Commission Decision
of 3 April 2001
declaring a concentration to be compatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement
(Case COMP/M.2139 — Bombardier/ADtranz)
(notified under document number C(2001) 1032)
(Only the English text is authentic)
(Text with EEA relevance)
(2002/191/EC)
THE COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,
Having regard to the Agreement on the European Economic Area (hereinafter the EEA Agreement), and in particular Article 57 thereof,
Having regard to the Commission decision of 6 December 2000 to initiate proceedings in this case,
Whereas:
On 20 October 2000, the Commission received a notification pursuant to Article 4 of the Merger Regulation of a proposed concentration by which Bombardier Inc., (hereinafter Bombardier) will acquire sole control of the undertaking DaimlerChrysler Rail Systems GmbH (hereinafter ADtranz) and will merge their activities world-wide.
By decision dated 6 December 2000, the Commission found that the notified operation raised serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market. The Commission accordingly initiated proceedings in this case pursuant to Article 6(1)(c) of the Merger Regulation.
Bombardier is a Canadian corporation engaged in design, development, manufacture and marketing in the aircraft, rail transportation equipment and recreational product industries. In addition, the company offers services related to its core products and core businesses and is, through subsidiaries, involved in financial services and the development of real estate interests. Bombardier operates plants mainly in North America and Western Europe. Over 90 % of its revenues are generated outside Canada.
ADtranz, which is wholly owned by DaimlerChrysler AG, is engaged in the manufacture and distribution of rail transportation vehicles. Its current activities cover the manufacture and sale of rolling stock equipment as well as fixed installation and signalling equipment. Even prior to and independent of the present transaction, the company decided to focus on its rolling stock business. Accordingly, ADtranz has entered into a binding agreement to sell its fixed installations business to the United Kingdom-based group Balfour Beatty, subject to clearance by the Office of Fair Trading. Moreover, ADtranz also intends to sell its signalling equipment operations, although a buyer has yet to be found.
Bombardier intends to acquire sole control over ADtranz by way of purchase and transfer of 100 % of ADtranz shares, all of which are currently held by Daimler-Chrysler AG. The notified operation therefore constitutes a concentration within the meaning of Article 3(1)(b) of the Merger Regulation.
high-speed trains,
self-propelled electrical multiple units (EMUs) and diesel multiple units (DMUs) for intercity transport (hereinafter also referred to as intercity trains or mainline trains),
EMUs and DMUs for regional transport (hereinafter also referred to as regional trains),
passenger coaches,
trams and light-rail vehicles (the latter also referred to as LRVs),
underground vehicles,
airport people movers (APMs),
heavy maintenance services,
light maintenance services, and
refurbishment of rail vehicles.
Self-propelled units for intercity transport are sets of coaches in which the traction components are fully integrated, i.e. passenger coaches and locomotives are merged. Such train sets cannot be separated, but may be coupled in order to increase their capacity. They are intended for long-range travel between urban centres on ordinary rail tracks, achieving speeds of 160 km/h to 250 km/h, and may have tilting technology. There are two basic types of self-propelled intercity train units, namely electrical multiple units (EMUs) and diesel multiple units (DMUs). As regards these two types of self-propelled units, the Parties' activities overlap and their combined market share does not vary significantly. It can therefore be left open in this case whether two separate product markets exist for intercity EMUs and DMUs.
It has been suggested by third parties that the distinction between mainline and regional trains is not a rigid one since there is no accepted industry definition. While there is a certain degree of overlap between the two product markets for at least some products in the market, there are several features which render a distinction valid. For regional trains, top speed is not an overriding issue, due to frequent stops on those routes. There seems to be agreement at least in Germany that regional trains operate at speeds of up to 160 km/h. Capacity is more important for regional trains than comfort. These product requirements are reflected in the technical profile of the product, e.g. propulsion systems are designed for lower operating speed, the interior layout focuses on functionality. Therefore, from a demand-side point of view, the two products are different. As regards the supply side, it has to be noted that all major players in the market are active in both markets, with the exception of small players active in regional trains only, such as Stadler and Jenbacher, neither of which would be capable of switching to mainline trains without significant adjustment costs. Therefore, the distinction between mainline and regional trains remains valid for the purpose of this decision.
Passenger coaches include all non-self-propelled railway vehicles, in particular for mainline and, to a smaller extent, for regional passenger transport, hauled by any type of locomotive. Coaches do not have propulsion, which makes adaptation to different national environments easier, and they require significantly less production technology than other rolling stock.
As for trams and light-rail vehicles, the Parties have suggested a distinction between low-floor and high-floor trams. The answers to the Commission's market investigation indicated, from a demand side perspective, a clear trend by urban public transport companies towards low-floor trams, with high-floor trams being progressively replaced by low-floor trams when coming to the end of their life cycle. Also, the use of low-floor trams usually involves low-floor specific investment in infrastructure, i.e. platforms for level access to the cars. It would not be technically impossible to switch to the other system, and in fact, some tram operators even use both systems on the same tracks. Nevertheless, operators will be hesitant to revert to high-floor trams once they have introduced a low-floor system. The reasons for this are, inter alia, that the cost of specific low-floor platforms would be frustrated and that the increased comfort of level access could no longer be used as a value proposition. Moreover, low-floor trams are in many instances the best solution to comply with specific legislation or local policies designed to grant handicapped people better access to public transport. However, from a supply-side perspective, the answers to the Commission's market investigation clearly pointed towards substitutability between high-floor and low-floor trams. Therefore, these two segments do not seem to constitute separate product markets.
Underground vehicles or metros are electric vehicles that run on either steel or rubber wheels, and transport people within a city centre, always on completely segregated tracks and usually underground. Metros are generally heavier and sturdier than LRVs, mainly because of their greater capacity, and need to accommodate the high flow of passengers in and out of the cars at peak travel times. They are built to accelerate and decelerate quickly, mainly due to the short distances between stations.
Airport people movers (APMs) are completely automated vehicles that form part of an integrated transit system carrying passengers from planes to terminals or between terminals in an airport. As travel times are short and passengers may be carrying luggage, quick loading and unloading are crucial, which is why they are fitted with large doors and little seating capacity. Furthermore, as routes are generally relatively simple, guidance systems are also much less sophisticated than those of automated guided transports (AGTs).
As regards maintenance and refurbishment, the results of the market investigation suggest that a distinction should be made between light maintenance, heavy maintenance and refurbishment. Light maintenance includes day-to-day repairs, component exchanges and safety checks carried out on a regular basis. Heavy maintenance, on the contrary, covers more substantial interventions as well as major overhaul of railway vehicles, carried out in central workshops on a less regular and more infrequent basis, for a duration of several days or weeks. Finally, refurbishment involves the modernisation and adaptation of rolling stock to a completely new concept or design. In many cases, only the body shell of railway vehicles remains unchanged. All three types of services require different equipment, skills and technology, and must therefore be regarded as separate markets.
Bombardier submits that the market for rolling stock should be regarded as a European one, the rail vehicle industry having evolved considerably towards Europeanisation since the decision in ABB/Daimler-Benz. Reasons put forward by Bombardier to support that submission include the following: EU public procurement rules now also apply to train tenders and have undermined the practice of awarding significant contracts to national champions. Accordingly, manufacturers compete for orders across Europe and even outside the EEA. An increasing number of EU countries such as the United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal and Finland have already awarded contracts to companies from other countries. Even in certain EU countries (such as Germany, France and Italy) where contracts continue to be awarded to companies with a local presence or to consortia that involve a local company, bids are contested by train manufacturers from other EU Member States and non-EU countries. Furthermore, European-wide bidding has to be seen in the context of increasing standardisation of rail equipment and infrastructure in Europe. The major market players tend to offer so-called product platforms whose objective is to serve all customer requirements from a restricted number of basic products, rather than to design and produce customised products for each project. Thus, according to Bombardier, market entry barriers are lowered and European-wide bidding is facilitated.
The Commission's view was supported by most of the competitors and customers of the Parties. In particular, the remaining diversity of infrastructural requirements among different Member States was cited as the major obstacle to the Europeanisation of these markets. Thus, even though EU procurement rules have been implemented, it appears that the real obstacle to European-wide bidding still lies in the different national standards for rail infrastructure.
In this respect, it is important to note that Bombardier itself reasoned in internal strategy documents provided to the Commission in the notification that it has in the past faced the need to show local presence and therefore followed the common approach of buying local manufacturers and maintaining a widespread network of local production facilities in targeted markets. Bombardier also expressed the view that the Europeanisation of national markets was mainly hindered by the lack of harmonisation of technical standards across the existing infrastructure, and that it was progressing extremely slowly and might not even be accomplished at all.
The Commission, therefore, concludes that the markets for regional trains, trams and LRVs, as well as for underground trains, are still national in scope.
Furthermore, the Commission investigated the market for intercity trains, passenger coaches and airport people movers both at the national and at the EEA-wide level. As in the case of high-speed trains, the scope of the relevant geographic market for these products can be left open, since the competitive assessment does not change, irrespective of the definition chosen.
As far as light maintenance, heavy maintenance and refurbishment services are concerned, the relevant geographical markets must clearly be defined as being national or even sub-national. The results of the market investigation have confirmed this conclusion. In fact, local presence of maintenance service providers is essential, as it would not be economical for train operating companies to move rolling stock from the region where it operates to other, more distant places for maintenance purposes only, given the loss of operating time and profit as well as the transportation costs that would be incurred. In order to avoid such drawbacks, many train operators currently even provide maintenance services ‘in-house’, in their own depots. This picture is not likely to change with the evolving trend among train operators to ‘out-source’ maintenance to train suppliers, in which case a local presence and the acquisition of local depots by suppliers is of utmost importance.
In the light of the above, the Commission considers the relevant geographic markets for the following products and services still to be national: regional trains; trams and LRVs; underground trains; maintenance and refurbishment. In contrast, a trend towards European markets has become apparent for high-speed trains, intercity trains, airport people movers and passenger coaches. The precise definition of the relevant geographic market for those products can be left open, since the competitive assessment in the present case does not change, irrespective of the definition chosen.
The main characteristics of the rail technology market in Europe are the privatisation and increasing cost-consciousness of customers, an ongoing consolidation process among manufacturers, a trend towards platform-based products, and the fact that contracts are generally awarded through a bidding process.
Whereas in the past the design, development and manufacture of rail technology products took place in close collaboration between suppliers and customers, with customers having a direct influence on the products to be manufactured and the selection of the firms producing them (tailor-made products), the trend is now for suppliers to offer their own set products (also referred to as platform-based products) from which customers can choose. The objective of this is to serve all customers from a restricted number of platforms rather than to design and produce completely new vehicles for each project. Even where national or customer-specific technical requirements differ, a platform-based approach allows manufacturers to obtain economies of scale and scope for those parts of the train that do not require customisation.
Siemens was the first supplier to introduce a platform-based LRV product, in Potsdam in 1996. At that time, the existence of platform-based products exerted significant price pressure on competitors and resulted in overall price decreases. At present, all major European manufacturers have developed their own platform-based product lines. Alstom, for instance, is promoting its Citadis (trams), Metropolis (underground trains), X'Trapolis and Coradia (regional trains) platforms. ADtranz has begun to offer its Incentro (trams), Movia (underground trains), Itino (regional trains), and Crusaris (intercity trains) platforms. AnsaldoBreda has developed a platform in the tram sector called Sirio. Siemens' product portfolio includes the Combino (trams), MOMO (underground trains) and Desiro (regional trains) platforms. Bombardier's Cityrunner (trams) and Talent (regional trains) product lines are also platform-based. However, Bombardier does not currently manufacture platform-based products in other market segments.
Nevertheless, there are customers, in particular in the tram sector, who are very reluctant to buy a platform product and continue to demand individual, customised solutions.
Privatisation, fewer public resources and political pressure to develop efficient rail transport systems have resulted in railway operators becoming more sophisticated and cost-conscious in their procurement policies and using their purchasing power more effectively. In particular, purchasing pools and buying consortia have become more common in recent years, even among local train operators.
Customers are increasingly concerned with product performance standards, life-cycle costs and contract management. The ability of manufacturers to offer, alone or as leaders of a consortium, the complete product, and to assume responsibility for it, has become one of the main selection criteria for rolling stock customers.
Amongst the main European manufacturers of rolling stock, only four companies currently produce the mechanical part as well as electrical propulsion elements of rail vehicles. These so-called full-line suppliers (systems integrators) are ADtranz, Alstom, AnsaldoBreda, and Siemens.
In addition to these, several smaller companies focus on supplying either mechanical or electrical elements of railway vehicles. Mechanical elements are produced by the two Spanish manufacturers Construcciones y Auxiliar de Ferrocarrilles (hereinafter CAF) and Patentes Talgo (Hereinafter Talgo), as well as the Swiss manufacturer Stadler Rail AG (hereinafter Stadler). These suppliers are, however, capable of supplying complete trains with diesel engines for propulsion (DMUs).
Bombardier has so far had an intermediate position between the systems integrators and the non-integrated manufacturers. Its main focus has been on supplying the mechanical parts of rolling stock. However, Bombardier does supply complete train sets with diesel propulsion (DMUs), and has also managed to bid as a prime contractor for trams, LRV's and regional trains with electrical propulsion, mainly in Germany and Austria, due to its close cooperation with Kiepe in the tram sector and ELIN in the trams and regional trains sector. In the context of this cooperation, Kiepe and ELIN provided the electrical propulsion.
In determining the market strength of rolling stock manufacturers, account must be taken of the fact that most of the contracts for purchase of rail vehicles are awarded as the result of a bidding process in public calls for tender. Accordingly, market share figures only take into account the activity of the winners of a given contract but do not show how many credible competitors actually participated as bidders and thus created competitive constraints.
Furthermore, demand for rail technology varies over time. Consequently, in order to assess the Parties' market strength correctly, a fairly long period must be considered. Therefore, as a general rule, the market shares analysed in this decision have been calculated on the basis of the undertakings' average market volume shares over the five-year period 1995-1999. In some cases, when market trends have changed substantially within this period, shorter periods have been taken into account in order to ensure that market shares reflect more accurately the post-merger competitive situation.
Only base contracts awarded between 1995 and 1999, or shorter periods when appropriate, were taken into account. To the contrary, options exercised by customers in that period were not considered, given that they were based on contracts tendered out earlier and do not reflect the same competitive environment. In particular, some of the underlying base contracts were awarded before the beginning of privatisation of train operating companies and the transposition into German law of the public procurement directives.
high-speed trains in Germany, the Netherlands and the European Economic Area (EEA),
self-propelled units for intercity transport in Germany and the EEA,
passenger coaches in the EEA,
regional trains in Germany,
trams and light-rail vehicles in Austria, France, Sweden and Germany,
underground vehicles in Austria, and
heavy maintenance services in the United Kingdom (UK).
The businesses of Bombardier and ADtranz are to some extent complementary, given that the former is predominantly focused on manufacturing the mechanical elements of railway vehicles, whereas the latter also provides electrical propulsion elements. Therefore, in many markets there is no real overlap in the activities of the two parties, since they are part of a consortium in which Bombardier is supplying the mechanical part, whilst ADtranz is responsible for the electrical components. Nevertheless, there exist some significant overlaps in the Parties' activities, in particular in the markets for regional trains and trams/LRVs, where both offer their own branded products, as ADtranz also manufactures the mechanical parts of rolling stock.
In the market for high-speed trains, both Bombardier and ADtranz are members of the ICE 3 consortium. The consortium leader and prime contractor for the ICE 3 is Siemens, which accounts for [… %]* of the consortium. The share of ADtranz in the consortium is [… %]*, Bombardier has [… %]*. There have been two orders in the EEA for high-speed trains over the five-year period 1995—1999, placed by Deutsche Bahn AG and by the Netherlands Railway (NS) respectively. Both operators ordered the ICE 3. Since both ADtranz and Bombardier are members of the same consortium supplying the ICE 3, there is no real overlap between the Parties' activities in either the Netherlands or Germany. If the relevant market were the EEA, the same reasoning would apply.
As for the competitive situation in the high-speed train sector, it should be noted that consortia are very common in the industry, given the enormous costs of development. This is not only true for the German and Dutch markets, examined in this case, but also for several other geographical markets in Europe and in third countries. For instance, the Italian ETR 500 is supplied by a consortium of AnsoldoBreda and ADtranz, and the Spanish Talgo 350 by Talgo/Siemens/ADtranz with Talgo manufacturing the coaches. The two European industry leaders, Alstom and Siemens, have also joined forces to win a contract in Taiwan.
Bombardier supplies the centre coaches for the ICE 3, and also manufactures, in a consortium with Alstom, mechanical parts for the competing TGV. Alstom has stated in its reply to the Commission that, should Bombardier not be willing to participate in such projects following the merger, it could easily replace Bombardier as the supplier of centre coaches and other mechanical parts by either CAF or AnsaldoBreda.
The demand side is also highly concentrated, both in national markets like the Netherlands and Germany and on a European level. Buyers are the national railway operators, with the exception of the United Kingdom. This means that in most countries there is only one buyer. These railway operators have started to form buyer consortia. For instance, the Belgian national train operating company SNCB teamed up with its French and British counterparts in 1989 in order to purchase TGV Eurostar high-speed trains. Similar agreements were entered into by SNCB with its French and Dutch counterparts for the acquisition of TGV Thalys high-speed trains in 1993.
Deutsche Bahn and SNCF, the two main customers for high-speed trains in Europe, publicly announced in autumn 2000 that they consider tendering out jointly the fourth generation of high-speed trains which can operate in Germany, France and other countries. It is very likely that a new consortium will be formed to supply the fourth generation. Alstom and Siemens are currently negotiating terms and conditions of such a consortium to build this train. The Parties have stated that they would seriously consider developing a fourth generation high-speed train on their own.
The competitive situation in Germany, the Netherlands and the EEA will not change as a result of the transaction, since Bombardier and ADtranz are already part of the same consortium, the ICE 3. Bombardier has supplied mechanical parts to Alstom for the TGV, but the market investigation shows that it could be easily replaced by other manufacturers. It is also likely that a merged entity will develop its own high-speed train, which could increase competition. Moreover, the demand side is also concentrated and has considerable buyer power which balances the concentration of the supply side. There is usually only one buyer in each country, that is to say a monopsonist, whereas on a European level, large buyers form buyer consortia. Therefore, the proposed transaction does not lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position in the market for high-speed trains in Germany, the Netherlands, or the EEA.
Concerning intercity or mainline trains, the only national market where the activities of the Parties overlap is Germany. Two contracts were awarded between 1995 and 1999, both by Deutsche Bahn AG. One of the two contracts tendered out by Deutsche Bahn AG was awarded to ADtranz, the other to a consortium led by Siemens, with Bombardier as the supplier of mechanical components. Siemens has stated in its reply to the Commission that, should Bombardier not be willing to participate in such projects following the merger, it could easily replace Bombardier as the supplier of the mechanical parts. In the German market, therefore, the Parties did not compete against each other because Bombardier did not submit a bid on its own. After the takeover of ADtranz by Bombardier, the number of suppliers, that is to say systems integrators able to offer intercity trains, will not change.
On a European level, there were 11 tenders in the relevant period 1995-1999, representing a total volume of 1 482 cars and a total value of EUR 2,4 billion. Of these 11 tenders, Alstom won five (representing more than 50 % in terms of both value and volume), ADtranz two, and Bombardier one. The remaining three tenders were won by consortia of which Siemens was prime contractor for two contracts, and Alstom for one (the latter together with CAF). Given that Alstom was also part of one of the consortia led by Siemens, it follows that Alstom was the winner or part of the winning consortium in seven out of 11 contracts. Therefore, Alstom is the clear market leader.
As in the case for high-speed trains, the demand side is also highly concentrated. This means that in most countries there is only one buyer, the national railway operator, which therefore enjoys significant countervailing power. The only exception is the United Kingdom, where three tenders accounting for more than half of European demand for intercity trains took place. However, the companies inviting tenders are large powerful train operators such as First Great Western Group or Connex which are active internationally and are backed by financing companies; the latter are themselves subsidiaries of large multinational banks, such as HSBC.
As regards the German market, the competitive situation will not change significantly as a result of the merger. If the relevant geographic market were to be the EEA, the merged entity would become a distant second to the market leader Alstom. Siemens is regarded by all customers as a credible integrated supplier. Furthermore, there is considerable buyer power by the national railway companies or the train operators in the case of the United Kingdom. Therefore, the proposed transaction does not lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position of the Parties in the market for intercity trains in Germany or the EEA.
In the market for passenger coaches, the Parties' activities are to a large extent complementary. Since either Bombardier or ADtranz, but not both, have won a contract in all Member States, there is no overlap at all. Only if the relevant geographic market were found to cover the whole EEA would this area represent an affected market. Even then, ADtranz would add only [0-10 %]* to Bombardier's [30-40 %]* European-wide market share. ADtranz has won only one contract in Austria. Competitors in this market include Siemens [5-15 %]*, Alstom [10-20 %]*, AnsaldoBreda [0-10 %]*, and CAF.
As in the case for high-speed and intercity trains, the demand side is highly concentrated. This means that in most countries there is only one buyer, the national railway operator. All orders in the relevant period 1995-1999 were made by the national railway operators in Austria, Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy and Spain which have considerable buyer power. Therefore, the proposed transaction will not lead to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position of the Parties in the market for coaches in the EEA.
Siemens is part of the BR 424-426 consortium (together with ADtranz and Bombardier) which won, in particular, contracts for 139 train sets (870 cars) from DB Regio AG. It is responsible for the electrical part of these trains. Furthermore, Siemens has two branded products in that market, the Desiro and the RegioSprinter. The RegioSprinter is a light weight DMU, which has so far only been sold in small quantities in Germany. According to the Parties, the RegioSprinter was not accepted by Deutsche Bahn AG because of its low buffer load (crashworthiness). By contrast, the Desiro is a newly-developed platform product which has been well received in the marketplace.
Alstom has developed two product families, called Coradia and X'Trapolis, which are modular platform products. Alstom secured a large contract from DB Regio AG (BR 423) in a consortium with ADtranz, which is supplying the electrical part. It also won a significant number of contracts for the Coradia-Lint 27 and 41 recently.
Jenbacher started developing a DMU in 1993 as a successor to its BR 5047, which is called the Integral. Jenbacher was awarded one contract for its supply in 1997 to the Bavarian Oberlandbahn. These 17 trains were delivered in early 1999 and brought Jenbacher a market share of less than 3 %. However, all 17 trains had to be taken back to the depot due to severe quality problems and will not be operational before early 2001. Jenbacher is currently looking for a strategic partner. Therefore, Jenbacher cannot be considered a strong competitor in this market.
Stadler initially neither produced nor marketed the GTW itself. It entered the German market by giving a licence to DWA, which adapted the GTW to the German market and built the majority of the cars. Stadler was initially only a subsupplier to DWA for the manufacturing of the mechanical part. ADtranz is the supplier of the electrical part and was also responsible for the marketing of the GTW.
The initial marketing agreement for the GTW between ADtranz and Stadler lapsed on 31 December 2000. Since 1 January 2001, Stadler has marketed the GTW itself. However, ADtranz as a […]* partner in the Stadler-Pankow Joint Venture is still able to influence decisions concerning the GTW. Therefore, Stadler can, at present, not be considered a fully independent competitor to the merged entity as long as its structural link with ADtranz remains unchanged.
Although Deutsche Bahn Regio AG is the biggest customer for regional trains in Germany which has countervailing buyer power, there are several privately owned smaller operators of regional trains. The privatisation process is likely to continue. While some of these smaller regional train operating companies belong to the French company Connex (Vivendi), a group active across Europe, a majority does not. Therefore, the demand side is much more fragmented than in the market for high speed or intercity trains, and does not enjoy the same degree of buyer power. The risk of market dominance by the Parties cannot therefore be ruled out.
For the above reasons, the notified concentration raises serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market with regard to regional trains in Germany. It is likely to create a dominant position for the Parties in that market.
Only a very small number of contracts were awarded in Austria in the period 1995-1999. Of the six contracts examined by the Commission, Bombardier won [less than six]*, representing a value of EUR […]* million (40-50 %]* of the overall market) and a volume of […]% cars ([50-60 %]* of the overall market). Siemens won one contract, representing a value of EUR […]* million ([40-50 %]* of the overall market) and a volume of […]* cars ([35-45 %]* of the overall market). One contract representing a value of EUR 16,2 million and a volume of six cars was awarded to a consortium consisting of Bombardier, ADtranz, ELIN and Siemens. ADtranz's market share in Austria of [0-10 %]* (in value) is exclusively based on its participation in that consortium. There is, therefore, no overlap between the Parties with the exception of that resulting from their participation in that consortium, in which they did not compete against each other.
As regards the Swedish market for trams and light-rail vehicles, only one contract (by SL Infrateknik AB, Stockholm, 1997) was awarded in the five-year period 1995-1999 examined by the Commission; this contract represented a total value of just EUR 21,9 million (twelve cars). Moreover, Bombardier and ADtranz had submitted their bid for that contract as members of a single consortium (shares in that consortium: Bombardier [… %]*, ADtranz [… %]*) and were, therefore, not competing against each other. Their activities in the Swedish market did not therefore overlap. The Commission's market investigation has revealed no evidence for the creation or strengthening of a dominant position for the Parties in Sweden.
In Germany, by far the largest market for trams and light-rail vehicles in Europe, the Parties' combined market share amounts to [50-60 %]* (Bombardier: [30-40 %]*, ADtranz: [20-30 %]*), followed by Siemens ([30-40 %]*) and Alstom ([0-10 %]*, each calculated on a five-year basis covering the years 1995 through 1999.
Regarding the tram and light-rail vehicle purchases in Germany examined by the Commission, Siemens participated as a bidder in 18 out of 19 projects tendered out from 1995 to 1999, was short-listed in most cases and won ten contracts; its success rate has, therefore, been above 50 %.
As regards Alstom, this company submitted nine bids over the same period of time, was short-listed three times and won one contract. It should be noted that Alstom has recently been focussing on the production site of its German subsidiary LHB, Salzgitter, for the manufacture of regional trains and trams/light-rail vehicles for the German market. This could enhance the company's future chances of winning contracts in Germany and should allow it to increase its current market share.
Both Siemens and Alstom have a full product portfolio which covers the whole range of applications and can satisfy all customer requirements: Siemens was the first supplier to introduce a platform-based product. It currently markets the Combino low-floor tram, the CitySprinter high-floor tram and the dual voltage GT8-100D/2S-M, whilst Alstom offers the Citadis 100, 200 and 300 low-floor trams, the B-Wagen high-floor tram and the dual-voltage Citadis 500 tram train.
On the other hand, the notified concentration will undoubtedly reduce the number of leading active suppliers of trams and light-rail vehicles in the German market from four (Bombardier, ADtranz, Siemens, and Alstom, or their subsidiaries) to three (Bombardier/ADtranz, Siemens, and Alstom, or their subsidiaries), with Bombardier/ADtranz obtaining clear market leadership. Against this background, the following aspects need to be taken into account:
Furthermore, the concentration will jeopardise the existence of electric propulsion supplier Kiepe, which is mainly active in the German market for trams. Although Kiepe has teamed up with different mechanical suppliers in the past, an important part of its turnover in the railway business has so far been generated by supplying Bombardier. Given that Bombardier will itself become an integrated producer of rail vehicles after the takeover of ADtranz, it will no longer have to rely on electrical propulsion equipment from smaller sub-suppliers, such as Kiepe or ELIN, who have so far been important partners for Bombardier. Consequently, the Commission's market investigation has revealed concerns that these suppliers might lose their businesses or be reduced to the role of niche players. In that case, they would no longer be able to serve as partners for non-integrated mechanical suppliers, such as Stadler, nor could they act as gatekeepers for potential, non-integrated market entrants, such as CAF or Talgo.
For the above reasons, the notified concentration raises serious doubts as to its compatibility with the common market with regard to trams and light-rail vehicles in Germany. It is likely to create a dominant position for the Parties in that market.
Moreover, the Vienna underground is the only urban metro system in place in Austria, and it is not expected that new tenders will be published within the next few years, either for the existing Vienna underground or for any new system in any other Austrian city. In its market investigation, therefore, the Commission has found no evidence of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position for the Parties in Austria with regard to underground vehicles.
In the heavy maintenance sector in the United Kingdom, the Parties' combined market share amounted to [30-40 %]* in 1999 (ADtranz: [20-30 %]*, Bombardier: [10-20 %]*), followed by Railcare ([10-20 %]*) and Alstom ([10-20 %]*). Local train operating companies accounted for [20-30 %]* of the heavy maintenance market in the United Kingdom. Based on these figures, Bombardier and ADtranz would have achieved a leading position in the United Kingdom heavy maintenance market after the concentration, giving rise to competitive concerns:
The notifying Party submits, however, that the major part of the turnover generated by Bombardier in the United Kingdom heavy maintenance segment was only achieved as a result of the execution of two contracts which were terminated before the end of 2000; at this point of time, according to the notifying Party, there is no order backlog, nor has Bombardier concluded any new contracts which are due to enter into force in the heavy maintenance sector, nor does Bombardier currently have significant spare capacities which would allow it to offer heavy maintenance services in the near future.
In the light of the above, the concentration does not give rise to competition concerns in the United Kingdom heavy maintenance sector. Given that Bombardier's activity in the United Kingdom heavy maintenance market will significantly decrease from 2001, there will be no major overlap in the Parties' heavy maintenance activities from that time. The Commission has found no evidence for the creation or strengthening of a dominant position for the Parties in the United Kingdom.
ADtranz is the world leader in the market for APMs with a global market share of 70 %. Main competitors are Poma-Otis, a joint venture between Pomagalski of France and the American company Otis, Matra (Siemens) and Mitsubishi. ADtranz won the only new contract in the EEA in the period 1995-1999 awarded by the airport of Rome. Bombardier does not have its own APM product. Therefore, there is no overlap between ADtranz and Bombardier. As for Bombardier, after evaluating several options for entering the APM market, the company formed an alliance with Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (hereinafter MHI) in 1999. Bombardier markets and provides the overall system integration, and MHI provides the vehicle itself and the signalling system. To date, the MHI/Bombardier relationship has not resulted in any joint APM bids in Europe, although MHI/bombardier were in the process of preparing a bid for the Madrid Airport and intended to participate in the bid process for the Charles de Gaulle Airport project. However, Bombardier and MHI have agreed to terminate their relationship should the proposed transaction with ADtranz be consummated.
Bombardier has already withdrawn from the Madrid Airport Project. Therefore, the transaction could strengthen the dominant position of ADtranz in the European APM market by putting at risk the entrance of a new supplier of APMs into the European market. However, MHI itself has stated that it was able to finalise the bid for the Madrid airport with Sumitomo. Therefore, the proposed transaction does not lead to the elimination of a potential entrant and does not strengthen ADtranz's dominant position in this market in Europe.
In order to address the aforementioned competition concerns that arise in the German markets for regional trains and trams, the Parties have submitted the undertakings described in recitals 93 to 100. The full text of those undertakings is set out in the Annex which forms an integral part of this Decision.
ADtranz holds […]* of the shares in the Joint Venture, whilst Stadler holds the remaining […]* of the shares. Since ADtranz has the right to appoint […]* of the five members of the Joint Venture's supervisory board and a right of veto regarding the Joint Venture's budget, Stadler Pankow is jointly controlled by both parent companies.
The Parties offer to withdraw from this Joint Venture and to divest ADtranz's stake in Stadler Pankow to Stadler.
The Parties also offer to take certain interim measures to ensure that Stadler Pankow can continue its business activities. These include, in particular, a capacity load guarantee (up to a certain total of working hours per year) for Stadler Pankow until the end of […]*, thereby largely exceeding ADtranz's current obligations under the Joint Venture agreement, and the commitment to supply Stadler, for a transitional period of […]* years, with certain components on current commercial terms, subject to adjustment for inflation.
Furthermore, the Parties offer to grant exclusive licenses for production and marketing, in the EU, of two of their product lines, namely the Regioshuttle regional train and the Variotram tram, to Stadler. The Regioshuttle represents roughly [5-20 %]* of the German market for regional trains in the period 1995-1999, whereas Variotram represents approximately [5-20 %]* of the German market for trams/light-rail vehicles in that same period. Both products have been sold to various customers.
Furthermore, Bombardier undertakes — in addition to its existing cooperation with ELIN in the development of regional trains of the Talent type — to extend its cooperation with ELIN to light-rail vehicles of the Cityrunner Linz type for a period of five years. A Joint Development Agreement has already been concluded.
In addition, Bombardier undertakes to exclusively use traction equipment of the undertaking Kiepe for the worldwide sale of its high-floor trams of the K 5000 type and the EU-wide sale of tram trains of the Saarbrücken Vehicle type, over a period of […]* years. The proposed exclusive cooperation with Kiepe is binding upon Bombardier only (unilateral exclusivity). Furthermore, Bombardier offers to order installation work from Kiepe valued at DEM […]* per year over a period of […]* years. A cooperation agreement has already been concluded.
The proposed undertakings will ensure the independence of three of the remaining non-integrated players in the markets for regional trains and trams/LRVs and increase their competitivity. These companies are, on the one hand, ELIN and Kiepe, both of whom are electrical propulsion providers; and, on the other hand, Stadler who is a mechanical manufacturer of regional trains and trams/light-rail vehicles. Stadler will be established as an important manufacturer of regional trains and trams for the German market, whilst Kiepe and ELIN will continue to play an important role as electrical propulsion suppliers to non-integrated mechanical manufacturers, in particular Stadler. The undertakings submitted by the Parties will, therefore, provide compensation for the disappearance of ADtranz as a manufacturer of regional trains and trams/light-rail vehicles.
As regards Stadler Pankow, the [… %]* minority stake of ADtranz in that Joint Venture grants it joint control, together with the majority shareholder, Stadler, given that, for instance, the Joint Venture's budget needs to be approved unanimously by both shareholders. Furthermore, ADtranz has the right to appoint […]* of the five members of the Joint Venture's supervisory board; thus, the Parties would have access to all relevant business information concerning the Joint Venture if the concentration was cleared unconditionally.
As regards ELIN, the [… %]* minority stake of Bombardier's subsidiary DWA in that company grants it joint control, together with the majority shareholder, VA TECH ELIN EBG GmbH, Vienna, given that DWA has the right to veto certain strategic business decisions. In addition, Bombardier has an option to acquire the remaining [… %]* of ELIN as soon as the major part of ELIN's turnover is generated through projects with Bombardier. Furthermore, […]* of the four members of ELIN's supervisory board is appointed by DWA; thus, the Parties would have access to all relevant business information about ELIN if the concentration was cleared unconditionally.
Severing ELIN's structural link with Bombardier will turn this company into an independent supplier of propulsion technology for regional trains and trams/light-rail vehicles. Nevertheless, certain guarantees will be necessary for a transitional period in order to allow ELIN to find new partners, replacing Bombardier, which will become vertically integrated after the acquisition of ADtranz and, thus, will no longer have to rely on ELIN as a supplier of electrical propulsion equipment. Two Joint Development Agreements concluded between Bombardier and ELIN provide for cooperation between these two companies for a period of […]* years, concerning both projects in the regional trains and in the tram sector (Talent and Cityrunner Linz), thereby allowing ELIN to continue to be active in both market segments.
As regards Kiepe, the guarantees offered by Bombardier will provide sufficient time for that company to find new cooperation partners, replacing Bombardier, which will become vertically integrated after the acquisition of ADtranz and, thus, will no longer have to rely on Kiepe as a supplier of electrical propulsion equipment. The cooperation agreement concluded with Bombardier for this transition period covers both a high-floor tram project (K5000) and a light-rail vehicle of the tram-train type (Saarbrücken Vehicle), thereby providing sufficient diversity for Kiepe to allow it to continue to be active in both market segments. Moreover, Bombardier's commitment to order DEM […]* worth of installation work from Kiepe per year for a […]*-year period provides additional economic security for that company until it can find new partners.
Given that the undertakings submitted will preserve the independence of two propulsion suppliers (ELIN and Kiepe) as well as that of Stadler who provides only the mechanical parts of trains, cooperation between these three companies seems possible in the medium-term. All three companies have already shown interest in such cooperation, especially Stadler. Such cooperation would allow these three companies to compete as independent suppliers in the German markets for regional trains and trams/light-rail vehicles, against the Parties as well as against Siemens and Alstom.
Moreover, ELIN and Kiepe could serve as gatekeepers in the German market for other companies, such as the two Spanish firms CAF and Talgo, in a way similar to that in which Bombardier entered the German market in cooperation with Kiepe. In fact, cooperation with suppliers of electrical propulsion, in particular with Kiepe as regards the sale of trams in Germany, was one crucial factor that allowed Bombardier to rapidly gain considerable market shares in that Member State over the last six years.
Stadler's future market share will roughly correspond to the current share achieved by ADtranz ([20-40 %]* in the period 1995-1999, [40-50 %]* in the period 1997-1999); this assumption is conformed by the fact that, in recent years, ADtranz has only sold Regioshuttle and GTW regional trains in Germany. Of the three product lines that ADtranz marketed in this segment, two will now be transferred to Stadler. ADtranz's only remaining product line, the Itino, has not secured a single order to date. Since it is competitively close to Bombardier's Talent regional train, it is not unlikely that the Parties will stop manufacturing and marketing one of these products after the concentration.
In view of the above, it can be concluded that the overlap in the Parties' activities regarding regional trains in Germany will be eliminated under the new market situation.
Similarly, ADtranz's share in the market for trams and light-rail vehicles in Germany will decrease significantly from [50-60 %]* to [40-50 %]* (based on the five-year period 1995-1999). This decrease will be due to the divestiture by the Parties of the Variotram, a product line representing roughly [5-15 %]* of the German market and currently owned and marketed by ADtranz. The [5-15 %]* market share can now be attributed to Stadler, the prospective purchaser of the Variotram license.
Licensing the Variotram to Stadler will thus remove about half of the Parties' overlap in the German market for trams and light-rail vehicles due to the operation. It will, however, ensure that Stadler becomes a viable competitor in this market with the potential to replace the competitive position of ADtranz previous to the operation. Indeed, Variotram is one out of two ADtranz tram products sold by ADtranz in Germany in the relevant period 1995-1999. Compared to the NGT tram, Variotram is more modern and technically advanced. Stadler would be well suited to produce Variotram as it requires the same production technique as already used by Stadler Pankow for the Regioshuttle. Furthermore, acquiring the Variotram license will allow Stadler to diversify its product portfolio and to establish itself in the German tram market. The electrical propulsion suppliers Kiepe and ELIN, who are both already active in the tram and LRV sector, would be suitable partners for Stadler.
The commitments submitted by the Parties enable the establishment of a new independent supplier of regional trains and trams/light-rail vehicles (Stadler) which will take over to a large extent the current market position of ADtranz. Furthermore, the undertakings will ensure that two independent suppliers of electrical propulsion (Kiepe and ELIN) remain active in both markets, which will allow for future consortia with Stadler and other non-integrated mechanical suppliers. The Commission has, therefore, reached the conclusion that, on the basis of the undertakings submitted by the Parties, the notified concentration will not lead to a dominant position for the Parties in the German markets for regional trains and trams/light-rail vehicles.
Pursuant to the first sentence of the second subparagraph of Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation, the Commission may attach to its decision conditions and obligations intended to ensure that the undertakings concerned comply with the commitments they have entered into vis-à-vis the Commission with a view to rendering the concentration compatible with the common market. A distinction must be made between conditions and obligations. The requirement for achievement of each measure that gives rise to the structural change of the market is a condition, whereas the implementing steps which are necessary to achieve this result are generally obligations on the Parties. Where a condition is not fulfilled, the Commission's decision declaring the concentration compatible with the common market no longer stands; where the undertakings concerned commit a breach of an obligation, the Commission may revoke its clearance decision, acting pursuant to Article 8(5)(b) of the Merger Regulation, and the Parties may also be subject to fines and periodic penalty payments as provided in Articles 14(2)(a) and 15(2)(a) of the Merger Regulation.
In view of the foregoing, the Commission's decision in the present case must be conditional upon full compliance with all undertakings involving divestitures, both of minority participations in third companies and of product lines, including the licensing of product lines, as these bring about the structural change of the market. The latter also applies to the cooperation and supply requirements vis-à-vis third parties to which the Parties have committed themselves, as these are aimed at ensuring the success of the divestitures. On the other hand, those parts of the undertakings which refer to the Trustee to be appointed by the Parties shall be obligations upon them, as they aim at implementing the structural change of the market.
For the reasons set out above, and subject to full compliance with the undertakings given by the Parties, it is to be assumed that the proposed concentration does not create nor strengthen a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would be significantly impeded in the common market or in a substantial part of it. The concentration is therefore to be declared compatible with the common market and the functioning of the EEA Agreement, pursuant to Article 2(2) and Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation and Article 57 of the EEA Agreement, subject to full compliance with the undertakings set out in the Annex.
HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: