an adequately broad range of experience.
8
Each member of the management body shall act with honesty, integrity and independence of mind to effectively assess and challenge the decisions of the senior management where necessary and to effectively oversee and monitor management decision-making. Being a member of affiliated companies or affiliated entities does not in itself constitute an obstacle to acting with independence of mind.
9
Institutions shall devote adequate human and financial resources to the induction and training of members of the management body.
10
Member States or competent authorities shall require institutions and their respective nomination committees to engage a broad set of qualities and competences when recruiting members to the management body and for that purpose to put in place a policy promoting diversity on the management body.
11
Competent authorities shall collect the information disclosed in accordance with Article 435(2)(c) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and shall use it to benchmark diversity practices. The competent authorities shall provide EBA with that information. EBA shall use that information to benchmark diversity practices at Union level.
12
EBA shall issue guidelines on the following:
a
the notion of sufficient time commitment of a member of the management body to perform his functions, in relation to the individual circumstances and the nature, scale and complexity of activities of the institution;
b
the notion of adequate collective knowledge, skills and experience of the management body as referred to in paragraph 7;
c
the notions of honesty, integrity and independence of mind of a member of the management body as referred to in paragraph 8;
d
the notion of adequate human and financial resources devoted to the induction and training of members of the management body as referred to in paragraph 9;
e
the notion of diversity to be taken into account for the selection of members of the management body as referred to in paragraph 10;
f
the consistent application of the power referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 1.
EBA shall issue those guidelines by 31 December 2015.
13
This Article shall be without prejudice to provisions on the representation of employees in the management body as provided for by national law.

Remuneration policies
Article 92
1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2
Member States shall ensure that, when establishing and applying the total remuneration policies, inclusive of salaries and discretionary pension benefits, for categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on the institution's risk profile, institutions comply with the following requirements in a manner that is appropriate to their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities:
a
the remuneration policy is consistent with and promotes sound and effective risk management and does not encourage risk-taking that exceeds the level of tolerated risk of the institution;
aa
the remuneration policy is a gender neutral remuneration policy;
b
the remuneration policy is in line with the business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the institution, and incorporates measures to avoid conflicts of interest;
c
the institution' s management body in its supervisory function adopts and periodically reviews the general principles of the remuneration policy and is responsible for overseeing its implementation;
d
the implementation of the remuneration policy is, at least annually, subject to central and independent internal review for compliance with policies and procedures for remuneration adopted by the management body in its supervisory function;
e
staff engaged in control functions are independent from the business units they oversee, have appropriate authority, and are remunerated in accordance with the achievement of the objectives linked to their functions, independent of the performance of the business areas they control;
f
the remuneration of the senior officers in the risk management and compliance functions is directly overseen by the remuneration committee referred to in Article 95 or, if such a committee has not been established, by the management body in its supervisory function;
g
the remuneration policy, taking into account national criteria on wage setting, makes a clear distinction between criteria for setting:
1. basic fixed remuneration, which should primarily reflect relevant professional experience and organisational responsibility as set out in an employee's job description as part of the terms of employment; and
2. variable remuneration which should reflect a sustainable and risk adjusted performance as well as performance in excess of that required to fulfil the employee's job description as part of the terms of employment.
3
For the purposes of paragraph 2, categories of staff whose professional activities have a material impact on the institution's risk profile shall, at least, include:
a
all members of the management body and senior management;
b
staff members with managerial responsibility over the institution's control functions or material business units;
c
staff members entitled to significant remuneration in the preceding financial year, provided that the following conditions are met:
1. the staff member's remuneration is equal to or greater than EUR
500 000
and equal to or greater than the average remuneration awarded to the members of the institution's management body and senior management referred to in point (a);
2. the staff member performs the professional activity within a material business unit and the activity is of a kind that has a significant impact on the relevant business unit's risk profile.

Institutions that benefit from government intervention
Article 93
In the case of institutions that benefit from exceptional government intervention, the following principles shall apply in addition to those set out in Article 92(2):
1. variable remuneration is strictly limited as a percentage of net revenue where it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base and timely exit from government support;
2. the relevant competent authorities require institutions to restructure remuneration in a manner aligned with sound risk management and long-term growth, including, where appropriate, establishing limits to the remuneration of the members of the management body of the institution;
3. no variable remuneration is paid to members of the management body of the institution unless justified.

Variable elements of remuneration
Article 94
1
For variable elements of remuneration, the following principles shall apply in addition to, and under the same conditions as, those set out in Article 92(2):
a
where remuneration is performance related, the total amount of remuneration is based on a combination of the assessment of the performance of the individual and of the business unit concerned and of the overall results of the institution and when assessing individual performance, financial and non-financial criteria are taken into account;
b
the assessment of the performance is set in a multi-year framework in order to ensure that the assessment process is based on longer-term performance and that the actual payment of performance-based components of remuneration is spread over a period which takes account of the underlying business cycle of the credit institution and its business risks;
c
the total variable remuneration does not limit the ability of the institution to strengthen its capital base;
d
guaranteed variable remuneration is not consistent with sound risk management or the pay-for-performance principle and shall not be a part of prospective remuneration plans;
e
guaranteed variable remuneration is exceptional, occurs only when hiring new staff and where the institution has a sound and strong capital base and is limited to the first year of employment;
f
fixed and variable components of total remuneration are appropriately balanced and the fixed component represents a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration to allow the operation of a fully flexible policy on variable remuneration components, including the possibility to pay no variable remuneration component;
g
institutions shall set the appropriate ratios between the fixed and the variable component of the total remuneration, whereby the following principles shall apply:
1. the variable component shall not exceed 100 % of the fixed component of the total remuneration for each individual. Member States may set a lower maximum percentage;
2. Members States may allow shareholders or owners or members of the institution to approve a higher maximum level of the ratio between the fixed and variable components of remuneration provided the overall level of the variable component shall not exceed 200 % of the fixed component of the total remuneration for each individual. Member States may set a lower maximum percentage.
Any approval of a higher ratio in accordance with the first subparagraph of this point shall be carried out in accordance with the following procedure:
  - the shareholders or owners or members of the institution shall act upon a detailed recommendation by the institution giving the reasons for, and the scope of, an approval sought, including the number of staff affected, their functions and the expected impact on the requirement to maintain a sound capital base;
  - shareholders or owners or members of the institution shall act by a majority of at least 66 % provided that at least 50 % of the shares or equivalent ownership rights are represented or, failing that, shall act by a majority of 75 % of the ownership rights represented;
  - the institution shall notify all shareholders or owners or members of the institution, providing a reasonable notice period in advance, that an approval under the first subparagraph of this point will be sought;
  - the institution shall, without delay, inform the competent authority of the recommendation to its shareholders or owners or members, including the proposed higher maximum ratio and the reasons therefore and shall be able to demonstrate to the competent authority that the proposed higher ratio does not conflict with the institution's obligations under this Directive and under Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, having regard in particular to the institution's own funds obligations;
  - the institution shall, without delay, inform the competent authority of the decisions taken by its shareholders or owners or members, including any approved higher maximum ratio pursuant to the first subparagraph of this point, and the competent authorities shall use the information received to benchmark the practices of institutions in that regard. The competent authorities shall provide EBA with that information and EBA shall publish it on an aggregate home Member State basis in a common reporting format. EBA may elaborate guidelines to facilitate the implementation of this indent and to ensure the consistency of the information collected;
  - staff who are directly concerned by the higher maximum levels of variable remuneration referred to in this point shall not, where applicable, be allowed to exercise, directly or indirectly, any voting rights they may have as shareholders or owners or members of the institution;
3. Member States may allow institutions to apply the discount rate referred to in the second subparagraph of this point to a maximum of 25 % of total variable remuneration provided it is paid in instruments that are deferred for a period of not less than five years. Member States may set a lower maximum percentage.
EBA shall prepare and publish, by 31 March 2014, guidelines on the applicable notional discount rate taking into account all relevant factors including inflation rate and risk, which includes length of deferral. The EBA guidelines on the discount rate shall specifically consider how to incentivise the use of instruments which are deferred for a period of not less than five years;
h
payments relating to the early termination of a contract reflect performance achieved over time and do not reward failure or misconduct;
i
remuneration packages relating to compensation or buy out from contracts in previous employment must align with the long-term interests of the institution including retention, deferral, performance and clawback arrangements;
j
the measurement of performance used to calculate variable remuneration components or pools of variable remuneration components includes an adjustment for all types of current and future risks and takes into account the cost of the capital and the liquidity required;
k
the allocation of the variable remuneration components within the institution shall also take into account all types of current and future risks;
l
a substantial portion, and in any event at least 50 %, of any variable remuneration shall consist of a balance of the following:
1. shares or, subject to the legal structure of the institution concerned, equivalent ownership interests; or share-linked instruments or, subject to the legal structure of the institution concerned, equivalent non-cash instruments;
2. where possible, other instruments within the meaning of Article 52 or 63 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or other instruments which can be fully converted to Common Equity Tier 1 instruments or written down, that in each case adequately reflect the credit quality of the institution as a going concern and are appropriate to be used for the purposes of variable remuneration.
The instruments referred to in this point shall be subject to an appropriate retention policy designed to align incentives with the longer-term interests of the institution. Member States or their competent authorities may place restrictions on the types and designs of those instruments or prohibit certain instruments as appropriate. This point shall be applied to both the portion of the variable remuneration component deferred in accordance with point (m) and the portion of the variable remuneration component not deferred;
m
a substantial portion, and in any event at least 40 %, of the variable remuneration component is deferred over a period which is not less than four to five years and is correctly aligned with the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the staff member concerned. For members of the management body and senior management of institutions that are significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities, the deferral period should not be less than five years.
Remuneration payable under deferral arrangements shall vest no faster than on a pro-rata basis. In the case of a variable remuneration component of a particularly high amount, at least 60 % of the amount shall be deferred. The length of the deferral period shall be established in accordance with the business cycle, the nature of the business, its risks and the activities of the staff member concerned;
n
the variable remuneration, including the deferred portion, is paid or vests only if it is sustainable according to the financial situation of the institution as a whole, and justified on the basis of the performance of the institution, the business unit and the individual concerned.
Without prejudice to the general principles of national contract and labour law, the total variable remuneration shall generally be considerably contracted where subdued or negative financial performance of the institution occurs, taking into account both current remuneration and reductions in payouts of amounts previously earned, including through malus or clawback arrangements.
Up to 100 % of the total variable remuneration shall be subject to malus or clawback arrangements. Institutions shall set specific criteria for the application of malus and clawback. Such criteria shall in particular cover situations where the staff member:
1. participated in or was responsible for conduct which resulted in significant losses to the institution;
2. failed to meet appropriate standards of fitness and propriety;
o
the pension policy is in line with the business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the institution.
If the employee leaves the institution before retirement, discretionary pension benefits shall be held by the institution for a period of five years in the form of instruments referred to in point (l). Where an employee reaches retirement, discretionary pension benefits shall be paid to the employee in the form of instruments referred to in point (l) subject to a five-year retention period;
p
staff members are required to undertake not to use personal hedging strategies or remuneration- and liability-related insurance to undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements;
q
variable remuneration is not paid through vehicles or methods that facilitate the non-compliance with this Directive or Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
2
EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards to specify the classes of instruments that satisfy the conditions set out in point (l)(ii) of paragraph 1.
EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by
31 March 2014
.
For the purpose of identifying staff whose professional activities have a material impact on the institution's risk profile as referred to in Article 92(3), EBA shall develop draft regulatory technical standards setting out the criteria to define the following:
a
managerial responsibility and control functions;
b
material business unit and significant impact on the relevant business unit's risk profile; and
c
other categories of staff not expressly referred to in Article 92(3) whose professional activities have an impact on the institution's risk profile comparably as material as that of those categories of staff referred to therein.
EBA shall submit those draft regulatory technical standards to the Commission by
28 December 2019
.
Power is delegated to the Commission to supplement this Directive by adopting the regulatory technical standards referred to in this paragraph in accordance with Article 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
3
By way of derogation from paragraph 1, the requirements set out in points (l) and (m) and in the second paragraph of point (o) of that paragraph shall not apply to:
a
an institution that is not a large institution as defined in point (146) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and the value of the assets of which is on average and on an individual basis in accordance with this Directive and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 equal to or less than EUR 5 billion over the four-year period immediately preceding the current financial year;
b
a staff member whose annual variable remuneration does not exceed EUR
50 000
and does not represent more than one third of the staff member's total annual remuneration.
4
By way of derogation from point (a) of paragraph 3, a Member State may lower or increase the threshold referred to therein, provided that:
a
the institution in relation to which the Member State makes use of this provision is not a large institution as defined in point (146) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and, where the threshold is increased:
1. the institution meets the criteria set out in points (145)(c), (d) and (e) of Article 4(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013; and
2. the threshold does not exceed EUR 15 billion;
b
it is appropriate to modify the threshold in accordance with this paragraph taking into account the institution's nature, scope and complexity of its activities, its internal organisation or, if applicable, the characteristics of the group to which it belongs.
5
By way of derogation from point (b) of paragraph 3, a Member State may decide that staff members entitled to annual variable remuneration below the threshold and share referred to in that point shall not be subject to the exemption set out therein because of national market specificities in terms of remuneration practices or because of the nature of the responsibilities and job profile of those staff members.
6
By
28 June 2023
, the Commission, in close cooperation with EBA, shall review and report on the application of paragraphs 3 to 5 and shall submit that report to the European Parliament and to the Council together with a legislative proposal, if appropriate.
7
EBA shall issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, facilitating the implementation of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 and ensuring their consistent application.

Remuneration Committee
Article 95
1
Competent authorities shall ensure that institutions that are significant in terms of their size, internal organisation and the nature, the scope and the complexity of their activities establish a remuneration committee. The remuneration committee shall be constituted in such a way as to enable it to exercise competent and independent judgment on remuneration policies and practices and the incentives created for managing risk, capital and liquidity.
2
Competent authorities shall ensure that the remuneration committee is responsible for the preparation of decisions regarding remuneration, including those which have implications for the risk and risk management of the institution concerned and which are to be taken by the management body. The Chair and the members of the remuneration committee shall be members of the management body who do not perform any executive function in the institution concerned. If employee representation on the management body is provided for by national law, the remuneration committee shall include one or more employee representatives. When preparing such decisions, the remuneration committee shall take into account the long-term interests of shareholders, investors and other stakeholders in the institution and the public interest.

Maintenance of a website on corporate governance and remuneration
Article 96
Institutions that maintain a website shall explain there how they comply with the requirements of Articles 88 to 95.
Section III

Supervisory review and evaluation process

Supervisory review and evaluation
Article 97
1
Taking into account the technical criteria set out in Article 98, the competent authorities shall review the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by the institutions to comply with this Directive and Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and evaluate:
a
risks to which the institutions are or might be exposed;
(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c
risks revealed by stress testing taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of an institution's activities.
2
The scope of the review and evaluation referred to in paragraph 1 shall cover all requirements of this Directive and of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
3
On the basis of the review and evaluation referred to in paragraph 1, the competent authorities shall determine whether the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by institutions and the own funds and liquidity held by them ensure a sound management and coverage of their risks.
4
Competent authorities shall establish the frequency and intensity of the review and evaluation referred to in paragraph 1 having regard to the size, systemic importance, nature, scale and complexity of the activities of the institution concerned and taking into account the principle of proportionality. The review and evaluation shall be updated at least on an annual basis for institutions covered by the supervisory examination programme referred to in Article 99(2).
When conducting the review and evaluation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article, competent authorities shall apply the principle of proportionality in accordance with the criteria disclosed pursuant to point (c) of Article 143(1).
4a
Competent authorities may tailor the methodologies for the application of the review and evaluation referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article to take into account institutions with a similar risk profile, such as similar business models or geographical location of exposures. Such tailored methodologies may include risk-oriented benchmarks and quantitative indicators, shall allow for due consideration of the specific risks that each institution may be exposed to, and shall not affect the institution-specific nature of measures imposed in accordance with Article 104.
Where competent authorities use tailored methodologies pursuant to this paragraph, they shall notify EBA. EBA shall monitor supervisory practices and issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, specifying how similar risk profiles shall be assessed for the purposes of this paragraph and to ensure the consistent and proportionate application of methodologies across the Union that are tailored to similar institutions.
5
Member States shall ensure that where a review shows that an institution may pose systemic risk in accordance with Article 23 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 the competent authorities inform EBA without delay about the results of the review.
6
Where a review, in particular the evaluation of the governance arrangements, the business model, or the activities of an institution, gives competent authorities reasonable grounds to suspect that, in connection with that institution, money laundering or terrorist financing is being or has been committed or attempted, or there is increased risk thereof, the competent authority shall immediately notify EBA and the authority or body that supervises the institution in accordance with Directive (EU) 2015/849 and is competent for ensuring compliance with that Directive. In the event of potential increased risk of money laundering or terrorist financing, the competent authority and the authority or body that supervises the institution in accordance with Directive (EU) 2015/849 and is competent for ensuring compliance with that Directive shall liaise and notify their common assessment immediately to EBA. The competent authority shall take, as appropriate, measures in accordance with this Directive.

Technical criteria for the supervisory review and evaluation
Article 98
1
In addition to credit, market and operational risks, the review and evaluation performed by competent authorities pursuant to Article 97 shall include at least:
a
the results of the stress test carried out in accordance with Article 177 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 by institutions applying an internal ratings based approach;
b
the exposure to and management of concentration risk by institutions, including their compliance with the requirements set out in Part Four of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and Article 81 of this Directive;
c
the robustness, suitability and manner of application of the policies and procedures implemented by institutions for the management of the residual risk associated with the use of recognised credit risk mitigation techniques;
d
the extent to which the own funds held by an institution in respect of assets which it has securitised are adequate having regard to the economic substance of the transaction, including the degree of risk transfer achieved;
e
the exposure to, measurement and management of liquidity risk by institutions, including the development of alternative scenario analyses, the management of risk mitigants (in particular the level, composition and quality of liquidity buffers) and effective contingency plans;
f
the impact of diversification effects and how such effects are factored into the risk measurement system;
g
the results of stress tests carried out by institutions using an internal model to calculate market risk own funds requirements under Part Three, Title IV, Chapter 5 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
h
the geographical location of institutions' exposures;
i
the business model of the institution;
j
the assessment of systemic risk, in accordance with the criteria set out in Article 97.
2
For the purposes of point (e) of paragraph 1, the competent authorities shall regularly carry out a comprehensive assessment of the overall liquidity risk management by institutions and promote the development of sound internal methodologies. While conducting those reviews, the competent authorities shall have regard to the role played by institutions in the financial markets. The competent authorities in one Member State shall duly consider the potential impact of their decisions on the stability of the financial system in all other Member States concerned.
3
Competent authorities shall monitor whether an institution has provided implicit support to a securitisation. If an institution is found to have provided implicit support on more than one occasion the competent authority shall take appropriate measures reflective of the increased expectation that it will provide future support to its securitisation thus failing to achieve a significant transfer of risk.
4
For the purposes of the determination to be made under Article 97(3) of this Directive, competent authorities shall consider whether the valuation adjustments taken for positions or portfolios in the trading book, as set out in Article 105 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, enable the institution to sell or hedge out its positions within a short period without incurring material losses under normal market conditions.
5
The review and evaluation performed by competent authorities shall include the exposure of institutions to the interest rate risk arising from non-trading activities. Measures shall be required at least in the case of institutions whose economic value declines by more than 20 % of their own funds as a result of a sudden and unexpected change in interest rates of 200 basis points or such change as defined in the EBA guidelines.
6
The review and evaluation performed by competent authorities shall include the exposure of institutions to the risk of excessive leverage as reflected by indicators of excessive leverage, including the leverage ratio determined in accordance with Article 429 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. In determining the adequacy of the leverage ratio of institutions and of the arrangements, strategies, processes and mechanisms implemented by institutions to manage the risk of excessive leverage, competent authorities shall take into account the business model of those institutions.
7
The review and evaluation conducted by competent authorities shall include governance arrangements of institutions, their corporate culture and values, and the ability of members of the management body to perform their duties. In conducting that review and evaluation, competent authorities shall, at least, have access to agendas and supporting documents for meetings of the management body and its committees, and the results of the internal or external evaluation of performance of the management body.
8
EBA shall assess the potential inclusion in the review and evaluation performed by competent authorities of environmental, social and governance risks (ESG risks).
For the purposes of the first subparagraph, EBA's assessment shall comprise at least the following:
a
the development of a uniform definition of ESG risks, including physical risks and transition risks; the latter shall comprise the risks related to the depreciation of assets due to regulatory changes;
b
the development of appropriate qualitative and quantitative criteria for the assessment of the impact of ESG risks on the financial stability of institutions in the short, medium and long term; such criteria shall include stress testing processes and scenario analyses to assess the impact of ESG risks under scenarios with different severities;
c
the arrangements, processes, mechanisms and strategies to be implemented by the institutions to identify, assess and manage ESG risks;
d
the analysis methods and tools to assess the impact of ESG risks on lending and financial intermediation activities of institutions.
EBA shall submit a report on its findings to the Commission, the European Parliament and to the Council by
28 June 2021
.
On the basis of the outcome of its report, EBA may, if appropriate, issue guidelines, in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, regarding the uniform inclusion of ESG risks in the supervisory review and evaluation process performed by competent authorities.

Supervisory examination programme
Article 99
1
The competent authorities shall, at least annually, adopt a supervisory examination programme for the institutions they supervise. Such programme shall take into account the supervisory review and evaluation process under Article 97. It shall contain the following:
a
an indication of how competent authorities intend to carry out their tasks and allocate their resources;
b
an identification of which institutions are intended to be subject to enhanced supervision and the measures taken for such supervision as set out in paragraph 3;
c
a plan for inspections at the premises used by an institution, including its branches and subsidiaries established in other Member States in accordance with Articles 52, 119 and 122.
2
Supervisory examination programmes shall include the following institutions:
a
institutions for which the results of the stress tests referred to in points (a) and (g) of Article 98(1) and Article 100, or the outcome of the supervisory review and evaluation process under Article 97, indicate significant risks to their ongoing financial soundness or indicate breaches of national provisions transposing this Directive and of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
c
any other institution for which the competent authorities deem it to be necessary.
3
Where appropriate under Article 97 the following measures shall, in particular, be taken if necessary:
a
an increase in the number or frequency of on-site inspections of the institution;
b
a permanent presence of the competent authority at the institution;
c
additional or more frequent reporting by the institution;
d
additional or more frequent review of the operational, strategic or business plans of the institution;
e
thematic examinations monitoring specific risks that are likely to materialise.
4
Adoption of a supervisory examination programme by the competent authority of the home Member State shall not prevent the competent authorities of the host Member State from carrying out, on a case-by-case basis, on-the-spot checks and inspections of the activities carried out by branches of institutions on their territory in accordance with Article 52(3).

Supervisory stress testing
Article 100
1
The competent authorities shall carry out as appropriate but at least annually supervisory stress tests on institutions they supervise, to facilitate the review and evaluation process under Article 97.
2
EBA shall issue guidelines in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 to ensure that common methodologies are used by the competent authorities when conducting annual supervisory stress tests.

Ongoing review of the permission to use internal approaches
Article 101
1
Competent authorities shall review on a regular basis, and at least every 3 years, institutions' compliance with the requirements regarding approaches that require permission by the competent authorities before using such approaches for the calculation of own funds requirements in accordance with Part Three of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013. They shall have particular regard to changes in an institution's business and to the implementation of those approaches to new products. Where material deficiencies are identified in risk capture by an institution's internal approach, competent authorities shall ensure they are rectified or take appropriate steps to mitigate their consequences, including by imposing higher multiplication factors, or imposing capital add-ons, or taking other appropriate and effective measures.
2
The competent authorities shall in particular review and assess whether the institution uses well developed and up-to-date techniques and practices for those approaches.
3
If for an internal market risk model numerous overshootings referred to in Article 366 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 indicate that the model is not or is no longer sufficiently accurate, the competent authorities shall revoke the permission for using the internal model or impose appropriate measures to ensure that the model is improved promptly.
4
If an institution has received permission to apply an approach that requires permission by the competent authorities before using such an approach for the calculation of own funds requirements in accordance with Part Three of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 but does not meet the requirements for applying that approach anymore, the competent authorities shall require the institution to either demonstrate to the satisfaction of the competent authorities that the effect of non-compliance is immaterial where applicable in accordance with Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 or present a plan for the timely restoration of compliance with the requirements and set a deadline for its implementation. The competent authorities shall require improvements to that plan if it is unlikely to result in full compliance or if the deadline is inappropriate. If the institution is unlikely to be able to restore compliance within an appropriate deadline and, where applicable, has not satisfactorily demonstrated that the effect of non-compliance is immaterial, the permission to use the approach shall be revoked or limited to compliant areas or those where compliance can be achieved within an appropriate deadline.
5
In order to promote consistent soundness of internal approaches in the Union, EBA shall analyse internal approaches across institutions, including the consistency of implementation of the definition of default and how those institutions treat similar risks or exposures.
EBA shall develop guidelines in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010, which contain benchmarks on the basis of that analysis.
Competent authorities shall take into account that analysis and those benchmarks for the review of the permissions they grant to institutions to use internal approaches.
Section IV

Supervisory measures and powers

Supervisory measures
Article 102
1
Competent authorities shall require an institution to take the necessary measures at an early stage to address relevant problems in the following circumstances:
a
the institution does not meet the requirements of this Directive or of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
b
the competent authorities have evidence that the institution is likely to breach the requirements of this Directive or of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 within the following 12 months.
2
For the purposes of paragraph 1, the powers of competent authorities shall include those referred to in Article 104.

Application of supervisory measures to institutions with similar risk profiles
Article 103 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Supervisory powers
Article 104
1
For the purposes of Article 97, Article 98(4) and (5), Article 101(4) and Article 102 of this Directive and of the application of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, competent authorities shall have at least the power to:
a
require institutions to have additional own funds in excess of the requirements set out in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, under the conditions set out in Article 104a of this Directive;
b
require the reinforcement of the arrangements, processes, mechanisms and strategies implemented in accordance with Articles 73 and 74;
c
require institutions to submit a plan to restore compliance with supervisory requirements pursuant to this Directive and to Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and set a deadline for its implementation, including improvements to that plan regarding scope and deadline;
d
require institutions to apply a specific provisioning policy or treatment of assets in terms of own funds requirements;
e
restrict or limit the business, operations or network of institutions or to request the divestment of activities that pose excessive risks to the soundness of an institution;
f
require the reduction of the risk inherent in the activities, products and systems of institutions, including outsourced activities;
g
require institutions to limit variable remuneration as a percentage of net revenues where it is inconsistent with the maintenance of a sound capital base;
h
require institutions to use net profits to strengthen own funds;
i
restrict or prohibit distributions or interest payments by an institution to shareholders, members or holders of Additional Tier 1 instruments where the prohibition does not constitute an event of default of the institution;
j
impose additional or more frequent reporting requirements, including reporting on own funds, liquidity and leverage;
k
impose specific liquidity requirements, including restrictions on maturity mismatches between assets and liabilities;
l
require additional disclosures.
2
For the purposes of point (j) of paragraph 1, competent authorities may only impose additional or more frequent reporting requirements on institutions where the relevant requirement is appropriate and proportionate with regard to the purpose for which the information is required and the information requested is not duplicative.
For the purposes of Articles 97 to 102, any additional information that may be required from institutions shall be deemed as duplicative where the same or substantially the same information has already been otherwise reported to the competent authority or may be produced by the competent authority.
The competent authority shall not require an institution to report additional information where it has previously received it in a different format or level of granularity and that different format or granularity does not prevent the competent authority from producing information of the same quality and reliability as that produced on the basis of the additional information that would be otherwise reported.
3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Additional own funds requirement
Article 104a
1
Competent authorities shall impose the additional own funds requirement referred to in point (a) of Article 104(1) where, on the basis of the reviews carried out in accordance with Articles 97 and 101, they determine any of the following situations for an individual institution:
a
the institution is exposed to risks or elements of risk that are not covered or not sufficiently covered, as specified in paragraph 2 of this Article, by the own funds requirements set out in Parts Three, Four and Seven of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 of the European Parliament and of the Council ;
b
the institution does not meet the requirements set out in Articles 73 and 74 of this Directive or in Article 393 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and it is unlikely that other supervisory measures would be sufficient to ensure that those requirements can be met within an appropriate timeframe;
c
the adjustments referred to in Article 98(4) are deemed to be insufficient to enable the institution to sell or hedge out its positions within a short period without incurring material losses under normal market conditions;
d
the evaluation carried out in accordance with Article 101(4) reveals that the non-compliance with the requirements for the application of the permitted approach will likely lead to inadequate own funds requirements;
e
the institution repeatedly fails to establish or maintain an adequate level of additional own funds to cover the guidance communicated in accordance with Article 104b(3);
f
other institution-specific situations deemed by the competent authority to raise material supervisory concerns.
The competent authorities shall only impose the additional own funds requirement referred to in point (a) of Article 104(1) to cover the risks incurred by individual institutions due to their activities, including those reflecting the impact of certain economic and market developments on the risk profile of an individual institution.
2
For the purposes of point (a) of paragraph 1 of this Article, risks or elements of risk shall only be considered as not covered or not sufficiently covered by the own funds requirements set out in Parts Three, Four and Seven of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 where the amounts, types and distribution of capital considered adequate by the competent authority, taking into account the supervisory review of the assessment carried out by institutions in accordance with the first paragraph of Article 73 of this Directive, are higher than the own funds requirements set out in Parts Three, Four and Seven of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.
For the purposes of the first subparagraph, competent authorities shall assess, taking into account the risk profile of each individual institution, the risks to which the institution is exposed, including:
a
institution-specific risks or elements of such risks that are explicitly excluded from or not explicitly addressed by the own funds requirements set out in Parts Three, Four and Seven of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402;
b
institution-specific risks or elements of such risks likely to be underestimated despite compliance with the applicable requirements set out in Parts Three, Four and Seven of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.
To the extent that risks or elements of risk are subject to transitional arrangements or grandfathering provisions laid down in this Directive or in Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, they shall not be considered risks or elements of such risks likely to be underestimated despite compliance with the applicable requirements set out in Parts Three, Four and Seven of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.
For the purposes of the first subparagraph, the capital considered adequate shall cover all risks or elements of risks identified as material pursuant to the assessment laid down in the second subparagraph of this paragraph that are not covered or not sufficiently covered by the own funds requirements set out in Parts Three, Four and Seven of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.
Interest rate risk arising from non-trading book positions may be considered material at least in the cases referred to in Article 98(5), unless the competent authorities, in performing the review and evaluation, come to the conclusion that the institution's management of interest rate risk arising from non-trading book activities is adequate and that the institution is not excessively exposed to interest rate risk arising from non-trading book activities.
3
Where additional own funds are required to address risks other than the risk of excessive leverage not sufficiently covered by point (d) of Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, competent authorities shall determine the level of the additional own funds required under point (a) of paragraph 1 of this Article as the difference between the capital considered adequate pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article and the relevant own funds requirements set out in Parts Three and Four of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402.
Where additional own funds are required to address the risk of excessive leverage not sufficiently covered by point (d) of Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, competent authorities shall determine the level of the additional own funds required under point (a) of paragraph 1 of this Article as the difference between the capital considered adequate pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article and the relevant own funds requirements set out in Parts Three and Seven of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
4
The institution shall meet the additional own funds requirement imposed by the competent authority under point (a) of Article 104(1) to address risks other than the risk of excessive leverage with own funds that satisfy the following conditions:
a
at least three quarters of the additional own funds requirement shall be met with Tier 1 capital;
b
at least three quarters of the Tier 1 capital referred to in point (a) shall be composed of Common Equity Tier 1 capital.
The institution shall meet the additional own funds requirement imposed by the competent authority under point (a) of Article 104(1) to address the risk of excessive leverage with Tier 1 capital.
By way of derogation from the first and the second subparagraphs, the competent authority may require the institution to meet its additional own funds requirement with a higher portion of Tier 1 capital or Common Equity Tier 1 capital, where necessary, and having regard to the specific circumstances of the institution.
Own funds that are used to meet the additional own funds requirement referred to in point (a) of Article 104(1) of this Directive imposed by competent authorities to address risks other than the risk of excessive leverage shall not be used to meet any of the following:
a
own funds requirements set out in points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
b
the combined buffer requirement;
c
the guidance on additional own funds referred to in Article 104b(3) of this Directive where that guidance addresses risks other than the risk of excessive leverage.
Own funds that are used to meet the additional own funds requirement referred to in point (a) of Article 104(1) of this Directive imposed by competent authorities to address the risk of excessive leverage not sufficiently covered by point (d) of Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 shall not be used to meet any of the following:
a
the own funds requirement set out in point (d) of Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
b
the leverage ratio buffer requirement referred to in Article 92(1a) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
c
the guidance on additional own funds referred to in Article 104b(3) of this Directive, where that guidance addresses risks of excessive leverage.
5
The competent authority shall duly justify in writing to each institution the decision to impose an additional own funds requirement under point (a) of Article 104(1), at least by giving a clear account of the full assessment of the elements referred to in paragraphs 1 to 4 of this Article. That justification shall include, in the case set out in point (e) of paragraph 1 of this Article, a specific statement of the reasons for which the imposition of guidance on additional own funds is no longer considered sufficient.

Guidance on additional own funds
Article 104b
1
Pursuant to the strategies and processes referred to in Article 73, institutions shall set their internal capital at an adequate level of own funds that is sufficient to cover all the risks that an institution is exposed to and to ensure that the institution's own funds can absorb potential losses resulting from stress scenarios, including those identified under the supervisory stress test referred to in Article 100.
2
Competent authorities shall regularly review the level of the internal capital set by each institution in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article as part of the reviews and evaluations performed in accordance with Articles 97 and 101, including the results of the stress tests referred to in Article 100.
Pursuant to that review, competent authorities shall determine for each institution the overall level of own funds they consider appropriate.
3
Competent authorities shall communicate their guidance on additional own funds, to institutions.
The guidance on additional own funds shall be the own funds exceeding the relevant amount of own funds required pursuant to Parts Three, Four and Seven of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, point (a) of Article 104(1) and point (6) of Article 128 of this Directive or pursuant to Article 92(1a) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, as relevant, which are needed to reach the overall level of own funds considered appropriate by the competent authorities pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article.
4
Competent authorities' guidance on additional own funds pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article shall be institution-specific. The guidance may cover risks addressed by the additional own funds requirement imposed pursuant to point (a) of Article 104(1) only to the extent that it covers aspects of those risks that are not already covered under that requirement.
5
Own funds that are used to meet the guidance on additional own funds communicated in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article to address risks other than the risk of excessive leverage shall not be used to meet any of the following:
a
the own funds requirements set out in points (a), (b) and (c) of Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013;
b
the requirement laid down in Article 104a of this Directive imposed by competent authorities to address risks other than the risk of excessive leverage and the combined buffer requirement.
Own funds that are used to meet the guidance on additional own funds communicated in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article to address the risk of excessive leverage shall not be used to meet the own funds requirement set out in point (d) of Article 92(1) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, the requirement laid down in Article 104a of this Directive imposed by competent authorities to address the risk of excessive leverage and the leverage ratio buffer requirement referred to in Article 92(1a) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
6
Failure to meet the guidance referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article where an institution meets the relevant own funds requirements set out in Parts Three, Four and Seven of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 and in Chapter 2 of Regulation (EU) 2017/2402, the relevant additional own funds requirement referred to in point (a) of Article 104(1) of this Directive and, as relevant, the combined buffer requirement or the leverage ratio buffer requirement referred to in Article 92(1a) of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 shall not trigger the restrictions referred to in Article 141 or 141b of this Directive.

Cooperation with resolution authorities
Article 104c
Competent authorities shall notify the relevant resolution authorities of the additional own funds requirement imposed on institutions pursuant to point (a) of Article 104(1) and of any guidance on additional own funds communicated to institutions in accordance with Article 104b(3).

Specific liquidity requirements
Article 105
For the purposes of determining the appropriate level of liquidity requirements on the basis of the review and evaluation carried out in accordance with Section III, the competent authorities shall assess whether any imposition of a specific liquidity requirement is necessary to capture liquidity risks to which an institution is or might be exposed, taking into account the following:
1. the particular business model of the institution;
2. the institution's arrangements, processes and mechanisms referred to in Section II and in particular in Article 86;
3. the outcome of the review and evaluation carried out in accordance with Article 97.
. . . . .
In particular, without prejudice to Article 67, competent authorities should consider the need to apply administrative penalties or other administrative measures, including prudential charges, the level of which broadly relates to the disparity between the actual liquidity position of an institution and any liquidity and stable funding requirements established at national or Union level.

Specific publication requirements
Article 106
1
Member States shall empower the competent authorities to require institutions:
a
to publish information referred to in Part Eight of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 more than once per year, and to set deadlines for publication;
b
to use specific media and locations for publications other than the financial statements.
2
Member States shall empower competent authorities to require parent undertakings to publish annually, either in full or by way of references to equivalent information, a description of their legal structure and governance and organisational structure of the group of institutions in accordance with Article 14(3), Article 74(1) and Article 109(2).

Consistency of supervisory reviews, evaluations and supervisory measures
Article 107
1
Competent authorities shall inform EBA of:
a
the functioning of their review and evaluation process referred to in Article 97;
b
the methodology used to base decisions referred to in Articles 98, 100, 101, 102, 104 and 105 on the process referred to in point (a).
EBA shall assess the information provided by competent authorities for the purposes of developing consistency in the supervisory review and evaluation process. It may request additional information from competent authorities in order to complete its assessment, on a proportional basis in accordance with Article 35 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
2
EBA shall annually report to the European Parliament and the Council on the degree of convergence of the application of this Chapter between Member States.
In order to increase the degree of such convergence, EBA shall conduct peer reviews in accordance with Article 30 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010.
3
EBA shall issue guidelines addressed to the competent authorities in accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 to further specify, in a manner that is appropriate to the size, the structure and the internal organisation of institutions and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities, the common procedures and methodologies for the supervisory review and evaluation process referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article and in Article 97 and for the assessment of the organisation and treatment of the risks referred to in Articles 76 to 87, in particular relating to concentration risk in accordance with Article 81.
Section V

Level of application

Internal capital adequacy assessment process
Article 108
1
Competent authorities shall require every institution which is neither a subsidiary in the Member State where it is authorised and supervised, nor a parent undertaking, and every institution not included in the consolidation pursuant to Article 19 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, to meet the obligations set out in Article 73 of this Directive on an individual basis.
Competent authorities may waive the requirements set out in Article 73 of this Directive in regard to a credit institution in accordance with Article 10 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
Where the competent authorities waive the application of own funds requirements on a consolidated basis provided for in Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, the requirements of Article 73 of this Directive shall apply on an individual basis.
2
Competent authorities shall require parent institutions in a Member State, to the extent and in the manner prescribed in Part One, Title II, Chapter 2, Sections 2 and 3 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 to meet the obligations set out in Article 73 of this Directive on a consolidated basis.
3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4
Competent authorities shall require subsidiary institutions to apply the requirements set out in Article 73 on a sub-consolidated basis if those institutions, or the parent undertaking where it is a financial holding company or mixed financial holding company, have an institution or a financial institution or an asset management company as defined in Article 2(5) of Directive 2002/87/EC as a subsidiary in a third country, or hold a participation in such an undertaking.

Institutions' arrangements, processes and mechanisms
Article 109
1
Competent authorities shall require institutions to meet the obligations set out in Section II of this Chapter on an individual basis, unless competent authorities make use of the derogation provided for in Article 7 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013.
2
Competent authorities shall require the parent undertakings and subsidiaries subject to this Directive to meet the obligations set out in Section II of this Chapter on a consolidated or sub-consolidated basis, to ensure that the arrangements, processes and mechanisms required by Section II of this Chapter are consistent and well-integrated and that any data and information relevant to the purpose of supervision can be produced. In particular, they shall ensure that parent undertakings and subsidiaries subject to this Directive implement those arrangements, processes and mechanisms in their subsidiaries not subject to this Directive, including those established in offshore financial centres. Those arrangements, processes and mechanisms shall also be consistent and well-integrated and those subsidiaries shall also be able to produce any data and information relevant to the purpose of supervision. Subsidiary undertakings that are not themselves subject to this Directive shall comply with their sector-specific requirements on an individual basis.
3
Obligations resulting from Section II of this Chapter concerning subsidiary undertakings that are not themselves subject to this Directive shall not apply if the EU parent institution can demonstrate to the competent authorities that the application of Section II is unlawful under the laws of the third country where the subsidiary is established.
4
The remuneration requirements laid down in Articles 92, 94 and 95 shall not apply on a consolidated basis to either of the following:
a
subsidiary undertakings established in the Union where they are subject to specific remuneration requirements in accordance with other Union legal acts;
b
subsidiary undertakings established in a third country where they would be subject to specific remuneration requirements in accordance with other Union legal acts if they were established in the Union.
5
By way of derogation from paragraph 4 of this Article, and in order to avoid circumvention of the rules set out in Articles 92, 94 and 95, Member States shall ensure that the requirements laid down in Articles 92, 94 and 95 apply to members of staff of subsidiaries that are not subject to this Directive on an individual basis where:
a
the subsidiary is either an asset management company, or an undertaking that provides the investment services and activities listed in points (2), (3), (4), (6) and (7) of Section A of Annex I to Directive 2014/65/EU; and
b
those members of staff have been mandated to perform professional activities that have a direct material impact on the risk profile or the business of the institutions within the group.
6
Notwithstanding paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article, Member States may apply Articles 92, 94 and 95 on a consolidated basis to a broader scope of subsidiary undertakings and their staff.

Review and evaluation and supervisory measures
Article 110
1
Competent authorities shall apply the review and evaluation process referred to in Section III of this Chapter and the supervisory measures referred to in Section IV of this Chapter in accordance with the level of application of the requirements of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 set out in Part One, Title II of that Regulation.
2
Where the competent authorities waive the application of own funds requirements on a consolidated basis as provided for in Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013, the requirements of Article 97 of this Directive shall apply to the supervision of investment firms on an individual basis.
OJ L 120, 15.5.2009, p. 22.
Commission Directive 2006/73/EC of 10 August 2006 implementing Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards organisational requirements and operating conditions for investment firms and defined terms for the purposes of that Directive (OJ L 241, 2.9.2006, p. 26).
Regulation (EU) 2017/2402 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
12 December 2017
laying down a general framework for securitisation and creating a specific framework for simple, transparent and standardised securitisation, and amending Directives 2009/65/EC, 2009/138/EC and 2011/61/EU and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 648/2012 (
OJ L 347, 28.12.2017, p. 35
).
Substituted by Directive (EU) 2019/878 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards exempted entities, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies, remuneration, supervisory measures and powers and capital conservation measures (Text with EEA relevance).
Inserted by Directive (EU) 2019/878 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards exempted entities, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies, remuneration, supervisory measures and powers and capital conservation measures (Text with EEA relevance).
Substituted by Corrigendum to Directive (EU) 2019/878 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards exempted entities, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies, remuneration, supervisory measures and powers and capital conservation measures (Official Journal of the European Union L 150 of 7 June 2019).
Deleted by Directive (EU) 2019/878 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 2019 amending Directive 2013/36/EU as regards exempted entities, financial holding companies, mixed financial holding companies, remuneration, supervisory measures and powers and capital conservation measures (Text with EEA relevance).