(1)Where a person (“D”) kills or is a party to the killing of another (“V”), D is not to be convicted of murder if—
(a)D's acts and omissions in doing or being a party to the killing resulted from D's loss of self-control,
(b)the loss of self-control had a qualifying trigger, and
(c)a person of D's sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same or in a similar way to D.
(2)For the purposes of subsection (1)(a), it does not matter whether or not the loss of control was sudden.
(3)In subsection (1)(c) the reference to “the circumstances of D” is a reference to all of D's circumstances other than those whose only relevance to D's conduct is that they bear on D's general capacity for tolerance or self-restraint.
(4)Subsection (1) does not apply if, in doing or being a party to the killing, D acted in a considered desire for revenge.
(5)On a charge of murder, if sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue with respect to the defence under subsection (1), the jury must assume that the defence is satisfied unless the prosecution proves beyond reasonable doubt that it is not.
(6)For the purposes of subsection (5), sufficient evidence is adduced to raise an issue with respect to the defence if evidence is adduced on which, in the opinion of the trial judge, a jury, properly directed, could reasonably conclude that the defence might apply.
(7)A person who, but for this section, would be liable to be convicted of murder is liable instead to be convicted of manslaughter.
(8)The fact that one party to a killing is by virtue of this section not liable to be convicted of murder does not affect the question whether the killing amounted to murder in the case of any other party to it.
Commencement Information
I1S. 54 in force at 4.10.2010 for E.W. by S.I. 2010/816, art. 6(a)
I2S. 54 in force at 1.6.2011 for N.I. by S.R. 2011/182, art. 3(b)