

<b>Title:</b> The Pensions Act 2011(Consequential and Supplementary Provisions) Regulations 2014 and The Pensions Act 2011 (Transitional, Consequential and Supplementary Provisions) Regulations 2014 <b>IA No:</b> DWP0041  <b>Lead department or agency:</b> Department for Work and Pensions <b>Other departments or agencies:</b>	<b>Impact Assessment (IA)</b>
	<b>Date:</b> 10/02/2014
	<b>Stage:</b> Final
	<b>Source of intervention:</b> Domestic
	<b>Type of measure:</b> Secondary legislation

<b>Summary: Intervention and Options</b>	<b>RPC Opinion:</b> GREEN
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Cost of Preferred (or more likely) Option			
Total Net Present Value	Business Net Present Value	Net cost to business per year (EANCB on 2009 prices)	In scope of One-In, Two-Out? Measure qualifies as
N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes Zero Net Cost

**What is the problem under consideration? Why is government intervention necessary?**

Regulations will be made under sections (s.) 30, 31 and 33 of the Pensions Act 2011 (as well as other pensions legislation) to provide for transitional, consequential and supplementary measures and to modify existing legislation for the commencement of s.29 of that Act. S.29 restores and clarifies the definition of money purchase (MP) benefits which is key to pensions legislation. It will come into force with retrospective effect to Jan 1997. This was in response to a Supreme Court judgment in July 2011 which cast doubt on the meaning of MP. The regulations ease the practical position for affected schemes, which have acted on the basis of a different understanding of MP benefits, helping them comply with the regime for non-MP benefits.

**What are the policy objectives and the intended effects?**

1. Protection for members: The Department is committed to protecting pension scheme members' benefits and is obliged to do so under European law.
2. Minimising the burden on industry. The regulations will minimise the burden on affected schemes becoming compliant.
3. Consistency with Departmental and Governmental priorities: Clarifying the meaning of MP ensures clarity and consistency in the legal framework. These regulations will provide the clarity and certainty as to how both primary and secondary legislation applies to affected schemes.

**What policy options have been considered, including any alternatives to regulation? Please justify preferred option (further details in Evidence Base)**

Option Zero: Make no transitional, consequential or supplementary arrangements or modifications under the regulation making powers in Part 4 of the Pensions Act 2011.

Option One: Use regulation making powers in s.30, 31, and 33 of the Pensions Act 2011 (and in other pensions legislation) to provide for transitional measures for schemes to comply with requirements; provide consequential and supplementary arrangements, and modify as appropriate the existing legislation where it would be unduly burdensome for affected schemes to comply with the retrospective effect of s.29. In light of responses to the consultation the Department has amended Option One for its final stage proposal. Notably this removes any requirement (in most cases) for affected schemes to revisit past decisions as a result of s.29, which is a significant easement for these schemes, and no detriment to members' benefits.

**Will the policy be reviewed?** It will not be reviewed. **If applicable, set review date:** Month/Year

Does implementation go beyond minimum EU requirements?			No		
Are any of these organisations in scope? If Micros not exempted set out reason in Evidence Base.	<b>Micro</b> Yes	<b>&lt; 20</b> Yes	<b>Small</b> Yes	<b>Medium</b> Yes	<b>Large</b> Yes
What is the CO <sub>2</sub> equivalent change in greenhouse gas emissions? (Million tonnes CO <sub>2</sub> equivalent)			<b>Traded:</b>		<b>Non-traded:</b>

*I have read the Impact Assessment and I am satisfied that (a) it represents a fair and reasonable view of the expected costs, benefits and impact of the policy, and (b) that the benefits justify the costs.*

Signed by the responsible Minister:  Date: 10 02 14

# Summary: Analysis & Evidence

# Policy Option 1

**Description:** The Pensions Act 2011 (Consequential and Supplementary Provisions) Regulations 2014 and The Pensions Act 2011 (Transitional, Consequential and Supplementary Provisions) Regulations 2014

## FULL ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT

Price Base Year	PV Base Year	Time Period Years	Net Benefit (Present Value (PV)) (£m)		
			Low: Optional	High: Optional	Best Estimate:

COSTS (£m)	Total Transition (Constant Price) Years	Average Annual (excl. Transition) (Constant Price)	Total Cost (Present Value)
Low	Optional	Optional	Optional
High	Optional	Optional	Optional
Best Estimate			

### Description and scale of key monetised costs by 'main affected groups'

N/A

### Other key non-monetised costs by 'main affected groups'

The Department expects these provisions to primarily impact on hybrid pensions schemes. Of 40,000 occupational pension schemes, including money purchase benefits in the UK only 2% are hybrids. However, there is insufficient information at an industry wide level to precisely calculate how many schemes, members and employers will be affected by these measures. A consultation between 31 October 2013 and 12 December has not provided sufficient information to quantify associated costs.

BENEFITS (£m)	Total Transition (Constant Price) Years	Average Annual (excl. Transition) (Constant Price)	Total Benefit (Present Value)
Low	Optional	Optional	Optional
High	Optional	Optional	Optional
Best Estimate			

### Description and scale of key monetised benefits by 'main affected groups'

N/A

### Other key non-monetised benefits by 'main affected groups'

The Department expects these provisions to primarily impact on hybrid pensions schemes. Of 40,000 occupational pension schemes, including money purchase benefits in the UK only 2% are hybrids. However, there is insufficient information at an industry wide level to precisely calculate how many schemes, members and employers will be affected by these measures. A consultation between 31 October 2013 and 12 December has not provided sufficient information to quantify associated benefits.

### Key assumptions/sensitivities/risks

Discount rate (%)

The Department is assuming that only a small number of schemes (maximum of approximately 800 out of around 40,000) will be affected by s.29, and therefore by the provision made under s. 30, 31 and 33 and other pensions legislation. This is based on engagement with the industry, including a consultation between 31 October and 12 December, and with the Pensions Regulator.

## BUSINESS ASSESSMENT (Option 1)

Direct impact on business (Equivalent Annual) £m:			In scope of OITO?	Measure qualifies as
Costs:	Benefits:	Net:	Yes	Zero net cost

# **Impact Assessment for The Pensions Act 2011(Consequential and Supplementary Provisions) Regulations 2014 and The Pensions Act 2011 (Transitional, Consequential and Supplementary Provisions) Regulations 2014**

## **Background**

1. The definition of money purchase benefits is a key component of pensions law. The regulatory framework that protects members of occupational pension schemes is built on the understanding that money purchase benefits cannot develop a funding deficit. Consequently they are not subject to a regulatory regime in respect of funding or accrued rights in the same way as occupational non-money purchase schemes.
2. Section 29 of the Pensions Act 2011(section 29) will remove any uncertainty created on 27 July 2011 by the Supreme Court judgment (*Bridge Trustees v Houldsworth and another (2011) (Bridge)*) on the legal definition of money purchase benefits in section 181 of the Pension Schemes Act 1993. It clarifies the definition of money purchase benefits and restores it to the meaning it had before *Bridge*.
3. The Pensions Act 2011(Consequential and Supplementary Provisions) Regulations 2014 and The Pensions Act (Transitional, Consequential and Supplementary Provisions) Regulations 2014 (the regulations) to be made under sections 30, 31 and 33 of the Pensions Act 2011 (and other regulation making powers in pensions legislation) will provide transitional, consequential and supplementary measures or modify the effects of section 29.
4. This impact assessment covers the effects of the regulations and does not cover section 29 of the Pensions Act 2011. An enactment impact assessment was published in 2011<sup>1</sup> and showed no new impact on business. This is because the clarified definition of money purchase benefits in section 29 restored the legal position (following the judgment of the Court of Appeal in *KPMG v Aon Trust*) that existed prior to the Supreme Court judgment. It is expected that section 29 will be commenced in summer 2014.
5. Section 32 of the Pensions Act 2011 gives powers to amend the clarified definition (section 29 of the Act). There are no plans to use this power.

## **Issue**

6. Section 29 will have retrospective effect from 1 January 1997<sup>2</sup> when it comes into force. The Department has engaged with the industry through informal stakeholder engagement and the formal consultation on the draft Transitional Regulations. This has shown that a number of schemes have been acting in a

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<sup>1</sup> See paragraphs 12 to 14 and Table 1 of the *Summary of Impacts* and paras 28 to 32 of *Annex F: Other Pension Bill Measures* at <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/pensions-act-2011-impact-assessment>

<sup>2</sup> This is the earliest relevant instance of money purchase pension in existing legislation.

- manner not consistent with the meaning of money purchase benefits in section 29. These schemes will be affected by section 29 when it is commenced, meaning they would have to revisit past decisions and it would not be clear how they could become compliant going forward.
7. To address this issue, these regulations provide transitional protection, including limiting the retrospective impact of section 29 in pensions legislation and providing mechanisms for schemes to become compliant.
  8. These regulations provide that affected schemes will only have to comply from the commencement date of section 29 unless the scheme is winding up on commencement, or where a multi-employer scheme is in deficit following an actuarial valuation in specified circumstances.
  9. It has been difficult to establish the precise scale of this issue. Data from the Pensions Regulator shows that there are currently 40,000 occupational pension schemes containing money purchase benefits.
  10. Following engagement with stakeholders we understand that hybrid schemes (those that provide money purchase as well as non-money purchase benefits) are most likely to be affected by section 29. Only around 2% of schemes containing money purchase benefits are hybrids - approximately 800 schemes.
  11. In addition to the hybrid schemes that might be affected, the Department is only aware of approximately half a dozen schemes that have been treated as wholly money purchase schemes, and therefore are not hybrids, but could be affected by section 29.
  12. It has not been possible to quantify the exact number of affected schemes as trustees and scheme managers are only required to make detailed reports to the Pensions Regulator on benefits that they consider to be non-money purchase. Schemes do not provide detailed reports of benefits that they consider to be money purchase.
  13. Stakeholders have been unable to share with us detailed scheme level data as this information is sensitive and restricted. A small number of consultation responses indicated the size of the scheme and the potential costs involved, however the information is not representative of all the schemes affected and cannot be reliably used to produce an aggregate estimate.
  14. Despite not being able to quantify the impacts in detail stakeholders were unanimous that without transitional protection costs would arise for schemes not already compliant with section 29, especially where they would be required to revisit past decisions.
  15. The protections in these regulations will ensure that any costs that schemes would face as a result of having used an understanding of money purchase benefits inconsistent with section 29 are minimised. However some schemes have been behaving consistently with section 29 and therefore will be validated by commencement of that section, and will not be affected by these regulations.

## Policy objectives

16. There are three key policy objectives:
  - **Protection for members.** The Department will affirm its commitment to

protect member benefits and also ensure that it continues to meet its obligations under article 8 of the European Union's Insolvency Directive (2008/94/EC), and articles 15 – 17 of the Directive on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision (2003/41/EC) (the IORP Directive) to protect member benefits;

- **Minimising the burden on industry.** The regulations are intended to ease the practical burdens that schemes may face in order to comply with section 29 when it comes into force. The purpose of the regulations is to modify the effect of existing legislation on schemes either treated as money purchase schemes, or providing benefits treated as money purchase benefits, that will become subject to the legal framework for pension protection once section 29 is commenced;
- **Consistency with Departmental and Governmental priorities and providing clarity and certainty in the law.** Clarifying the definition of money purchase benefits in law through section 29 of Pension Act 2011 and its effect through the regulations ensures clarity and consistency in the existing legal framework. This is important to provide clarity and certainty on how affected occupational pension schemes transition into the regulatory requirements in both primary and secondary legislation. This is essential to minimising the burden on industry and ensuring protection for members. The measures also provide for consequential changes.

## Options considered

17. Option Zero: Do nothing following commencement of section 29. This means all schemes would be required to comply with retrospective effect from 1 January 1997.
18. Option One: Use regulation making powers to modify the effects of section 29 and to make transitional, consequential and supplementary provision. This is for schemes which may have taken decisions based on different understandings of money purchase benefits to that clarified in section 29 or as understood prior to the *Bridge* judgment.
19. These regulations provide transitional measures to assist affected schemes in three ways:
  - retrospective protection so that schemes do not have to revisit past decisions where these have been made on a basis different to the meaning of money purchase in section 29, and there is very likely to be no detrimental material impact on member benefits;
  - temporary prospective protection to give schemes a reasonable transitional period to comply with the legislative requirements in existing legislation; and
  - consequential changes arising from the above.
20. The consultation responses confirmed that there was no feasible alternative to Option One to achieve the policy objectives. Commencing section 29 to protect member benefits without appropriate transitional measures could result in some schemes having to revisit past decisions to demonstrate that they are complying with section 29. In practice this would not be feasible, particularly if they had to

revisit decisions going back to 1997.

## Consultation

21. The Department launched its consultation on these regulations on 31 October 2013<sup>3</sup>. The consultation ended on 12 December 2013.
22. The consultation document asked stakeholders for their views on the proposed policy and draft regulations. It also asked for information to assist the Department in quantifying the number of schemes affected by the proposals, and to assist with the monetisation of the costs and benefits. The Department received 95 responses.
23. Responses were received from: trustees (whose role is to represent members); industry bodies; employers; and pensions professionals (including lawyers and actuaries). Where the Department felt further information was needed in the initial stages of the consultation it approached the appropriate organisations directly. For instance, when it became apparent that there was a growing concern about the impact of the proposed changes to the employer debt regulations on employers in multi-employer schemes, the Department actively sought comment from leading employer representative bodies.
24. Over the course of consultation the Department held four stakeholder forum events, with over one hundred stakeholders in attendance. Among other issues the Department used these events to try to get a sense of likely costs arising from schemes not being compliant with the meaning of money purchase in section 29. However, stakeholders were unable to provide estimates. It also used social media channels to reach as wide an audience as possible.
25. Despite these efforts the Department is unable to quantify the impact of the regulations on the schemes that are likely to be affected. There is no data available at an industry-wide level and the consultation did not elicit sufficient data at scheme level to allow us to produce reliable estimates of the impacts on schemes, employers or members.
26. A majority of responses (sixty eight) said that where the schemes had not acted consistently with the Department's understanding of money purchase benefits, they could incur some costs if the regulations required them to revisit past decisions. This was assuming that such revisitations were even possible. Only two respondents took the view that it was reasonable to require schemes to revisit decisions taken after July 2011, which was the requirement in the consultation draft of the Transitional Regulations. The remaining twenty five respondents were silent on this issue.
27. Therefore, having considered the consultation responses the Department took the decision to alter the retrospection proposed at the consultation stage in respect of three key areas:
  - wind-up;
  - employer debt; and

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<sup>3</sup><https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/definition-of-money-purchase-benefits-in-occupational-pension-schemes>

- associated amendments in respect of Pension Protection Fund assessment periods.
28. At the consultation stage the draft regulations modified the effect of section 29 on legislation in respect of dates before July 2011 in these three key areas for non-compliant schemes. This meant that these schemes may have had to revisit decisions taken since that date.
  29. Following consultation, the regulations will modify the effect of section 29 up to the commencement date except in certain circumstances where a scheme is in wind-up. Affected schemes will not have to revisit decisions made prior to that date, unless:
    - they have started to wind up before commencement; or
    - have put member benefits at risk in prescribed circumstances and;
    - where the sponsoring employer is not insolvent.
  30. The Department has taken into account the strongly expressed views of those in the industry. Having carefully considered these responses, the Department is persuaded that this change to the policy will not appreciably increase risk to members' entitlement or make any material difference to members' pension outcomes, given the protections put in place through these regulations.
  31. There was no support during the consultation for Option Zero.

## **Final proposal**

32. The regulations provide that, in most cases, section 29 will only come into force with prospective effect unless the scheme has benefits which are not directly affected by section 29 on commencement.
33. The legislative requirements around employer debt will not apply retrospectively unless the scheme is in wind-up on commencement in limited prescribed circumstances.
34. The employer debt requirements will also not apply retrospectively to an ongoing multi-employer scheme, unless an employer debt event occurred before the commencement date, and at the first actuarial valuation after this date the scheme is under-funded and not able to put in place a recovery plan within a specified time.
35. In both cases, the scheme must have provided benefits which are not directly affected by the commencement of section 29. That means that the scheme provided benefits which are not money purchase benefits and the benefits do not fall within the exemptions for cash balance benefits, underpin benefits, top-up benefits, or pensions in payment derived from these benefits or money purchase benefits.
36. For most schemes that have begun winding up prior to the coming into force date, the employer debt provisions are entirely disapplied in relation to the exempt benefits where schemes have treated these benefits as money purchase.
37. These schemes will therefore not have to revisit decisions made before section 29 is commenced, regardless of whether or not they made decisions consistent with the meaning of money purchase benefit in section 29.

38. At the same time, member benefits most at risk from schemes in winding-up will be protected. For compliant schemes, the commencement of section 29 with retrospective effect to January 1997 will validate their actions and the regulations do not change that.
39. The regulations provide transitional measures for non-compliant schemes to ease them into the regulatory requirements in certain areas like scheme funding and the Pension Protection Fund levy, while at the same time ensuring member benefits will be protected.

### **Rationale for the final stage proposal**

40. To support members, trustees, scheme managers and employers, the Transitional Regulations will:
  - provide that affected schemes will not be required to revisit acts or omissions in respect of scheme funding, wind-up, employer debt, revaluation and indexation or in respect of any requirement specified under pensions legislation prior to the coming into force date for section 29. This protection applies to benefit types where the Department recognises that schemes could reasonably have interpreted the existing meaning of money purchase benefits in law in a way inconsistent with section 29, and that interpretation does not materially impact on members' entitlement to benefits under the scheme;
  - give schemes time and mechanisms through which to come into compliance with section 29; and
  - make permanent amendments prospectively to the pensions regulatory framework. These changes are de-regulatory.
41. This ensures schemes do not incur unnecessary practical costs where there is no appreciable benefit to members or risk to members' entitlement.
42. The regulations will ensure that members of schemes affected by section 29 will, over a transitional period, have access to pension protection. It will also ensure that trustees, scheme managers, members and employers have certainty as to how the law applies to their scheme.

### **Costs and benefits of final stage proposal**

#### **Monetised and non-monetised costs and benefits**

43. As previously discussed there is insufficient information available to accurately estimate the number of schemes affected by these regulations. There are approximately 40,000 private occupational pension schemes in the UK which include money purchase benefits. About 2% of these are hybrid schemes.
44. This is the principal type of scheme affected by section 29. The Department is only aware of half a dozen schemes that regard themselves as wholly money purchase and could be affected. Therefore, taking both hybrid and wholly money purchase schemes, at most section 29 and the regulations are likely to affect around 2% of all occupational pensions schemes (about 800).
45. The small proportion of all occupational pension schemes affected by section 29 could incur disproportionate administrative, legal and actuarial costs if they are



required to revisit past decisions.

46. Prior to consultation the Department commissioned additional questions in the Pensions Regulator annual survey to gather information on the numbers of schemes that may be affected. It also engaged with the wider pensions industry in an effort to more accurately determine the number of non-compliant and compliant schemes potentially affected by section 29.
47. The consultation sought further information to enable some quantification of costs and benefits, but insufficient information was forthcoming. Two respondents did provide some scheme level data but taken in isolation it is not sufficient to allow impacts to be extrapolated across the industry.
48. Many respondents represented multiple pension schemes but were unable or unwilling to say how many would be affected or to specify the amount of costs likely to be incurred by non-compliant schemes in complying with section 29.

#### *Impacts on schemes*

49. Based on engagement with the industry prior to consultation, the Department believed that only two specific benefit designs (cash balance benefits, and scheme pensions derived from cash balance benefits or money purchase benefits) would be likely to be affected by section 29.
50. However the consultation identified other benefit designs that might also be affected. As a consequence, the Department has widened the scope of the transitional measures. This is to ensure that benefit designs commonly called underpin benefits and top-up benefits, as well as pensions derived from cash balance benefits, will also be able to use the transitional measures in the regulations.
51. Other ongoing schemes can access these protections if their assets are equal to or greater than their liabilities, or if they agree a recovery plan with the Pensions Regulator.
52. The Department recognises that only a small proportion of all schemes with money purchase benefits will be affected by section 29. However it also accepts that the impact of revisiting past decisions since July 2011 for individual schemes could be significant, while the impact on member benefits would be negligible. Therefore the impact of the regulations would be to lift costs that would otherwise be significant to some schemes.

#### *Impacts on scheme members*

53. Theoretically in some cases where a scheme has used an interpretation of money purchase benefits incompatible with section 29 a member might have received less benefit than they would otherwise have done. However two factors mean the Department does not believe this is likely to occur in practice.
54. First, all administrative, legal or actuarial costs that schemes face are ultimately paid for by the scheme members (in the form of reduced benefit value) or employers (in the form of increased contributions) depending on the scheme rules. Therefore even if revisiting past decisions could potentially benefit individual members the costs of doing so could fall across all members. Following consultation with the industry the Department is persuaded that members would not appreciably benefit from revisitation.

55. Secondly, in many of the policy areas, it would not be practical because schemes no longer hold the necessary data or there has been a subsequent restructuring, dissolution or insolvency of a relevant employer.
56. If the existing decisions cannot in practice be amended then there is no realistic prospect of anyone benefiting from a requirement for schemes to revisit past decisions.
57. Prospectively, the regulations will give schemes with benefits affected by section 29 a transitional period in which to become compliant, while ensuring that members are not excluded from pension protection measures.
58. Benefits that are already recognised by their trustees or scheme managers as non-money purchase will not be affected by commencement of section 29, and therefore the regulations will have no impact on them.

### **Summaries of policy areas and final stage proposal**

59. The regulations will impact on a number of existing policy areas and the legal framework for pension schemes. Each of these policy areas is addressed separately below.
60. Section 29 will apply to both occupational pension schemes and personal pension schemes. The former are sponsored by an employer and are typically trust-based, while the latter take the form of arrangements between a pension provider and individual, which may or may not be work-based.
61. No consequences to existing legislation (other than in relation to disclosure requirements) affecting personal pension schemes resulting from the commencement of section 29 have been identified, and therefore there are no transitional provisions for them.

Policy area/legal framework for pension schemes	Does this policy provide temporary support?	Does this policy make a permanent change to the pensions landscape?	Following consultation is the IA text in this area:		
			amended	new	unchanged
Winding Up			X		
Employer Debt			X		
Revaluation		X	X		
Indexation	X		X		
Preservation		X	X		
Transfers		X	X		
Scheme Surpluses	X			X	
Scheme Administration	X			X	
Pension Protection Fund Levy	X		X		
Pension Protection Fund Compensation		X	X		
Internal Annuities/ AVCs	X		X		
Scheme Funding	X		X		
Financial Assistance Scheme (FAS)	X		X		
Equality		X			X
Pension Sharing on Divorce	X				X
Cross-Border Schemes	X			X	
Disclosure	X	X			X
Underpins and Top-Up benefits	X	X		X	
Contracted-out Protected Rights	X			X	
Scheme Modifications				X	
Schedules of Payment	X	X		X	

**\*NB:** All policy areas provide retrospective protection so that schemes do not have to revisit decisions made before the commencement date of the regulations and section 29, except in limited prescribed circumstances for schemes in winding-up on this date. This protection is available to schemes that have used a definition of money purchase benefits that is inconsistent with the amendment that will be made by section 29 to section 181 of the Pension Schemes Act 1993.

## Impacts of Transitional Regulations on schemes and employers

### Winding up

62. Occupational pension schemes complete wind-up when all assets and liabilities are discharged or transferred to a separate scheme. Winding-up may be triggered by the sponsoring employer's insolvency. If the scheme assets are insufficient to fund all the benefits under the scheme, then the scheme must wind up in accordance with section 73 of the Pensions Act 1995, which sets the priority order by which the liabilities must be discharged.
63. Section 73 only applies to non-money purchase schemes. If a scheme with only money purchase benefits somehow becomes under-funded there is no statutory priority order which applies, as, until the *Bridge* judgment, it was not possible for a money purchase scheme to become under-funded except where there was fraud or error.

### Impacts

64. The Department recognises that where schemes in wind-up have made decisions on a basis incompatible with section 29, revisiting these decisions will give rise to costs. For schemes that have in effect completed winding-up, it will be practically impossible.
65. In consultation the Department proposed that schemes should have to revisit winding-up decisions made between 27 July 2011 and the coming into force date, where those decisions were incompatible with section 29. It believed this was necessary to protect members, and proportionate, since the Department had made its intention to introduce retrospective legislation clear in its statement on 27 July 2011. The Department also notes that this practice is not uncommon when foreshadowing the introduction of retrospective changes to pensions legislation.
66. Following consultation, the Department accepts that members would not appreciably benefit from retrospection, except in the limited circumstances where a scheme is winding up on commencement and benefits are underfunded. All but one respondent believed that protection was not necessary. Having carefully considered submissions and representations, the Department is persuaded that the statement in July 2011 had the desired effect of giving the many schemes that had been compliant with the Department's understanding of the meaning of money purchase benefits assurance that legislation would be introduced to validate their actions. This means that they did not need to revisit past decisions or rearrange existing arrangements. The Department is fully aware that the statement did not have the force of law and that was never its intention.
67. The Department also recognises that it would not necessarily have been sufficient in law for schemes to rely on the statement when making winding-up decisions between July 2011 and the commencement date. This is particularly the case where section 29 would have changed the way trustees treated benefits provided by the scheme. Although one scheme was able to reconcile the Department's statement with the prevailing law, most respondents, including professional advisers, believed this was not generally possible.
68. The regulations therefore modify the retrospective application of winding up legislation so that wind-ups that commenced before the coming into force date are not required to be reopened, unless the winding up is underway at commencement in limited prescribed circumstances. These are where benefits

are not and have never been affected by section 29, but trustees have nevertheless treated the benefits as money purchase not in compliance with the existing definition of money purchase benefits in section 181 of the 1993 Act.

69. Overall the measures here present a nil cost to schemes because past decisions will not need to be revised. However, cost could arise in the following circumstances: a scheme is still winding up on commencement; or there is a risk to member entitlement because the scheme is not able to fund the benefits provided under the scheme that fall outside the current definition of money purchase benefit.
70. The only other class of member who could benefit from requiring schemes to revisit past winding up decisions are non-money purchase members who have taken early retirement. Even these members could only benefit where the amount of money available increases to a level above the Pension Protection Fund minimum, but below their full entitlement.
71. Some employers in relation to multi-employer schemes that began winding up prior to the coming into force date and on a basis incompatible with section 29, could conceivably benefit from the scheme having to go back and revisit earlier decisions. However, we have no way of quantifying this benefit or even knowing if there are any employers in this position as none have come forward.

#### **Deficiencies in assets (employer debt)**

72. An employer debt can be triggered by the insolvency of an employer participating in a pension scheme or by the scheme commencing a wind-up. This can also happen when an employer stops employing active members in a multi-employer scheme and at least one other employer continues to employ active members.

#### **Impacts**

73. Transitional regulations will modify the retrospective application of the employer debt legislation where schemes are newly affected by section 29.
74. The regulations provide that, in most cases, section 29 will only come into force with prospective effect. The legislative requirements around employer debt will not apply retrospectively except in two limited cases where the scheme has benefits which are not directly affected by section 29 on commencement.
75. The first case is where a scheme has been treated as a money purchase scheme and falls within either one of two categories.
76. Category one is where the scheme is winding up on the commencement date. After this date the trustees must secure a valuation of the scheme's assets and liabilities under regulation 5 of the employer debt Regulations 2005.
77. Where this valuation reveals a deficit in the scheme, a debt is due on the employer under section 75 of the Pensions Act 1995 unless the employer is insolvent, the scheme enters the Pension Protection Fund assessment period, or there is a voluntary wind-up of the employer.
78. Category two is where an employer debt event occurred before the commencement date in a scheme that is an ongoing scheme. Here, after commencement the trustees must secure a valuation of the scheme's assets and liabilities under regulation 5, and where this shows a deficit, a section 75 debt is due on the employer who triggered the employer debt event unless the employer is insolvent.

79. However, trustees are not required to undertake the valuation under regulation 5 if this scheme is able to meet the statutory funding objective at the first valuation after commencement, or is able to put in place a recovery plan within a specified time.
80. In this first case, the scheme must have provided benefits which are not directly affected by section 29 on commencement i.e. benefits that are not money purchase benefits, death benefits, cash balance benefits, or pensions in payment derived either from cash balance benefits or money purchase benefits.
81. The second case is where a scheme is not a money purchase scheme but as with the first case provides benefits which are not directly affected by section 29 on commencement as set out above.
82. If a section 75 debt was due on the employer before the commencement date, then trustees will be required to secure a valuation of the scheme's assets and liabilities under regulation 5 after this date.
83. Where this valuation shows the scheme is in deficit, the trustees must impose a section 75 debt on the employer unless the scheme is able to meet the statutory funding objective at the first actuarial valuation after commencement or to put in place a recovery plan within a specified time.
84. For most schemes that have begun winding up prior to the coming into force date the employer debt provisions are entirely disapplied in relation to the exempt benefits, where schemes have treated these benefits as money purchase.
85. These transitional measures should be regarded as a cost saving provision for schemes, which would otherwise have to revisit decisions as far back as 1997. In light of the feedback from trustees and employers during consultation the Department has accepted that in all cases, with the exceptions of the circumstances set out above, the costs of schemes having to revisit decisions of this nature could be high with no benefit to members. This kind of revisitation may not be possible at all.
86. The Department also accepts that any deficit arising from a past debt being calculated incompatibly with section 29 in an ongoing scheme would be small relative to the assets of the scheme. These would be absorbed by the remaining employers, who consultation responses indicate are willing to accept additional liabilities in the next scheme funding cycle, so there would be no loss to members.
87. As with winding up, in consultation the Department proposed that affected schemes should be required to revisit past employer debt determinations between 27 July 2011 and the commencement date. The Department believed that it was reasonable to expect schemes to have behaved compatibly with section 29 after 27 July 2011 because the Department issued a statement on that day setting out the Government's intention to make retrospective legislation to clarify the definition.
88. Following consultation, the Department acknowledges that neither this statement, nor the clarified definition in section 29, which was enacted but not commenced in November 2011, was necessarily sufficient for schemes to rely on. This is particularly the case if they had never been compliant in the first place. The Department accepts that the industry could not be absolutely sure of the form that the commenced definition of money purchase benefits would take, because of the power to amend the definition by regulation in section 32 of the Act. In the event this has not been done.

89. In the course of the consultation the Department contacted employer representative organisations, including the British Chamber of Commerce and Business in the Community, and has not received representations disputing that this is a reasonable solution.

## Revaluation

90. Where a member has left a scheme prior to normal pension age, schemes are required to revalue many deferred benefits relative to inflation when the member reaches that age. For non-money purchase schemes, this is generally done by reference to the annual Revaluation Order or in accordance with the scheme rules, if these are more generous. However, average salary and flat rate benefits relating to deferred members may be revalued on the same basis as that used to revalue the benefits of active members. In the case of money purchase benefits, the member must receive any investment income growth on the preserved fund that he would have received if he had still been an active member.
91. With the commencement of section 29, there may be schemes which have revalued benefits in a way incompatible with the new definition. Schemes could face administrative costs if they were obliged to revisit calculations made prior to the commencement of section 29.
92. The Department appreciates that the detail of the final salary, average salary and money purchase methods of revaluation do not apply neatly to many cash balance schemes. A new cash balance method of revaluation, available for all eligible future accruals, will give trustees and scheme managers an alternative to the default final salary method with the Revaluation Order. This new method (actually an extension of the flat rate method), is based on the same principles as the money purchase and average salary methods, that active and deferred members should be treated in the same way.
93. Prior to consultation the Department did not have evidence of any schemes in this situation but understood that they existed. The consultation document published on 31 October 2013 therefore asked for evidence from trustees. Responses indicate that there are schemes that have been revaluing benefits in a way that is not compatible with section 29, but no firm details of the number of either schemes or members affected could be established.

## Impacts

94. Going forward, the provision of a revaluation method specifically for cash balance schemes will give trustees and scheme managers of those schemes a clear, easy-to-administer option for the revaluation of future accruals.
95. Few consultation responses commented on this aspect. Those that did indicated that affected schemes would have to identify accruals before and after the commencement of the change separately.
- “Records will need to show the split of benefit accrual, although we would not anticipate this creating much effort”
- (Pensions consultants)*
96. The Department believes that this would mainly apply to schemes which had previously been revaluing by the default Revaluation Order method and would consequently have little impact as this revaluation method already has different requirements for different periods of accrual.
97. Every consultation response which commented on the revaluation proposals

agreed that schemes should not be required to revisit benefits which had already been revalued. Although no figures were given, all respondents agreed it would be difficult, time consuming and expensive to attempt to do so.

“It would be costly to revisit past calculations....for each pensioner”.

“Cost are difficult to quantify and will depend on the numbers of members involved so could be significant in a large schemes and in any case material to smaller schemes. Practical issues would involve having to change member records and explain the changes to the member...”

*(Pension administrator)*

98. The provisions which allow trustees and scheme managers to use the money purchase method in relation to periods before the commencement of section 29 will avoid the need for trustees and scheme managers to undertake complex and possibly costly reviews of benefits already in payment. It will also avoid having to seek costly legal advice at the expense of scheme funds for little or no discernible benefit to affected members.

### **Indexation**

99. Indexation is the amount by which a pension in payment is increased each year to take into account the effect of inflation. Schemes are required to increase non-money purchase benefits accrued after 1997 by a minimum of Limited Price Indexation<sup>4</sup>.
100. Money purchase benefits have not been subject to indexation requirements since 2005. Pensions resulting from cash balance benefits are required, where the pension came into payment prior to the 3 January 2012, to be indexed to at least Limited Price Indexation.
101. The effect of commencement of section 29 on affected benefits would not be clear in the absence of consequential modifications of the indexation requirements. In some circumstances it would impose an indexation requirement on incomes in payment, the terms of which would have already been agreed between the member and the scheme or annuity provider. To add indexation to such benefits would mean revisiting and unpicking that decision at additional cost, with no discernible benefit to the member.
102. It remains unclear how many schemes and members may be affected if schemes had to revisit benefits in payment. It is, however, unlikely to be very many as only a very few advisors and lawyers admitted to being aware of one or more schemes. Only one pension scheme admitted to providing un-indexed benefits in a manner not compatible with section 29. Around 80 per cent of over 3,500 members in this scheme who chose scheme pensions would be affected as well as an unknown number who opted for external annuities.
103. The Department will ensure that the statutory minimum indexation requirements do not apply, going forward, to any scheme pensions derived from funds which were either money purchase or cash balance benefits in the accrual phase, and which are not required to be indexed under the rules of the scheme or under a statutory requirement.
104. Further transitional arrangements will ensure that there is no impact on the

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<sup>4</sup> Limited Price Indexation requires that, once in payment, pensions accrued between 1997 and 2005 must be increased by inflation capped at 5 per cent per annum. For pensions accrued from 2005 onwards, the figure is inflation capped at 2.5 per cent per annum.



indexation rate of any existing pensions in payment. Where a pension in payment derived from cash balance benefits came into payment prior to 3 January 2012 and was not subject to indexation, the transitional measures will allow the pension to be continued to be paid at a flat rate after the commencement of section 29.

105. This will benefit schemes, which will not have to revisit the terms of existing agreements and meet the associated administrative costs.
106. All consultation responses agreed that pensions in payment should not be revisited. The responses are definite that attempting to revisit and recalculate pensions in payment would be difficult, time consuming and expensive. They were unclear on whether external annuities could be amended or whether the scheme (and sponsoring employer) would end up paying for the indexation.

“There would ... be considerable time spent in recalculating the [scheme pensions] manually and correcting them, together with informing the member what has happened.”

*(Pensions scheme)*

### **Preservation**

107. Legislation provides a level of benefit protection to a member of an occupational pension scheme who has accrued benefit but leaves before the normal pension age of that scheme. This is referred to as preservation.
108. Commencing section 29 will create technical inconsistencies between section 74 of the Pension Schemes Act 1993 and the Occupational Pension Schemes (Preservation of Benefit) Regulations 1991 (Preservation Regulations) by suggesting that a benefit which meets certain criteria could still be a money purchase benefit, whereas section 29 means it should be a non-money purchase benefit.
109. The Government intends to repeal regulations 14 and 14A of the Preservation Regulations on commencement of the transitional arrangements for section 29 and replace them with a clarified regulation setting out how short term benefits should be calculated.
110. This will benefit trustees and scheme managers who had faced uncertainty as to the effect of the regulations now being repealed. This does not give rise to costs nor affect member benefits in a material way.
111. Consultation responses have not produced any concerns or evidence about the impact on schemes.

### **Transfers**

112. A member of a pension scheme can transfer the value of their pension to another scheme or an insurance provider in the accumulation phase subject to certain conditions. For money purchase benefits the transfer amount is the current cash value of the fund.
113. For non-money purchase benefits, other than cash balance benefits, schemes take account of the projected preserved pension that would be payable at the scheme's normal retirement age and the value of the fund needed to provide that pension. For all non-money purchase benefits, the transfer value may reflect any deficit within the overall fund.

### **Impacts**

114. A new provision will enable the transfer value of non-money purchase benefits

which are cash balance benefits to be calculated at the current value of the fund. This will include any notional interest, guarantees, bonuses or discretionary payments but subject to an adjustment if the scheme is underfunded. This will make it easier for schemes affected by section 29 to calculate the transfer values of these benefits and explain it to members. This is a permanent change to pensions regulation and not a time-limited transitional provision.

115. It is necessary to make it clear that the transfer value of money purchase benefits cannot be reduced to reflect scheme underfunding, but that transfer values for non-money purchase benefits, which can become underfunded, may be reduced proportionately to scheme underfunding in that category of benefits.
116. To do anything different might mean that a member's transfer value could be determined to be higher than the underlying assets. This would impact detrimentally on the scheme's funding position. Therefore this measure is beneficial to schemes as it increases their stability and protects their funding level for the benefit of all members.
117. Revisiting past transfers between schemes would be practically very difficult.
118. It is theoretically possible that there would be some distributional impact between schemes if their transfer value was revisited. However the Department believes that the administrative costs associated with this would be disproportionate.
119. Consultation responses unanimously agreed with this position, although few provided any specific figures.

"It is impractical to unwind past transfers. Data may not be available for transfers going back 17 years and there will be disproportionate and substantial costs involved...."

*(Pension lawyers)*

### **Scheme surpluses**

120. Payments of surplus funds from an occupational pension scheme can be made to an employer, providing that the conditions in section 37 of the Pensions Act 1995 and the Occupational Pension Schemes (Payments to Employer) Regulations 2006 are met.
121. The conditions for withdrawing surpluses from a scheme are different for non-money purchase schemes than those for a money purchase scheme.
122. Where any of the schemes affected by section 29 have made surplus payments to an employer before the coming into force of these regulations, these transactions will not be subject to section 37 and the associated regulations. This ensures that scheme assets and the interests of members are protected.
123. The regulations provide that a valuation made on the basis that affected benefits were money purchase benefits, cannot be used to support any future payment to employers after the regulations come into force. If the trustees or managers of the scheme want to make a payment of surplus funds to the employer beyond that date, they must obtain a new actuarial valuation of assets and liabilities.

### **Impacts**

124. If there is an intention to make a surplus payment after the regulations have come into force, the scheme would need to ensure that any actuarial valuation used to do so reflects the non-money purchase nature of the scheme's benefits. However, this merely reflects the requirement for any non-money purchase scheme and is not an additional cost.

125. Overall this is a potentially cost saving measure for schemes, which would otherwise be required to bear the cost of revisiting and unpicking past surplus payments, which may have been made to employers no longer associated with the scheme.

### **Scheme Administration**

126. Section 47 of the Pensions Act 1995 requires occupational pension schemes to appoint an actuary. However, money purchase schemes are exempted from this requirement by regulation 3(2) (a) of the Occupational Pension Schemes (Scheme Administration) Regulations 1996.

### **Impacts**

127. When section 29 comes into force affected schemes that had been considered to be money purchase and will now be treated as non-money purchase, could be in breach of the requirement in section 47, without transitional protection.
128. The Regulations therefore makes transitional provisions so that these schemes will be treated as if they were money purchase schemes, in relation to periods before the coming into force date. Schemes will also not be required to appoint an actuary until three months after the coming into force of these regulations.
129. If a scheme affected by section 29 at the appointed day becomes wholly money purchase by buying out its non-money purchase benefits within three months of the coming into force date, it will not be required to appoint or re-appoint an actuary under section 47 if it has no benefits which are money purchase at that time.
130. Without this “period of grace” schemes would incur the cost of having to appoint an actuary immediately, which might not be possible given the need of the trustees to complete a selection process and ensure they are getting value for money.

### **Pension Protection Levy**

131. Section 175 of the Pensions Act 2004 requires the Board of the Pension Protection Fund to impose an annual levy on occupational pension schemes with members who may be eligible to receive compensation.

### **Impacts**

132. Transitional regulations under sections 30, 31 and 33 of the Pensions Act 2011 will be used to modify the retrospective application of the levy requirements. This will ensure that trustees of any of the schemes affected by section 29 do not have to revisit past valuations on which the levy is based. This should be seen as a cost saving for schemes because they will not need to construct historic valuations (which trustees would be required to do without the regulations covered in this impact assessment).
133. Any of the schemes that become eligible when section 29 comes into force will be treated as ineligible for any period before 1 April 2015. This will allow time for trustees and managers to make arrangements to comply with the requirements of the Pension Protection Fund.
134. For hybrid schemes already paying the levy on non-money purchase benefits, modifying the effect of section 29 will save the cost of revisiting past valuations.
135. Levy bills take account of scheme assets and liabilities and revisiting them in

respect of benefits previously treated as money purchase could result in over and underpayments. The practical implications of such a task would be complex and costly for schemes and the Pension Protection Fund, and would not benefit other levy payers.

### **Pension Compensation**

136. At present, legislation on how the Pension Protection Fund pays pension compensation is primarily based on the scheme having promised the member an income in retirement.
137. Where the scheme has offered a guarantee on a lump sum to the member, for example using a guaranteed minimum investment return, there is no income stream. On retirement the member would normally take the lump sum and convert it into an income stream either on the open market, or through a mechanism provided by the scheme itself.
138. The Pension Protection Fund is currently able to pay compensation to members of cash balance schemes which guarantee the amount of a lump sum under the compensation provisions for such schemes. However there is no provision for other non-money purchase lump sums.

### **Impacts**

139. These regulations will clarify the process by which a non-money purchase lump sum is converted to periodic compensation in the future. By applying standard actuarial factors to the lump sum it can be turned into an income. This will then be regarded as the protected pension rate, to which compensation arrangements can be applied.
140. This will provide members who have a guarantee on a lump sum whose schemes enter the Pension Protection Fund with a mechanism through which they can be paid compensation.
141. This does not give rise to administrative costs for either schemes or members since it merely provides a method for the Pension Protection Fund to take in the rights and to pay compensation. This will apply from the commencement of section 29.

### **Internal annuities from additional voluntary contributions**

142. Some schemes offer members the option of making money purchase additional voluntary contributions alongside their defined benefit pension, and on retirement using these to take a pension from the scheme funds rather than buying a pension from an external provider. Such benefits will not be money purchase once actuarial factors are applied to the accumulated fund to convert it to an income stream in the form of an internal annuity. In the past such internal annuities may have been treated as money purchase benefits for pension protection purposes.
143. At present, if the scheme entered the Pension Protection Fund the member would receive compensation for the salary related pension scheme, and separately an external annuity purchased by the scheme in place of the internal annuity they were receiving from scheme funds. On commencement of section 29 of the Pensions Act 2011 the internal annuity will not meet the definition of money purchase benefits, so the compensation would be calculated on the combined total of their salary related pension and internal annuity.
144. For members who have not yet reached normal scheme retirement age and have

not taken early retirement on medical grounds, an age related cap is applied and compensation is paid at 90%. This means that a few members who retire early could receive significantly less benefit without protection from these regulations.

## **Impacts**

145. For scheme members in receipt of an internal annuity at commencement of section 29 and for members whose additional voluntary contributions come into payment within a limited period after commencement, transitional arrangements will allow such benefits to continue to be treated as money purchase benefits. As such the trustees or managers of the scheme could discharge them from scheme funds should the scheme enter a Pension Protection Fund assessment period.
146. Members with internal annuities bought with additional voluntary contributions and which are in payment at the coming into force date will benefit if their scheme winds up or enters the Pension Protection Fund, as their pension payment in respect of the annuity will not be reduced.
147. Where a scheme winds up outside the Pension Protection Fund, treating internal annuities as money purchase benefits and discharging in full will reduce the scheme assets available to meet non-money purchase benefits with a lower priority. This could potentially reduce non-money purchase benefits for scheme members to a minimum level of pension compensation that would have been paid by the Pension Protection Fund.
148. Internal annuities would also be treated as money purchase benefits for the purposes of the priority order in section 73 of the Pensions act 1995 if the scheme winds up outside the Pension Protection Fund. This means that the member will continue to receive the full amount of their annuity, without it being potentially reduced in line with Pension Protection Fund compensation rules.
149. This protection will also be extended to scheme members who use money purchase additional voluntary contributions to purchase an annuity within twelve months of the coming into force of section 29.
150. This approach allows time for members who are making additional voluntary contributions to be made aware that if they choose an internal annuity in the future, their benefit will be not be treated as money purchase from that point for pension protection purposes.

## **Scheme funding**

151. Trustees of schemes containing non-money purchase benefits must obtain regular actuarial valuations. If a funding deficit is identified, a recovery plan must be prepared, setting out how the deficit will be dealt with.
152. Past scheme funding valuations in line with the clarified definition will be validated by the commencement of section 29, but without suitable transitional arrangements, valuations which used an incompatible definition may need to be revisited and potentially unpicked.

## **Impacts**

153. These regulations will be used to modify the retrospective application of the scheme funding provisions. This should be seen as a cost saving for schemes because historic valuations will not need to be revisited, or undertaken where they had not previously been deemed necessary.
154. Schemes will still have to carry out prospective valuations using the definition in

section 29. This will not reduce member protection as, where trustees or scheme managers believed affected benefits were money purchase, matching assets and liabilities relating to those benefits should have been set aside.

155. However, liabilities in hybrid schemes for non-money purchase benefits accrued in relation to periods of pensionable service will be required to be taken into account for the purposes of prospective valuations from the commencement date in accordance with Part 3 of the Pensions Act 2004. This is regardless of whether they were accrued before or after the commencement of section 29. This will apply where a scheme contains benefits which are covered by section 29, but which have been treated as money purchase benefits in previous valuations.
156. Schemes which will no longer be recognised as wholly money purchase once section 29 is in force will be required to obtain an initial actuarial valuation. This will be with reference to an effective date not later than one year from the date of commencement of section 29. This is a position analogous to a newly created scheme. Engagement with the industry and the Pensions Regulator suggests that there will not be many schemes in this position.
157. Prospectively these schemes will still have to meet the requirements associated with being non-money purchase. However regulations will lift the need for them to undertake retrospective funding valuations. These regulations will therefore benefit schemes which would otherwise have to take action to revisit past decisions once section 29 is commenced.

### **Financial Assistance Scheme**

158. The Financial Assistance Scheme came into operation in September 2005 and the relevant regulatory provisions are contained in the Financial Assistance Scheme Regulations 2005. It helps members of qualifying schemes who have suffered losses to their defined benefit pensions as a consequence of employer insolvency, generally between 1 January 1997 and 5 April 2005. The majority of these schemes transfer their defined benefit related assets to the Government in return for assistance. Money purchase liabilities in these schemes are discharged separately as they are not covered by the Financial Assistance Scheme.
159. The Supreme Court's judgment has caused uncertainty amongst qualifying schemes which offered money purchase benefits affected by section 29 that have yet to complete the transfer of assets to Government. The Department understands there are very few schemes in this position.
160. The retrospective nature of section 29 could generate risks for qualifying schemes that have already wound up using the Supreme Court interpretation as they might be considered to have acted illegally unless their actions are transitionally protected.

### **Impacts**

161. The Department does not intend to unpick decisions already taken in relation to the treatment of affected money purchase benefits in qualifying schemes which used either the Pensions Act 2011 or the Supreme Court's interpretation of money purchase benefits.
162. This means that schemes:
  - that applied the Pensions Act 2011 interpretation will be protected retrospectively by the commencement of section 29;

- that wound up using an interpretation similar to the Supreme Court interpretation of money purchase benefits will not be required to revisit past decisions under the regulations; and
  - that are still in the process of allocating assets and have used the Supreme Court interpretation of money purchase benefits to date will not be expected to unpick their calculations. The Transitional Regulations will allow for these benefits to be discharged as money purchase.
163. This approach will avoid uncertainty for scheme members and the further erosion of limited assets due to additional administration costs.
164. Even if section 29 were commenced without supporting regulations it would be a practical impossibility to revisit past decisions. Theoretically if such a revision were possible it would alter the allocation of assets for schemes in the Financial Assistance Scheme, but would not alter the overall value of assets.
165. Through consultation the Department sought to obtain information on any schemes affected by these regulations. The responses did not provide any evidence of schemes in this position.

### **Equality**

166. The Sex Equality Act 2010 (Sex Equality Rule) (Exceptions) Regulations 2010 are made using the power in paragraph 5(2) of Schedule 7 to the Equality Act 2010. Those regulations contain permitted exceptions to the Sex Equality Rule in the Equality Act. Regulation 4 allows the use of actuarial factors which differ for men and women in relation to the calculation of employers' contributions in certain circumstances, and the provision of certain benefits.

### **Impacts**

167. The regulations will be amended to give certainty that schemes which apply different actuarial factors for men and women when converting money purchase benefits to a rate of scheme pension will continue to be able to do so.
168. This will not give rise to any costs.

### **Pension sharing (on divorce)**

169. The value of pension rights are included as part of the couple's assets on divorce or dissolution of a civil partnership, for the purpose of calculating a financial settlement. Options include either sharing the value of the pension or offsetting the value. If pension sharing is chosen, the pension rights are valued a second time, immediately before the pension sharing order is implemented.
170. Pension sharing on divorce legislation is mainly contained in the Welfare Reform and Pensions Act 1999 and associated regulations.

### **Impacts**

171. Money purchase and non-money purchase pensions are valued in different ways. If a scheme valued the rights by the money purchase method but then, after the commencement of section 29, had to value the rights by the non-money purchase method, complexity and confusion could arise. This could lead to an administrative burden on the few schemes that could find themselves in this situation.
172. Transitional regulations made under section 31 of the Pensions Act 2011 will ensure that, where a scheme is in the process of valuing pension rights or

implementing a pension sharing order, the scheme can continue using the same valuation method, rather than switch during the implementation process. Schemes will also not have to revisit valuations or pension sharing which has already taken place.

173. These provisions will benefit schemes which have provided valuations or are in the process of valuing pension rights in respect of a member's divorce. They will not be required to undertake a costly revision of valuations which have already taken place or are in progress.
174. Theoretically some members/former spouses would benefit from revisiting decisions already taken, while other members/former spouses would lose out to an equal degree.
175. Consultation responses were again unanimous that valuations and pension sharing which had already taken place should not be revisited. Respondents also supported the position that pension sharing valuations or implementation which has commenced but not completed before the regulations come into force, should continue using the original methodology.

### **Cross-border schemes**

176. Cross-border schemes must be authorised by the Pensions Regulator to receive contributions from a European employer. Different authorisation requirements apply to money purchase benefits as opposed to non-money purchase benefits. If a scheme has regarded itself as wholly money purchase but contains benefits affected by section 29, the authorisation will be invalidated.
177. The Department has therefore included provision in the regulations to enable an existing authorisation on a money purchase basis to remain valid for a period of a year, during which period affected schemes would need to have re-applied on the non-money purchase basis.

### **Impacts**

178. After consultation the Department is not aware of any cross-border schemes that will be required to re-apply for authorisation. However, in order to ensure that any schemes which might be in this position are not in breach of the legislation on cross-border schemes, the Department believes that the provisions in the regulations should be retained.
179. If there are any affected schemes, they will be required to provide an actuarial valuation within a year of the date of the further application.
180. These measures would represent a cost saving to schemes since they would have a year to come into compliance with section 29, including re-applying for authorisation as hybrid schemes if appropriate.
181. Ultimately, there will be additional administration and actual cost in ensuring that affected schemes, if any, are correctly authorised, for example, the requirement to provide annual valuations. The scheme would also be subject to the wider legislative requirements for a non-money purchase scheme, such as scheme funding and the Pension Protection Fund levy. However, these requirements are in line with the existing requirements for any non-money purchase cross-border scheme.

### **Disclosure**

182. The Occupational and Personal Pension Schemes (Disclosure of Information)



Regulations 2013 (Disclosure Regulations) set out the information which must be disclosed in certain situations; to whom the information must be disclosed; the timescales for doing so; and the manner in which the information should be provided.

183. Some disclosure requirements currently apply only to money purchase benefits, while others apply only to non-money purchase benefits.

184. The policy intention here is that the distinction should be drawn between:

- pensions that in accumulation principally comprise a defined set of assets, even if they are also subject to other factors such as a guaranteed rate of return; and
- pensions that, in accumulation are defined in terms of a defined income in retirement.

This is because different types of information are useful to members in respect of each of these benefits. The regulations will amend the Disclosure Regulations to reflect this distinction as appropriate.

185. When a member approaches retirement the Department would want to ensure that schemes are required to disclose the right to the Open Market Option (to buy an annuity from an insurance provider) and provide the relevant information to those members who have that right. The right to the Open Market Option is contained in the Finance Act 2004 and is not amended or affected by bringing into effect section 29 of the Pensions Act 2011. These regulations will amend the disclosure regulations to reflect the Finance Act 2004 definition, and require that members approaching retirement be given information on the Open Market Option.

186. Up until 5 April 2014 the regulations on disclosure are principally found in the Occupational Pension Schemes (Disclosure of Information) Regulations 1996. From 6 April 2014 these regulations will be revoked and replaced by the Occupational and Personal Pension Schemes (Disclosure of Information) Regulations 2013.

## **Impacts**

187. This will benefit members who will receive the appropriate information in respect of their benefit entitlements.

188. The Department expects that the few affected schemes, being hybrid schemes, will already be using both types of disclosure and therefore will not face additional costs arising as they move to the correct type following the coming into force of section 29.

## **Underpins and top-up benefits**

189. Many pension schemes offer an “underpin” benefit, where the scheme rules provide for the member to receive a money purchase benefit only if its value exceeds the value of a specified non-money purchase benefit.

190. Schemes have also treated certain top-up arrangements in a similar way, for example where a benefit is calculated by taking the difference between a money purchase benefit and a pre-set amount.

191. Underpin and top-up benefits were not considered by the Supreme Court in the *Bridge* case but there is an argument that the definition of money purchase benefit in section 29 impacts on these types of arrangements.

## **Impacts**

192. Consultation has brought to light that some schemes have been treating these types of benefits as money purchase. If the Transitional Regulations do not cover these types of benefits, on commencement of section 29 schemes would have to look retrospectively at decisions that they have made from January 1997.
193. We received a number of consultation responses that detailed concerns that it would be a considerable cost to the industry if the Department did not consider this type of benefit within the transitional arrangements.
194. Taking these and other responses into consideration, the Department has decided that if provision was not made to include underpin and top-up benefits within the scope of the transitional legislation (in a situation where a defined benefit guarantee bites), schemes would have to revisit decisions, or at least seek professional advice. Either of these actions could give rise to significant costs and likely in practice prove to be almost impossible to do as asserted by respondents.
195. Transitional provisions will validate actions of trustees who have treated underpin and top-up arrangements, as described above, as money purchase benefits.
196. The Department's provision in this area will therefore represent a cost saving for schemes and employers with no discernable impact, based on available information, on members' entitlement.
197. Where schemes have benefits that fall into the definition for underpins in section 73 of the Pension Act 1995, as modified by regulation 13 of the Occupational Pension Schemes (Winding Up) Regulations 1996, the current provision will apply.
198. The transitional provisions will replicate the application of the current legislation to money purchase underpin benefits and money purchase benefits which are subject to a "top-up arrangement", with no additional impacts on schemes.

## **Contracted-Out Protected Rights**

199. Contracting-out has provided an alternative to the state additional pension. People have been able to contract out of the state additional pension provided certain conditions are met.
200. Until 6 April 2012, contracting-out was permitted for occupational pension schemes on a money purchase (also known as defined contribution (DC)) basis, and is still permitted on a salary-related (also known as defined benefit) basis.
201. In a contracted-out DC occupational pension scheme, the employer and employees paid a reduced rate of National Insurance contributions and Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs made an annual age-related payment into the scheme. The amount of an individual's pension fund derived from this rebate, its investment return and any tax relief on the rebate were known as "protected rights".
202. There are certain restrictions that applied to the protected rights, including that they should be money purchase benefits.
203. In 2005 an independent Pensions Commission set up by the Government recommended abolishing contracting-out for pension schemes which contracted out on a DC basis. The Commission found that contracting-out rules on defined contributions were too complex and poorly understood, and that it was increasingly difficult for individuals to determine whether it was better to contract-out or remain in the state additional pension.

204. The Department accepted the Commission's recommendations, resulting in the abolition of contracting-out on a DC basis from 6 April 2012, although the rebates for the period up to this date could continue to be paid in certain circumstances.
205. There were no provisions in the consultation draft of the regulations on contracted-out protected rights. However, responses to the consultation on the regulations has revealed that some defined benefit schemes contracting-out on a DC basis held these protected rights as cash balance benefits or money purchase underpin benefits. Schemes considered these benefits to be money purchase benefits.
206. Under section 29, cash balance benefits or a defined benefit (in relation to a money purchase underpin benefit) would be non-money purchase benefits. Schemes with these arrangements could therefore be in breach of the requirement in section 31 of the Pension Schemes Act 1993 that protected rights should be money purchase benefits.

### **Impacts**

207. Whilst acknowledging that schemes operating in this manner were in breach of section 31, the Department recognises that requiring schemes to unpick all decisions that were based on the understanding that benefits of this type were money purchase would impose significant burdens on schemes. Without any transitional provisions in these regulations, schemes would be required to revisit actions taken since 1 January 1997, the date from which section 29 will apply. Based on the information received in consultation, the Department understands that of the 40,000 schemes with some money purchase elements very few could find themselves in this situation.
208. Aside from the administrative task of revisiting decisions and the cost of potentially having to seek professional advice, the Department understands that in some cases schemes would be hard pressed to isolate these benefits.
209. The Department therefore proposes to validate the treatment of these arrangements as money purchase benefits from 1 January 1997, by applying transitional protection to allow these types of benefits to satisfy the requirements for protected rights, both before the appointed day, and for limited purposes after the appointed day.
210. These provisions will represent a cost saving for schemes and employers with no associated impact for members, in terms of assets being depleted in having to revisit decisions taken by the scheme.

### **Scheme modifications**

211. The rules which govern changes to rights or entitlements are detailed in section 67 of the Pensions Act 1995. During the course of the consultation on these regulations, stakeholders have advised that there could be schemes which have inadvertently changed their benefits from non-money purchase to money purchase, for example by removing a guarantee from a cash balance scheme. The change would have been made in accordance with their interpretation of the law in force at the time.

### **Impacts**

212. The few schemes whose benefits have been re-classified from non- money purchase to money purchase as a consequence of section 29, may not, therefore have secured member consent as required by the scheme modification rules.

213. In keeping with the Department's wish to avoid unnecessary burdens for these schemes in unpicking decisions in the past, transitional arrangements will deem the requirements of section 67 of the Pensions Act 1995 to have been satisfied where the actuarial equivalence requirements were met before such a scheme modification before the appointed day took effect.
214. The regulations protect schemes from the administrative burden and cost of a requirement to revisit decisions taken prior to the commencement of section 29 and the coming into force of these regulations.
215. A provision preventing a scheme from modifying benefit structure so as to remove a defined benefit guarantee, at a time when a member is entitled to money purchase benefits, has also been put in place to meet concerns raised in consultation.

### **Schedules of payment**

216. Trustees or scheme managers of occupational pension schemes offering money purchase benefits must prepare and maintain a schedule of payments. For schemes offering non-money purchase benefits a schedule of contributions must be prepared which has to be actuarially certified.
217. Any of the few schemes that had previously classified themselves as entirely money purchase, but which will change their classification to having non-money purchase benefits under section 29, will no longer have to prepare a schedule of payments, but will have to prepare a schedule of contributions.

### **Impacts**

218. Without transitional provision an affected scheme would be in breach of its obligations as soon as section 29 is commenced.
219. The Department is therefore proposing that the schedule of payments for an affected scheme will continue to be in force with full effect until the trustees or managers prepare the scheme's first schedule of contributions under section 227 of the Pensions Act 2004.
220. The transitional provisions for scheme funding in the regulations require a scheme to prepare the first schedule of contributions within 15 months of the effective date, which must be a date that is not more than one year after the commencement of section 29.
221. By providing schemes with 15 months to secure their schedule of contributions the Department is allowing them a cost saving easement. It is not expected that anyone would benefit from requiring schemes to prepare their schedule more quickly than this, or from invalidating past schedules.

### **Risks and Assumptions**

222. Although the Pensions Regulator reports that only 2% of the 40,000 private occupational pension schemes in the UK which include money purchase benefits are hybrid schemes, the Department has no way of knowing how many, if any, of these will be affected by commencement of section 29 of the Pensions Act 2011. Only schemes which have been acting inconsistently with the definition of money purchase benefits set out in section 29 will be affected. Therefore it is likely that less than 2% of all occupation pensions schemes containing money purchase benefits will be affected. These assumptions remain intact following consultation.

### **One In, Two Out**

223. These regulations are in scope for One-In, Two-Out.
224. Those schemes that have not acted in accordance with section 29 or the understanding of money purchase benefit prior to the *Bridge* judgment would benefit from these measures, as for example, they would not have to revisit past actions.
225. The proposed transitional arrangements should allow schemes more time to comply with the legal framework for occupational pension schemes and greater certainty as to how it applies to them. This will minimise any practical burdens where trustees and scheme managers held a different understanding of money purchase benefits to that held by the Department.
226. Parliament is repealing regulations 14 and 14A of the Preservation Regulations and replacing them with a clarified regulation setting out how short term benefits should be calculated. There are no quantifiable savings to business as a result of the repeals, but they will help business by clarifying how benefits should be calculated.

### **Wider impacts**

227. These regulations will support the Government's commitment to ensure that it pays to save, by enabling members who have made additional voluntary contributions to receive the amount they expect. Also, members who have been promised or guaranteed certain benefits will receive these benefits on retirement, and will have access to the statutory protection mechanisms where there has been failure to fund these benefits.