Commission Decision (EU) 2020/1671
of 2 August 2019
on State aid SA.47867 2018/C (ex 2017/FC) granted by France to Ryanair and Airport Marketing Services
(notified under document C(2019) 5729)
(Only the French text is authentic)
(Text with EEA relevance)
THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION,
Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular the first subparagraph of Article 108(2) thereof,
Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and in particular Article 62(1)(a) thereof,
Whereas:
By letter dated 24 May 2017, the Commission sent France a non-confidential version of the complaint and invited France to submit its comments and answer certain questions on the measures at issue. On 12 July 2017, the Commission sent a reminder asking France to provide the information requested by the letter of 24 May 2017.
France replied by letter dated 18 August 2017.
By letter dated 13 September 2017, the Commission asked France for further information. On 9 October 2017, France requested further time to reply, to which the Commission agreed by letter dated 18 October 2017.
By letter dated 22 November 2017, France provided some of the information requested by the Commission.
On 22 December 2017, the Commission sent a reminder asking France to provide the answers to the remaining questions.
France replied by letter dated 29 January 2018.
By letter dated 4 July 2018, the Commission notified France of its decision (‘the opening decision’) to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’) in respect of the aid.
The Commission received comments from Ryanair, the Region of Occitania, the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Hérault, the Montpellier local authority structure Montpellier Méditerranée Métropole, the Pays de l’Or local authority structure Communauté d’agglomération du Pays de l’Or, […] and the APFTE. On 15 April and 17 May 2019, the Commission sent Ryanair’s comments to France (with a request for information) and asked the latter to comment on them. The Commission received France’s comments by letter dated 13 June 2019 and the APFTE’s comments by letter dated 21 June 2019. The comments of the other interested parties were sent to France on 18 June 2019.
Montpellier Méditerranée airport (‘Montpellier airport’) lies approximately 7 km from the centre of Montpellier, which is the capital of the department of Hérault, in the Region of Occitania in France. The airport is open to domestic and international commercial traffic.
Table 1 | |||||||||
Commercial passenger traffic at Montpellier airport between 2010 and 2018 (number of passengers) | |||||||||
Year | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Local passengers4 | 1 177 860 | 1 308 346 | 1 285 428 | 1 420 614 | 1 444 110 | 1 507 928 | 1 669 023 | 1 847 314 | 1 878 035 |
Of which international passengers | 295 334 | 400 818 | 398 609 | 391 855 | 433 923 | 480 667 | 616 564 | 661 456 | 641 005 |
Of which domestic passengers | 882 526 | 907 528 | 886 819 | 1 028 759 | 1 010 187 | 1 027 261 | 1 052 459 | 1 185 858 | 1 237 030 |
Passengers in transit | 2 588 | 4 930 | 2 787 | 2 179 | 1 224 | 2 242 | 2 063 | 2 096 | 1 928 |
Total | 1 180 448 | 1 313 276 | 1 288 215 | 1 422 793 | 1 445 334 | 1 510 170 | 1 671 086 | 1 849 410 | 1 879 963 |
Of which low-cost airline passengers | 275 341 | 378 980 | 397 819 | 441 388 | 464 170 | 507 965 | 577 198 | 679 148 | 708 273 |
Source: http://www.aeroport.fr/view-statistiques/montpellier-mediterranee, visited on 1 July 2019. | |||||||||
Aside from these scheduled flights, other commercial movements at Montpellier airport during the 2010-2018 period mainly involved flying club and business flights.
Ryanair served Montpellier airport between March 2002 and April 2019.
Table 2 | ||||||||||
Ryanair’s share of commercial passenger traffic at Montpellier airport between 2010 and 2019 | ||||||||||
Year | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | January-April 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Total traffic at the airport by number of passengers8 | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] |
Ryanair passengers by number of passengers9 | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] |
— Hahn route | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] | |
— Charleroi route | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] |
— Bradford route | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] | […] | ||
— Birmingham route | […] | […] | […] | |||||||
Ryanair passengers as % of total passenger traffic | [5-10] | [10-15] | [10-15] | [5-10] | [5-10] | [5-10] | [5-10] | [5-10] | [0-5] | [0-5] |
Source: Information received from the French authorities. | ||||||||||
As apparent from Table 2, from 2010 onwards, the total number of Ryanair passengers flying to and from Montpellier airport accounted for only a relatively small share of the airport’s passenger traffic (less than [10-15] %), i.e. between […] and […] passengers between 2010 and 2017.
Montpellier airport lies 57 km from Nîmes-Alés-Camargue-Cévennes airport and 70 km from Béziers-Cap d’Agde airport, which both handle international scheduled and charter flights.
In April 2019, Ryanair launched a route to Brussels-Charleroi from Béziers-Cap d’Agde airport. Ryanair has been operating a route between Nîmes and Charleroi since April 2006.
The State owns the airport infrastructure and delegates its management and operation to AMM through a concession.
AMM and Ryanair concluded the following agreements: […].
The nature of these marketing agreements will be analysed in more depth in recitals 152 et seq. and recitals 189 et seq.
It is therefore clear from the minutes of the APFTE’s General Meeting that the association was regarded as ‘the structure best suited to meeting the legal requirements, and would boost the area’s development through this “low-cost” momentum’.
According to the APFTE’s constitution, the General Meeting approves the accounts for the previous financial year, votes on the budget for the next financial year, debates and votes on all items placed on the agenda, and where necessary renews the members of the Board. The General Meeting comprises the paid-up members of the association and meets at least once a year. All its decisions are taken by a simple majority of the votes cast, except where they involve any contractual obligation with a value of more than EUR 10 000. In such cases, the General Meeting must decide by a two-thirds majority. This is the case, for example, with any marketing agreement with a value of more than EUR 10 000.
The constitution also provides for the APFTE to be administered by a Board consisting of at least nine members and at most twenty-five members appointed by the General Meeting. From among its members, the Board appoints an Executive Committee consisting of a president, one or more vice-presidents, a secretary and a treasurer, in accordance with the rules of procedure decided by the Board. The Board meets at the invitation of its president at least twice a year, at the request of half of its members provided that one third of its members are present. Decisions are taken by a majority of the votes cast for routine decisions and by a two-thirds majority for the signature of any commitment exceeding one year and with a value of more than EUR 10 000.
- (a)
The first President of the APFTE was a full member of the CCIM in 2010 and between 2016 and 2019, and a technical adviser within the CCIM from 2013 to 2015. This person was President of the APFTE from June 2010 to March 2011 and then again from December 2012 to at least 2018, and also Vice-President of the APFTE (with the capacity to act on behalf of the President of the APFTE) from October to December 2012.
- (b)The President of the APFTE between April 2011 and February 2012 also acted as a technical adviser within the CCIM between 2011 and 201228.
- (c)
His successor (President from February 2012 to December 2012) was at the same time President of the Regional Economic, Social and Environmental Council of Languedoc-Roussillon (Conseil économique, social, et environnemental régional du Languedoc-Roussillon) and thus president of an institution of one of the local authorities belonging to the APFTE.
- (a)The Governance Committee was intended to ‘bring together the local authorities, as funders of the [APFTE]’. Its objective was to ‘guide and confirm the strategic choices made in the development of routes and the associated budget. The Governance Committee meeting [was] preceded, where necessary, by a preparatory meeting with all the local authority technicians’29. This committee was formed at the request of the local authorities30, which wanted to ensure that the choice of marketing agreements to be funded was not determined solely by the new airport operator, AMM31. The records of the committee, as provided to the Commission, show that it consisted of representatives of the local authorities (Region, Department, Pays de l’Or, Agglomération de Montpellier, City of Montpellier), the CCIM and the Executive Committee of the APFTE. The records also refer to the presence of an AMM representative who proposed strategic choices to the funding members of the APFTE32.
- (b)
In addition, documents relating to the workings of the APFTE show that the Governance Committee was subsequently called the ‘Funders Committee’ from at least 2012, but involved the same institutions. The French authorities have confirmed that, according to the APFTE, the ‘Funders Committee’ is the same body as the ‘Governance Committee’, which had different names at different times.
Proposals on geographical areas to be targeted by tourist marketing services are submitted to the Board, which gives an opinion on them.
The proposals are then submitted for approval by the General Meeting.
If the General Meeting approves the proposals (by a two-thirds majority for any marketing agreement with a value of more than EUR 10 000), a public procurement procedure is launched.
The results of the analysis of the tenders received are presented to the Board, which gives an opinion.
The results are then submitted to the General Meeting, which may authorise the President to sign the contracts (by a two-thirds majority for any marketing agreement with a value of more than EUR 10 000; the decision is recorded in the minutes of the General Meeting).
Depending on the applicable procedure, any rejection letters are written and sent.
Depending on the applicable procedure, notification letters signed by the President and accompanied by the tender document and price schedule, both also signed by the President, are also written and sent to each of the successful tenders.
Although the information just cited does not say so, in practice, when proposals were put forward for geographical areas to be targeted by tourist marketing services, before the deliberations of the Board and General Meeting other parties played a part in making the budget choices and determining the policy of the APFTE (i.e. the marketing agreements to be concluded).
Table 3 | |||||||||||
Origin of the APFTE’s income between 2010 and 2019 | |||||||||||
Year | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 201836 | 201937 | 2010 to 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Subsidies from local authorities and the CCIM in EUR (proportion of this entity’s contribution) | |||||||||||
Regional Council of Languedoc-Roussillon (now the Region of Occitania) | 283 670 | 550 000 | 509 024 | 550 000 | 446 830 | 587 696 | 509 174 | 355 239 | 75 000 | 0 | 3 866 633 |
(30 %) | (27 %) | (25 %) | (23 %) | (28 %) | (36 %) | (32 %) | (32 %) | (34 %) | (29 %) | ||
Hérault Departmental Council | 283 670 | 559 746 | 509 024 | 550 000 | 150 000 | 0 | 111 092 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 163 532 |
(30 %) | (27 %) | (25 %) | (23 %) | (10 %) | (0 %) | (7 %) | (0 %) | (0 %) | (16 %) | ||
Communauté d’agglomération de Montpellier (now Montpellier Méditerranée Métropole) and City of Montpellier | 283 670 | 730 473 | 706 524 | 747 500 | 644 331 | 747 500 | 692 015 | 505 865 | 75 000 | 0 | 5 132 878 |
(30 %) | (36 %) | (35 %) | (31 %) | (41 %) | (46 %) | (44 %) | (45 %) | (34 %) | (38 %) | ||
Communauté d’agglomération du Pays de l’Or | 85 000 | 85 000 | 100 000 | 119 915 | 97 574 | 130 803 | 110 092 | 107 250 | 21 500 | 0 | 857 134 |
(9 %) | (4 %) | (5 %) | (5 %) | (6 %) | (8 %) | (7 %) | (10 %) | (10 %) | (6 %) | ||
CCIM (now the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Hérault) | 038 | 125 000 | 212 000 | 440 000 | 232 500 | 150 000 | 150 000 | 150 000 | 51 000 | 0 | 1 510 500 |
(0 %) | (6 %) | (10 %) | (18 %) | (15 %) | (9 %) | (10 %) | (13 %) | (23 %) | (11 %) | ||
Membership fees of the various APFTE members | |||||||||||
Membership fees from EUR 50 to EUR 100 | 1 100 | 50 | 1 550 | 1 500 | 0 | 600 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 800 |
(0,117 %) | (0,002 %) | (0,076 %) | (0,062 %) | (0 %) | (0,037 %) | (0 %) | (0 %) | (0 %) | (0 %) | (0,035 %) | |
(Proportion of the membership fees within the APFTE’s total budget) | |||||||||||
Subsidies from local authorities and the CCIM in euro (proportion of this entity’s contribution) | |||||||||||
APFTE’s total budget in euro39(subsidies plus membership fees) | 937 110 | 2 050 269 | 2 038 112 | 2 408 915 | 1 571 235 | 1 616 599 | 1 572 373 | 1 118 354 | 222 500 | 0 | 13 535 477 |
Source: information received from the French authorities. | |||||||||||
- (a)The 2010 marketing agreement with AMS (valid from 1 July 2010 to 31 December 2011) was approved by the General Meeting on 16 September 2010 and signed on the same day by the APFTE. The funding agreements with the local authorities for the 2010 budget year that have been provided to the Commission were not signed until 2011, and those for the 2011 budget year were signed only between June and November 201146.
- (b)The amendment to the 2010 marketing agreement with AMS regarding the Birmingham route was approved by the General Meeting on 20 April 2011 and signed on 11 April 2011 by the APFTE. The funding agreements with the local authorities for the 2011 budget year provided to the Commission were signed only between June and November 201147.
- (c)The extension of the 2010 marketing agreement with AMS for 2012 was decided by the Governance Committee on 23 September 2011, and the General Meeting of 19 October 2011 was so informed48 (the minutes of that meeting do not indicate that the General Meeting actually voted on the matter). The extension letter sent to AMS was signed by the President of the APFTE on 29 September 2011. The funding agreements with the local authorities for the 2012 budget year provided to the Commission were signed only between April and October 201249.
- (d)The extension of the 2010 marketing agreement with AMS for 2013 was signed on 23 February 2013 by the APFTE. The 2013 budget and the marketing action programme including payments to Ryanair on the basis of that agreement were decided by the APFTE’s General Meeting on 4 July 201350. The funding agreements with the local authorities for the 2013 budget year that have been provided to the Commission were signed only between April and November 201351.
- (e)On 27 January 2014, the General Meeting authorised the President of the APFTE to sign new marketing agreements with Ryanair for 2014, following the 2013 invitation to tender. These agreements had already been concluded by the President of the APFTE on 22 November 2013. The funding agreements with the local authorities for the 2014 budget year that have been provided to the Commission were signed only between February and October 201452.
- (f)The extension of the 2013 marketing agreements with Ryanair for 2015 was approved by the General Meeting on 11 December 2014 and signed by the APFTE on 19 December 2014. The funding agreements with the local authorities for the 2015 budget year that have been provided to the Commission were signed only between June and December 201553.
- (g)The extension of the 2013 marketing agreement with Ryanair for 2016 was approved by the General Meeting on 30 May 2016 and signed by the APFTE on 22 April 2016. The funding agreements with the local authorities for the 2016 budget year that have been provided to the Commission were signed only between July and December 201654.
- (h)The new 2017 marketing agreements with Ryanair were concluded by the APFTE on 19 May 2017 and approved by the APFTE’s General Meeting on 25 April 2017. The funding agreements with the local authorities for the 2017 budget year that have been provided to the Commission were signed only between June and September 201755.
- (i)For 2018, the Commission does not have any information on the date of extension of the 2017 marketing agreement with Ryanair. However, the sole budget allocation agreement provided to the Commission, namely the agreement concluded between the APFTE and the Communauté d’agglomération du Pays de l’Or in March 2018, refers to the promotion of Montpellier in Wallonia, Rhineland-Palatinate and Yorkshire, which were destinations of Ryanair flights56. It seems that, for the final time, the budget for 2018 was approved by the APFTE’s General Meeting on 20 December 2017 in order to honour the APFTE’s existing commitments – including its commitments to Ryanair – before the contractual relations between the CCIM, local authorities and airlines were legally restructured57.
- (a)
The agreements concluded with the Region gave the latter the right to demand repayment of the subsidy if the APFTE did not use this for the agreed purposes. They also included a right to terminate the agreement.
- (b)
The agreements concluded with the Department provided for a right of repayment of the subsidy to the Department if the APFTE used this for purposes other than those set out in the agreement. The description of the purposes of the 2010, 2011 and 2012 agreements explicitly included the conclusion of agreements with AMS. Moreover, the agreements contained a clause allowing the Department to terminate the agreement if the APFTE failed to meet its contractual obligations.
- (c)
The agreements concluded with the Communauté d’agglomération de Montpellier provided for the subsidy to be paid in proportion to the number of months that the actions of the destination programme were carried out, and on presentation of the corresponding invoices. In addition, the agreements subjected the body’s funding commitment to compliance by the APFTE with its contractual obligations, and included the right to terminate the agreement.
- (d)
The agreements concluded with the Communauté d’agglomération du Pays de l’Or subjected that authority’s commitment to compliance by the APFTE with its contractual obligations (the agreements concluded with Ryanair/AMS expressly refer to this) and entitled the authority to demand repayment of the subsidy and to terminate the agreement if the APFTE failed to meet its contractual obligations.
- (e)
The agreements concluded with the City of Montpellier required the APFTE to submit an activity report to that authority in order to demonstrate the progress made in the actions proposed by the APFTE on submission of the subsidy application. The French authorities have not provided these subsidy applications, but the Commission concludes from the circumstances of the case that they contain the promotional programme for the budget year in question. Moreover, the authority reserved the right to terminate the agreement if the APFTE failed to meet its contractual undertakings.
The measures that formed the subject of the formal investigation are the marketing agreements concluded between the APFTE and Ryanair or its subsidiary AMS. Between 2010 and 2018, Ryanair/AMS and the APFTE concluded three sets of marketing agreements.
On 16 September 2010, less than three months after its creation, the APFTE concluded an agreement with AMS (‘the 2010 agreement’), signed by the President of the APFTE without any prior invitation to tender.
The agreement was concluded for an initial term from 1 July 2010 to 31 December 2011.
with a route between Frankfurt-Hahn and Montpellier offering four flights per week in summer and at least two flights per week in winter,
with a route between Brussels South-Charleroi and Montpellier offering at least three flights per week throughout the year,
- with a route between Leeds-Bradford and Montpellier offering at least two flights per week in summer’59.
- (a)
For 2010, this offer includes five paragraphs of 150 words each to be selected by the APFTE and placed under the heading ‘Top Five Things to Do’ on the ‘Destination Montpellier’ page of Ryanair’s website; the presence of two links to a website selected by the APFTE, placed under the heading ‘Top Five Things to Do’ on the aforementioned ‘Destination Montpellier’ page; and the presence of one link to the website selected by the APFTE on the home pages of the British, German, Dutch and Belgian (French and Dutch) websites of www.ryanair.com for 55 days. The price of these services was EUR […].
- (b)
For 2011, the offer includes all the services provided in 2010, plus a ‘graphic banner link-button (200x110px)’ to be selected by the APFTE and placed on the ‘Discover Europe’ page of Ryanair’s website for 12 months, and a presence as ‘Destination of the Day (text, image and link selected by the APFTE)’ on the home pages of the British, German, Dutch and Belgian (French and Dutch) websites of www.ryanair.com for a total period of two weeks. The price of these services was EUR […].
The agreement of 16 September 2010 was altered by an amendment of 20 April 2011, which added a new Birmingham route to the three routes already mentioned in the agreement.
The presence of a link to a website selected by the APFTE, placed under the heading ‘Airports and tourism’ on the home page of the British website of www.ryanair.com for 14 days per year.
A presence as ‘Destination of the Day’ (text, image and link selected by the APFTE) on the home page of the British website of www.ryanair.com for a total of one week per year.
The price of these services was EUR […]. It was stipulated that the APFTE would pay this sum in monthly instalments of EUR […], on receipt of the AMS invoices, for each of the months of April to October of each year during the period of application of this amendment.
The APFTE sent a letter of undertaking to renew the 2010 agreement to AMS on 29 September 2011. The purpose of the letter was to renew the 2010 agreement for an additional period of one year, starting on 1 January 2012 and ending on 31 December 2012. According to its own wording, the APFTE undertook to renew the 2010 agreement on the basis of the following routes operated by Ryanair: Brussels-Charleroi, Frankfurt-Hahn and Leeds-Bradford.
On 2 October 2013, the APFTE therefore organised an invitation to tender for the purchase of marketing services intended to promote tourist and economic flows to Montpellier for 2014.
The invitation to tender indicated that tenderers should offer ‘to promote tourist and economic flows to Montpellier through all available media on the market’. The following media examples were listed: ‘radio campaigns; TV campaigns; communication on social networks (Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc.); participation in trade fairs; sponsorship of well-known events and visibility for Montpellier as a destination; training trips for professionals, press trips with journalists’, and digital communication. According to the invitation to tender, ‘In all cases, tenderers must include a link to the APFTE’s website (go to Montpellier) on their own website’. This was the only imperative criterion to be met by the marketing service provider.
The invitation to tender also divided the contract into five ‘lots’, namely ‘Brussels-Charleroi’, ‘Frankfurt-Hahn’, ‘Leeds’, ‘Birmingham’ and ‘[…]’. For each of them, the invitation to tender indicates the criteria to be met in terms of air transport to be offered: a minimum annual offer of seats available for sale, a minimum annual volume of incoming passengers, the seasonality recommended for the contract (annual or seasonal route), a minimum number of flights per week, and a start date for the route.
The evident aim of the invitation to tender was therefore to select not just any online marketing services providers, but rather airlines offering such services in addition to their air transport activities and also undertaking to operate air transport services between Montpellier airport and the destinations indicated by the various ‘lots’, under the conditions detailed by the invitation to tender in terms of seasonality, flight frequencies, minimum number of incoming passengers, and start date of the routes.
The lots entitled ‘Brussels-Charleroi’, ‘Frankfurt-Hahn’, ‘Leeds’ and ‘Birmingham’ and the minimum flight frequencies indicated for these in the invitation to tender precisely corresponded to the four destinations already operated from Montpellier by Ryanair at the time when the invitation to tender was launched.
Ryanair was the only airline to submit a bid for the ‘Brussels-Charleroi’, ‘Frankfurt-Hahn’, ‘Leeds’ and ‘Birmingham’ lots.
Following the invitation to tender, four lots were awarded to Ryanair, which concluded agreements with the APFTE on 22 November 2013 (‘the 2013 agreements’) for the first three lots, with a total value of approximately EUR […] for one year (‘Brussels-Charleroi’ for a fixed amount of EUR […], ‘Frankfurt-Hahn’ for a lump sum of EUR […]; and ‘Leeds-Bradford’ for a lump sum of EUR […]).
On 19 December 2014, in three letters signed by the President of the APFTE, the APFTE renewed with Ryanair, for 2015, the promotional services for each of the three destinations Brussels-Charleroi, Frankfurt-Hahn and Leeds-Bradford, for a price of EUR […] for Brussels-Charleroi, EUR […] for Frankfurt-Hahn and EUR […] for Leeds-Bradford.
On 22 April 2016, in three letters signed by the President of the APFTE, the APFTE again renewed with Ryanair, for 2016, the promotional services for each of the three destinations, for a price of EUR […] for Brussels-Charleroi, EUR […] for Frankfurt-Hahn and EUR […] for Leeds-Bradford.
On 13 March 2017, the APFTE launched a new invitation to tender for the purchase of marketing services, for one year with options to extend, in order to encourage ‘tourist and business flows’ to Montpellier. The tender specifications divided the contract into various ‘lots’, each covering a European region. The lots covered those regions whose inhabitants were to be targeted by the marketing services in question.
The invitation to tender stated that the selection criteria would be weighted as follows: price of services 40 %, and technical value 60 %.
‘Wallonia’ lot: Ryanair […] euro, […] […] euro;
‘Rhineland-Palatinate’ lot: Ryanair […] euro, […] […] euro;
‘Yorkshire’ lot: Ryanair […] euro, […] […] euro
All three lots were awarded to Ryanair, whose bid for each lot was exactly EUR […] cheaper than the bid submitted by […]. The French authorities have not provided any information showing that the APFTE queried this consistent price difference between the two competing bids.
On 19 May 2017 the APFTE concluded agreements with Ryanair for an indicative amount of EUR […] (for the Wallonia, Rhineland-Palatinate and Yorkshire agreements, respectively EUR […] excluding taxes, EUR […] excluding taxes and EUR […] excluding taxes).
In accordance with the tender specifications, these were agreements under which the marketing services would be provided and paid for only on the issue of purchase orders by the APFTE. The order forms issued by the APFTE show that the payments per target region (Wallonia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Yorkshire) were made in two stages: a payment for the ‘spring/summer period’ and another payment for the ‘autumn/winter’ period. The Commission notes that these periods correspond to the two seasons of the civil aviation calendar (April to September and October to March) defined by the International Air Transport Association (IATA).
- (a)
For the […] and […] lots, the successful tenderer was […], which beat […] (identical bid in terms of price, but different in terms of marketing services). The agreement concluded between the APFTE and […] was also based on purchase orders. The bid amounted to EUR […] for both lots combined. However, it is apparent from the information received from the French authorities that the APFTE never issued any purchase orders under this agreement.
- (b)
For the […] and […] lots, only […] submitted a bid (EUR […] in total). For these lots the APFTE judged the invitation to tender to have been unsuccessful, because […]’s bid was declared inadmissible on the grounds that the bid documents did not include the schedule of unit prices.
Table 4 | |||||||||||
Payments by the APFTE to Ryanair/AMS from 2010 | |||||||||||
2010 | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017 | 2018 | 2019 | 2010 to 2019 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Payments to Ryanair/AMS for the budget year | […] (the payments were actually made between 2010 and 2011) | […] (the payments were actually made between 2011 and 2012) | […] (the payments were actually made between 2012 and 2013) | […] (the payments were actually made between 2013 and 2014) | […] (the payments were actually made between 2014 and 2015) | […] (the payments were actually made between 2015 and 2016) | […] (the payments were actually made between 2016 and 2017) | […] (the payments were actually made between 2018 and February 2019) | […]66 | […] | 856 089 904 |
APFTE budget in EUR (see also Table 3) | 937 110 | 2 050 269 | 2 038 112 | 2 408 915 | 1 571 235 | 1 616 599 | 1 572 373 | 1 118 354 | 222 500 | 0 | 13 535 477 |
Source: Information received from the French authorities. | |||||||||||
According to the French authorities, the APFTE did not pay Ryanair for marketing services beyond April 2019.
The Commission initiated the formal investigation on 4 July 2018 because it could not rule out the possibility that the measures described in recitals 52 et seq. constituted State aid to Ryanair and its subsidiary AMS.
The complainant stands by the arguments set out in its complaint, namely that the APFTE was a vehicle for transferring State aid to Ryanair/AMS.
In the alternative, Ryanair contests the Commission’s conclusions as regards the applicability of the market economy operator principle to the case, the determination of the aid beneficiary, the selectivity of the aid, and its imputability to the State.
AMS did not submit any comments.
The APFTE denies having granted any advantage to Ryanair. It describes the contested sums as market-price remuneration for a service provided. The APFTE states that it acted as a public purchaser of services and that the promotional actions carried out formed part of a comprehensive marketing strategy for Montpellier and its surrounding area.
The APFTE points out that the regions targeted by the invitations to tender were the subject of discussions and strategic choices of the General Meeting and the Board. It submits that the decisions taken by the association cannot be imputable to the State, and refers to the APFTE’s method of working, as described in its constitution.
In the further alternative, even supposing that the Commission were to conclude that Ryanair and AMS had received State aid, the APFTE considers that Ryanair and AMS should repay only the difference between the price paid in remuneration for these services and the market price, given that, in its opinion, the services fell within the APFTE’s public policy tasks and the association clearly profited from them.
The Region of Occitania argues that the complaint is unfounded, as the APFTE’s actions created tourist and economic benefits for all the local and regional stakeholders. It considers that the APFTE worked to develop a more international customer base and enabled undertakings in the sector to continue trading over a longer period.
It states that, within the APFTE, decisions to fund the marketing campaigns in order to develop the area’s attractiveness for tourists were taken mainly by the General Meeting, with each member having one vote, generally by a qualified majority of two thirds.
The Region of Occitania adds that the APFTE acted through invitations to tender for the provision of services aimed at increasing the area’s visibility and attractiveness. These invitations were open to all undertakings that could submit a bid complying with the tender specifications, including the complainant.
The CCI Hérault considers that the APFTE’s actions to promote the Montpellier area among the public in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, England and […] were economically important to the area given their economic benefits. It adds that by pooling its members’ interests the APFTE met the need for the economic and tourist development of the area, which was entirely within the APFTE’s sphere of responsibility and that of the CCI Hérault.
Montpellier Méditerranée Métropole considers that an aggressive strategy to increase the area’s attractiveness needs to be conducted in order to develop the area, support the economy and combat unemployment. It states that the APFTE is a non-profit association of public and private partners whose common objective is to take measures to promote and develop tourism, as tourism serves the interests of both public regional development and private business development.
Montpellier Méditerranée Métropole considers that the marketing services purchased by the APFTE were in line with its actual needs and purpose, and that those services were the subject of prior competitive tendering, so that there was no element of selectivity of any kind (Ryanair was successful in some of the invitations to tender organised by the APFTE). Moreover, Montpellier Méditerranée feels that those services cannot be classified as aid: firstly, no advantage was conferred, because the remuneration received by Ryanair did not exceed market prices; and secondly, the measures were not imputable to the State, because the APFTE’s decisions took account of private structures, which formed the vast majority of its members and had significant decision-making power.
The […], a member of the APFTE, considers that the association has provided a forum for discussions between private operators in various sectors of activity and representatives of local authorities. It adds that the decisions made within the association have been in the collective interest of all economic operators and inhabitants in the region. It submits that this pooling of effort by the public sector and the private sector has allowed the objectives of increasing the visibility and development of the city of Montpellier and its surrounding area to be achieved.
The Communauté d’agglomération du Pays de l’Or considers that the advertising measures carried out by the APFTE in order to promote the Montpellier area among the public in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and England were important for the area owing to the economic benefits they brought and were targeted at regions with significant economic and tourist potential for the Montpellier area.
France considers that the payments in question do not constitute State aid. Given the APFTE’s structure and operation, as defined in its constitution, these measures are not imputable to the State. Furthermore, the objective of the agreements concluded with Ryanair/AMS was the promotion of a region through marketing, and the purchase of advertising by the APFTE – at a market price – was a legitimate measure contributing to regional economic development which did not confer any advantage on Ryanair and was not selective.
By virtue of Article 107(1) TFEU, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.
For a measure to be classed as State aid the following cumulative criteria therefore have to be met: 1) the beneficiary or beneficiaries must be undertakings within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU; 2) the measure must be granted through State resources and be imputable to the State; 3) the measure must confer an economic advantage on the beneficiary or beneficiaries; 4) the advantage must be selective; and 5) the measure must distort or threaten to distort competition and must be likely to affect trade between Member States.
As the beneficiaries of the measures are an airline and one of its wholly-owned subsidiaries providing marketing services, the Commission concludes that their activities are economic in nature within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
From the formal investigation the Commission concludes that the measures are imputable to the State. The marketing services agreements were concluded between Ryanair or its subsidiary AMS, on the one hand, and the APFTE, on the other hand, in order to achieve the APFTE’s objective of promoting the tourist flows generated by Ryanair for Montpellier and its area.
Ryanair contests the imputability of the APFTE’s decisions and actions to the State on the grounds that the APFTE is a private association with the majority of its members coming from the private sector.
But the formal investigation has enabled the Commission to gather various facts – from the records and minutes of the APFTE and its public members, supplied by the French authorities, and from public statements made by the APFTE – which clearly show that, despite its status as a private association, consisting mainly of private sector members and according to its constitution taking decisions by a majority of two thirds at its General Meeting, the APFTE was in reality an instrument of the member local authorities of the APFTE and of the CCIM, and was intended to allow them to pursue their regional development policy objectives.
the APFTE was designed by the CCIM and local authorities as a vehicle for public funding;
the APFTE pursued a public policy objective;
there were close links between the APFTE and the CCIM (and the local authorities);
strategic choices were made by the public members of the APFTE;
the APFTE was funded by its public members and the use of the APFTE’s budget was controlled by the public members.
As described in recitals 28 et seq., the APFTE was designed by public entities as a legal structure enabling the payment of public funds to Ryanair and other low-cost airlines.
The aforementioned documents show that the APFTE was set up as a direct result of the CCIM losing its status as manager of Montpellier airport, as described in recitals 26 et seq. The CCIM wanted to find a way of continuing to pay funds to the airlines through marketing agreements that the CCIM had previously concluded as airport manager.
The nature of these marketing agreements and the extent to which they were intended to promote Montpellier and its surrounding area will be analysed in more depth below, when the issue of the existence of an economic advantage to Ryanair is considered.
The Commission observes that the APFTE was aware of its obligation to comply with the public procurement rules when it extended the agreements concluded with Ryanair in 2013 and 2017.
The Commission infers that, despite the APFTE’s assertions regarding imputability, with particular reference to the decision-making power held by the private structures within the association, the APFTE did not regard itself as a simple private association, but as a body with a public policy task – namely the development of the local economy through tourism – that had to comply with the public procurement rules. The Commission regards this aspect as further evidence that the APFTE was no more than a legal device designed to facilitate the payment of public funds to airlines.
In addition to the facts relating to the setting up, object, funding and decision-making of the APFTE, the formal investigation has identified further links between the APFTE and its public members, particularly the CCIM, with the latter acting as a public agency under the supervision of the prefect of the Region of Occitania, who was informed of the activities and raison d’être of the APFTE, according to the documents received from the French authorities.
This is typical of the close link between the APFTE and its public members given that, in the de facto operation of the APFTE, the President and the Executive Committee play a fundamental role in determining the APFTE’s budget priorities (with the Funders Committee, consisting of the CCIM and the local authorities), which are then submitted to the General Meeting. In addition, according to the APFTE’s constitution, it is the President who is authorised to legally commit the APFTE in relation to third parties, which gives him the power to sign and therefore conclude marketing agreements with airlines and also subsidy agreements with local authorities.
The Commission regards these facts as further evidence of the decisive influence of the APFTE’s public members over the association, specifically in terms of the appointment of the APFTE’s President. This influence ensured that the APFTE continued to conclude marketing agreements with the airlines, as initiated by the CCIM.
From the start, and despite the decision-making process described in the APFTE’s constitution, it was the CCIM and the local authorities that steered the association’s choices. The private members, despite their two-thirds majority in the General Meeting, did not have any chance to object to the strategic priorities chosen by the public entities or to impose their strategic choices on the public entities. The Commission has arrived at this conclusion on the basis of the following findings:
The Commission notes that the French authorities have not commented on the existence or role of the Governance Committee and the Funders Committee.
The minutes of the APFTE’s inaugural General Meeting, mentioned in recital 33, show that the presence of private members in the APFTE was explained partly by the desire to set up the APFTE more quickly.
According to these same minutes, the CCIM representative (who was elected President of the APFTE during the meeting) explained the purpose of the APFTE to the private members present at the inaugural General Meeting, namely to continue concluding marketing agreements with the airlines. This CCIM representative stated that it was vital that ‘the undertakings could give their opinion on the chosen action plan’. The expression ‘give their opinion’ betrays the real role that the CCIM had planned for the private members, despite their majority in the General Meeting, in particular the lack of any real decision-making power as regards the strategic and budget orientations of the association, which were to be determined by the public members. This implies that the APFTE’s private members that were present at the time were aware of the fact that the strategic choices would be made by the CCIM and the local authorities, although the latter could take account of the opinions given by the private members.
The APFTE’s funds were always allocated in such a way that the projects defined by the public members were funded first, with the proposals of the private members being selected only on a subsidiary basis.
The APFTE’s minutes do not refer to either the mechanisms or the implementation of the marketing agreements concluded with AMS and Ryanair. The agreements constantly benefited from public funding, although the annual budgets were variable. This funding was never called into question in discussions within the APFTE, despite the fact that the public members provided no justification for its continuation. The public members simply renewed the agreements every year, describing them as ‘historic destinations’ or ‘routes’ in certain documents connected with the workings of the APFTE, without providing any further explanation.
- (a)With regard to the 2012 budget, the extension letter sent to AMS was signed on 29 September 2011 by the President of the APFTE. The extension of the 2010 marketing agreement with AMS for 2012 had been decided earlier by the Governance Committee on 23 September 2011. But the General Meeting was informed of this only on 19 October 201191 (the minutes of that meeting did not in fact indicate that the General Meeting actually voted on the matter).
- (b)With regard to the 2013 budget, the extension of the 2010 marketing agreement with AMS for 2013 was signed by the APFTE on 23 February 2013. The 2013 budget and the marketing action programme including payments to Ryanair on the basis of that agreement were decided by the APFTE’s General Meeting on 4 July 201392.
- (c)
With regard to the 2014 budget, the President of the APFTE had signed the agreements with Ryanair on 22 November 2013, following the 2013 invitation to tender. However, it was not until 27 January 2014 that the General Meeting authorised the President to sign new marketing agreements with Ryanair.
As described in recitals 45 et seq. and 107 et seq., with regard to the nature of the APFTE’s financial resources, the public members of the APFTE – the local authorities and the CCIM – that initially determined the APFTE’s budget choices by defining the APFTE’s promotional programme, which contained the precise choice of marketing agreements, and tightly controlled the APFTE’s subsequent use of their subsidies by making the subsidies conditional on the APFTE’s implementation of the promotional programme.
- (a)As described in recitals 49 et seq., an analysis of voting in the General Meeting, of the dates of signature of the marketing agreements and of the subsidy payments made year by year by the local authorities shows that the APFTE never had a budget placed at its disposal in advance that the association could have managed as it wished. The subsidies from the local authorities for a given budget year were always paid after the marketing agreements that the subsidies were intended to finance had been decided and signed. The local authorities were therefore always able to pay over their funds knowing precisely how the funds would be used96. This means that they could have refused to sign the funding agreements with the APFTE if they had not agreed with the choice made by the association. However, it also means that the APFTE, as an association, did not have a budget that it could freely use, but was obliged to request payment of the subsidies by the public members after the precise budget choices – decided by the public members themselves through the proposals of the Funders Committee – had been made. The Commission concludes that this practice at the very least had the effect (if not the object) of dissuading the APFTE’s private members from voting in the General Meeting for budget choices that would not be agreeable to the APFTE’s public members. The practice therefore enabled the public members effectively to control the use of the APFTE’s budget.
- (b)Furthermore, the analysis of the funding agreements in recital 51 shows that the APFTE’s public members, through various contractual stipulations, ensured that their subsidies would be used for their strategic choices as set out in the APFTE’s promotional programme for each budget year, whose content was decided by them97, thus preventing the private members from making budget choices independently.
- (c)Lastly, since the APFTE Presidents authorised to sign the marketing agreements with Ryanair/AMS and the funding agreements with the funding members all had links to those funding members (whether the CCIM or the Region of Occitania)98, the APFTE’s public members had further control over the APFTE’s financial commitments and over the payment of subsidies to the APFTE.
Thus the public members funding the APFTE tightly controlled the funds allocated to the APFTE until the funds were transferred to their final recipients. As a result, the funds in question retained their character of State resources when they were transferred by the APFTE to Ryanair or AMS.
On that basis, the Commission concludes that, from the start of its existence, the APFTE was designed and used by the CCIM and the local authorities concerned simply as a vehicle for paying public funds to Ryanair, without the association itself or its private members having any room for manoeuvre. The actions and decisions of the APFTE are therefore imputable to the State.
As a result, the Commission considers that the measures are imputable to the State and were granted by France using State resources within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.
It must be assessed whether the market economy operator principle applies to the agreements in question and, if so, whether the agreements comply with the principle.
With regard to the agreements concluded between the APFTE and AMS or Ryanair, the Commission must firstly determine whether, for the purposes of identifying an economic advantage from which they may have benefited, Ryanair and its subsidiary AMS should be considered individually or jointly.
Furthermore, Ryanair appears to be substitutable for AMS in its contractual relations with the APFTE. The APFTE initially concluded a marketing agreement with AMS (the 2010 agreement). Subsequently, the 2013 and 2017 agreements were concluded directly between the APFTE and Ryanair.
According to France, the APFTE acted as a public purchaser of services that enabled it to carry out its public policy tasks. According to France, the marketing agreements were therefore not in any way linked to the airport services agreements, and their objective was to contribute to the region’s economic development by attracting tourists.
France has not provided any evidence that might show that the decision to conclude the marketing services agreements was taken on the basis of specific economic assessments that sought to determine the future profitability of concluding those agreements with Ryanair/AMS or the resulting economic benefits, either considering the marketing agreements on their own or looking at the marketing agreements in conjunction with the airport services agreements.
Ryanair has not taken a clear position on the question whether the marketing agreements concluded with the APFTE and the airport services agreements concluded with AMM should be assessed in conjunction or separately: it argues that in any event Ryanair/AMS should not be regarded as a beneficiary of aid.
In this case, by contrast with the majority of recent cases decided by the Commission that have involved Ryanair and State aid, the Commission has not established a link between the marketing agreements and the airport services agreements, for the following reasons.
Table 5 | ||||||
Comparison of the proportion of contributions by the APFTE’s public members to their shareholdings in AMM | ||||||
Regional Council of Languedoc-Roussillon (now the Region of Occitania) | Hérault Departmental Council | Communauté d’agglomération de Montpellier (now Montpellier Méditerranée Métropole) and City of Montpellier | Communauté d'agglomération du Pays de l'Or | CCIM (now the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Hérault) | French State (at national level) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Participation in the funding of the APFTE (2010 to 2019) (%) | [20-30] | [10-20] | [30-40] | [0-10] | [10-20] | |
Shareholding in AMM (%) | 6,5 | 7 | 0,5109 | 1 | 25 | 60 |
In addition, the aforementioned minutes for 24 June 2010 show that, in concluding the marketing agreements, the APFTE and its members sought to promote the regional economy, with a view to the possible economic benefits of the marketing agreements for the region and various local businesses, and were not pursuing the interests that would be pursued by an operator (even in a minority capacity) of an airport or other business benefiting directly from the economic effects of the agreements.
When it has to be determined whether a public entity has acted as a market economy operator, considerations of regional policy are not relevant. And the formal investigation has not found anything to indicate that the contribution of the APFTE’s public members to the marketing agreements had the aim of increasing the revenue they obtained from the airport, for example through the payment of a dividend or other bonus by AMM that might have reflected a positive effect of the marketing agreements on the airport’s revenue.
On the basis of the aforementioned evidence, the Commission concludes that the links between the airport services agreements concluded by AMM and the marketing agreements concluded by the APFTE are not sufficient to justify assessing the two types of agreement in conjunction. The Commission has therefore assessed the marketing agreements in isolation.
According to France, the APFTE considers that the payments in question do not constitute State aid because the sums paid by the APFTE to Ryanair/AMS corresponded to the market price of the services, which were purchased following an invitation to tender. In the APFTE’s view, the services purchased also met the requirements of the APFTE and of its public policy tasks, namely the promotion of tourism and regional economic development. As a result, the APFTE acted as a public purchaser that was pursuing its public policy objective. The APFTE argues that, in this context, there was no need to carry out a profitability analysis in relation to the APFTE. According to the APFTE, therefore, the marketing agreements did not confer any economic advantage on Ryanair or AMS.
Ryanair puts forward the same arguments.
As regards the applicability of the market economy operator principle, it should be borne in mind that the comparison is not with any market economy operator in general but rather with a market economy operator in the situation of the APFTE.
Consideration has therefore to be given to the scope of the market economy operator principle with regard to the APFTE.
The minutes, records and other documents regarding the APFTE submitted by the French authorities show that when it concluded the marketing agreements with Ryanair/AMS, the APFTE was acting only as a public authority, in particular with a view to developing the regional economy.
The benefits of marketing agreements in terms of developing regional tourism, namely the potential revenue generated by tourism for the region, are not relevant to an assessment of compliance with the market economy operator criteria.
In the present case the Commission does not have any evidence to indicate that, through the conclusion of the marketing agreements, the APFTE or its funding public members could have expected any financial gain as market economy operators – in particular a return on investment – aside from the development of tourism in the region, an objective deriving entirely from the role of the APFTE and its funding public members as public authorities.
The formal investigation has shown that the payments made on the basis of the marketing agreements were of the same nature as subsidies paid by a public authority to an airline to ensure an air service to an airport. The Commission has concluded that the payments made by the APFTE to Ryanair and AMS can be regarded as straightforward subsidies aimed at reducing the costs borne by Ryanair to operate scheduled flights to Montpellier, so that they confer an economic advantage on Ryanair.
On the basis of a range of indicators examined during the formal investigation, the Commission has concluded that the purchase of marketing services from Ryanair did not meet an actual need of the APFTE. This is sufficient to establish the existence of an advantage conferred on Ryanair by the measures covered by the investigation.
Moreover, the formal investigation has not found evidence to confirm the claim made by Ryanair/AMS and the French authorities that the marketing services were purchased at market prices.
France, the APFTE, the CCIM, the local authorities having submitted comments and Ryanair have argued that the APFTE was a local tourism promotion association that purchased marketing services from Ryanair at market prices.
The purchase of marketing services served only as justification for the payments made to Ryanair to keep the latter at Montpellier airport; even if the marketing services had some marketing effect (quod non), it was not the main intention of the agreements, which must be viewed rather as concealed subsidies:
there was no real intention on the part of the APFTE to advertise the region;
Ryanair flight operations were targeted, rather than marketing services;
Ryanair/AMS was targeted, rather than any online marketing service provider in general;
there is no evidence showing that the APFTE was interested in the practical success of the marketing campaigns funded by its budget;
the end of the marketing payments coincided with the cessation of flight operations by Ryanair;
other State aid investigations conducted by the Commission have shown that marketing agreements have been used by Ryanair to conceal the payment of State aid.
The marketing services of Ryanair/AMS could not promote the city of Montpellier and its surrounding area effectively:
the APFTE’s choice of Ryanair was not sufficiently justified in economic terms;
Ryanair’s marketing services did not have the alleged effect.
Supposing the marketing services did have an effect, they benefited Ryanair more than anyone else, given that, as a private undertaking motivated by a desire for profitability, Ryanair has to carry out pricing and marketing measures to fill its aircraft.
The presentation as a marketing campaign was simply a tool to justify the payments made to Ryanair. The Commission has arrived at this conclusion on the basis of the following findings.
The Commission has gathered evidence indicating that there was no real intention on the part of the APFTE to advertise the region. Instead, the ‘promotion’ of the area referred to by the public bodies behind the APFTE consisted of keeping Ryanair at Montpellier airport in the hope that the local economy would profit from the economic benefits thus created.
According to the French authorities, the website initially used by the APFTE was www.flights-montpellier-mediterranean.com, which was set up in 2006 and belonged to the CCIM. In May 2013, this website was replaced by goto-montpellier.com, which was also owned by the CCIM.
The Commission therefore concludes that the APFTE was not engaged in marketing in the strict sense of the term, but in making payments intended to encourage airlines to allocate their capacity to Montpellier airport.
Thus the APFTE’s intention in concluding the agreements with Ryanair/AMS was not to promote Montpellier and its surrounding area through marketing campaigns in the strict sense of the term, but rather to encourage Ryanair to keep operating from Montpellier airport.
An analysis of the 2010 to 2017 marketing agreements and of the 2013 and 2017 invitations to tender confirms that the agreements and invitations to tender very specifically targeted the flight routes operated by Ryanair.
The APFTE’s agreements and invitations to tender were gradually adapted to conceal the link between the air services and the purchase of marketing services. The initial agreements were concluded without an invitation to tender and were based on clear commitments by Ryanair to operate certain routes. The later agreements were preceded by invitations to tender, and referred to Ryanair’s operations at Montpellier airport less directly, but still sufficiently explicitly for Ryanair to be selected. The desire to support Ryanair’s operations through the marketing agreements is evident in the clauses of the various marketing agreements, which refer directly or indirectly to Ryanair’s operations at Montpellier airport with regard to the existing routes.
The 2010 agreement and its successive amendment and renewal agreements and also the 2013 agreements and their successive renewal agreements were based on precise commitments by Ryanair to operate routes to Montpellier airport and imposed clear obligations on Ryanair in this regard. The 2010 agreement explicitly referred to these commitments and made the marketing payments conditional on their fulfilment.
The tender specifications for the 2013 invitation to tender, which subsequently became contractual obligations, contained very precise requirements to be met by Ryanair in terms of air transport from Montpellier to Brussels-Charleroi, Frankfurt-Hahn and Leeds-Bradford, whereas they were very general, not to say vague, on the nature of the marketing services to be provided. Moreover, it is striking that no agreement was ultimately concluded for the ‘Birmingham’ lot, which was a route that Ryanair had stopped operating between the publication of the tender specifications for the 2013 invitation to tender and the conclusion of the marketing agreements. This last point perfectly illustrates the connection between the marketing agreements concluded by the APFTE and the operation of routes by Ryanair.
The Commission has not identified any particular reason for choosing the three regions in question (Rhineland-Palatinate, Wallonia and Yorkshire) as targets of the marketing services, other than the fact that they were the only three regions already served by direct flights operated by Ryanair from Montpellier airport. If the APFTE had been motivated by a desire to engage in regional marketing, and thus to target a large number of potential tourists, it would have chosen more appropriate regions on the basis of the number of potential tourists, or a broader cross-section of regions. For example, the choice of Wallonia (around 3,5 million inhabitants) without including neighbouring Flanders (around 6,5 million inhabitants), which is situated within the catchment area of Brussels-Charleroi airport, is inexplicable. It is also striking that the invitation to tender chose Rhineland-Palatinate (around 4 million inhabitants) and not the neighbouring Länder within or at least very close to the catchment area of Frankfurt-Hahn airport, namely Hessen (around 6 million inhabitants, with its important cities of Wiesbaden (90 km from Frankfurt-Hahn airport) or Frankfurt am Main (120 km from Frankfurt-Hahn airport)), North Rhine-Westphalia (nearly 18 million inhabitants) and Saarland (nearly 1 million inhabitants), or larger urban areas such as Berlin (linked to Montpellier by a direct flight operated by the airline easyJet) or Düsseldorf (in the same catchment area as the city of Cologne, linked to Montpellier by a direct flight operated by the airline Eurowings). As regards the United Kingdom, aside from Yorkshire (around 5,2 million inhabitants), a larger number of tourists could have been targeted by including the neighbouring urban region of Greater Manchester (around 2,7 million inhabitants, situated less than 100 km from Leeds-Bradford airport) or the urban region of London (around 8,8 million inhabitants, with its airports at Gatwick, Heathrow and Luton being linked to Montpellier by direct flights operated by easyJet and British Airways).
The Commission regards the inclusion of obligations for Ryanair to operate flights as important evidence of the real object of the agreements concluded between the APFTE and Ryanair, namely the remuneration of Ryanair for continuing to operate at Montpellier airport.
Furthermore, the criteria of the 2013 and 2017 invitations to tender were defined in such a way as to favour Ryanair’s bids over the services of a conventional marketing service provider.
An analysis of the marketing agreements and corresponding invitations to tender shows that the decisive criteria defined by the APFTE and selected in the invitations to tender favoured AMS over conventional marketing service providers in particular by introducing the criterion of serving flight routes and needing to offer a website specific to the marketing service provider with enough traffic to offer online advertising on that site.
Although the APFTE concluded marketing agreements with several airlines, the formal investigation has not found any evidence to show that before concluding the 2010, 2013 and 2017 agreements that were the subject of the investigation the APFTE genuinely sought to conclude marketing agreements with an operator other than Ryanair/AMS. This is important for the analysis with regard to selectivity, but the Commission considers that the orientation of the choice of service provider towards AMS should also be taken into account as evidence of the lack of a market economy operator objective on the part of the APFTE. As indicated in recitals 326 et seq., which set out to show that the marketing agreements were selective, the Commission has concluded that the 2013 and 2017 invitations to tender were so designed that AMS would be awarded the marketing agreements in question.
The Commission has identified several points confirming that the APFTE favoured the services of Ryanair in the criteria it adopted for the invitations to tender for the 2013 and 2017 marketing agreements covered by the formal investigation.
Similarly, the invitation to tender of 13 May 2017 and the 2017 agreement were very general, not to say vague, about the nature of the marketing services to be provided by the successful tenderer. As indicated in recitals 208 et seq., it is clear that the invitation to tender was designed to select Ryanair rather than any marketing service provider chosen according to the nature of the services offered and the price charged.
As the invitation to tender also left the tenderer considerable freedom to choose the characteristics of the marketing services offered, it enabled Ryanair/AMS to choose the services in such a way that they primarily promoted its own air transport services to Montpellier on its website, a choice that was not penalised in the assessment of the invitation to tender because Ryanair was able to meet the only imperative condition of the tender by providing a link to the APFTE’s website on Ryanair’s own website.
For the 2017 agreement, it should also be noted that Ryanair was the only airline to serve the three regions covered by the first three lots of the invitation to tender. The Commission has been unable to identify any reasons for such a precise choice of regions other than a desire to target Ryanair’s operations, the plausibility of which is also demonstrated in recitals 189 et seq. However, the assessment of tenders carried out by the APFTE shows that the ability of the marketing service provider to precisely target the regional public was not decisive in the choice of bid. For example, the APFTE based itself on the number of hits on Ryanair’s website in the whole of Germany, and not on the number of hits on Ryanair’s German website from people located in Rhineland-Palatinate. The Commission concludes that the specifications in the invitation to tender with regard to the regions to be covered served only to favour AMS over other marketing service providers.
The weighting of criteria in the 2017 invitation to tender (price of services 40 % and technical value 60 %) ensured that Ryanair would be chosen even in the event of a lower-priced competing bid. In the 2013 invitation to tender, the weighting of the selection criteria had put the price first (price of services 85 %, technical value as shown by the technical brief 15 %).
Furthermore, the marketing services ultimately purchased by the APFTE from Ryanair were confined to the services offered on Ryanair’s website, even though the 2017 invitation to tender had been open to a very broad range of marketing services (beyond the services offered only on airline websites).
An entity wanting solely to purchase marketing services to promote a given area would have no interest in including in the agreements concluded with the provider of those marketing services obligations regarding the operation of air transport services. Nor would it have any interest in including obligations of that kind in invitations to tender organised in order to purchase marketing services.
The inclusion of such highly detailed obligations in an agreement for the purchase of marketing services has the effect of financially supporting the provision of air services via the remuneration of the marketing services. This excludes from the outset marketing service providers that – despite their ability to promote the city of Montpellier effectively through marketing campaigns in the strict sense – do not offer air transport services.
For its part, Ryanair argues that the service to the destination (i.e. Montpellier) covered by the marketing agreements is explained by the concern to ensure that marketing is effective. It would be less attractive for customers of Ryanair/AMS, such as the APFTE, to purchase marketing on the Ryanair website if there were no flight route to Montpellier operated by Ryanair. The APFTE therefore focused on the promotion of tourist flows that could be developed with existing flight routes.
The Commission observes that neither the French authorities nor Ryanair have provided any quantitative or qualitative evidence justifying the choice of Ryanair routes as the most appropriate marketing tool by comparison not only with other forms of advertising but also with other flight routes to Montpellier airport.
The Commission has not found any evidence to show that the APFTE assessed the potential impact of its budget either ex ante or ex post, whether by evaluating different service providers, by evaluating the impact of various marketing services, by assessing the impact of marketing campaigns targeted at different regions of northern Europe, or by analysing the costs and benefits of the marketing agreements concluded with Ryanair/AMS. The APFTE did not seek to conclude marketing agreements for the regions or destinations covered by Ryanair with an operator other than Ryanair/AMS, or to minimise its marketing expenditure. These various points support the Commission’s conclusion that the APFTE’s decisions to support Ryanair through marketing agreements were taken in the absence of any proper economic analysis.
The documents concerning the APFTE’s internal discussions show that, in the allocation of its marketing budget, the APFTE systematically favoured the payments planned for Ryanair and made the funding of the promotion of new destinations proposed by the APFTE’s private members conditional on funds remaining after allocation of the payments to Ryanair/AMS, without ever questioning or reassessing the benefits of those marketing agreements.
In this context, the Commission has found no evidence to show that the APFTE was genuinely interested in understanding the concrete impact of the marketing campaigns, even though they were funded by over [60-70] % of its budget.
In the same way, the APFTE does not seem to have looked at the performance indicators for the marketing services purchased from Ryanair/AMS, for example the number of clicks on the APFTE’s website or the number of flight tickets purchased during the marketing campaign. It should be noted here that at a meeting on 12 February 2019, in the presence of a representative of the French authorities, Ryanair said that for marketing agreements such as those concluded by the APFTE AMS did not offer its customers statistics which might have allowed the performance of the customer’s marketing campaign to be measured and its effectiveness to be assessed. This is surprising, as one of the advantages of online marketing is being able to measure more easily the impact of marketing campaigns. Ryanair has in fact used this argument in reports submitted to the Commission to demonstrate the value of its website as an online advertising space.
Other marketing agreements concluded between Ryanair/AMS and private companies also show that contractual clauses can indeed be inserted that link the price of the marketing services to the actual number of customers obtained through these marketing campaigns.
Ryanair has not operated at Montpellier airport since the 2019 summer season, but offers a route to Brussels-Charleroi from Béziers airport, which is 70 km from Montpellier airport.
The cessation of Ryanair’s operations at Montpellier airport coincided with the cessation of payments to Ryanair/AMS by the APFTE. According to the French authorities, the last payment to Ryanair/AMS was made in February 2019.
But in fact the APFTE or the legal structure that replaced it lost interest in promoting Montpellier and its surrounding area through Ryanair/AMS.
If the marketing agreements with Ryanair/AMS had really had the supposed effect of increasing the flow of international tourists to Montpellier and the Montpellier area, the APFTE or its replacement would have been interested in maintaining the agreements in order to encourage the flow of international passengers arriving in the area via Béziers and Nîmes airports.
The Commission would point out that the marketing relations targeting Birmingham – the basis of additional payments to Ryanair/AMS through the amendment of 20 April 2011 to the marketing agreement of 16 September 2010 – were initiated in the month that Ryanair started the service between Birmingham airport and Montpellier.
Even assuming that the marketing agreements did have effects of the kind alleged by Ryanair/AMS and the APFTE on the flow of international passengers, the Commission considers that there was no sufficient economic justification for dedicating over [60-70] % of the APFTE’s budget to just Ryanair/AMS and to just those tourists coming from Brussels-Charleroi, Frankfurt-Hahn, Leeds-Bradford and Birmingham airports.
As explained in the following chapter, neither the actual impact nor the maximum potential impact – alleged by Ryanair – of the marketing campaigns purchased by the APFTE from Ryanair/AMS would justify the price paid by the APFTE if it were acting as a market economy purchaser.
This is all the more striking given that the services offered by Ryanair/AMS and purchased by the APFTE at a cost of over [60-70] % of its total budget consisted solely of the promotion of Montpellier as a destination in connection with Ryanair’s flight operations, entirely through Ryanair’s media outlets.
However, the maximum potential number of tourists arriving by air with Ryanair was very low. It should be noted that Ryanair’s market share never exceeded [10-20] % of the passengers at Montpellier airport and went into constant decline after 2012. Among these passengers, the Ryanair marketing agreements – even assuming that they had the effect alleged by Ryanair – could have increased the proportion of international tourists only by a very small number.
Nor have the French authorities provided any information to show that Ryanair passengers were the most attractive target market segment in terms of future growth potential.
Among the services that Ryanair/AMS might have offered, the choices made by the APFTE in its purchases of marketing services made no sense if the intention was to promote the region.
The online marketing services provided by Ryanair/AMS on the basis of the marketing agreements concluded with the APFTE consisted essentially in inserting messages and links on the Montpellier destination page of the Ryanair website, and inserting a link to the website designated by the APFTE on the English, German, Dutch and Belgian (in French and in Dutch) homepage of this same website.
But the Montpellier destination page of the Ryanair website was targeted mainly at people who had already decided to use or were likely to consider using Ryanair’s transport services to Montpellier. In other words, the information provided about Montpellier on Ryanair’s website was unlikely to attract new customers.
In this respect, it is worthwhile noting that the marketing agreements submitted by Ryanair that were concluded between private non-airport enterprises and AMS draw their marketing value from the possibility of selling tourist goods or services to passengers travelling with Ryanair. These potential travellers are identified as likely to travel to a clearly defined destination airport following their visit to Ryanair’s website (purchase of ticket, search of available flights, etc.) and are therefore the target of marketing messages encouraging them to purchase goods or services at their destination airport.
Ryanair’s marketing value is therefore targeted at Ryanair customers who have already chosen their destination airport or whose visit to Ryanair’s website indicates that they are likely to choose a specific destination airport, in order to encourage them to purchase a tourist service at their final destination. The Commission does not rule out the possibility that the marketing offered by AMS on Ryanair’s website may have a value for certain enterprises interested in selling goods or services to Ryanair customers, such as a car rental company or a regional tour provider. But that is not the situation of a regional authority, which first and foremost has to ensure that potential tourists become interested in the region. For the APFTE, the benefit of such a marketing campaign is therefore very small, or indeed non-existent.
Furthermore, only the English, German, Dutch and Belgian (in French and in Dutch) homepages of Ryanair’s website were covered by the marketing services agreement. This is further evidence that the marketing services were designed essentially to promote Ryanair’s services between Montpellier and the destinations that Ryanair undertook to serve, which had catchment areas situated in Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
The specific choice of Ryanair/AMS marketing services cannot be explained by any considerations of regional development apart from the intention to subsidise Ryanair’s flights.
However, neither the APFTE’s constitution nor the analyses provided by the French authorities or by Ryanair indicate that the APFTE’s priority was to target passengers from narrowly defined northern European regions (namely Wallonia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Yorkshire and the Midlands), ignoring other similar markets such as the neighbouring regions mentioned in recital 209.
Ryanair claims that the marketing agreements helped to build the ‘Montpellier’ brand. If Ryanair’s marketing did have an effect on the building of the Montpellier region brand among potential tourists that reached beyond Ryanair’s own website, the APFTE could have used the marketing on Ryanair’s website more effectively.
However, in this case, the choice of marketing media ensured that the marketing campaigns funded by the APFTE benefited only Ryanair’s air transport services to Montpellier. These findings lead the Commission to conclude that, contrary to the assertions of Ryanair/AMS, the marketing agreements concluded with Ryanair did not contribute to the development of a ‘Montpellier’ brand.
As indicated in the previous chapter, the marketing campaigns purchased by the APFTE could not reach all Ryanair’s customers. Moreover, the formal investigation, and in particular the information provided by Ryanair, has shown that the contribution made by AMS’s marketing services was confined to the Ryanair environment and therefore mainly attracted potential Ryanair customers, without reaching other potential tourists not matching Ryanair’s profile in terms of their origin, their choice of means of transport or their consumption behaviour.
In addition, the Ryanair marketing campaigns did not target potential tourists – whether domestic or international – who chose other airlines or other means of transport such as trains (Montpellier is connected to the TGV network and has direct train links with Paris, Brussels and Spain), buses or cars. Ryanair itself has provided evidence in this respect, by indicating in particular that many customers go directly to the Ryanair website without using a search engine. Moreover, Ryanair refers to the low ‘bounce rate’ of the Ryanair website, which means that visitors to the homepage of the Ryanair website are likely to remain on the site and look at other pages instead of immediately leaving the site. This suggests that most visitors to the Ryanair website use the site specifically to purchase Ryanair flights rather than to look for ideas regarding possible destinations.
Furthermore, Ryanair particularly attracts travellers interested in low prices, which rules out a large proportion of luxury tourism.
According to the APFTE, the Ryanair/AMS marketing campaigns served to promote Montpellier and its surrounding area in order to increase the economic benefits for the region.
For its part, Ryanair/AMS argues that the marketing agreements predominantly affected not the load factor, but rather the proportion of Ryanair passengers accounted for by visiting passengers. However, the Commission is not convinced that the marketing agreements had this effect, for the following reasons.
The Commission recalls that Ryanair explains the contribution of the marketing agreements as follows: the interest in concluding such an agreement for an airport or a region lies, on the one hand, in increasing the airport’s visibility and the value of its brand (‘brand building’ to use Ryanair’s words) and, on the other hand and more specifically, in increasing the proportion of visiting or incoming passengers from outside (tourists or business travellers compared with local passengers who live in the Montpellier region), because their economic benefits for the region are more significant.
In this context of increasing the proportion of visiting passengers, Ryanair maintains that marketing agreements contribute less to an increase in the load factor of a given flight, which is determined mainly by the yield management carried out by Ryanair itself. The marketing campaigns allegedly help mainly to increase the proportion of the number of passengers predetermined by Ryanair’s yield management that is accounted for by visiting passengers. With regard to the impact of marketing on passenger make-up, Ryanair alleges that without a marketing agreement, by default, the proportion between local passengers and visiting passengers is more or less the same for each flight. A marketing campaign for an airport or a region on Ryanair’s website consequently helps to increase this proportion of visiting passengers.
However, the Commission would point out that this evidence shows that the purpose of the marketing agreements concluded with the APFTE was not to promote Montpellier as a destination through marketing campaigns, but rather – as indicated in recitals 189 et seq. to keep Ryanair at Montpellier airport. This means that the real impact of the marketing agreements in terms of advertising was not important to the contracting parties, which explains the choice of Ryanair/AMS made by the APFTE even though it was not economically justified, as shown in recitals 248 et seq.
The formal investigation has produced evidence, described in the following chapters, that the real advertising effect of the marketing campaigns was small.
First, the Commission concludes from the formal investigation that, contrary to the assertions of Ryanair and the APFTE, the tangible contribution made by the marketing campaigns is uncertain.
The formal investigation has not confirmed that customers genuinely seeking to promote a given region through advertising, without any link to the regional airport concerned, would have been interested in the marketing services actually provided by Ryanair/AMS at the price paid by the APFTE.
Moreover, there is no quantitative evidence of the tangible contribution made by the marketing campaigns purchased by the APFTE, but there is prima facie evidence that the marketing agreements concluded by the APFTE had no impact on the proportion of visiting tourists or on brand building.
As indicated in recital 229, there is no evidence quantitatively proving the alleged effect of the marketing agreements concluded by the APFTE with Ryanair/AMS.
Ryanair insists that the marketing agreements had a positive impact on the Montpellier region, or at least on its airport, owing to their effect of increasing the proportion of visiting tourists, and also on brand building and the future decisions of potential passengers. However, Ryanair argues that these effects are not measurable and consequently cannot be proven by statistics.
With regard to the main effect of the marketing agreements claimed by Ryanair, namely an increase in the proportion of visiting tourists using Montpellier airport, Ryanair confines itself to asserting that this effect is a known and obvious phenomenon in the sector. Despite its assertions, Ryanair has not provided any tangible evidence allowing the Commission to measure the positive effect of its marketing campaigns on Montpellier airport.
In short, neither Ryanair nor the French authorities have provided any evidence to show that the marketing agreements concluded by the APFTE had the effect of increasing the number of international tourists on the routes operated by Ryanair to Montpellier.
What is more, the formal investigation has found prima facie evidence that the marketing agreements concluded by the APFTE had no impact on the proportion of visiting tourists or on brand building.
In addition, with regard to the effect on the proportion of visiting tourists and on brand building, Ryanair seems to want to attribute the benefit of its presence as an airline at a regional airport to the alleged effects of a marketing agreement for that region, without differentiating the real causal links. Ryanair has submitted arguments and documents intended to prove the positive influence of Ryanair’s presence at an airport on the economic development of that airport and its brand building. However, this information shows that any increase in the number of visiting tourists stems merely from the fact that an airport in the region is being served by Ryanair. The arguments put forward by Ryanair in this context relate solely to the effects of Ryanair’s presence at a given airport. It follows that these arguments have no relevance to the tangible benefit of marketing campaigns to the region. The information provided by Ryanair regarding the effect of its presence at a regional airport tends rather to indicate that a marketing agreement has no significant additional impact on the proportion of visiting tourists or on brand building. It is therefore clear that the choice of destination made by a Ryanair customer depends primarily on the offer of direct routes by Ryanair, given that Ryanair operates a point-to-point commercial model based entirely on direct routes. In such a situation, an additional marketing agreement does not offer any significant added value for the flow of visiting tourists.
As indicated above, the Commission doubts that the marketing agreements concluded with Ryanair had a positive effect for the APFTE and its public funders. If the marketing agreements did have an effect, it was Ryanair that drew the most benefit. Assuming that these marketing campaigns did have the effect of encouraging customers of the airline Ryanair to purchase flight tickets to Montpellier, that effect would primarily have benefited Ryanair, and would have been the fruit of an effort to promote its services that Ryanair could have been be expected to have taken on itself.
Although the Commission doubts that the marketing agreements concluded with Ryanair had any tangible effect, their potential effect might have been twofold. Firstly, a marketing campaign might have increased the load factor of the aircraft and, secondly, a marketing campaign might have helped to alter the balance between passengers visiting Montpellier and passengers living in the Montpellier region.
Thus particularly in summer, when tourist flows naturally head towards the south and especially hotter and sunnier destinations beside the sea, Ryanair has an interest in carrying as many passengers as possible who will be prepared to pay a high-season price. In the 2010 to 2019 period, for each of the destinations concerned, the number of flights operated in the summer season was higher than the number of flights in the winter season.
Where there is a marketing campaign for a given region that is served by Ryanair, therefore, the promotion of destinations that allow Ryanair to obtain a high-season price will be in Ryanair’s interest too, and if the marketing campaign has an impact Ryanair will benefit directly. Even in the absence of a marketing agreement, Ryanair would have an interest in carrying a high proportion of tourists wanting to visit Montpellier and its surrounding area.
In addition, a marketing campaign could help to attract passengers who would not have been persuaded by the price alone, or who would not have envisaged travelling with Ryanair to Montpellier if they had not been exposed to a marketing campaign. Passengers who are attracted through marketing campaigns consequently reduce the pressure on Ryanair to attract passengers solely through its pricing policy in order to achieve its load factor objectives.
If the marketing services sold to the APFTE did have an effect, therefore, this was likely to increase Ryanair’s revenues and profits, particularly because Ryanair then had to reduce its prices less in order to fill its aircraft, or was enabled to increase the load factor of its aircraft.
As the 2013 and 2017 invitations to tender left the tenderer considerable freedom to choose the characteristics of the marketing services offered, they enabled Ryanair/AMS to choose the services in such a way that they primarily promoted its own air transport services to Montpellier on its website, a choice that was not penalised in the assessment of the invitation to tender because Ryanair was able to meet the only imperative condition of the tender by providing a link to the APFTE’s website on Ryanair's own website.
With regard to the impact of marketing campaigns on the balance between visiting and resident passengers, Ryanair has not provided any information on profit per passenger based on this typology. However, it is difficult to imagine that a marketing campaign likely to increase the number of tourists would not have a positive effect on the load factor or on fares, in which case Ryanair would benefit from that campaign in terms of filling its aircraft and improving the profitability of the route.
Lastly, Ryanair’s annual reports show that the company has been making greater and greater profits from ‘ancillary revenues’, which, in addition to in-flight sales and supplementary services such as insurance and the like, include revenues from marketing agreements concluded with third parties such as hotel partners or car rental companies.
The Commission concludes from the aforementioned evidence that neither the APFTE nor its public members actually needed the marketing services purchased from Ryanair/AMS, and that the purchase of those services was designed to justify the payments made to Ryanair for its flight operations, because the marketing services purchased were not genuinely capable of meeting the APFTE’s public policy objectives.
Establishing that the APFTE had no actual need to conclude the marketing agreements is sufficient to determine that an advantage was conferred. In this case, therefore, it is not necessary to determine whether the price paid for the marketing agreements was a market price, since the services provided did not constitute a real marketing service but rather corresponded to a subsidy for air transport services.
However, given that Ryanair raised this point in its comments on the opening decision, the Commission would point out that the formal investigation has not found any evidence to show that the prices paid by the APFTE for the Ryanair/AMS marketing services were in line with market prices.
Compliance with public procurement rules guaranteed that the prices were market prices.
AMS’s prices were justified by the popularity of Ryanair’s website.
AMS’s prices were favourable compared to those of other marketing service providers, and AMS’s services were superior to the services of other marketing service providers.
That the prices charged by Ryanair were market prices is proved by an economic analysis that Ryanair commissioned from an economic analysis firm, which compared Ryanair’s rate card with the prices of other marketing service providers.
As indicated in recital 230, the Commission has not found any evidence to show that the APFTE conducted a cost-benefit analysis or a price comparison or that it showed any interest in minimising costs for the marketing campaigns purchased from Ryanair/AMS.
Invitations to tender were organised for the 2013 and 2017 marketing agreements; the 2010 agreement and its successive amendment and renewal agreements were not preceded by an invitation to tender. For the 2010 agreement in particular, therefore, the APFTE does not seem to have tried to minimise the purchase cost of the desired marketing services.
Contrary to Ryanair’s assertions, the Commission concludes that, in the circumstances of this case, the issue of invitations to tender did not guarantee market prices.
Moreover, at the time of the 2013 and 2017 invitations to tender, the Commission had already publicly announced its intention to target marketing agreements concluded directly between Ryanair/AMS and regional airports.
Furthermore, Ryanair claims that the prices paid by the APFTE for the Ryanair/AMS services were in line with market prices for those marketing services.
However, the Commission concludes from the formal investigation that the arguments put forward by Ryanair do not demonstrate the existence of a market price.
In support of its argument, Ryanair has submitted a study commissioned from an economic analysis firm, which compares the prices of AMS’s marketing agreements with the prices charged by other online marketing service providers and concludes that they were in line with market prices.
However, the Commission does not regard this analysis as providing a relevant basis for determining whether the marketing payments made by the APFTE to Ryanair/AMS were in line with market prices. The study submitted by Ryanair compares only the gross prices indicated on the rate cards of several marketing service providers, without taking account of discounts applied to arrive at the actual prices. From the formal investigation the Commission concludes that the granting of discounts on the gross prices indicated in rate cards is a common market practice, and that the discounts applied to marketing agreements can vary considerably from one agreement to another, even for the services of the same undertaking. Discounts are therefore a significant factor in a comparison of marketing service prices, a factor that should have' been taken into account in the study submitted by Ryanair.
The various other bilateral marketing agreements submitted by Ryanair at the Commission’s request – the precise content of which is confidential – vary significantly in their durations, scope and prices. There is therefore no price transparency in this market.
Moreover, an analysis of the bids submitted for lots 4 and 5 of the 2017 invitation to tender shows that advertising for the region on websites comparable in terms of services – such as those of the railway companies SNCF and RENFE – could have been obtained at a much lower price.
Lastly, even if benchmarking had been possible in respect of the marketing agreements concluded by the APFTE (something the Commission was unable to confirm in the formal investigation), such benchmarking could not have shown that the APFTE was paying a market price. Given the real reason for concluding the marketing agreements, set out in detail in recitals 192 et seq., benchmarking could have shown only that the amount of the aid paid to Ryanair/AMS via the marketing agreements was sufficient to ensure that Ryanair served Montpellier airport.
For these reasons, the Commission considers that the marketing agreements in question conferred an economic advantage on Ryanair.
The measures in question are bilateral agreements concluded between the APFTE and Ryanair/AMS on terms which have not been made public and which were not subject to conditions of purchase standardised by the APFTE and applied to Ryanair’s competitors.
France maintains that the putting out to tender of the 2013 and 2017 agreements proves that there was no selectivity, as the invitations to tender were open to all interested companies.
Ryanair has not put forward any arguments on the selectivity of the marketing agreements as such, but only in respect of the marketing agreements and the airport services agreements considered jointly. In this context, Ryanair complains that the Commission has not investigated whether other airlines wanting to serve Montpellier airport might have obtained the same terms.
The 2010 marketing agreement (and its amendment and renewals) was concluded directly with AMS without a prior invitation to tender and without having been based on an act meeting the requirements of Article 1(d) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1589.
The minutes of the APFTE’s inaugural General Meeting of 24 June 2010 reflect a clear desire to continue the previous agreements with Ryanair/AMS, without looking for an alternative service provider for those destinations and that budget, and in the absence of rules governing that type of payment.
With regard to the 2013 and 2017 marketing agreements, the Commission does not consider that the invitations to tender organised by the APFTE were sufficient to effectively open the procurement to other service providers.
The Commission would point out that between the conclusion of the 2010 and 2013 marketing agreements it had adopted decisions opening formal investigations into, among others, the French airports of Nîmes, Pau and Angoulême, which ended with negative final decisions, and which likewise concerned marketing agreements concluded by Ryanair/AMS. The Commission’s intention to assess the conformity of such agreements with the State aid rules and the need for those concerned to halt or at least conceal their practices were therefore evident.
As shown in recitals 63 et seq. and 202 et seq., the 2013 and 2017 invitations to tender were designed in such a way as to favour the services offered by Ryanair/AMS so as to continue paying Ryanair and keep it operating at Montpellier airport. Owing to the obligations imposed in terms of the destinations and regions concerned and the marketing services that had to be offered, no service provider other than Ryanair – either marketing firm or airline – was in a position to compete with Ryanair in these invitations to tender.
In 2013 Ryanair was the only company to bid for lots 1 to 4 of the invitation to tender, which concerned destinations already operated by Ryanair. On the other hand, Ryanair did not bid for lot 5 (the guide price for which was much lower than the guide prices for lots 1 to 4), which did not concern a Ryanair destination (another airline was already operating flights to that destination from Montpellier).
With regard to the 2017 invitation to tender, the Commission would point out that, at the end of this process, the APFTE implemented agreements with Ryanair only for the first three lots (for which the guide prices were much higher than the guide prices for lots 4 to 7). Thus the additional lots were clearly a device to make the choice of Ryanair following the invitation to tender appear more credible. Moreover, the competing bid for these three lots – which was very different in terms of the marketing services offered – was precisely EUR […] higher for each lot, but the APFTE did not question this consistent price difference. In addition, the APFTE based its decision to choose Ryanair on the fact that its marketing offer was better targeted at the intended customers, although there was nothing to show that the marketing services offered by Ryanair genuinely targeted one of the regions mentioned in the invitation to tender (Wallonia, Yorkshire, and Rhineland-Palatinate). In the services actually provided by Ryanair on the basis of this marketing agreement, the targeting of regions was limited to the placement of the advertisement on specific language or national versions of the Ryanair website (English, German, Dutch, and Belgian (in French and in Dutch) websites), which shows that the targeting was more national than regional.
The Commission considers that, under those circumstances, the 2013 and 2017 invitations to tender were not such as to guarantee fair competition between Ryanair and other undertakings, and were not intended to do so.
The Commission concludes that the specifications of these 2013 and 2017 invitations to tender oriented the choice of successful tenderer towards Ryanair from the outset, and that the criteria applied to the choice of successful tenderer for lots 1 to 3 of the invitation to tender were designed to ensure that only Ryanair would be chosen.
Consequently, the Commission concludes that the economic advantage conferred on Ryanair by the 2010, 2013 and 2017 marketing agreements and their respective amendments and renewals is selective.
The Commission concludes that the agreements in question affect trade between Member States and distort competition.
In the light of the above, the Commission concludes that the measures in question constitute State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU granted to Ryanair.
France has not provided any analysis of compatibility with the internal market, because it considers that the payments in question do not constitute State aid. For its part the Commission does not have any information to show that the measures in question are compatible with the internal market. The only basis of compatibility that might possibly be considered is Article 107(3)(c) TFEU, as interpreted by the 2014 guidelines with regard to start-up aid to airlines (Section 5.2.).
However, in the present case, none of the marketing agreements in question satisfy these tests.
In the light of the above, the Commission concludes that the State aid involved in the agreements in question is incompatible with the internal market.
Article 108(3) TFEU states that ‘the Commission shall be informed, in sufficient time to enable it to submit its comments, of any plans to grant or alter aid […]. The Member State concerned shall not put its proposed measures into effect until this procedure has resulted in a final decision.’.
In the present case, it is plain that the agreements concerned were implemented before being notified to the Commission.
The Commission has not identified any legal basis exempting France from notifying the aid.
The Commission therefore considers that the payments made to Ryanair on the basis of the 2010, 2013 and 2017 marketing agreements and their amendments and renewals constitute aid granted in breach of Article 108(3) TFEU.
In line with this case-law, Article 16(1) of Regulation (EU) 2015/1589 states that ‘where negative decisions are taken in cases of unlawful aid, the Commission shall decide that the Member State concerned shall take all necessary measures to recover the aid from the beneficiary’.
Consequently, given that the measures in question were implemented in breach of Article 108(3) TFEU and are considered to constitute incompatible aid, this aid must be recovered in full in order to restore the situation that existed in the internal market prior to its granting. The recovery must cover the period from when the aid was made available to the beneficiary until its actual recovery. The amount to be recovered must bear interest until its actual recovery.
From the information available to the Commission on the date of adoption of this decision, the sums to be recovered are those that the APFTE actually paid to Ryanair or its subsidiary AMS between 2010 and 2019 on the basis of the marketing agreements concluded during that period, as indicated in Table 4 (see recital 82).
The Commission finds that France unlawfully implemented marketing agreements signed between the APFTE and Ryanair/AMS between 2010 and 2018 in breach of Article 108(3) TFEU. Given that the sums paid to Ryanair/AMS on the basis of these marketing agreements constitute aid incompatible with the internal market, they must be recovered in full in order to restore the situation that existed in the internal market prior to their granting,
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: