Pursuant to Article 4(3) of the Agreement establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development2 (EBRD), the Governors of the EBRD, at their annual meeting in Zagreb on 14 and 15 May 2010, decided in Resolutions 1263 and 1284 to increase by EUR 10 billion the authorised capital stock of the EBRD in order to maintain enough capital to sustain, over the medium term, a reasonable level of activity in the EBRD countries of operation within statutory limits.

Prior to those resolutions, the capital of the EBRD was fixed at EUR 20 billion, of which the Union subscribed to 60 000 shares, each share having a par value of EUR 10 000.

Pursuant to Resolution 126, the authorised capital stock of the EBRD is increased by 100 000 paid-in shares, and each member is issued a number of whole shares, rounded downwards, pro rata to their existing shareholding. The paid-in part of the capital increase is paid through integration in the capital of part of the EBRD’s unrestricted general reserves. This Decision thus has no direct impact on the budget of the Union. All EBRD shareholders automatically received paid-in shares in proportion of their existing shareholding, without any further procedural steps taken by the shareholders themselves. Accordingly, the Union has been issued with 3 031 new shares, each having a par value of EUR 10 000 increasing the number of paid-in shares of the Union to 63 031.

Pursuant to Resolution 128, the authorised capital stock of the EBRD should be increased by 900 000 callable shares, each share having a par value of EUR 10 000 which is subject to redemption. Each member should be entitled to subscribe, at par, to a number of whole callable shares up to, but not in excess of, 42,857 % of the number of shares owned by such member immediately prior to the effective date of the capital increase. The Union is thus entitled to subscribe to up to 27 013 callable shares by 31 December 2011.

Pursuant to Resolution 128, the use of EBRD’s capital should be monitored pursuant to the fourth Capital Resources Review (CRR4) for the period 2011-2015 (CRR4 period). The EBRD Board of Governors could decide in 2015, within the framework of CRR4, that part of the unutilised callable capital could be redeemed under specific conditions to be agreed in 2015. Pursuant to Resolution 128, the EBRD Board of Governors resolved that such redemption of callable shares would be automatic and applicable to all EBRD members who have subscribed to the callable shares authorised by that Resolution. In such a situation, the Commission would take note of, and implement, the EBRD Governors’ Resolution.

This Decision should enhance the capacity of the EBRD to increase its activities in its countries of operation, thus providing valuable assistance to the economies of those countries in difficult economic times. It is appropriate for the Union to subscribe to those additional shares in order to achieve the Union’s objectives in the field of economic external relations and preserve its relative voting power within the EBRD.

The increase in callable capital provided for in this Decision contributes to maintaining the EBRD’s access to financial markets.

The Commission should present to the European Parliament and the Council, by the end of the CRR4 period, a report assessing the effectiveness of the existing system of European public financing institutions promoting investment in Europe and its neighbourhood. That report should include recommendations on the cooperation between the respective banks and the optimisation and coordination of their activities as called for by the European Parliament in its resolution of 25 March 2009 on the 2007 Annual Reports of the European Investment Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development5.

In the countries of common intervention outside the Union, the EBRD should be encouraged to develop its cooperation with the other European public financing institutions through agreements such as the tripartite ‘Memorandum of Understanding between the European Commission, the European Investment Bank together with the European Investment Fund, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development in respect of cooperation outside the European Union’, which allows the banks to act in a complementary way by relying on their respective comparative advantages.

The contingent liability related to the callable part of the subscribed capital is reflected in the budget of the Union in p.m. line 01 03 01 02: ‘European Bank for Reconstruction and Development — Callable portion of subscribed capital’.

The representatives of the Union in the governing bodies of the EBRD should encourage the EBRD: to continue implementing the best prudential banking practices in order to further preserve its very strong capital position; to intervene in areas consistent with the key objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy in order to enhance the overall coherence of the Union’s external action policy; to further develop financial instruments, based on co-financing between the budgets of the Union and of the EBRD, contributing to the achievement of the Union’s objectives, while taking into account that such cooperation should be accompanied by effective control over, and visibility of, the Union’s public funds; and to provide, on its website, appropriate information about the beneficiaries, the impact of its financial intermediary operations and the evaluations of projects.

The Governor of the EBRD for the Union should report annually to the European Parliament on the promotion of the Union’s objectives with particular regard to the Union’s external action as laid down in Article 21 of the Treaty on European Union, the Europe 2020 Strategy, and the significant increase of the transfer of renewable energy and energy-efficient technologies.

The representatives of the Union in the governing bodies of the EBRD should use their best endeavours to avoid any activity by the EBRD implemented in its countries of operation through a foreign non-cooperative jurisdiction characterised notably by no or nominal taxes, a lack of effective exchange of information with foreign tax authorities and a lack of transparency in legislative, legal or administrative provisions, or as identified by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development or the Financial Action Task Force,