1. This explanatory memorandum has been prepared by the Home Office and is laid before Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.

2. **Purpose of the instrument**

   2.1 This Order provides that the powers of the Serious Organised Crime Agency (“SOCA”) to disclose information include the power to disclose information to the UK’s national anti-doping organisation, United Kingdom Anti-Doping Limited (“UKAD”) for the purposes of the exercise by UKAD of its public functions when acting as a national anti-doping organisation.

3. **Matters of special interest to the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments or the Select Committee on Statutory Instruments**

   3.1 None.

4. **Legislative Context**

   4.1 The Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (“the Act”) established SOCA and prescribes its functions and powers.

   4.2 Section 33 of the Act (as amended by paragraph 172 of Schedule 8 to the Serious Crime Act 2007) prescribes the circumstances in which SOCA may disclose information obtained by it in connection with the exercise of its functions. Such disclosure may only occur if it is for any of a number of “permitted purposes” specified in section 33.

   4.3 Section 33(2)(f) of the Act provides that permitted purposes can include the exercise of functions that appear to the Secretary of State to be functions of a public nature. The section requires that any such functions be designated by the Secretary of State by order. One such order has been made previously - The Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (Disclosure of Information by SOCA) Order 2008 (SI 2008/1908), which designated the functions of ‘protecting public health’ and ‘the functions of the Financial Services Authority under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000’.

   4.4 This Order designates the functions of UKAD when it is acting as a national anti-doping organisation, being functions which appear to the Secretary of State to be functions of a public nature, for the purposes of section 33 of the Act. The effect is that SOCA may disclose information to UKAD for the purposes of the exercise of those functions.

   4.5 UKAD is a company limited by guarantee, incorporated by the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport to undertake the United Kingdom’s anti-doping function. Further information about this function is provided in the policy background section below.
4.6. This Order is being made to allow SOCA to disclose information to UKAD. Such disclosures will help UKAD properly exercise its anti-doping functions. The Secretary of State is of the view that these functions are functions of a public nature because:

4.6.1. UKAD is a non-departmental public body managed on a day-to-day basis by a Board of Directors appointed by, and accountable to, the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport;

4.6.2. the exercise by UKAD of its functions will be supervised by the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport and, ultimately, UKAD will be answerable to the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport for any failure to undertake its functions effectively;

4.6.3. UKAD will be predominantly publicly funded;

4.6.4. UKAD will be giving effect to international obligations of the UK Government, following its ratification of the *UNESCO International Convention Against Doping in Sport*; and

4.6.5. there is a general public interest in the exercise by UKAD of its functions – that is, there is a public interest in sport being free of doping and other forms of cheating.

5. Territorial Extent and Application

5.1 The section of the Act under which this Order is made (section 33) and this Order extend and apply to all of the United Kingdom.


6.1 The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Office, Alan Campbell, has made the following statement regarding Human Rights:

In my view the provisions of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (Disclosure of Information by SOCA) Order 2010 are compatible with the Convention rights.

7. Policy background

*What is being done and why*

7.1. The UK Government is committed to eradicating doping in sport. By ratifying the *UNESCO International Convention Against Doping in Sport*, it has a legal obligation to adopt measures consistent with the ‘World Anti-Doping Code’ (introduced by the World Anti-Doping Agency) including measures to facilitate doping controls and restrict the availability and use in sport of doping substances and methods.

7.2. Traditionally, measures to tackle doping have focussed on testing of athletes’ blood and urine. However, the landscape for doping is changing and substances and methods that avoid detection are increasingly being used. It is therefore important to look at ways of using non-testing based methods to identify and tackle the entire range of doping violations (including trafficking and supply of substances), not just the presence of a detectable substance in an athlete’s body.

7.3. The UK Government has therefore established UKAD with an information-sharing and information-gathering function and is seeking to open up information sharing gateways
with agencies that may be able to provide information relevant to doping violations. Broadly speaking, UKAD would like information for the following two purposes:

7.3.1. First, to help identify trends and threats in doping, so it can target athletes or particular sports, and develop education strategies.

7.3.2. Secondly, it would like information to help determine whether an individual subject to its jurisdiction may have committed an anti-doping rule violation. This might, for example, include personal information about an athlete or their support personnel caught importing substances prohibited in the sporting context into the UK. If there is information that suggests an anti-doping rule violation may have occurred, UKAD may use that information in proceedings against an individual, including by introducing it as evidence before the ‘National Anti-Doping Panel’ (the UK’s independent tribunal for anti-doping matters) and at any subsequent appeal hearing. Anti-doping rule violations can result in a range of sanctions as provided for under the ‘World Anti-Doping Code’ (including for example, periods of ineligibility to compete, disqualification of results and forfeiture of public funding). Although some anti-doping rule violations also constitute criminal offences under UK law, UKAD would not conduct its own criminal investigations as this falls outside its responsibilities.

7.4. International experience has shown similar information sharing arrangements to be an effective way of obtaining evidence to help pursue drugs cheats. It also sends out a strong deterrent message to anyone considering doping in the UK.

7.5. Whilst we do not believe there to be a big problem with doping in the UK, doping poses a high risk for sport and there is a high level of public interest in demonstrating that sport in the UK is free from doping. The Government is keen to ensure that the UK is in the best position to tackle this issue effectively in the run up to, and during, the Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2012, and that it leaves a lasting legacy beyond.

7.6. This Order will allow SOCA to share information with UKAD that will inform its anti-doping programme and help pursue those athletes and athlete support personnel that commit anti-doping rule violations.

Consolidation

7.7. Not applicable. These Regulations do not consolidate any legislation.

8. Consultation outcome

8.1. These Regulations derive from proposals by the Minister of State for Sport to set up a new independent National Anti-Doping Organisation in the UK, which were the subject of a public consultation from 1st July – 23rd September 2009. Views were particularly sought from sports organisations and law enforcement bodies.

8.2. Part of this consultation sought views on the proposal for UKAD to work more closely with law enforcement agencies to strengthen the UK’s fight against doping in sport. Overall, the majority of respondents were broadly supportive of this proposed expansion in remit, and for information from law enforcement agencies to help inform a more intelligence-led anti-doping programme.

8.3. The primary concerns raised on the information sharing proposal were around confidentiality, data protection and human rights issues. The view of the Information
Commissioner’s Office was sought as part of the consultation and its response emphasised that the question of whether disclosure of information to UKAD is fair and proportionate necessitates detailed consideration of what information is to be shared and for what purpose; considerations which are central to human rights and confidentiality requirements.

8.4. UKAD has continued to work with the Information Commissioner's Office and the Ministry of Justice to ensure that these criteria are met. It has completed a Privacy Impact Assessment and will be preparing a Memorandum of Understanding with SOCA to ensure that these considerations are built into the operational procedures for data sharing and that there are appropriate procedures in place to protect the security and confidentiality of the information. The Privacy Impact Assessment is available on UKAD’s website (http://www.ukad.org.uk/).

8.5. A summary of responses to the consultation can be found on the DCMS website at http://www.culture.gov.uk/reference_library/publications/6494.aspx

9. Guidance

9.1. Details about the information that SOCA will disclose to UKAD and how the information sharing arrangements will operate in practice will be set out in a Memorandum of Understanding between SOCA and UKAD.

10. Impact

10.1. An Impact Assessment is attached to this memorandum.

10.2. The Impact on the Public Sector is expected to be minimal. These Regulations will not impose any significant increased burdens on SOCA, nor on the law enforcement bodies from whom SOCA obtains information.

10.3. There will be no impact on businesses, charities or voluntary bodies.

11. Regulating small business

11.1. This Order does not apply to small businesses.

12. Monitoring & review

12.1 The Department for Culture, Media and Sport, with the support of the Home Office, set up a Cross-Departmental Working Group on Anti-Doping in Sport in 2008 to consider the development of information sharing gateways under the new National Anti-Doping Organisation, and this group will continue to monitor their development. Their implementation will also be monitored as part of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport’s ongoing monitoring of UKAD. This will also form part of UKAD’s annual report, which will be published on its website (http://www.ukad.org.uk/).

13. Contact

Richard Rhodes at the Home Office (tel: 020 7035 1570, or email: richard.rhodes@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk) can answer any queries regarding the instrument.
What is the problem under consideration? Why is government intervention necessary?

A decade of British Sport, including the London 2012 Games and the Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games, brings an increasing international focus on the strength of the UK’s anti-doping policies and programmes. The Government has undertaken to modernise the delivery of its anti-doping policy and as part of this, has focused on developing more sophisticated methods for policing doping offences which cannot be detected by traditional testing processes. International experience has shown that an effective strategy for targeting ‘non-analytical’ doping offences (those which are not detectable or cannot be policed merely through testing, such as the trafficking and supply of banned substances) is the development of close working partnerships, which facilitate the exchange of information (including personal information) between anti-doping organisations and law enforcement agencies. Government intervention of this form overcomes information failures and ensures better access to relevant information for relevant parties.

What are the policy objectives and the intended effects?

To facilitate the exchange of information between the UK’s national anti-doping organisation, UK- Anti Doping (UKAD) and the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) in order to:

- Develop an effective mechanism for the detection and investigation of ‘non-analytical’ doping offences as part of the development of a wider intelligence analysis and intelligence gathering function within UKAD
- Help identify trends and threats in doping which allow the targeting of athletes or particular sports and inform the development of education strategies.

What policy options have been considered? Please justify any preferred option.

1. Maintain the status quo
2. Establish an information sharing gateway which will facilitate the exchange of information between UKAD and SOCA

Option 2 is preferable for the reasons outlined above and to ensure the UK is in a position to deliver a first class and modern anti-doping programme ahead of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games and the Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games.

When will the policy be reviewed to establish the actual costs and benefits and the achievement of the desired effects? The policy will be monitored and reviewed as part of UKAD’s annual report.
Ministerial Sign-off For Impact Assessments:

I have read the Impact Assessment and I am satisfied that, given the available evidence, it represents a reasonable view of the likely costs, benefits and impact of the leading options.

Signed by the responsible Minister:

Gerry Sutcliffe……………………………………………………………….. Date: 14th December 2009
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy Option: 2</th>
<th>Description: Establish an Information Sharing Gateway which will facilitate the exchange of Information between UKAD and SOCA.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### ANNUAL COSTS

| Description and scale of key monetised costs by ‘main affected groups’: **UKAD** - The information sharing gateway with SOCA will be one part of a new Intelligence Function, the full cost of which, including new staff, will be £100,000 per annum. The inclusion of this particular statutory instrument will only make a marginal difference to the running costs of the Intelligence Function. |
| Description and scale of key non-monetised costs by ‘main affected groups’: Other key non-monetised costs by ‘main affected groups’: SOCA & ACPO anticipate that they may experience a negligible increase in convictions/cases as a result of this policy change. The more likely outcome is an expected increase in sports prosecutions and sporting sanctions involving UKAD. Sporting prosecutions will be carried out before the National Anti-Doping Panel (NADP) or the National Governing Body (NGB) tribunal if the NGB opts to retain this function. The NADP is budgeted for 50 cases per year. This change anticipates an increase from the current 30 cases to just under 50, therefore no extra costs will be incurred. |

### ANNUAL BENEFITS

| Description and scale of key monetised benefits by ‘main affected groups’. |
| Description and scale of key non-monetised benefits by ‘main affected groups’: Facilitate information sharing between the UK’s national anti–doping organisation and law enforcement, in order to develop more effective methods for the detection and investigation of ‘non–analytical’ doping offences. |

Key Assumptions/Sensitivities/Risks: SOCA have confirmed in their response to the Consultation proposal regarding information sharing, that information will be provided to UKAD in the normal course of their business and therefore no significant additional costs will be incurred to enforce the policy.

### Price Base Year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period Years</th>
<th>Net Benefit Range (£)</th>
<th>NET BENEFIT (£)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>2005 Prices</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early 2010</td>
<td>2005 Prices</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

### Enforcement Costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organisation(s)</th>
<th>Total Annual Cost (PV)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOCA/UKAD</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Impact on Admin Burdens Baseline (2005 Prices)

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<tr>
<th>Annual cost (£-£) per organisation (excluding one-off)</th>
<th>Micro</th>
<th>Small</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>Large</th>
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</thead>
</table>

<p>| Are any of these organisations exempt? | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Increase of</th>
<th>£n/a</th>
<th>Decrease of</th>
<th>£n/a</th>
<th>Net Impact</th>
<th>£n/a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

Evidence Base (for summary sheets)

Rationale for intervention

Background

The International Fight against doping

1. The World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) is the international organisation responsible for co-ordinating the fight against doping in sport. In 2003, the first World Anti-Doping Code (the Code) was introduced providing a global framework for the harmonisation of anti-doping policies across all sports.

2. The UK Government formally recognised the role of WADA and made a commitment to the Code, through the Copenhagen Declaration on Anti –Doping in Sport (2003) and the ratification of the UNESCO International Convention against Doping in Sport (2006).

3. Since 2003, WADA have sought to make the fight against doping more effective by focusing on new methods for investigating and gathering evidence in relation to “non-analytical” doping violations. Non-analytical violations are those such as trafficking, possession and supply of prohibited substances and are offences that cannot be detected solely through the testing process. Currently only three out of the eight anti-doping rule violations (ADRVs)¹ set out in the Code, can be pursued through the ‘traditional' testing approach.

The need for a collaborative approach between anti-doping agencies and law enforcement

4. WADA recognised a need to develop capabilities to tackle these violations through a collaborative approach between anti-doping organisations and law enforcement². Intervention of this form overcomes information failures and ensures better access to relevant information for relevant parties. Countries which have already pioneered this approach have shown this to be a successful strategy for doping control.

5. For example, since its creation, the US Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) has built constructive links with law enforcement agencies (LEAs). In 2003, the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) raided the Bay Area Laboratory Co-Operative (BALCO) which was marketing and supplying undetectable designer steroids. This discovery eventually led to the criminal prosecution of and sporting sanctions against high profile athletes and sports stars.

6. Marion Jones, a US female sprinter, had been tested over 160 times for doping offences but the tests had been unable to detect the designer steroids developed in the BALCO

¹ The eight anti-doping violations are: (i) Presence of a prohibited substance or method; (ii) Use or attempted use of a prohibited substance/methods; (iii) Refusing or failing to give a sample collection; (iv) Whereabouts violations; (v) Tampering or attempting to tamper with any part of the doping control process; (vi) Possession of prohibited substances/methods; (vii) Trafficking or attempted trafficking of prohibited substances/methods; (viii) Administration or attempted administration of a prohibited substance

² Then WADA President Richard Pound, speaking in March 2007 stated: "It (the global fight against doping) requires a more unified and cooperative action among law enforcement and anti-doping agencies to shut down source and supply”. See World Anti-Doping Agency Discussion Document for Investigation Protocols Draft version 1.1 October 2007: Introduction p2.
7. Additionally, a move to a more investigative approach has proved successful in Australia, where 38 per cent of athletes and support personnel caught doping in 2008-2009, were caught as a direct result of the Australian Sports Anti-Doping Agency’s (ASADA’s) enhanced investigations and intelligence work. This represents an increase from 19 per cent the year before.\(^3\)

**Modernisation of the UK’s Anti – Doping Programme**

8. In February 2009, the Minister for Sport, Gerry Sutcliffe, announced the intention to establish a new National Anti-Doping Organisation (NADO) which would modernise the way in which the UK delivered its anti-doping programme. The new organisation will be known as UKAD (United Kingdom Anti-Doping) and as part of its remit to deliver a world class anti-doping organisation ahead of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games and the Glasgow 2014 Commonwealth Games, will focus on establishing strong effective partnerships with law enforcement agencies to fight the trafficking and supply of banned substances.

9. A Cross-Departmental Working Group on Anti-Doping in Sport (Working Group) was set up in November 2007 to establish a consensus on the need for sharing information (including personal information as defined by the Data Protection Act 1998) between law enforcement and UKAD, and to look at how best to achieve this. The Working Group includes, representatives from; the DCMS, the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), SOCA, the UK Borders Agency (UKBA), the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Authority (MHRA), as well as the devolved administrations and other Government Departments and bodies.

10. The intention is for UKAD to develop an intelligence analysis and information-sharing function with public and private bodies across the UK. The organisation will utilise information it obtains from these authorities to help inform the intelligent planning of tests and targeted testing of specific athletes. It will also be used as ‘evidence’ to help tackle anti-doping rule violations that cannot be evidenced through testing athletes. The Code specifically allows for ADRVs to be; “established by any reliable means”.\(^4\)

11. The Working Group looked at a number of different routes for achieving information sharing and identified the SOCA as one of three organisations, along with the UK Border Agency (UKBA) and Medicine Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA), with whom the ability to share information should be made a priority. As such, Government is looking at how to establish a formal information sharing ‘gateway’ between UKAD and SOCA by making amendments to existing legislation. Legislation is already in place which allows UKBA and MHRA to share relevant information with UKAD.

**Policy objectives**

12. The aim of this policy change is to establish an information sharing gateway which will allow the development of a close partnership between UKAD and SOCA, to tackle the ‘non-analytical’ ADRVs set out in the World Anti-Doping Code.


\(^4\) Code 2009 article 3.2
13. Information provided to UKAD, in the course of SOCA’s normal intelligence work will be used to investigate specific or potential ADRVs and also to identify trends and threats in doping, to allow UKAD to target athletes or particular sports and to inform the development of education strategies.

14. It is intended that strengthening the mechanisms in place to pursue doping offences such as trafficking, supply, manufacturing and administration of prohibited substances, will act as a strong deterrent, ahead of the London 2012 and Glasgow 2014 Games, against those wishing to participate in and facilitate doping in sport.

**Policy Options considered**

**Option 1: Status Quo**

15. UKAD would establish its intelligence analysis and information sharing function with a limited capability. Initial collaboration would only involve information sharing with the UK Border Agency (UKBA) and the Medicines Healthcare Regulatory Authority (MHRA).

16. Although the formation of partnerships with these public authorities would be beneficial to UKAD in tackling ‘non-analytical’ doping violations, experience has shown that many of the perpetrators of these offences, particularly those involved with trafficking, possession and administration, have links with organised crime. Without the capability to collaborate with SOCA, UKAD will not be fully equipped to successfully deliver all of its aims in the fight against doping which could damage the UK’s international reputation ahead of the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games and Glasgow 2014 Games.

**Option 2: Establish an information sharing gateway between SOCA and UKAD**

17. This option establishes a legislative basis to allow the exchange of personal information between UKAD and SOCA.

18. In its consideration of how a modernised anti-doping organisation should develop its intelligence management function, the government’s Cross Departmental Working Group identified SOCA as a key public authority with whom the ability to share information should be made a priority.

19. SOCA is an intelligence-led law enforcement agency receiving information from international and domestic police services as well as UKBA and HMRC and therefore has access to relevant intelligence.

20. A public consultation on establishing a modernised UK anti-doping organisation carried out in July this year, outlined the proposal for UKAD to work more closely with LEAs. The majority of respondents, which included SOCA, UKBA and ACPO, were broadly supportive of the proposal for a number of reasons. These included; evidence of the effectiveness of such collaboration from other countries whose anti-doping organisations had already developed partnerships with law enforcement agencies, the view that it would act as a deterrent to those participating in doping and the belief that it was

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6 Pg 13 DCMS Consultation on establishing a modernised UK Anti-Doping Organisation: July 2009 (http://www.culture.gov.uk/reference_library/consultations/6244.aspx)
necessary for successfully tackling non-analytical ADRVs\(^7\). Respondents also agreed that a legislative basis for information sharing was important to establish a clear legal footing for sharing information.\(^8\)

21. This policy approach obviously raises potential confidentiality, data protection and human rights issues, where personal information is being exchanged. However it is planned that once the information sharing gateway is formally established, UKAD will sign a Memorandum of Understanding with SOCA, outlining how the information will be used in accordance with relevant legislation. A separate Privacy Impact Assessment looking at compliance with the Data Protection Act is also being conducted and a Human Rights Specific Impact Test is annexed to this document.

**Costs and Benefits**

**Development of UKAD’s Intelligence analysis and Intelligence gathering function**

22. The creation of an information sharing gateway with SOCA is vital to developing UKAD’s intelligence management function, which will collect, record, collate, analyse and share information for the purposes of tackling ‘non analytical’ ADRVs.

23. Any information provided to UKAD by SOCA will be obtained in the course of SOCA’s normal investigative work and therefore information sharing will not additionally burden SOCA resources.

24. Both SOCA and ACPO have confirmed that any increase in criminal cases or convictions as a result of this policy change is likely to be negligible.

25. The National Anti Doping Panel (NADP), which will hear cases on behalf of UKAD, is likely to see an increase in cases as a result of the increased focus in the investigation of non-analytical offences. Traditional testing methods currently generate 30 cases to answer per year. It is estimated that, even with the increase of ‘non-analytical’ cases, the NADP’s workload will not rise beyond 50 cases per year in the first two years of operation. The current contract for the NADP already assumes that there will be approximately 50 cases a year.

**Cost**

The Information Sharing gateway with SOCA will be one part of a new Intelligence Management Function. Therefore implementation of this policy change will only make a marginal difference to the running costs of the Intelligence Management Function.

26. **Staff** – There will be an addition of 8 staff to deliver the new Intelligence Management Function.

27. **Budget** – Intelligence Management Function will have an annual budget of £100,000 in its first year of full operation, 2010/2011.

28. There are no transition costs for delivery of this policy proposal.

\(^7\) Summary of responses to consultation on establishing a modernised UK Anti-Doping Organisation: Chapter 3 Key findings and future action –Information Sharing Powers, para 30.

\(^8\) Summary of responses to consultation on establishing a modernised UK Anti-Doping Organisation: Chapter 3 Key findings and future action –Information Sharing Powers – Gateways via existing or impending legislation, para 43.
Benefits

29. The main benefits of facilitating information sharing between UKAD and SOCA are the:

- Ability to develop a close working partnership with a key law enforcement agency, in order to tackle 'non-analytical' ADRVs as set out in the Code.
- Development of a fit for purpose Intelligence Management Function as part of the UK’s modernised national anti-doping organisation.
- A world class anti-doping programme ready before the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games.
Use the table below to demonstrate how broadly you have considered the potential impacts of your policy options.

Ensure that the results of any tests that impact on the cost-benefit analysis are contained within the main evidence base; other results may be annexed.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of testing undertaken</th>
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<td>Rural Proofing</td>
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ANNEX 1

Human Rights Specific Impact Test for Statutory Instrument allowing the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) to disclose information to UK Anti-Doping Limited (UKAD)

The statutory instrument will facilitate the sharing of personal information between SOCA and UKAD and could therefore engage the Article 8 rights of those people whose information is shared. Article 8(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) establishes the right to respect for private and family life, the home and correspondence.

It is important to note that it is not certain that every instance of disclosure of information by SOCA to UKAD will amount to an interference with Article 8(1). However, in those cases where it does, as we set out below, as long as the disclosure is for the purposes of, and proportionate to, UKAD’s anti-doping functions, it will be justified under Article 8(2) of the ECHR.

The Government has assessed the proposal and believes it is lawful. Any interference with the Article 8(1) will be in accordance with the law. Section 33(2)(f) of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 (SOCPA) permits SOCA to disclose information for the purpose of “the exercise of any function which appears to the Secretary of State to be a function of a public nature and which he designates by order”. The statutory instrument will designate the functions of UKAD, when it is acting as a national anti-doping organisation, as functions appearing to the Secretary of State to be functions of a public nature.

UKAD’s anti-doping functions are functions of a public nature, exercisable by UKAD in the public interest. The functions themselves arise from obligations of the UK Government under the UNESCO International Convention Against Doping in Sport. In any event, in the Government’s view, there is a strong public interest in the exercise of those functions because there is a strong public interest in sport being free of doping and other forms of cheating.

The Government has established UKAD specifically for the purpose of undertaking anti-doping functions on its behalf and, in so doing, meeting the UK’s obligations under the UNESCO Anti-Doping Convention. UKAD is a publicly funded, non-departmental public body whose directors are appointed by, and accountable to, the Secretary of State.

Furthermore, we believe that any interference will be necessary in pursuit of one of the aims set out in Article 8(2) of the ECHR. The disclosure of information to UKAD by SOCA (and other public bodies) is, or is likely to be, essential for UKAD effectively to undertake its functions. Such information is particularly necessary for the effective enforcement by UKAD of non-analytical doping violations (that is, doping violations which are not detectable through usual blood or urine analysis processes). In the absence of information from law enforcement and other public bodies, it would be considerably more difficult for UKAD effectively to undertake anti-doping activity, in particular, in respect of non-analytical violations.

Some of the doping rule violations that UKAD will investigate will also amount to criminal offences (such as the trafficking of some doping substances and the possession of Class A drugs). In those cases, the disclosure of information can be justified on the basis of the “prevention of disorder or crime” under Article 8(2). Further, we believe that, in all cases, disclosure can be justified in the interests of protecting “health or morals” and / or “the rights and freedoms of others”. As previously stated above, there is, in the Government’s view, a strong public interest in keeping sport free from doping and other forms of cheating and UKAD’s functions are aimed at meeting that interest. Ensuring that sporting competition is fair and free of doping helps to preserve the integrity of that competition and safeguards the rights of competitors, and others, who have a legitimate interest in sport being free of cheating (those “others” include spectators, promoters and organisers, sponsors, people who have placed bets on the
competition and betting companies). In this way, UKAD’s functions are allied with, and contribute to, the protection of morals and the rights and freedoms of others.

In order to meet the requirements of Article 8(2) of the ECHR, disclosure of information by SOCA for the purposes of the exercise by UKAD of its anti-doping functions must also be proportionate.

Each disclosure of information will be judged on a case by case basis – the information disclosed in any particular instance will be that which is necessary for the exercise by UKAD of its functions, and only that which is so necessary. SOCA will not disclose more information to UKAD than that which is essential to enable the latter to undertake its functions. Furthermore, in exceptional cases, where disclosure would have a disproportionately adverse effect on an individual, SOCA will not disclose information to UKAD even though such disclosure might enable UKAD to exercise its functions.

The information sharing processes established by SOCA and UKAD will ensure that disclosure of information by SOCA to UKAD is proportionate in individual cases. That being the case, disclosure of information by SOCA to UKAD for the purposes of UKAD’s functions will be consistent with Article 8 of ECHR.

In light of the analysis above, we conclude that any impact of these proposals on the Article 8 rights of individuals whose personal information is shared is justified.