CHAPTER III

OBLIGATIONS REGARDING MANAGEMENT COMPANIES
SECTION 3

Operating conditions
Article 10
1
The competent authorities of the management company’s home Member State shall require that the management company which they have authorised complies at all times with the conditions laid down in Article 6 and Article 7(1) and (2).
The own funds of a management company shall not fall below the level specified in Article 7(1)(a). If they do, however, the competent authorities may, where the circumstances so justify, allow such firms a limited period in which to rectify their situations or cease their activities.
2
The prudential supervision of a management company shall be the responsibility of the competent authorities of the management company’s home Member State, whether the management company establishes a branch or provides services in another Member State or not, without prejudice to those provisions of this Directive which confer responsibility to the competent authorities of a management company’s host Member State.
Article 11
1
Qualifying holdings in management companies shall be subject to the same rules as those laid down in Articles 10, 10a and 10b of Directive 2004/39/EC.
2
For the purposes of this Directive, the terms ‘investment firm’ and ‘investment firms’ referred to in Article 10 of Directive 2004/39/EC, mean, respectively, ‘management company’ and ‘management companies’.
3
In order to ensure consistent harmonisation of this Directive, ESMA may develop draft regulatory technical standards to establish an exhaustive list of information, as provided for in this Article, with reference to Article 10b(4) of Directive 2004/39/EC, to be included by proposed acquirers in their notification, without prejudice to Article 10a(2) of that Directive.
Power is delegated to the Commission to adopt the regulatory technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Articles 10 to 14 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
In order to ensure uniform conditions of application of this Article, ESMA may develop draft implementing technical standards to establish standard forms, templates and procedures for the modalities of the consultation process between the relevant competent authorities, as provided for in this Article, with reference to Article 10(4) of Directive 2004/39/EC.
Power is conferred to the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the third subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Article 12
1
Each Member State shall draw up prudential rules which management companies authorised in that Member State, with regard to the activity of management of UCITS authorised according to this Directive, shall observe at all times.
In particular, the competent authorities of the management company’s home Member State, having regard also to the nature of the UCITS managed by a management company, shall require that each such company:
a
has sound administrative and accounting procedures, control and safeguard arrangements for electronic data processing and adequate internal control mechanisms including, in particular, rules for personal transactions by its employees or for the holding or management of investments in financial instruments in order to invest on its own account and ensuring, at least, that each transaction involving the UCITS may be reconstructed according to its origin, the parties to it, its nature, and the time and place at which it was effected and that the assets of the UCITS managed by the management company are invested according to the fund rules or the instruments of incorporation and the legal provisions in force;
b
is structured and organised in such a way as to minimise the risk of UCITS’ or clients’ interests being prejudiced by conflicts of interest between the company and its clients, between two of its clients, between one of its clients and a UCITS, or between two UCITS.
2
Each management company the authorisation of which also covers the discretionary portfolio management service referred to in Article 6(3)(a) shall:
a
not be permitted to invest all or a part of the investor’s portfolio in units of collective investment undertakings it manages, unless it receives prior general approval from the client;
b
be subject with regard to the services referred to in Article 6(3) to the provisions laid down in Directive 97/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 March 1997 on investor-compensation schemes .
3
Without prejudice to Article 116, the Commission shall adopt, by means of delegated acts
in accordance with Article 112a
, measures specifying the procedures and arrangements as referred to under point (a) of the second subparagraph of paragraph 1 and the structures and organisational requirements to minimise conflicts of interests as referred to under point (b) of the second subparagraph of paragraph 1.
. . . . .
4
In order to ensure uniform conditions of application of this Article, ESMA may develop draft implementing technical standards to determine the conditions of applications of the delegated acts adopted by the Commission regarding the procedures, arrangements, structures and organisational requirements referred to in paragraph 3.
Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Article 13
1
If the law of the management company’s home Member State allows management companies to delegate to third parties for the purpose of a more efficient conduct of the companies’ business, to carry out on their behalf one or more of their own functions, all of the following preconditions shall be complied with:
a
the management company must inform the competent authorities of its home Member State in an appropriate manner; the competent authorities of the management company’s home Member State must, without delay, transmit the information to the competent authorities of the UCITS home Member State;
b
the mandate must not prevent the effectiveness of supervision over the management company, and, in particular, must not prevent the management company from acting, or the UCITS from being managed, in the best interests of its investors;
c
when the delegation concerns the investment management, the mandate must be given only to undertakings which are authorised or registered for the purpose of asset management and subject to prudential supervision; the delegation must be in accordance with investment-allocation criteria periodically laid down by the management companies;
d
where the mandate concerns the investment management and is given to a third-country undertaking, cooperation between the supervisory authorities concerned must be ensured;
e
a mandate with regard to the core function of investment management must not be given to the depositary or to any other undertaking whose interests may conflict with those of the management company or the unit-holders;
f
measures must exist which enable the persons who conduct the business of the management company to monitor effectively at any time the activity of the undertaking to which the mandate is given;
g
the mandate must not prevent the persons who conduct the business of the management company from giving further instructions to the undertaking to which functions are delegated at any time or from withdrawing the mandate with immediate effect when this is in the interest of investors;
h
having regard to the nature of the functions to be delegated, the undertaking to which functions will be delegated must be qualified and capable of undertaking the functions in question; and
i
the UCITS’ prospectuses must list the functions which the management company has been allowed to delegate in accordance with this Article.
2
The liability of the management company or the depositary shall not be affected by delegation by the management company of any functions to third parties. The management company shall not delegate its functions to the extent that it becomes a letter-box entity.
Article 14
1
Each Member State shall draw up rules of conduct which management companies authorised in that Member State shall observe at all times. Such rules shall implement at least the principles set out in this paragraph. Those principles shall ensure that a management company:
a
acts honestly and fairly in conducting its business activities in the best interests of the UCITS it manages and the integrity of the market;
b
acts with due skill, care and diligence, in the best interests of the UCITS it manages and the integrity of the market;
c
has and employs effectively the resources and procedures that are necessary for the proper performance of its business activities;
d
tries to avoid conflicts of interests and, when they cannot be avoided, ensures that the UCITS it manages are fairly treated; and
e
complies with all regulatory requirements applicable to the conduct of its business activities so as to promote the best interests of its investors and the integrity of the market.
2
Without prejudice to Article 116, the Commission shall adopt, by means of delegated acts
in accordance with Article 112a
, measures with a view to ensuring that the management company complies with the duties set out in paragraph 1, in particular to:
a
establish appropriate criteria for acting honestly and fairly and with due skill, care and diligence in the best interests of the UCITS;
b
specify the principles required to ensure that management companies employ effectively the resources and procedures that are necessary for the proper performance of their business activities; and
c
define the steps that management companies might reasonably be expected to take to identify, prevent, manage or disclose conflicts of interest as well as to establish appropriate criteria for determining the types of conflicts of interest whose existence may damage the interests of the UCITS.
Those measures, designed to amend non-essential elements of this Directive by supplementing it, shall be adopted in accordance with the regulatory procedure with scrutiny referred to in Article 112(2).
3
In order to ensure uniform conditions of application of this Article, ESMA may develop draft implementing technical standards to determine the delegated acts adopted by the Commission regarding the criteria, principles and steps referred to in paragraph 2.
Power is conferred on the Commission to adopt the implementing technical standards referred to in the first subparagraph in accordance with Article 15 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010.
Article 14a
1
Member States shall require management companies to establish and apply remuneration policies and practices that are consistent with, and promote, sound and effective risk management and that neither encourage risk taking which is inconsistent with the risk profiles, rules or instruments of incorporation of the UCITS that they manage nor impair compliance with the management company’s duty to act in the best interest of the UCITS.
2
The remuneration policies and practices shall include fixed and variable components of salaries and discretionary pension benefits.
3
The remuneration policies and practices shall apply to those categories of staff, including senior management, risk takers, control functions and any employee receiving total remuneration that falls within the remuneration bracket of senior management and risk takers whose professional activities have a material impact on the risk profiles of the management companies or of the UCITS that they manage.
4
In accordance with Article 16 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, ESMA shall issue guidelines addressed to competent authorities or to financial market participants concerning the persons referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article and the application of the principles referred to in Article 14b. Those guidelines shall take into account the principles on sound remuneration policies set out in Commission Recommendation 2009/384/EC
, the size of the management company and the size of the UCITS that they manage, their internal organisation, and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities. In the process of the development of those guidelines, ESMA shall cooperate closely with the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority) (
‘
EBA
’
), established by Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council
, in order to ensure consistency with requirements developed for other financial services sectors, in particular credit institutions and investment firms.
Article 14b
1
When establishing and applying the remuneration policies referred to in Article 14a, management companies shall comply with the following principles in a way and to the extent that is appropriate to their size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities:
a
the remuneration policy is consistent with and promotes sound and effective risk management and does not encourage risk taking which is inconsistent with the risk profiles, rules or instruments of incorporation of the UCITS that the management company manages;
b
the remuneration policy is in line with the business strategy, objectives, values and interests of the management company and the UCITS that it manages and of the investors in such UCITS, and includes measures to avoid conflicts of interest;
c
the remuneration policy is adopted by the management body of the management company in its supervisory function, and that body adopts, and reviews at least annually, the general principles of the remuneration policy and is responsible for, and oversees, their implementation; the tasks referred to in this point shall be undertaken only by members of the management body who do not perform any executive functions in the management company concerned and who have expertise in risk management and remuneration;
d
the implementation of the remuneration policy is, at least annually, subject to central and independent internal review for compliance with policies and procedures for remuneration adopted by the management body in its supervisory function;
e
staff engaged in control functions are compensated in accordance with the achievement of the objectives linked to their functions, independently of the performance of the business areas that they control;
f
the remuneration of the senior officers in the risk management and compliance functions is overseen directly by the remuneration committee, where such a committee exists;
g
where remuneration is performance-related, the total amount of remuneration is based on a combination of the assessment as to the performance of the individual and of the business unit or UCITS concerned and as to their risks and of the overall results of the management company when assessing individual performance, taking into account financial and non-financial criteria;
h
the assessment of performance is set in a multi-year framework appropriate to the holding period recommended to the investors of the UCITS managed by the management company in order to ensure that the assessment process is based on the longer-term performance of the UCITS and its investment risks and that the actual payment of performance-based components of remuneration is spread over the same period;
i
guaranteed variable remuneration is exceptional, occurs only in the context of hiring new staff and is limited to the first year of engagement;
j
fixed and variable components of total remuneration are appropriately balanced and the fixed component represents a sufficiently high proportion of the total remuneration to allow the operation of a fully flexible policy on variable remuneration components, including the possibility to pay no variable remuneration component;
k
payments relating to the early termination of a contract reflect performance achieved over time and are designed in a way that does not reward failure;
l
the measurement of performance used to calculate variable remuneration components or pools of variable remuneration components includes a comprehensive adjustment mechanism to integrate all relevant types of current and future risks;
m
subject to the legal structure of the UCITS and its fund rules or instruments of incorporation, a substantial portion, and in any event at least 50 %, of any variable remuneration component consists of units of the UCITS concerned, equivalent ownership interests, or share-linked instruments or equivalent non-cash instruments with equally effective incentives as any of the instruments referred to in this point, unless the management of UCITS accounts for less than 50 % of the total portfolio managed by the management company, in which case the minimum of 50 % does not apply.
The instruments referred to in this point shall be subject to an appropriate retention policy designed to align incentives with the interests of the management company and the UCITS that it manages and the investors of such UCITS. Member States or their competent authorities may place restrictions on the types and designs of those instruments or ban certain instruments as appropriate. This point shall apply to both the portion of the variable remuneration component deferred in line with point (n) and the portion of the variable remuneration component not deferred;
n
a substantial portion, and in any event at least 40 %, of the variable remuneration component, is deferred over a period which is appropriate in view of the holding period recommended to the investors of the UCITS concerned and is correctly aligned with the nature of the risks of the UCITS in question.
The period referred to in this point shall be at least three years; remuneration payable under deferral arrangements vests no faster than on a pro-rata basis; in the case of a variable remuneration component of a particularly high amount, at least 60 % of the amount shall be deferred;
o
the variable remuneration, including the deferred portion, is paid or vests only if it is sustainable according to the financial situation of the management company as a whole, and justified according to the performance of the business unit, the UCITS and the individual concerned.
The total variable remuneration shall generally be considerably contracted where subdued or negative financial performance of the management company or of the UCITS concerned occurs, taking into account both current compensation and reductions in payouts of amounts previously earned, including through malus or clawback arrangements;
p
the pension policy is in line with the business strategy, objectives, values and long-term interests of the management company and the UCITS that it manages.
If the employee leaves the management company before retirement, discretionary pension benefits shall be held by the management company for a period of five years in the form of instruments referred to in point (m). In the case of an employee reaching retirement, discretionary pension benefits shall be paid to the employee in the form of instruments referred to in point (m), subject to a five-year retention period;
q
staff are required to undertake not to use personal hedging strategies or remuneration- and liability-related insurance to undermine the risk alignment effects embedded in their remuneration arrangements;
r
variable remuneration is not paid through vehicles or methods that facilitate the avoidance of the requirements laid down in this Directive.
2
In accordance with Article 35 of Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, ESMA may request information from competent authorities on the remuneration policies and practices referred to in Article 14a of this Directive.
ESMA shall, in close cooperation with EBA, include in its guidelines on remuneration policies provisions on how different sectoral remuneration principles, such as those set out in Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
and in Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
, are to be applied where employees or other categories of personnel perform services subject to different sectoral remuneration principles.
3
The principles set out in paragraph 1 shall apply to any benefit of any type paid by the management company, to any amount paid directly by the UCITS itself, including performance fees, and to any transfer of units or shares of the UCITS, made for the benefit of those categories of staff, including senior management, risk takers, control functions and any employee receiving total remuneration that falls into the remuneration bracket of senior management and risk takers, whose professional activities have a material impact on their risk profile or the risk profile of the UCITS that they manage.
4
Management companies that are significant in terms of their size or of the size of the UCITS that they manage, their internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of their activities shall establish a remuneration committee. The remuneration committee shall be constituted in a way that enables it to exercise competent and independent judgment on remuneration policies and practices and the incentives created for managing risk.
The remuneration committee that is, where appropriate, set up in accordance with the ESMA guidelines referred to in Article 14a(4) shall be responsible for the preparation of decisions regarding remuneration, including those which have implications for the risk and risk management of the management company or the UCITS concerned and which are to be taken by the management body in its supervisory function. The remuneration committee shall be chaired by a member of the management body who does not perform any executive functions in the management company concerned. The members of the remuneration committee shall be members of the management body who do not perform any executive functions in the management company concerned.
If employee representation on the management body is provided for by national law, the remuneration committee shall include one or more employee representatives. When preparing its decisions, the remuneration committee shall take into account the long-term interest of investors and other stakeholders and the public interest.
Article 15
Management companies or, where relevant, investment companies shall take measures in accordance with Article 92 and establish appropriate procedures and arrangements to ensure that they deal properly with investor complaints and that there are no restrictions on investors exercising their rights in the event that the management company is authorised in a Member State other than the UCITS home Member State. Those measures shall allow investors to file complaints in the official language or one of the official languages of their Member State.
Management companies shall also establish appropriate procedures and arrangements to make information available at the request of the public or the competent authorities of the UCITS home Member State.
OJ L 84, 26.3.1997, p. 22.
Commission Recommendation 2009/384/EC of
30 April 2009
on remuneration policies in the financial services sector (
OJ L 120, 15.5.2009, p. 22
).
Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
24 November 2010
establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC (
OJ L 331, 15.12.2010, p. 12
).
Directive 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
8 June 2011
on Alternative Investment Fund Managers and amending Directives 2003/41/EC and 2009/65/EC and Regulations (EC) No 1060/2009 and (EU) No 1095/2010 (
OJ L 174, 1.7.2011, p. 1
).
Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
26 June 2013
on access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC (
OJ L 176, 27.6.2013, p. 338
).
Substituted by Directive 2014/91/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 amending Directive 2009/65/EC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) as regards depositary functions, remuneration policies and sanctions (Text with EEA relevance).
Inserted by Directive 2014/91/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 amending Directive 2009/65/EC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) as regards depositary functions, remuneration policies and sanctions (Text with EEA relevance).
Inserted by Directive 2010/78/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending Directives 98/26/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2003/6/EC, 2003/41/EC, 2003/71/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2004/109/EC, 2005/60/EC, 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2009/65/EC in respect of the powers of the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) (Text with EEA relevance).
Substituted by Directive 2010/78/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending Directives 98/26/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2003/6/EC, 2003/41/EC, 2003/71/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2004/109/EC, 2005/60/EC, 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2009/65/EC in respect of the powers of the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) (Text with EEA relevance).
Deleted by Directive 2010/78/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending Directives 98/26/EC, 2002/87/EC, 2003/6/EC, 2003/41/EC, 2003/71/EC, 2004/39/EC, 2004/109/EC, 2005/60/EC, 2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2009/65/EC in respect of the powers of the European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), the European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) and the European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority) (Text with EEA relevance).
Substituted by Corrigendum to Directive 2014/91/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 amending Directive 2009/65/EC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS) as regards depositary functions, remuneration policies and sanctions (Official Journal of the European Union L 257 of 28 August 2014).