

**EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM TO**  
**THE OCCUPATIONAL PENSION SCHEMES (INVESTMENT)**  
**(AMENDMENT) REGULATIONS 2010**

**2010 No. 2161**

1. This explanatory memorandum has been prepared by the Department for Work and Pensions and is laid before Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.

2. **Purpose of the instrument**

These Regulations contain amendments to the Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment) Regulations 2005. They make technical changes to ensure those Regulations reflect the limits on investments by occupational pension schemes in the sponsoring employer which are required by Article 18(1)(f) of Directive 2003/41/EC (OJ L235, 23.09.2003 p 10) of the European Parliament and of the Council on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision (the IORP Directive).

3. **Matters of special interest to the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments**

None.

4. **Legislative Context**

- 4.1 These amendments partially transpose the requirements of Article 18(1)(f) of the IORP Directive (investments in the sponsoring employer) which requires that scheme investments in the sponsoring employer are limited to 5% of the market value of a scheme's investment portfolio.
- 4.2 In particular, the Regulations remove an exception to restrictions on employer- related investments for an operator of a collective investment scheme. The Regulations also remove transitional protection for schemes which retained certain investments in their sponsoring employer on 6 April 1997, in excess of the 5% limit required by the IORP Directive.
- 4.3 As this instrument implements EU legislation, a copy of the Transposition Note is attached as an Annex.
- 4.4 The House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee reported on the proposal and the Government's explanatory memoranda in report no.2, Session 00/01 and in report no. 31, Session 01/02. The proposal and explanatory memoranda were sifted to Sub-Committee A of the House of Lords European Union Committee and were cleared by that committee following correspondence with Ministers on 17 June 2002.

## **5. Territorial Extent and Application**

This instrument applies to Great Britain.

## **6. European Convention on Human Rights**

As the instrument is subject to negative resolution procedure and does not amend primary legislation, no statement is required.

## **7. Policy background**

### **7.1 *What is being done and why***

- Regulation 2 amends the Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment) Regulations 2005 (the Investment Regulations). This is necessary in order to transpose fully the requirements of Article 18(1)(f) of the IORP Directive. Article 18(1)(f) requires Member States to impose, by 23 September 2010, a 5% limit on the amount an occupational pension scheme can invest its resources in the sponsoring employer.
- The Investment Regulations already impose this restriction in most circumstances, but the changes made to those Regulations by regulation 2 ensure that the remaining exceptions which are prohibited by Article 18(1)(f) are removed. In particular the exception relating to investments by a collective investment scheme and a transitional provision which allows schemes to retain certain investments in excess of the 5% limit required by the IORP Directive.
- The amendments in this instrument were originally contained in the Occupational, Personal and Stakeholder Pensions (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2009 (S.I.2009/615), which contained other provisions implementing the requirements of Article 18(1)(f), but were removed following certain responses to the consultation conducted in relation to those Regulations (see “Consultation outcome” below).

### **7.2 *Consolidation***

- Informal consolidation of the instrument will be included in due course in the Department’s “The law relating to Social Security” (the Blue Volumes), which are available at no cost to the public on the internet at <http://www.dwp.gov.uk/advisers/docs/lawvols/bluevol/>

## **8. Consultation outcome**

- 8.1 The changes being introduced in this instrument were first introduced by the Occupational, Personal and Stakeholder Pensions (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2009 that were subject to an 8 week consultation exercise which ran from 8 December 2008 to 30

January 2009. The Department for Business, Innovation & Skills Regulatory Reform Code of Practice on consultation advises that a minimum of 12 weeks is appropriate for public consultations, unless there are good reasons for a shorter period. As that consultation document was of a technical, specialised nature and of interest to professionals in the pensions industry, Ministers agreed that a limited consultation of 8 weeks was appropriate.

- 8.2 Twenty-five responses were received. Respondents' main concerns were over the removal of the current exception for collective investment schemes and the consequential requirement for trustees to look through the investment of such schemes in the sponsoring employer. Others were concerned with the disproportionate effect on schemes that had benefited from either donations or bequests of shares in the sponsoring employer and, consequently, were well in excess of the 5% limit imposed by the IORP Directive, allowed by the Regulations where the investments had been held on 6 April 1997. It was suggested that shares acquired in this way should not count toward the limit. A number of respondents suggested that the complex issues arising from the removal of the current exceptions warranted these provisions being removed and dealt with on a separate track.
- 8.3 As a result of these comments, the changes were removed from the Miscellaneous Regulations package. This was to give further consideration to the issues raised and to give certain respondents the opportunity to put forward legal arguments as to why the IORP Directive did not require removal of the current exceptions.
- 8.4 On consideration of all further comments received, no arguments were presented which gave the Department reason to reconsider its view that the current exceptions had to be removed in order for the UK to comply with its obligations under Article 18(1)(f) of the IORP Directive. The changes are therefore being reintroduced in this instrument.

## **9. Guidance**

This Department does not issue guidance on private pension issues as a matter of course. The specialist pensions press will be notified so the introduction of these Regulations will be publicised within the pensions industry.

## **10. Impact**

- 10.1 This instrument may impose some new costs on business, charities and voluntary bodies which sponsor occupational pension schemes. This will happen where the scheme holds investments in the sponsoring employer in excess of the 5% limit on such investments, either directly, or through a collective investment scheme. The impact is expected to be low.
- 10.2 This instrument has a negligible impact on the public sector.

10.3 A full impact assessment is attached to this memorandum and will be published alongside the Explanatory Memorandum on the OPSI website.

**11. Regulating small businesses**

This legislation applies to small business but the impact is expected to be low since small firms are much less likely than other firms to sponsor occupational pension schemes. Small schemes (those with fewer than 12 members, all of whom are trustees) are exempted from the restrictions on loans and employer-related investments.

**12. Monitoring & review**

These Regulations make minor and technical changes to current Regulations. Formal monitoring is therefore not appropriate. Review of these Regulations will be subject to stakeholder views.

**13. Contact**

Lindsey Lewis (020 7449 7381) and Barry Owen (020 7449 7388) at the Department for Work and Pensions can answer any queries regarding the instrument.

## Transposition Note

### The Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment) Regulations 2005

**Transposing that part of the European Union Directive 2003/41/EC on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision<sup>1</sup> (IORP Directive) which concern the investments of private sector occupational pension schemes**

Article	Requirements	Implementation
<b>18(1)(f)</b>	Investment by schemes in the sponsoring undertaking shall be no more than 5% of the portfolio as a whole.	<p>This requirement is already satisfied in part by section 40 of the Pensions Act 1995 and regulations 10 to 16 of the Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment) Regulations 2005 (the Investment Regulations), which restrict the proportion of the market value of a scheme's resources that may be invested in the sponsoring employer. Such investments are called employer-related investments.</p> <p>Regulation 2 of the Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment) (Amendment) Regulations 2010 amends regulations 13 and 14 of the Investment Regulations with effect from 23 September 2010 to bring additional employer-related investments within the limits required by Article 18(1)(f) of the IORP Directive.</p>

#### **Scrutiny history**

Doc Ref 13420/00, COM(200)507: *Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of laws, Regulations and administrative provisions relating to institutions for occupational retirement provisions.*

The Government submitted explanatory memoranda to Parliament dated 11 December 2000, 16 May 2001 and 16 March 2009.

The House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee reported on the proposal and the Government's explanatory memoranda in report no.2, Session 00/01 and in report no. 31, Session 01/02.

The proposal and explanatory memoranda were sifted to Sub-Committee A of the House of Lords European Union Committee and were cleared by that committee following correspondence with Ministers on 17 June 2002.

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<sup>1</sup> (OJ No. L 235, 23.9.03, p.10)

<p>Title: The Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment) (Amendment) Regulations 2010</p> <p>Lead department or agency: Department for Work and Pensions</p> <p>Other departments or agencies:</p>	<p><b>Impact Assessment (IA)</b></p> <hr/> <p><b>Date:</b> 02/09/2010</p> <hr/> <p><b>Stage:</b> Final</p> <hr/> <p><b>Source of intervention:</b> EU</p> <hr/> <p><b>Type of measure:</b> Secondary legislation</p> <hr/> <p><b>Contact for enquiries:</b> Barry Owen 020 7449 7388</p>
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**Summary: Intervention and Options**

**What is the problem under consideration? Why is government intervention necessary?**

The Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment) Regulations 2005 partly transposed European Union Directive 2003/41/EC on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision<sup>1</sup> (IORP Directive) which includes restrictions on the amount an occupational scheme can invest in its sponsoring employer. This is intended to limit the impact on pension schemes' funding in the event of a scheme's sponsoring employer becoming insolvent. The existing regulations temporarily exempt investments made through a 'collective investment scheme' and include provisions temporarily exempting schemes that were in excess of the statutory limits when the restrictions were first introduced in 1997. In order to transpose the above Directive fully into UK domestic law, both of these exemptions now need to be repealed.

**What are the policy objectives and the intended effects?**

To remove the transitional employer-related provisions in The Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment Regulations) 2005 in order to comply with European Union Directive 2003/41/EC on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision (IORP Directive).

**What policy options have been considered? Please justify preferred option (further details in Evidence Base)**

Do nothing:

Legal advice confirmed that there were no grounds for retaining the existing exemptions (ie to do nothing) and, if the UK Government did, it would be in breach of its EU law obligations. By retaining the existing transitional provisions, UK pensions law would be in breach of the European Directive, which could lead to infraction proceedings being taken against the UK government.

Consequently, the full transposition of the IORP Directive is the only option.

**When will the policy be reviewed to establish its impact and the extent to which the policy objectives have been achieved?**

The policy objective is to fully transpose the IORP Directive into UK domestic law. This will be achieved as soon as the changes to the Investment Regulations come into force. However we will monitor stakeholder views to ascertain whether it would be appropriate to review ways of implementing the Directive which could reduce regulatory burden in future.

**Are there arrangements in place that will allow a systematic collection of monitoring information for future policy review?**

No – collection of monitoring data would place a disproportionate additional burden on pension schemes

<sup>1</sup> (OJ No. L 235, 23.9.03, p.10)

**SELECT SIGNATORY Sign-off** For final proposal stage Impact Assessments:

*I have read the Impact Assessment and I am satisfied that (a) it represents a fair and reasonable view of the expected costs, benefits and impact of the policy, and (b) the benefits justify the costs.*

**Signed by the responsible Minister: Steve Webb .....** **Date: 01/09/10 .....**

Summary: Analysis and Evidence Policy Option 1

Description:

Price Base Year <b>2010</b>	PV Base Year <b>2010</b>	Time Period Years <b>10</b>	Net Benefit (Present Value (PV)) (£m)		
			Low:	High:	Best Estimate: Negligible

COSTS (£m)	Total Transition (Constant Price) Years	Average Annual (excl. Transition) (Constant Price)	Total Cost (Present Value)
Low	0	0	0
High	Low	Low	Low
Best Estimate	Low	Low	Low

**Description and scale of key monetised costs by ‘main affected groups’**

Schemes with employer-related investments in excess of 5 per cent will need to change their asset allocations. The scheme will bear the one-off cost of the transaction process. Overall, these costs are expected to be small as the transaction costs are expected to be low and only a small number of schemes will be affected. Schemes which invest in collective investment schemes will need to track the level of these investments, which will also incur a one-off cost to set up monitoring systems and a small ongoing monitoring cost. Negligible costs will be incurred by the Pensions Regulator.

**Other key non-monetised costs by ‘main affected groups’**

Sponsors of schemes divesting themselves of a significant amount of employer-related investments may find themselves more vulnerable to takeover. However, this is unlikely since trustees are already required to invest prudently and in the members’ best interest, which implies a properly diversified investment portfolio.

BENEFITS (£m)	Total Transition (Constant Price) Years	Average Annual (excl. Transition) (Constant Price)	Total Benefit (Present Value)
Low			
High			
Best Estimate	0	Negligible	Negligible

**Description and scale of key monetised benefits by ‘main affected groups’**

Reducing the exposure of occupational pension schemes to investment in the sponsoring employer will improve these schemes’ funding levels in the event of the sponsor becoming insolvent. This would improve funding for the Pensions Protection Fund (PPF). It is expected that this benefit will be very small, since the measure is likely to affect a small proportion of schemes, and of those only a small proportion will become insolvent and fall under the PPF regime.

**Other key non-monetised benefits by ‘main affected groups’**

Schemes’ funding positions will be less reliant on the performance of the sponsoring employer, making schemes more robust at times of low performance for the sponsor, and hence less likely to need to call for additional funding from the sponsor at these times.

**Key assumptions/sensitivities/risks**

Discount rate 3.5

Given that the temporary transitional provisions were intended to give schemes with employer-related investments in excess of 5 per cent immediately before 6 April 1997 time to disinvest, it is expected that most schemes will be within the permitted limit by the time these regulations come into force. That the current investment practice for the majority of occupational pensions schemes is governed by trust law supports this assumption. This already requires schemes to invest in a prudent manner and to limit employer-related investments. Schemes that have not divested would be subject to action by the Pensions Regulator, subject to their risk based approach.

Impact on admin burden (AB) (£m):	Impact on policy cost savings (£m):	In
New AB:	Policy cost savings:	No
AB savings:	Net: <b>NIL</b>	

## Enforcement, Implementation and Wider Impacts

What is the geographic coverage of the policy/option?	United Kingdom				
From what date will the policy be implemented?	September 2010				
Which organisation(s) will enforce the policy?	The Pensions Regulator				
What is the annual change in enforcement cost (£m)?	Negligible				
Does enforcement comply with Hampton principles?	Yes				
Does implementation go beyond minimum EU requirements?	No				
What is the CO <sub>2</sub> equivalent change in greenhouse gas emissions? (Million tonnes CO <sub>2</sub> equivalent)	Traded: N/A		Non-traded: N/A		
Does the proposal have an impact on competition?	No				
What proportion (%) of Total PV costs/benefits is directly attributable to primary legislation, if applicable?	Costs: N/A		Benefits: N/A		
Annual cost (£m) per organisation (excl. Transition) (Constant Price)	Micro	< 20	Small	Medium	Large
Are any of these organisations exempt?	No	No	No	No	No

### Specific Impact Tests: Checklist

Set out in the table below where information on any SITs undertaken as part of the analysis of the policy options can be found in the evidence base. For guidance on how to complete each test, double-click on the link for the guidance provided by the relevant department.

Please note this checklist is not intended to list each and every statutory consideration that departments should take into account when deciding which policy option to follow. It is the responsibility of departments to make sure that their duties are complied with.

Does your policy option/proposal have an impact on...?	Impact	Page ref within IA
<b>Statutory equality duties<sup>2</sup></b> <a href="#">Statutory Equality Duties Impact Test guidance</a>	No	8
<b>Economic impacts</b>		
<b>Competition</b> <a href="#">Competition Assessment Impact Test guidance</a>	No	8
<b>Small firms</b> <a href="#">Small Firms Impact Test guidance</a>	Yes	8
<b>Environmental impacts</b>		
<b>Greenhouse gas assessment</b> <a href="#">Greenhouse Gas Assessment Impact Test guidance</a>	No	
<b>Wider environmental issues</b> <a href="#">Wider Environmental Issues Impact Test guidance</a>	No	
<b>Social impacts</b>		
<b>Health and well-being</b> <a href="#">Health and Well-being Impact Test guidance</a>	No	
<b>Human rights</b> <a href="#">Human Rights Impact Test guidance</a>	No	
<b>Justice system</b> <a href="#">Justice Impact Test guidance</a>	No	
<b>Rural proofing</b> <a href="#">Rural Proofing Impact Test guidance</a>	No	
<b>Sustainable development</b> <a href="#">Sustainable Development Impact Test guidance</a>	No	

<sup>2</sup> Race, disability and gender Impact assessments are statutory requirements for relevant policies. Equality statutory requirements will be expanded 2011, once the Equality Bill comes into force. Statutory equality duties part of the Equality Bill applies to GB only. The Toolkit provides advice on statutory equality duties for public authorities with a remit in Northern Ireland.

## References

**Include the links to relevant legislation and publications, such as public impact assessment of earlier stages (e.g. Consultation, Final, Enactment).**

<b>No.</b>	<b>Legislation or publication</b>
1	<b>Directive 2003/41/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 3 June 2003 on the activities and supervision of Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision (IORP) – Article 18(1) and (2) of the Pensions Directive.</b>
2	<b><u>Consultation:</u> The changes were consulted upon in draft regulations - ‘The Occupational, Personal and Stakeholder Pensions (Miscellaneous Amendments) Regulations 2009’</b> <b><u><a href="http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/pensions-misc-regs-2009.pdf">http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/pensions-misc-regs-2009.pdf</a></u></b>  <b><u>Government Response to Consultation:</u></b> <b><u><a href="http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/pensions-misc-regs-response.pdf">http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/pensions-misc-regs-response.pdf</a></u></b>

## Evidence Base

### Introduction

1. This impact assessment considers the effect on schemes of removing the transitional provisions in regulation 14 of The Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment) Regulations 2005: SI 2005/3378 (the Investment Regulations).

### Issue under consideration

2. Where certain employer-related investments exceeded five per cent of the market value of the assets of the scheme immediately before 6 April 1997, the transitional provisions set out in regulation 14 of the investment regulations, permit those investments to be retained until disinvestment can be effected.
3. DWP consulted on the provisions in Pensions Directive 2003/41/EC during the final quarter of 2003 and again in March 2005. The 2005 consultation proposed to remove some of the existing transitional arrangements in the investment regulations but, in light of the issues raised by respondents (in particular that it may lead to a 'forced sale' of assets which could be detrimental to the members' interests), the Government decided they would permit the current transitional provisions for pre-owned investments to continue.

### Rationale for Government intervention

4. The transitional provisions cannot continue beyond the 23<sup>rd</sup> September, when the discretion available under Article 22(4) of the Directive to postpone the transposition of Article 18(1) and (2) is withdrawn.

### Objectives

5. To remove the risk of UK pensions law being in breach of the European Directive which may lead to infraction proceedings being taken against the UK Government.

### Intended effect

6. The intended effect is to ensure that those elements of Article 18(1) and (2) which are not currently found in domestic legislation are incorporated through regulations. This will also protect the Pensions Protection Fund from additional costs due to schemes which are heavily invested in the sponsoring employer.

### Main affected groups

7. The main groups affected by the proposals are as follows:
  - **Pension schemes with employer-related investments in excess of 5 per cent immediately before 6 April 1997:** The regulations withdraw transitional provisions in regulation 14 of the investment regulations. From the date the changes come into force, (with very few exceptions), pension scheme investment in a sponsoring employer will be restricted to no more than 5 per cent of the scheme's portfolio.
  - **Pension schemes which invest in collective investment schemes (CISs):** The regulations withdraw transitional provisions exempting CISs from the calculation of the level of employer-related investment. Schemes will be required to ensure that there is 'look through' into the CIS to allow them to monitor the level of employer-related investment they are making through the CIS.
  - **Government:** Government and the taxpayer stand behind private pension provision by providing tax relief on contributions to schemes. It is important, therefore, to have a regulatory regime that supports and encourages prudent investment.

- **The Pensions Regulator:** The Pensions Regulator will enforce these regulations, based on its usual risk-based approach.
- **The Pension Protection Fund:** The Pension Protection Fund provides pensions compensation to members of eligible defined benefit schemes in the UK. These regulations make a small reduction in the likelihood of the Pensions Protection Fund being called upon to provide compensation.

### **Geographical extent**

8. Whilst the regulations apply to the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland will make separate, corresponding legislation.

### **Implementation**

9. The Regulations will be laid before Parliament on 2<sup>nd</sup> September 2010 (coming into force on 23<sup>rd</sup> September) and will be accompanied by a Press Release. DWP will also contact major stakeholders.

### **Alternative Options**

10. The only alternative to removing the current transitional provision would be to do nothing. However, this would result in UK pensions law being in breach of the European Directive which could, in turn, lead to infraction proceedings being taken against the UK Government.

### **Numbers affected**

11. Given that the transitional provisions are intended to give schemes with employer-related investments in excess of 5 per cent immediately before 6 April 1997 time to divest, it is expected that most schemes will be within the permitted limit by the time the changes come into force. For the same reasons, it is anticipated that schemes with employer-related loans will have effected repayment. Consequently, it is expected that the number of schemes affected by the removal of the provisions will be low.

### **SCHEMES: One-off and annual costs**

12. Where schemes have employer-related investments in excess of the 5 per cent limit, the trustees or managers of those schemes will have to instruct their investment managers to liquidate the excess employer stock and use the proceeds to purchase alternative assets. The scheme will bear the transaction costs of this process. The aggregate cost would be the sum of the per-scheme transaction cost across all the affected schemes. This is a one-off cost – there are no on-going costs. DWP has no evidence available about the size of these costs. However, since we expect the number of schemes affected to be low, we also expect the overall cost to be small.
13. Schemes investing in collective investment schemes (CISs) would bear a one-off cost in setting up systems to monitor the level of investment in the sponsoring employer through the CIS. There will be an ongoing cost of monitoring the level of employer related investment in the CIS, to ensure that the total level of employer related investment in the scheme remains below the 5% limit. Alternatively, schemes could comply by investing in CISs which commit not to invest more than 5% in any one company. DWP has no evidence available about the likely size of these costs or the number of schemes who are invested in CISs. We believe that a relatively small proportion of schemes make use of CISs, therefore we expect these costs to be negligible.

### **SCHEMES: Non-monetised benefits**

14. Reducing the dependence of scheme assets on the sponsoring employer's stock is intended to provide increased financial security for schemes in the event of the sponsor suffering from adverse business conditions.

## **GOVERNMENT: Annual Costs**

15. Negligible (smaller than the costs described above). The Pensions Regulator will enforce these regulations applying their usual risk based approach.

## **Pension Protection Fund: Non-monetised benefits**

16. Increased financial security for trust-based defined benefit schemes reduces the risk of such schemes looking to the Pension Protection Fund (PPF) to provide compensation. Reducing the reliance of employer related investment will make a small improvement in the funding position of some schemes entering the PPF.

## **KEY ASSUMPTIONS/SENSITIVITIES/RISKS**

### **Key assumptions**

17. Since these transitional provisions have given schemes the opportunity to reduce their employer related investments over a number of years, it is assumed that the majority of schemes will, by 2010, have reduced employer-related investments to 5% or less. We assume that the transaction costs of disinvesting the sponsoring employer's stock will be small, and that the costs of setting up monitoring system and carrying out ongoing monitoring is also small.

### **Sensitivities/Risks**

18. That the number of schemes affected by the regulations and the costs incurred by these schemes will be greater than that envisaged in the 'Key Assumptions'.

## **IMPACT TESTS**

### **Competition**

19. These regulations apply to trust based pension schemes. Schemes are employer specific and do not compete to serve a market. Therefore these regulations do not directly or indirectly affect the number or range of suppliers in a market, or alter their ability or incentives to compete.

### **Small firms**

20. These regulations are less likely to impact on small firms than other types of firms. This is because they are much less likely than other firms to sponsor occupational pension schemes. A small firm is very unlikely to make up a significant part of the value of a collective investment scheme. Small schemes (those with fewer than 12 members, all of whom are trustees) are already exempted from the restrictions on loans and employer-related investments. There is no scope within the IORP Directive for the exemption of small firms.

### **Equality impact**

21. An equality impact assessment was considered. These regulations do not impact directly on individuals. The regulations aim to change the level of exposure schemes have to investment in the sponsoring employer. In the event of the employer becoming insolvent and an eligible scheme being unable to pay benefits at the Pensions Protection Fund level, the scheme would enter the Pensions Protection Fund both before and after the introduction of this legislation and levels of compensation to individuals would not change. The level of compensation remains the same regardless of race, disability and gender.

## Annex 1: Post Implementation Review (PIR) Plan

<p>Basis of the review:</p> <p><b>To review whether this aspect of implementation of the IORP Directive could be implemented in a way that reduces burdens on pension schemes.</b></p>
<p>Review objective:</p> <p><b>To ensure that regulation remains proportionate</b></p>
<p>Review approach and rationale:</p> <p><b>There is little hard data about costs and numbers of schemes affected by the change. Collecting data would be a disproportionate cost and an additional burden on pension schemes. Therefore review will be based on a scan of stakeholder views.</b></p>
<p>Baseline:</p> <p><b>No baseline can be established, due to the lack of data and burden of collecting such data.</b></p>
<p>Success criteria:</p> <p><b>Views of stakeholders, including schemes and their representative bodies, the Pensions Regulator and the Pensions Protection Fund.</b></p>
<p>Monitoring information arrangements:</p> <p><b>Establishing a regular collection of monitoring information would incur a disproportionate cost and impose an additional burden on pension schemes. Therefore there is no proposal to collect monitoring information on this policy change.</b></p>

