Part 1: Criminal Justice Modernisation
Section 1 – Electronic signatures and alternative methods of sending documents
10.This section modifies the 1995 Act to make provision permitting the use of electronic signatures on documents in criminal proceedings. This section further enables documents to be transmitted between parties electronically, and to be sent to solicitors acting on an individual’s behalf.
11.Subsection (2) inserts four new sections into the 1995 Act before section 304 (and the Part heading immediately preceding it) – i.e. immediately after section 303B.
12.Subsection (3) repeals subsections (6C) to (6E) of section 66, section 72G and section 148D of the 1995 Act. Those provisions make more limited provision about the service of certain documents on an accused person via their solicitor and are therefore superseded by the more general provision made by this section.
Inserted section 303C – Electronic signatures
13.This section provides for an electronic signature to fulfil any requirement (however expressed and for whatever purpose) that a document of a type mentioned in inserted section 303E, or a deletion or correction of it, be signed or initialled.
Inserted section 303D – Sending documents electronically and to a solicitor
14.This section provides that any requirement (however expressed) that a document of a type mentioned in inserted section 303E be given to a person may be fulfilled by (a) transmitting it to the person electronically, or (b) transmitting it to the person’s solicitor.
15.Subsection (2) sets out certain requirements associated with the electronic transmission of documents as provided for in subsection (1), specifying that the transmission must be effected in a manner that the recipient has indicated (either specifically or generally) that they are willing to receive the document. The subsection further provides that in certain specified circumstances, this willingness is capable of being inferred.
16.Subsection (3) provides further detail on what references to “giving” a person a document covers.
Inserted section 303E – Documents to which sections 303C and 303D apply
17.By virtue of this section, sections 303C and 303D apply to orders, warrants, sentences, citations, minutes or any other document produced by a court, including any extracts of them. These sections also apply to any document which is required by law to be given to a person in connection with any criminal proceedings before a court, which includes documents required to initiate proceedings, and documents used as, or in place of, evidence.
18.Subsection (2) confers a power on the Lord Justice General to direct that a type of document mentioned in subsection (1) is not to be treated as falling within section 303C or 303D. Subsection (3) provides that such a direction may relate to some or all criminal proceedings, may be varied or revoked, and must be made publicly available for so long as it has effect. For example, the Lord Justice General could direct that in respect of business in the High Court, citations are not to be regarded as mentioned in subsection (1) for the purposes of section 303C or 303D.
Inserted section 303F – Interpretation of sections 303C to 303E
19.This section sets out the interpretation applicable to sections 303C, 303D and 303E. Further material on interpretation is provided in inserted section 303O (inserted by section 4).
Section 2 – Virtual attendance at court
20.This section modifies the 1995 Act to remove the requirement for people to physically attend court, and thereon permit virtual attendance at court, in certain criminal proceedings.
21.Subsection (2) inserts seven sections into the 1995 Act after inserted section 303F (inserted by section 1 of this Act).
Inserted section 303G – Suspension of requirement for physical attendance in criminal trials
22.This section applies only to hearings in criminal proceedings in which a person is to give evidence. By virtue of subsection (1)(b), this section does not apply where the only party to the proceedings is a public official such as a prosecutor (see paragraph 27 of these Notes for further discussion).
23.In the circumstances where subsection (1) applies, the default position will be for in-person attendance at court. However, by virtue of subsection (2), the court may disapply any requirement (however expressed) that a person attend a court by issuing a direction stating that the person need not do so.
24.Subsection (3) sets the test for this disapplication, being that the court must be satisfied that allowing the person to attend by electronic means would not prejudice the fairness of proceedings, or otherwise be contrary to the interests of justice.
25.Subsection (4) notes that this section does not affect any other basis upon which a person need not physically attend a court. For example, where a person qualifies as a “vulnerable witness” under section 271 of the 1995 Act, the court may opt to continue to apply the bespoke provisions for their attendance to the hearing in question, rather than those under this section.
26.Subsection (5) provides that references in this section to physically attending a court are to being in a particular place or before a particular person, for the purpose of any “
Inserted section 303H – Suspension of requirement for physical attendance in criminal proceedings where only party is a public official
27.This section applies only to criminal proceedings in which the sole party to the proceedings is a public official (for example, in an application for a warrant which is not intimated on the accused and where the only party is therefore a prosecutor or a constable).
28.By virtue of subsection (2), in proceedings to which this section applies, the default position will be for virtual attendance.
29.Subsection (3) permits the court to direct a person to physically attend the court. However, such a direction can only be made in the circumstances where the court considers that allowing the person to attend by electronic means would prejudice the fairness of proceedings, or would otherwise be contrary to the interests of justice.
30.Subsection (4) provides that this section does not affect any other basis upon which a person need not physically attend a court (see paragraph 25 of these Notes).
31.Subsection (5) confirms that references in this section to physically attending a court are to be construed in accordance with inserted section 303G(5) (see paragraph 26 of these Notes).
Inserted section 303I – Directions under sections 303G and 303H
32.This section makes further provision about directions issued under inserted sections 303G and 303H.
33.Subsection (1) provides that a court may issue a direction under sections 303G and 303H on the motion of a party or of its own accord.
34.Subsection (2) confirms that the power to issue a direction under sections 303G and 303H also includes the power to revoke an earlier direction made under the respective section.
35.Subsection (3) provides that the court must, in considering whether to issue or revoke a direction made under section 303G or 303H, give all parties to the proceedings an opportunity to make representations. It further requires the court to have regard to any guidance issued by the Lord Justice General when considering whether to issue or revoke a direction.
36.Subsection (4) qualifies subsection (3), in providing that the first direction made under section 303G in relation to a hearing, or under section 303H in relation to proceedings can be issued without giving the parties an opportunity to make representations first. This means that a court can initially tell individuals how they are to appear before it. Where a court proceeds in that way, subsection (5) requires the court to ensure that the parties know they can ask the court to change the way that it has asked an individual to attend, and if a party makes such a request, the court must consider it before dealing with any substantive matters at the hearing. However, the court does not have to consider such a request before dealing with a decision to adjourn or a matter that an enactment requires the court to deal with before another hearing can practically be arranged.
Inserted section 303J – Suspension of requirement for physical attendance in other criminal hearings or proceedings
37.This section applies only in relation to criminal hearings and proceedings which do not fall within the confines of section 303G or 303H (see paragraphs 22 and 27 of these Notes).
38.Where this section applies, the default position is for physical attendance, but subsection (2)(a) provides that the Lord Justice General may make a determination disapplying any requirement (however expressed) that a person attend a court. However, subsection (2)(b) allows a court to override such determinations and direct in-person attendance in individual cases.
39.Subsection (3) provides further details about determinations made under subsection (2)(a). Paragraph (a) provides that such determinations may specify the persons, hearings or proceedings to which physical attendance is disapplied, or specify the circumstances in which a court may disapply physical attendance. For example, such a determination could provide that accused persons are to attend sentencing hearings by electronic means. A determination may also empower courts in individual cases to remove the requirement for in-person attendance. Paragraph (b) enables determinations to make different provision for different purposes and different areas, so they could be used to pilot virtual attendance in certain localities. The determination must also set out the reason why the Lord Justice General has decided to make it. Determinations may be varied or revoked, and must be made publicly available for so long as they have effect.
40.By virtue of subsection (4), the Lord Justice General may only make a determination under subsection (2)(a) when satisfied that disapplying the requirement for physical attendance would not prejudice the fairness of proceedings, or otherwise be contrary to the interests of justice.
41.Where a court directs physical attendance in an individual case through subsection (2)(b), subsection (5) provides that such directions may be issued on the motion of a party or of the court’s own accord, and may be revoked.
42.In the circumstances where a person is to attend a court hearing by electronic means following a determination made under subsection (2)(a), subsection (6) requires the court to ensure that parties know they can ask the court to make a direction under subsection (2)(b), and if a party makes that request the court must consider it before dealing with any other matter at the hearing. However, the court does not have to consider such a request before dealing with a decision to adjourn or a matter that an enactment requires that the court deal with before another hearing can practically be arranged.
43.Subsection (7) provides that this section does not affect any other basis upon which a person need not physically attend a court (see paragraph 25 of these Notes).
44.Subsection (8) confirms that references in this section to physically attending a court are to be construed in accordance with inserted section 303G(5) (see paragraph 26 of these Notes).
Inserted Section 303K – Attending by electronic means
45.Subsection (1) provides that a person excused from physically attending a court under section 303G, 303H, or 303J must instead appear by electronic means in accordance with a direction issued by the court.
46.Subsection (2) provides that where a person fails to attend court by electronic means in accordance with such a direction, they are to be regarded as having failed to comply with the requirement to physically attend from which they were excused under section 303G, 303H or 303J.
47.Subsection (3) provides that directions under subsection (1) must set out how the person is to appear by electronic means before the court or office holder, including what requirements must be satisfied by the location the person is to appear from. This is about specifying the criteria that must be met by a location, rather than specifying the location itself. For example, these requirements could include expectations regarding the privacy or formality of the location. The directions may also include any other provision which the court considers appropriate, and may be issued by the court on the motion of a party or of its own accord.
48.Subsection (4) provides that a court may vary or revoke a direction made under subsection (1).
49.Subsection (5)0 provides that before issuing or revoking a direction under subsection (1), the court must give all parties to the proceedings an opportunity to make representations. It further requires the court to have regard to any guidance issued by the Lord Justice General.
50.Subsection (6) qualifies subsection (5), in providing that the first direction issued under subsection (1) in relation to a hearing or proceedings can be issued without giving the parties an opportunity to make representations first. This means that a court can initially tell individuals how they are to appear before it. Where a court proceeds in that way, subsection (7) requires the court to ensure that parties know they can ask the court to change the way that it has asked an individual to attend, or to revoke the direction altogether, and if a party makes that request the court must consider it before dealing with any substantive matters at the hearing. However, the court does not have to consider such a request before dealing with a decision to adjourn or a matter that an enactment requires that the court deal with before another hearing can practically be arranged.
51.Subsection (8) requires that directions issued under subsection (1) which direct how a party to trial proceedings, including an accused person, is to attend using electronic means, must ensure that such means enable the party to both see and hear all of the other participants in a hearing including any witness who is giving evidence. A direction to a witness who is giving evidence at a trial using electronic means must enable all of the other participants in the trial, which includes an accused person, to both see and hear the witness. Any direction by a court which is not in relation to trial proceedings is not subject to such specific requirements.
52.Subsection (9) provides that directions made under subsection (8) cannot enable a person to see or hear a witness in any way that measures taken in accordance with an order of the court, such as measures in relation to a vulnerable witness, would otherwise prevent.
Inserted section 303L – General directions under section 303K
53.Subsection (1)(a) permits a court to issue a direction under section 303K(1) that applies to all proceedings of a specified type, provided that the only party to such proceedings is a public official. For example, this would allow a court to issue a direction as to how applications for search warrants should be made by the procurator fiscal. Subsection (1)(b) allows the court to issue a further direction overriding a general direction made under paragraph (a) in individual cases.
54.Subsection (2) confirms that the requirement to give parties an opportunity to make representations under section 303K(5)(a) does not apply in relation to general directions issued under subsection (1)(a).
Inserted section 303M – Publication of guidance
55.This section requires the publication of any guidance issued by the Lord Justice General which relates to the issuing of directions under sections 303G, 303H or 303K for as long as it has effect.
Section 3 – Review of virtual attendance provisions
56.This section requires the Scottish Ministers to undertake a review of the operation of the virtual attendance provisions (sections 303G to 303M of the 1995 Act as inserted by section 2 of this Act). This review must be undertaken as soon as reasonably practicable after the expiry of the period of 2 years after the day section 2 of the Act comes into force.
57.When undertaking the review, the Scottish Ministers must consult with the various persons listed in subsection (2). Paragraph (h) provides that the Scottish Ministers must also consult such other persons as the Scottish Ministers consider appropriate.
58.Following the review, the Scottish Ministers must prepare and publish a report on the review, and lay a copy of the report before the Scottish Parliament.
Section 4 – Transitional provisions and interpretation for sections 1 and 2
59.This section modifies the 1995 Act by inserting two new sections after inserted section 303M (inserted by section 2).
Inserted section 303N – Transitional provisions
60.This section provides that any direction or determination made under a provision of the schedule of the 2022 Act specified in the first column of the table in subsection (1), or under paragraph 9(1)(a) of the schedule to that Act, is to be treated as having been made under the corresponding provision of this Act. This means, for example, that the existing determination of the Lord Justice General that there is no requirement to physically attend a preliminary hearing in the High Court will continue to operate without needing to be re-made under new section 303J.
Inserted section 303O – Interpretation of sections 303C to 303N
61.This section provides definitions for words and terms used in inserted sections 303C to 303N.
Section 5 – Digital productions
62.This section modifies the 1995 Act to make provision about the use of evidence in an electronic form in criminal proceedings.
63.Subsection (2) amends section 68 of the 1995 Act, inserting a new subsection (2A). This new inserted subsection (2A) provides that the existing entitlement of the accused (under section 68(2)) to see productions in the relevant court office does not apply where a production is in an electronic form and the accused is otherwise given an opportunity to examine it in that form. For example, where an accused person is provided with an opportunity to examine a CCTV recording at their solicitor’s premises, the requirements of section 68(2) do not apply.
64.Subsection (2)(c) and (d) amends section 68(3) of the 1995 Act and inserts a new subsection (3A). Section 68(3) sets out presumptions which apply where a person who has examined a production gives evidence on it and the production was lodged by a certain time. The presumptions are that the person who examined the production received and returned it in the same condition as it was given to them, and also that it is the same item which was taken possession of by the prosecutor/police. The amendment to subsection (3) provides that the subsection will also apply where the accused is otherwise given an opportunity to see the production in an electronic form and, in such a scenario, the relevant timescales in that subsection will run with reference to the date that such an opportunity is given. Subsection (3A) confirms that where the person adduced to give evidence has examined a physical item, but it is an image of that item that is the production in the proceedings, the presumptions discussed above apply to the physical item that was examined.
65.Subsection (3) amends section 71(2A) of the 1995 Act to ensure that applications for directions under section 279B(2) (see paragraph 69 of these Notes) can be considered by the court at a first diet.
66.Subsection (4) amends section 79 of the 1995 Act:
Paragraph (a) amends subsection (2)(b) and inserts a new sub-paragraph (va). This new sub-paragraph adds a new preliminary issue that can be raised in proceedings, being any other point concerning the accessing, examination, production, or use of evidence by digital means. This means that objections based on this ground will need to be raised in line with the processes and timescales which apply to the other matters listed in section 79(2) of the 1995 Act, unless the court allows a late objection.
Paragraph (b) inserts a new subsection (2A) to highlight that, as per section 279B(7) (see paragraph 73 of these Notes), an application for a direction under section 279B(2) is not a preliminary issue for the purpose of section 79(2)(b).
67.Subsection (4) inserts new sections 279B and 279C after 279A in the 1995 Act.
Inserted section 279B – Images of physical evidence
68.By virtue of this section, an image of physical evidence is, unless the court otherwise directs, to be treated for evidential purposes in criminal proceedings as if it were the physical evidence itself. For the purposes of this section, it does not matter whether or not the physical evidence is still in existence. For example, an image of a weapon can be produced in court in place of the physical item, and receive equal evidentiary status for the purpose of the proceedings. However, if the court is not satisfied by the use of such an image in place of the physical evidence, it remains open to the court to otherwise direct that the original item be produced. This section does not apply to documents within the meaning of paragraph 8 of schedule 8 of the 1995 Act.
69.The court may only issue a direction that an image of physical evidence is not to be treated as if it were the physical evidence itself where, on the application of a party to the proceedings, it is satisfied that treating the image in such a manner would prejudice the fairness of the proceedings.
70.Section 279B(3) sets out the timescales within which (subject to subsection (4)) any applications for such directions must be made:
In summary proceedings, applications must be made no later than 28 days after the date the image is disclosed to the party making the application. If the image is not disclosed to the party making the application, then the application may be made at any time (as per subsection (5)(a)).
In proceedings on petition or indictment (solemn proceedings), where the application is made by the prosecutor, the application must be made no later than 28 days after written notice is given by the accused in accordance with section 78(4)(a). Where the application is made by the accused in respect of an image included in the list of productions lodged in accordance with section 66(5), the application must be made no later than 28 days after the date the indictment is served. If written notice is not given in respect of the image by the accused or, as the case may be, the image is not included in the list of productions lodged in accordance with section 66(5), then the application may be made at any time prior to the image being led as evidence in proceedings (as per subsection (5)(b)).
71.Section 279B(4) provides that where the timescales for an application for a direction under subsection (3) are not met, the court can permit an application to proceed where it considers that the application was made as soon as was reasonably practicable.
72.Section 279B(6) confirms that where a court issues a direction under section 279B(1) in proceedings on petition or indictment (solemn proceedings), the court may permit the physical evidence to be produced in evidence, notwithstanding the fact that it was not included on any list lodged by the parties and that notice required by sections 67(5) and 78(4) of the 1995 Act has not been given. For example, if the court directs that an image of a weapon cannot be produced in court in place of the physical item following an application by the accused, the court may permit the weapon itself to be produced in evidence, even though it was not included on the list of productions.
73.Section 279B(7) provides that applications for directions under section 279B(2) are not preliminary issues for the purpose of section 79(2)(b) of the 1995 Act. However, the applications can still be considered by the court at the first diet (see paragraph 65 of these Notes).
Inserted section 279C – Guidance on use of images of physical evidence by prosecutors
74.This section requires the Lord Advocate to prepare and publish guidance regarding the use of images of physical evidence by prosecutors acting for the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service. This guidance must set out firstly, the factors that prosecutors will take into account when deciding whether to produce an image of physical evidence in a criminal trial in reliance on section 279B(1) of the 1995 Act (see paragraph 68 of these Notes), and secondly, in general terms, when an image is so used, the approach of prosecutors to the physical evidence that the image is of.
75.The Lord Advocate may revise this guidance from time to time. Where the Lord Advocate revises the guidance, the revised guidance must also be published.
76.Subsection (6) amends section 281 of the 1995 Act. That section sets out the rules which apply where an autopsy or forensic science report is lodged as a production (for example, setting out a presumption that the body of the person identified in the report is the body of the person identified in the indictment or complaint). Subsection (6) of this section applies these rules equally to an autopsy or forensic science report where the accused has been given an opportunity to see the report in an electronic form.
Section 6 – Authentication of electronic copy documents
77.This section modifies schedule 8 of the 1995 Act to make provision for the disapplication of the requirement to authenticate copy documents where they are stored electronically, and where the court is otherwise satisfied as to their authenticity.
78.Subsection (2) inserts a new sub-paragraph (1A) into paragraph 1, which provides that where a copy document is stored on the digital evidence storage system (defined in paragraph 8 of the schedule, as modified by section 6(6) of the Act) and was created by uploading the original document to the system from another electronic device, that copy is to be deemed and treated as a true copy and for evidential purposes as if it were the document itself. Sub-paragraph (1A)(b)(ii) confirms that this also applies to subsequent versions of that initial copy that are also stored on the digital evidence storage system, unless the court otherwise directs. These rules apply to copies of entire documents but also to copies of a material part of a document.
79.Subsection (2) further inserts a new sub-paragraph (1B) into paragraph 1, which provides that the court may direct that a copy of a document (or a copy of a material part of a document) to which sub-paragraph (1) or (1A) does not apply may still be deemed and treated as if sub-paragraph (1) applied to it.
80.Subsection (3) inserts sub-paragraph (2A) into paragraph 1, which confirms that paragraph 1 is without prejudice to section 279A(2) of the 1995 Act. Section 279A(2) provides for the use of evidence from official documents in criminal proceedings, and the authentication of copies of such documents.
81.Subsection (4) expands the definition of “copy” to include documents uploaded to an electronic device from another electronic device.
82.Subsection (5) makes a consequential change to paragraph 6 of the schedule. Paragraph 6 applies where the court has given a direction preventing a document from benefitting from the default rules in the schedule and allows the court to allow additional evidence to be led. Subsection (4) extends paragraph 6 so that it also applies where the court has given a direction under inserted paragraph 1(1A)(b)(ii) preventing a subsequent copy from benefitting from the rule in paragraph 1(1A).
83.Subsection (6) inserts a new definition of “digital evidence storage system” into paragraph (8) of the schedule. This defines it based on the current system which has been developed but allows the court, by Act of Adjournal, to specify a different digital system in future.
Section 7 – Body-worn video evidence
84.This section modifies the 1995 Act to make provision regarding the use of body-worn video recordings in criminal proceedings. Subsection (2) inserts a new section after section 283 of the 1995 Act.
85.Inserted section 283A(1) provides that for the purposes of any criminal proceedings, where footage recorded on a body-worn video camera is produced in evidence by the prosecution, and any or all of the time, date and place of the events recorded are displayed on the recording produced, the recording is to be deemed sufficient evidence of the details that are displayed unless and to the extent that the details are disputed. On that basis, if it is displayed on the footage that the recording was taken at 10:00 on 30 June 2026, then this section would mean that the production of that footage in evidence by the prosecution would, if not disputed, be sufficient evidence of the date and time, and no further evidence would be required to be led in respect of those details.
86.Section 283A(2) qualifies this presumption, and provides that subsection (1) does not apply to a recording unless the prosecutor has disclosed the recording to the accused, and informed the accused in writing of the accused’s ability to serve a notice under subsection (3) and the period within which any notice must be served.
87.Section 283A(3) provides that if the accused serves notice on the prosecutor that the accused disputes the accuracy of the details of the time, date or place of the events recorded, or any part of those events, as displayed, then the evidentiary presumption under subsection (1) does not apply to those details. As such, if the accused disputes that the events recorded on the body-worn video recording took place at 10:00, as displayed on the footage, then the recording will not be deemed sufficient evidence of the time of the events recorded. However, the presumption that the date (30 June 2026) was correct would remain, as that would not have been disputed.
88.Section 283(4) provides that any notice under subsection (3) must be served by the accused within 7 days beginning with the date on which the prosecutor disclosed the recording to the accused and informed the accused in writing of the accused’s ability to serve notice and the time limit for doing so. If the accused was informed of their ability to serve notice on a different date to that on which the recording was disclosed to them, then the 7 days will begin from the later of those dates. Therefore, if the prosecutor discloses the evidence to the accused on 1 August, and on 5 August informs the accused that they have 7 days in which to serve notice under subsection (3), then the accused will have until 12 August to serve notice.
89.Section 283(5) provides that the body-worn video cameras covered by the provision are restricted to those issued to and worn by a constable (defined under section 307 of the 1995 Act as having the same meaning as in the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012 – i.e. a constable of Police Scotland), or a person appointed as a member of police staff under section 26(1) of the Police and Fire Reform (Scotland) Act 2012. The Scottish Ministers have the power to modify subsection (5) by regulations so as to add a person, vary the description of a person, or remove a person. Prior to making such regulations, the Scottish Ministers must consult the chief constable of the Police Service of Scotland, the Lord Advocate, and the Lord Justice General. These regulations are subject to the negative procedure.
Section 8 – Increase of fixed penalty limit
90.Subsection (1) modifies section 302 of the 1995 Act, which deals with the offer by a procurator fiscal of a fixed penalty in lieu of criminal proceedings. It amends section 302(7A) to provide that the maximum available penalty that may be offered by the procurator fiscal under that section is £500. It then inserts a new subsection (7B), which provides the Scottish Ministers with the power to substitute the sum of £500 for a higher sum by way of regulations. The 1995 Act already contained a power to alter the maximum available penalty by way of subordinate legislation (see previous subsection (7A)), but the new power allows the change to be made on the face of the 1995 Act rather than having to remain in a separate piece of secondary legislation. Section 302(8) of the 1995 Act is also amended to require regulations made under subsection (7B) to be laid in draft before, and approved by resolution of, the Scottish Parliament.
91.Subsection (2) substitutes the scale for fixed penalties in the 2008 Order with a new scale. This scale replicates the scale that was temporarily added to the Order by the 2022 Act. This scale will continue to be able to be adjusted in future through the use of subordinate legislation, as provided for under the existing power found in section 302(7) of the 1995 Act (which became a power of the Scottish Ministers under section 53 of the Scotland Act 1998).
Section 9 – National jurisdiction for custody cases in sheriff courts and JP courts
92.This section modifies the 1995 Act to make provision regarding the national jurisdiction for custody cases in sheriff courts and justice of the peace courts.
93.Subsection (2) inserts four new sections after section 5 of the 1995 Act regarding the jurisdiction of sheriff courts. Subsection (3) inserts four new sections after section 7 concerning justice of the peace courts.
94.Subsection (4) amends section 62(3) of the 2007 Act in consequence of subsection (3).
Inserted section 5B – Jurisdiction for callings of custody cases in a sheriff court
95.This section provides that where a person appears in the sheriff court for the first time from custody in criminal proceedings, that calling of the case may be taken in any sheriff court in Scotland and may be dealt with in that court by a sheriff of any sheriffdom. As provided by section 5E, the criminal proceedings that the person is appearing in respect of can be proceedings on petition, proceedings on indictment, summary proceedings, or ancillary proceedings such as, for example, those in respect of the failure of the person to attend a diet. For example, if a person is arrested for an offence allegedly committed in Edinburgh, the first time they appear in court from custody in connection with that offence could be in Glasgow Sheriff Court (in person or virtually), despite previous rules dictating that such a case should be heard by the sheriff court where the offence was committed (in this case Edinburgh Sheriff Court). This would equally mean that if a person was arrested after failing to attend summary proceedings at Aberdeen Sheriff Court, the person could appear from custody at Dundee Sheriff Court for the ancillary proceedings in respect of the warrant for that person’s arrest (see paragraphs 102 to 107 of these Notes for discussion of the procedure after such a hearing).
96.Subsection (3) (as read with subsection (1)) further provides that a calling of proceedings on petition can come before any sheriff court and may be dealt with by any sheriff where the accused is appearing from custody after a court has authorised the accused’s remand, and that court is unable to open due to the court building being closed in emergency or other special circumstances. For example, where the accused first appears on petition in Edinburgh Sheriff Court, and the court does not consider that the accused should be granted bail at that hearing, the accused will be required to be brought back before the court for a further hearing, known in practice as the “full committal hearing” or the “further examination”. If that hearing is unable to take place at Edinburgh Sheriff Court due to the court building being closed due to emergency or other special circumstances, such as severe weather, then subsection (3) provides that this hearing can be heard in any other sheriff court and by a sheriff of any sheriffdom. This provision will also encompass any other hearings that take place after the initial appearance on petition but before the end of the petition stage, such as a bail review hearing under section 30 of the 1995 Act if scheduled in that period, where the accused is appearing from custody and the court that authorised the accused’s remand is closed in emergency or other special circumstances. As the provision is limited to callings of proceedings on petition, it cannot encompass any hearings on indictment. Subsection (6) (see paragraph 99 of these Notes) does not apply to hearings held under subsection (3), and as such any subsequent hearings will not continue to be heard by the court which dealt with this particular appearance.
97.If there is more than one person subject to the proceedings (whether under subsection (2) or (3)), subsection (4) enables the proceedings to call before any sheriff court and any sheriff, provided that at least one of the people subject to the proceedings is appearing either for the first time from custody in connection with it (see paragraph 95 of these Notes) or in the circumstances described in subsection (3) (see paragraph 96 of these Notes). This means that, for example, where two people are co-accused of committing a crime, the case can call before any sheriff court even though only one of the accused has been arrested for the crime and is therefore appearing from custody at that court.
98.Subsection (5) confirms that it is for the Lord Advocate or the procurator fiscal to determine in which sheriff court the case is to be heard.
99.Subsection (6) provides the sheriff court that has heard the initial calling of the case with continuing jurisdiction over the proceedings (and that sheriff court can be presided over by a sheriff of any sheriffdom). This subsection applies only to proceedings under subsection (2), and therefore a court which has heard a calling of proceedings under subsection (3) will not have continuing jurisdiction under subsection (6). Subsection (7) confirms that this continuing jurisdiction granted by subsection (6) will come to an end at the points described in paragraph (a) or (b):
Paragraph (a) describes the situation where, in summary proceedings, the accused pleads not guilty and the prosecutor does not accept that plea. This means it is likely that the case will go to trial, which will be handled by the court that has normal territorial jurisdiction for the case. The court’s jurisdiction under subsection (6) will end at the end of the diet at which this plea was tendered. If an accused is charged with, say, two offences and pleads guilty to one and not guilty to the other, the continuing jurisdiction that subsection (6) creates over the proceedings will be lost only insofar as the proceedings relate to the charge to which the accused has pled not guilty. The court that has jurisdiction by virtue of subsection (6) would therefore be able to deal with the guilty plea as it sees fit, including by sentencing the accused for that offence.
Paragraph (b) describes the situations where the court’s continuing non-territorial jurisdiction will end in proceedings on petition or indictment (solemn proceedings). Sub-paragraph (i) provides that, as with summary proceedings, the jurisdiction will end where the accused pleads not guilty and the prosecutor does not accept that plea. Sub-paragraph (ii) provides that where the accused is committed until liberated in due course of law, which means that the court has ordered that the accused will be held in prison while proceedings are ongoing, the court’s jurisdiction will end. Finally, sub-paragraph (iii) provides that the first diet, and any proceedings following on from it, cannot be dealt with by virtue of subsection (6). As such, the court’s continuing jurisdiction will end before the first diet.
100.Subsection (8) provides that where the situations described in subsection (7) do not occur, the court’s continuing jurisdiction can continue until the conclusion of the proceedings. As such, where the accused pleads guilty in advance of the first diet before a court exercising national jurisdiction under this section, the court’s continuing jurisdiction will not end under subsection (7), and the court will be able to deal with the subsequent sentencing hearing.
101.Subsection (9) provides that proceedings on indictment that follow from proceedings on petition are to be treated as the same proceedings. In solemn criminal procedure (which is the procedure used for the most serious crimes), cases usually begin with a petition and then progress to an indictment, which sets out the formal charges against the accused. Subsection (9) means that a court which began dealing with a case at the petition stage can continue dealing with it, under subsection (6), once it has reached indictment stage. This will be relevant for any hearings held under the jurisdiction after the service of the indictment but before the first diet (at which point the jurisdiction would end under subsection (6)(b)(iii)), such as where the accused makes an early guilty plea under section 76 of the 1995 Act.
Inserted section 5C – Jurisdiction for cases in a sheriff court after failure to appear
102.This section allows a sheriff court to deal with prosecution proceedings for which it would not normally have jurisdiction where the accused has come before it having been arrested for a failure to appear in those prosecution proceedings.
103.When an accused person fails to appear in court, the court can grant a warrant for the accused’s arrest. On arrest the person will be brought before a court as soon as is practicable. That court appearance will be a form of “ancillary proceedings” within the meaning of section 5E(d) and therefore any sheriff court can deal with it by virtue of section 5B(1). The ancillary proceedings for failing to appear are separate from the main prosecution proceedings. If the person had been brought before the court that had normal territorial jurisdiction for the main prosecution proceedings, the court might have dealt with those main prosecution proceedings as well as the proceedings for the person’s failure to appear. Section 5C allows a court that has jurisdiction to deal with the ancillary proceedings to deal with the prosecution proceedings in the same way that the court with normal territorial jurisdiction would. In most cases that will mean rescheduling diets in light of a hearing having been missed when the accused failed to attend, but in the case of summary proceedings if the accused pleads guilty it may include sentencing the accused or ordering reports ahead of sentencing. The national jurisdiction granted in respect of a person’s failure to appear applies regardless of whether the main prosecution proceedings are taking place under the national jurisdiction or whether they are taking place under normal jurisdictional rules.
104.Subsection (2) provides that where the “
105.Subsection (3) provides that where the principal proceedings are summary criminal proceedings, the proceedings can continue to be dealt with in the same sheriff court and by any sheriff, unless, and until the end of a diet at which, a plea of not guilty by the accused is rejected. Subsection (5) defines a plea of not guilty as being rejected where the accused either tenders a plea of not guilty or adheres to a previously tendered plea of not guilty, and that plea is not accepted by the prosecutor (see paragraph 99 of these Notes).
106.However, subsection (4) provides that despite subsections (2) and (3) permitting a court to continue to deal with the proceedings, the court may only pass a sentence or otherwise dispose of the principal proceedings where—
evidence has not been led in the principal proceedings, or
the court considers that it would be in the interests of justice.
107.On that basis, if evidence has been led in the principal proceedings and the court does not consider that it would be in the interests of justice for it to dispose of the case, then the court’s non-territorial jurisdiction will come to an end.
Inserted section 5D – Further provision about national jurisdiction of sheriff courts
108.As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, section 5D supports sections 5B and 5C by ensuring that sheriffs and prosecutors have the necessary powers to deal with cases that come before a court by virtue of those sections. In particular, section 5D(3)(b) ensures that summary sheriffs benefit from this national jurisdiction in the sheriff court in the same way as sheriffs. Section 5D also makes clear that sections 5B and 5C supplement, rather than supersede, other legal bases for a sheriff hearing a case from outwith the sheriff's normal territorial jurisdiction (specifically those provided for in Part 1 and sections 34A and 137C of the 1995 Act – for example, section 137C makes more bespoke provision permitting the transfer of cases in exceptional circumstances).
Inserted section 5E – Interpretation of sections 5B to 5D
109.This section provides definitions for words and terms used in inserted sections 5B to 5D.
Inserted section 7A – Jurisdiction for callings of custody cases in a JP court
110.In a similar manner to inserted sections 5A to 5E, sections 7A to 7D extend the jurisdiction of JP courts, and that of those hearing JP cases, in respect of custody appearances. They also make provision allowing sheriffs to preside over JP courts in relation to the exercise of the national jurisdiction (in addition to justices of the peace and summary sheriffs, who ordinarily preside over JP courts).
111.Section 7A provides that, where a person appears in the JP court for the first time from custody in criminal proceedings, that calling of the case may be taken in any JP court in Scotland. The case may also be heard by any justice of the peace, summary sheriff or sheriff of any sheriffdom.
112.If there is more than one person subject to the proceedings, subsection (3) allows the proceedings to call before any JP court and any justice of the peace, summary sheriff or sheriff, provided that at least one of the people subject to the proceedings is appearing for the first time from custody in connection with it. This means that, for example, where two people are co-accused of committing a crime, the case can call before any JP court even though only one of the accused has been arrested for the crime and is therefore appearing from custody.
113.Subsection (4) confirms that it is for the procurator fiscal to determine in which JP court the case is to be heard.
114.Subsection (5) provides the JP court that has heard the initial calling of the case with continuing jurisdiction over the proceedings (and that JP court can be presided over by a justice of the peace, summary sheriff or sheriff of any sheriffdom). However, subsection (6) qualifies this and provides that where the accused pleads not guilty and the prosecutor does not accept that plea, the continuing jurisdiction under subsection (5) will cease at the end of the diet at which that plea was made. Such a scenario will mean it is likely that the case will go to trial, which will therefore be handled by the court that has normal territorial jurisdiction for the case. If an accused is charged with, say, two offences and pleads guilty to one and not guilty to the other, the continuing jurisdiction that subsection (5) creates over the proceedings will be lost only insofar as the proceedings relate to the charge to which the accused has pled not guilty. The court that has jurisdiction by virtue of sub-paragraph (5) would therefore be able to deal with the guilty plea as it sees fit, including by sentencing the accused for that. Subsection (7) provides that where the court’s national jurisdiction is not brought to an end as described in subsection (6), the court can continue to deal with the proceedings until their conclusion.
115.Subsection (8) confirms that where a sheriff is hearing a JP case under inserted section 7A or 7B, the jurisdiction and powers of the JP court are exercisable by the sheriff. The court itself will still be a JP court and the fact that a sheriff is presiding over it should result in no difference in treatment compared to a JP court presided over by a justice of the peace or summary sheriff. For example, where section 52A of the 1995 Act applies and there is a requirement to transfer jurisdiction to a sheriff, such a transfer would still need to be made despite the fact that the person presiding over the JP court is a sheriff.
Inserted section 7B – Jurisdiction for cases in a JP court after failure to appear
116.This section allows a JP court to deal with prosecution proceedings for which it would not normally have jurisdiction where the accused has come before it having been arrested for a failure to appear in those prosecution proceedings.
117.When an accused person fails to appear in court, the court can grant a warrant for the accused’s arrest. On arrest the person will be brought before a court as soon as is practicable. That court appearance will be a form of “ancillary proceedings” within the meaning of section 7D(1) and therefore any JP court can deal with it by virtue of section 7A(1). The ancillary proceedings for failing to appear are separate from the main prosecution proceedings. If the person had been brought before the court that had normal territorial jurisdiction for the main prosecution proceedings, the court might have dealt with those main prosecution proceedings as well as the proceedings for the person’s failure to appear. Section 7C allows a court that has jurisdiction to deal with the ancillary proceedings to deal with the prosecution proceedings in the same way that the court with normal territorial jurisdiction would. In most cases that will mean rescheduling diets in light of a hearing having been missed when the accused failed to attend, and if the accused pleads guilty it may include sentencing the accused or ordering reports ahead of sentencing. The national jurisdiction granted in respect of a person’s failure to appear applies regardless of whether the main prosecution proceedings are taking place under the national jurisdiction or whether they are taking place under normal jurisdictional rules.
118.Subsection (2) provides that the principal proceedings can continue to be dealt with in the same JP court and by any justice of the peace, summary sheriff or sheriff. In a similar manner to section 7A(6), this continuing jurisdiction will cease at the end of the diet at which the accused either tenders a plea of not guilty or adheres to a previously tendered plea of not guilty, and that plea is not accepted by the prosecutor (see paragraph 114 of these Notes). Subsection (4) confirms the circumstances in which a plea of not guilty is rejected for the purposes of subsection (2).
119.However, subsection (3) provides that despite subsection (2) permitting a court to continue to deal with the proceedings, the court may only pass a sentence or otherwise dispose of the principal proceedings where—
evidence has not been led in the principal proceedings, or
the court considers that it would be in the interests of justice.
120.On that basis, if evidence has been led in the principal proceedings and the court does not consider that it would be in the interests of justice for it to dispose of the case, then the court’s non-territorial jurisdiction will come to an end.
Inserted section 7C – Further provision about national jurisdiction of JP courts
121.As mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, section 7C supports sections 7A and 7B by ensuring that justices of the peace, summary sheriffs, sheriffs and prosecutors have the necessary powers to deal with cases that come before a court by virtue of those sections. It also makes clear that sections 7A and 7B supplement, rather than supersede, other legal bases for a JP court taking a case from outwith its normal territorial jurisdiction (specifically those provided for in Part 1 and section 137CC of the 1995 Act, and section 62 of the 2007 Act - for example, section 137CC makes more bespoke provision permitting the transfer of cases in exceptional circumstances).
Inserted section 7D – Interpretation of sections 7A to 7C
122.This section provides definitions for words and terms used in inserted sections 7A to 7C.
Section 10 – Section 9: transitional provision
123.This section provides that any proceedings that have come before a sheriff court by way of paragraph 16(1) of the schedule of the 2022 Act (being the first calling of a case from custody under the existing national custody jurisdiction provisions) are, for the purposes of inserted sections 5B to 5D of the 1995 Act (as inserted by section 9), to be treated as though they came before that court by virtue of inserted section 5B(1). This means that any proceedings which begin under the existing national custody jurisdiction provisions in the 2022 Act but conclude under the new legislation can continue to be dealt with under the national jurisdiction in the same way, and to the same extent, as they could if they began under the new legislation.
Section 11 – Addition of charge to indictment
124.This section modifies the 1995 Act and the 2010 Act to make provision for the addition of charges to an indictment after the point of service. Subsection (4) inserts a new section into the 1995 Act setting out the procedure by which a charge can be added. Subsections (1), (2), (3) and (5) to (12) make changes to the 1995 Act and the 2010 Act in consequence of this procedure. These changes will operate in conjunction with existing mechanisms under the 1995 Act which ought to already have sufficient flexibility to encompass this new procedure without any amendments being required. For example—
No provision is made about adding to the witness list to reflect the addition of a new charge. However, witnesses can already be added by the prosecutor late, with the leave of the court, under section 67(5) and (5A). Late objections in respect of any deficiencies in the specification of witnesses are also permitted under section 67(3) on cause being shown. Similarly, section 78(4)(b) allows the court to, on cause being shown, allow the accused to examine witnesses who are notified to the court late.
No change is made to section 70A which deals with the lodging of defence statements. However, if this duty has already been complied with then it would be expected that in the vast majority of cases an amendment of the indictment would amount to a “
material change in circumstances ” for the purposes of subsection (4). If in rare cases it did not amount to a material change in circumstances (e.g. because the additional charge was so similar and the defence to it was identical) then no adjustment to the statement would be required but the court would continue to have adequate details of the defence’s approach.No change is made to section 78(1) which deals with special defences and incrimination. However, that provision already allows the court the latitude to allow the accused to state such a defence or lead the relevant evidence, on cause being shown, despite the normal notice not being given.
No change is made to section 79 which deals with preliminary pleas and preliminary issues. However, subsection (1) of that section already allows the court to allow such a plea or issue to be made with the leave of the court on cause being shown despite not having been notified to the court in the normal manner.
The duty to seek agreement of evidence under section 257 of the 1995 Act applies up until the point of the trial starting, so it will automatically apply in respect of any evidence which arises in relation to the added charge. However, it will not place an untenable burden on any party as the obligation is simply to seek to ensure that certain matters are identified and agreed.
125.Subsection (2) of section 11 inserts a new subsection (2A) into section 65 of the 1995 Act. This new subsection confirms that where a charge is added to the indictment under section 70AA (see paragraphs 128 to 137 of these Notes), section 65(1A) will not affect the indictment as respects that additional charge. As such, where the accused is discharged from an indictment due to the preliminary hearing, first diet or trial not commencing within the relevant set periods after the first appearance on petition, this discharge will not encompass any charge added to the indictment, and therefore the proceedings as respects the added charge will be able to continue. In the event that an indictment were to continue as respects only the added charge(s), the time limits in subsection (4) of section 65 would not be relevant as the accused would not have been committed to prison in respect of the added charge. Similarly, subsection (1) of section 65 will not apply to any added charges as, if the charge is added to the indictment then the accused will not have a first appearance on petition in respect of the added charge because by definition the petition stage will already have concluded by the time the charge is added.
126.Subsection (3) amends section 70(4) of the 1995 Act by inserting a new paragraph (aa). This new paragraph provides that an organisation may appear in court by way of a representative for the purpose of making representations regarding an application to add an additional charge to an indictment under section 70AA (see paragraphs 128 to 137 of these Notes).
127.Subsection (4) inserts a new section 70AA into the 1995 Act.
Inserted section 70AA – Addition of charge to indictment
128.Section 70AA provides that after the service of an indictment on an accused person, it is competent for the indictment to be amended to include an additional charge of an offence (or offences - as the singular includes the plural). This additional charge must be of an offence alleged to have been committed by the accused person on whom the indictment was served (or any or all of the accused if there is more than one person subject to the proceedings), but it does not have to relate to the charges included on the original indictment.
129.An additional charge can only be added to the indictment on application to the court by the prosecutor. As per section 70AA(18), where the indictment is in respect of the High Court, the application must be made to a single judge of that court, and in any other case the application must be made to the sheriff.
130.The application must fulfil certain conditions as regards its content and timing, as set out in section 70AA(3) and (4), in order to be granted. Section 70AA(3) provides that the application can only be granted where prosecutor was not aware, and could not have reasonably been aware, of the act or omission forming the subject matter of the additional charge at the time of service of the indictment (for example, that the accused carried out a particular assault). The second condition in subsection (3) is that the application must have been made as soon as was reasonably practicable after the prosecutor became aware of the act or omission forming the subject matter of the additional charge. If the court considers that such knowledge existed at the point of service, or that the application was not made within such time, then the application must be refused. Where the court is content that the conditions are fulfilled, under subsection (2) it must grant the application, unless it otherwise sees just cause not to. Whether and when there is just cause not to grant an application will be for the court to determine, taking into account all the varying facts and circumstances of the case in question and in particular whether any prejudice which may arise can be cured by taking action under subsection (12) instead.
131.Subsection (4) provides that any application must be made at least two months before the trial diet, or can be made at a later date on special cause being shown. The requirement as to the point at which the application is made in subsection (4) does not apply where the trial date has not been fixed at the point of making the application. When the application is made, subsection (6) requires the application to be intimated to the accused, or where there is more than one accused, to all of them. The intimation requirement applies regardless of whether the additional accused persons are also subject to the additional charge. Where an application is made within two months of the trial diet and the court is not satisfied that there is special cause to allow the application at a later date then the application will fail, regardless of whether the conditions in subsection (3) are satisfied, because subsection (4) will not be satisfied.
132.After the court receives an application from a prosecutor, under section 70AA(7) the court is required to fix a diet for hearing the application and considering any representations regarding a late application (if necessary). This requirement does not apply where there is a diet already fixed at which these matters could be dealt with, or where the accused consents to the charge being added to the indictment (though it would remain open to the court to nevertheless hold a hearing if it saw fit, even where the accused consented). If there is a preliminary hearing or first diet fixed at which the court could determine the application but the timing of that hearing or diet is inopportune for doing so, the court would be able to exercise its existing power under section 75A(5) to adjust that date. In a case where the application is made late, it will be for the court to determine how this is dealt with at the hearing – i.e. whether to dispose of the lateness question at the outset or whether to hear representations on all matters relating to the application and reserve its decision on that preliminary point until the end.
133.Subsection (9) provides that where an application is being considered at a first diet, the court may only proceed to determine the application after the accused has stated how the accused pleads to the indictment as served. The relevant rules for this plea at a first diet are at section 71(6) of the 1995 Act. Where an application is being considered at a preliminary hearing, as a result of the amendment to section 72 of the 1995 Act in section 11(6) (see paragraph 138 of these Notes), the accused will also be required to plead to the indictment prior to the application being considered. Where, at either form of diet, the accused pleads guilty in respect of all charges on the indictment, the additional charges cannot be added and the court must refuse the application. The reference in subsection (10)(a) to pleading guilty to the indictment is, as alluded to in the previous sentence, a reference to pleading guilty to all charges on the indictment but, in line with the approach taken in the rest of the 1995 Act, this is taken as read without being spelled out(1). However, if the accused pleads not guilty in respect of any or all of the charges on the indictment, the court may proceed to determine the application. In the event that the court grants the application, the court must then require the accused to tender a plea in respect of the additional charge at that diet.
134.Section 70AA(11) provides that where the court is determining an application at a diet other than a first diet, the court may, on cause shown, proceed to determine the application without the accused being present. Where the court is determining an application at a first diet, section 71(6) of the 1995 Act (in conjunction with section 70AA(9) as discussed at paragraph 133 of these Notes) will require the accused to be present in order to plead to the indictment, and therefore the application will not be able to be determined in their absence.
135.Where an indictment is amended under section 70AA, subsection (13) provides that the amendment must be sufficiently authenticated by the initials of the clerk of court. No provision is made about serving the amended indictment on the accused as the accused will have received notice of the application and been present or represented at the hearing at which it was disposed of.
136.Where the charge added is of committing one or more of the offences listed in section 66(14A)(b) of the 1995 Act, and the accused has not previously received a notice under section 66(6A)(a) of that Act in respect of the current proceedings, subsection (14) requires the accused to be served with a notice specifying the matters specified in that paragraph. The matters are that the proceedings may be conducted only by a lawyer, that it is therefore in the accused’s interests to obtain the professional assistance of a solicitor if not obtained already, and that if the accused does not engage a solicitor for these purposes then the court will do so on the accused’s behalf. However, subsection (15) confirms that where the prosecutor fails to comply with these requirements, this will not affect the validity or lawfulness of the proceedings as a whole. As per subsection (16), service of this notice, and the intimation of an application to amend an indictment, may be effected by any officer of law (in addition to other methods of service and intimation).
137.As a result of the additional provision made by section 70AA(17), the procedure for appeals set out in section 74 of the 1995 Act and any Act of Adjournal made under that section will apply to the determination – regardless of whether an application is determined at a first diet or preliminary hearing, or at another hearing fixed by the court. Where the application is determined at a first diet or preliminary hearing, it is section 74(1) itself which provides the authority for the appeal, but where the application is determined at another hearing then it is section 70AA(17) which provides the authority.
138.Subsection (5) of section 11 modifies section 71 of the 1995 Act, to provide that applications under section 70AA can be considered at first diets. Subsection (6) amends section 72 of the 1995 Act, to similarly provide that applications under section 70AA can be considered at preliminary hearings.
139.Subsections (8) to (12) modify the 2010 Act to impose additional disclosure duties where a charge is added to an indictment under section 70AA of the 1995 Act. Subsection (8) amends section 117 of the 2010 Act, to provide that where the indictment is amended under section 70AA after the accused has appeared for the first time on petition or indictment, the disclosure duties in section 117(2) and (3) imposed on the relevant investigating agency will be triggered again in respect of the new charge. Where the investigating agency has already disclosed information to the prosecutor regarding this matter under section 117 (following the first appearance on petition or indictment), the investigating agency will only be required to disclose the relevant information that has not previously been provided to the prosecutor. Subsection (9) modifies section 118 of the 2010 Act, to confirm that the continuing duty on the investigating agency to disclose information to the prosecutor does not apply to information that has previously been disclosed to the prosecutor in accordance with the continuing duties. Subsections (10) to (12) make equivalent changes to the disclosure duties imposed on the prosecutor in sections 121 to 123 of the 2010 Act.
See for example sections 71(6) and 71B(1) of the 1995 Act, as contrasted with section 77(1) which makes specific provision when referring to a plea to only some of the charges. See also section 72(6) of the 1995 Act where the court is instructed not to do things like dispose of preliminary issues if a guilty plea has been accepted to the indictment (which logically must therefore mean in respect of all charges on the indictment or else there would still be preliminary pleas to be disposed of).
