EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM TO

THE OCCUPATIONAL PENSION SCHEMES (GOVERNANCE) (AMENDMENT) REGULATIONS (NORTHERN IRELAND) 2018

S.R. 2018 No. 214

1. Introduction

1.1 This Explanatory Memorandum has been prepared by the Department for Communities to accompany the Statutory Rule (details above) which is laid before the Northern Ireland Assembly.

1.2 The Statutory Rule is made under section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 and is subject to the negative resolution procedure.

2. Purpose

2.1 These Regulations amend existing legislation to implement provisions of the European Union Directive (EU) 2016/2341 on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision (commonly known as “IORP II”) which relate to workplace pension scheme governance.

3. Background

3.1 IORP II is a recast of the Directive 2003/41/EC (commonly known as “IORP I”), on the same subject matter. IORP II places greater emphasis on effective corporate governance for pension scheme trustees.

3.2 IORP I’s occupational pension scheme governance requirements were implemented in 2005. Article 14(1) of IORP I required national regulators to ensure IORPs have sound administrative and accounting procedures, and adequate internal control mechanisms. This was implemented by the insertion of Article 226A into the Pensions (Northern Ireland) Order 2005 and corresponding Great Britain legislation.

3.3 Internal controls are the systems and processes put in place by those running an occupational pension scheme to make sure that the administration of the scheme operates adequately and in accordance with the law.

3.4 IORP II places more emphasis on scheme governance than IORP I, and therefore represents a position closer to the UK’s. Scheme governance requirements in IORP II are set out across ten articles outlining what comprises an effective system of governance for occupational pension schemes.

3.5 A system of governance refers to the overarching system whereby those running an organisation or entity – in this case an occupational pension scheme – conduct their business with effective corporate controls. Internal controls are only one element that sit under this overarching system. Most financial services providers, including
those who provide private personal pensions, are already legally required to
demonstrate an effective system of governance. More information on the concept
of a system of governance may be found in the guidance note from the European
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA) available at

3.6 These Regulations amend the governance requirements in the Pensions (Northern
Ireland) Order 2005 to require trustees of private occupational pension schemes to
establish an effective system of governance which includes internal controls, and
which is proportionate to the size, nature, scale and complexity of the activities of
the pension scheme.

3.7 These Regulations do not apply to authorised master trusts within the meaning of
Part 1 of the Pension Schemes Act 2017 or any corresponding Northern Ireland
legislation as these schemes must already meet governance requirements beyond
the establishment of adequate internal controls.

3.8 These Regulations also do not apply to public service pension schemes within the
Public Service Pensions Act (Northern Ireland) 2014 (c.2 (N.I.)) Article 226B of
the Pensions (Northern Ireland) Order 2005 currently requires public service
pension schemes to establish adequate internal controls. The Public Service
Pensions Act (Northern Ireland) 2014 and the Pensions Regulator’s (TPR) Code
of Practice (COP) 14 put in place additional governance requirements beyond the
establishment of adequate internal controls.

3.9 There is an existing duty on TPR to issue a COP in relation to the duty imposed
by Article 226A(1) of the Pensions (Northern Ireland) Order 2005 (under
regulation 3 of the Occupational Pension Schemes (Internal Controls) Regulations
(Northern Ireland) 2005) and corresponding Great Britain legislation. These
Regulations prescribe what exactly must be covered by that COP.

3.10 The granular details that will expand on the COP content prescribed in these
Regulations will be developed by TPR in close liaison with the pensions industry
and government. Part of an effective system of governance is the evaluation of its
effectiveness and trustees will be expected to carry out and document such a
review by the end of their next scheme year following the publication of the COP,
or in alignment with their existing review and document cycle if different.

3.11 The Pensions Regulator, operates UK-wide. TPR is a non-departmental body
which regulates private occupational and personal pension schemes provided
through employers. TPR’s statutory objectives include promoting the good
administration of work-based pension schemes and protecting the benefits of
pension scheme members.

3.12 The purpose of TPR’s COPs. A COP is suited to dealing with detailed
requirements of this sort that will need to be approached very differently across a
diverse landscape of regulated entities. It is a more agile and flexible means of
setting regulatory expectations than legislation and is therefore also particularly
appropriate when the economic and regulatory landscape is subject to change.
COPs are subject to formal consultation.
3.13 In this case, transposing the practical details of the governance requirements in a 
COP will also ensure that the UK is aligned with the flexible and proportionate 
principles of the IORP II directive.

3.14 The Directive has a transposition deadline of 13th January 2019. The UK will 
still be a member of the EU at this time, and is committed to transpose the 
Directive into UK law.

4. Consultation

4.1 There is no requirement to consult on these Regulations. They make in relation to 
Northern Ireland only provision corresponding to provision contained in 
regulations made by the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions in relation to 
Great Britain.

5. Equality Impact

5.1 In accordance with its duty under section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, the 
Department has conducted a screening exercise on the legislative proposals for 
these Regulations. As they are largely of a technical nature to implement 
Directive (EU) 2016/2341 on the activities and supervision of institutions for 
occupational retirement provision, the Department has concluded that they would 
not have significant implications for equality of opportunity and considers that an 
Equality Impact Assessment is not necessary.

6. Regulatory Impact

6.1 A Regulatory Impact Assessment is attached in the Annex to this Explanatory 
Memorandum.

7. Financial Implications

7.1 None for the Department.

8. Section 24 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998

8.1 The Department has considered section 24 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 and is 
satisfied that these Regulations –

(a) are not incompatible with any of the Convention rights,

(b) are not incompatible with Community law,

(c) do not discriminate against a person or class of person on the ground of 
religious belief or political opinion, and

(d) do not modify an enactment in breach of section 7 of the Northern Ireland Act 
1998.
9. EU Implications

9.1 These Regulations implement provisions of Directive (EU) 2016/2341 on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision. A Transposition Note is attached in the Annex to this Explanatory Memorandum.

10. Parity or Replicatory Measure

10.1 The corresponding Great Britain Regulations are the Occupational Pension Schemes (Governance) (Amendment) Regulations 2018 (S.I. 2018/1103) which come into force on 13th January 2019. Parity of timing and substance is an integral part of the maintenance of single systems of social security, child support and pensions in line with section 87 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. The Regulations are necessary to implement provisions of Directive (EU) 2016/2341 on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision, across the UK. It was, therefore necessary to make the Regulations during the period of interregnum.
The costs and savings outlined in this Regulatory Impact Assessment are calculated on a United Kingdom-wide basis.

Evidence Base

The policy issue and rationale for Government intervention

1. EU Directive 2016/2341 (commonly known as IORP\(^1\) II) is a ‘recast’, or revision, of the ‘IORP 1’ Directive\(^2\). The recast directive places greater emphasis on effective corporate governance for pension scheme trustees. The transposition deadline for this directive is 13th January 2019.

2. It is the current cross-Government position that the UK should continue to transpose EU law. Until exit negotiations are concluded, the UK remains a full member of the European Union and all the rights and obligations of EU membership remain in force. During this period, the Government will continue to negotiate, implement and apply EU legislation. The outcome of these negotiations will determine what arrangements apply in relation to EU legislation in the future once the UK has left the EU.

3. This directive is part of the EU’s framework for financial regulation, and, as its requirements are aligned with the UK’s own priorities, it is sensible to transpose it with a minimal impact approach. This also supports the UK’s position in the EU Exit negotiations, particularly in respect of any implementation period.

4. The changes are in line with domestic initiatives for occupational pensions that are designed to improve protection for savers and confidence in financial services. These include:

- Governance requirements for public service pension schemes.
- Governance requirements for Defined Contribution (DC) pensions Master Trusts to obtain authorisation.
- DC Chair’s Statement, which must demonstrate a range of activities that comprise adequate scheme governance.
- Proposals in the recent Defined Benefit (DB) pensions white paper to improve risk management and the governance of decision making

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\(^1\) IORP stands for Institutions for Occupational Retirement Provision – in the UK, a private occupational pension scheme

\(^2\) Directive 2003/41/EC
following high profile corporate insolvencies which left significant deficits in DB pension schemes. For example, the Westminster Work and Pensions Committee hearings have reinforced this message, focusing attention on standards of corporate governance on trustee boards, in particular on their ability to identify and manage risks and to ensure the interests of employers are not allowed to override those of savers.

- The Pensions Regulator’s “21st Century Trusteeship” and “TPR Futures” initiatives.

Policy objectives and intended effects

5. The EU’s position on corporate governance for pension scheme trustees, as set out in IORP II, closely reflects the UK’s existing position. This requires that an effective system of governance should be in place in each pension scheme, proportionate for the size and risk profile of each pension scheme. The second of four stated aims for the directive is to ensure good governance and risk management, as set out in the Commission’s proposal\(^3\) to recast the IORP directive (para 1.1, page 4 refers). The overarching aim is that all scheme members should be able to have confidence that their retirement savings are being properly managed.

6. The changes being made as part of IORP II transposition will codify what trustees in the UK should already be doing to properly run their schemes. This approach will clarify what is expected from trustees for schemes where the approach is less clearly defined within the UK’s regulatory framework. When clear and enforceable legal requirements are in place for all schemes TPR will be able to take more targeted and timely action against schemes that are not properly run.

Policy options considered, including alternatives to regulation

Option 1: Do nothing

7. The option was considered following the Referendum on exiting the European Union in June 2016, when it was unclear whether it would be necessary for the UK to transpose this Directive in January 2019.

8. It is now the confirmed cross-Government position that the UK should continue to transpose EU law. Until exit negotiations are concluded, the UK remains a full member of the European Union and all the rights and obligations of EU membership remain in force. During this period, the Government will continue to negotiate, implement and apply EU legislation. The outcome of these negotiations will determine what arrangements apply in relation to EU legislation in the future once the UK has left the EU.

9. It was then considered whether transposing this directive was disproportionate or inappropriate given the reality of the UK exiting the EU, in line with DExEU legal guidance. The directive does not fall into that category.

\(^3\) Brussels, 27.3.2014 COM(2014) 167 final
10. “Do nothing” is not in line with the UK’s duty of sincere co-operation under article 4 of the Treaty on European Union, and is therefore not in line with the Government’s position on continuing to meet the obligations.

11. The UK pensions industry has been expecting IORP II since 2014 and it would create confusion if it was ignored at this late stage.

Option 2: Non-legislative transposition

12. Non-legislative means – TPR’s Codes of Practice – have been used to transpose some elements of the directive (these are not discussed in this impact assessment). TPR Codes of Practice explain in practical detail what the Regulator expects from trustees in complying with the law. In scenarios where the UK’s existing law is sufficiently close to IORP II, or is sufficiently broad, the UK can transpose those elements of the directive by changing the relevant Code of Practice so it aligns with the directive.

13. It was considered whether it would be possible to transpose the governance elements of the directive purely by such non-legislative means, so as to minimise the amount of legislation brought forth. However, the extent of the change to governance requirements in the recast directive – from one sub-paragraph requiring “adequate internal controls” to ten lengthy articles requiring an effective system of governance – requires a small amendment to be made to legislation in order to fulfil the obligation to transpose.

14. Amending the way that governance requirements are described in legislation will enable all other elements of the IORP II governance elements to be transposed through non-legislative means.

Option 3: A mixture of legislative and non-legislative transposition

15. The existing legal requirement for adequate internal controls is too narrow to allow the entirety of the system of governance set out in the directive to be expressed only in an updated TPR Code of Practice. Doing so would make TPR’s Code of Practice unenforceable and may put the UK in the position of sub-delegating to TPR without a power to do so.

16. Failing to update our legislation to reflect the extent of change in this key area of pension scheme would also make it challenging to demonstrate to the European Commission that the UK had sufficiently transposed this element of the directive. This could also lead to an ‘infringement procedure’ or referral to the Court of Justice.

17. The chosen option is therefore to take a proportionate approach which includes both legislative and non-legislative elements, minimising the legislative component as far as possible.

18. In collaboration with industry stakeholders, a minimum harmonisation approach to these articles has been designed which will minimise any impact on industry. It will formalise the requirement that trustees for all pension schemes with more than 15 members need to satisfy themselves that they have an effective system
of governance. Specific requirements for risk management and other operational matters will be set out for schemes with more than 100 members, proportionate to the complexity and risk profile of the scheme.

19. This approach enables the requirements of the directive to be made proportionate to the different segments of the UK’s diverse private occupational pensions landscape.

20. This directive is part of the EU’s framework for financial regulation, and, as its requirements are aligned with the UK’s own priorities, it is sensible to transpose it with a minimal impact approach. This also supports the UK’s position in the EU Exit negotiations, particularly in respect of any implementation period.

21. In the unlikely event that the EU Exit negotiations result in the UK adopting a position where its policy is no longer to transpose such directives, the ability to revoke this legislation is retained.

**Expected level of business impact**

22. Engagement with Industry suggests that the costs of complying will be minimal. Work has been carried out with a group of key industry stakeholders to develop options for how different types of schemes could achieve an effective system of governance at a proportionate level of cost, and this work will continue during the development of TPR’s Code of Practice.

23. The approach to each change is costed in the table below.

24. The changes to scheme governance in IORP II have only occasionally been referred to in the pensions press. It has correctly positioned them as being in line with the UK’s existing direction of travel, in particular the current work to drive up standards of governance by TPR under its flagship “21st Century Trustee” initiative.

25. The most recent information provided to industry by professional bodies was supportive of this approach, clearly articulating the narrative\(^4\).

**Monetised and non-monetised costs and benefits**

**Summary**

26. The total estimated cost in year 1 is £5.1\(^5\) million and every third year after that £2.7 million. The estimated annual net direct cost to business (EANDCB) in 2016 prices and discounted to 2017 is £1.3 million.

**Key assumptions**

**Scheme volumes**

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\(^4\) For example: https://www.lcp.uk.com/our-viewpoint/2018/08/pensions-bulletin-201832/

\(^5\) Note: it is assumed that the triennial costs are first incurred in year 1; the £5.1 million figure is the sum of it and the one-off / initial costs (which are all incurred in year 1) – see table 2 below for more detail.
27. Public Service schemes, Master Trust schemes, and schemes with less than 15 members are excluded from the volumes as the regulations will not apply to them.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of scheme members</th>
<th>Defined benefit (DB) &amp; hybrid</th>
<th>Defined contribution (DC)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-99^6</td>
<td>1,760</td>
<td>920</td>
<td>2,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100+</td>
<td>3,638^7</td>
<td>400^8</td>
<td>4,038</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 1: Volumes of schemes to be used in the estimates.**

Trustee numbers

28. All trustees need to familiarise themselves with the new regulations. There is no definitive figure for the total number of trustees that will be impacted so it is necessary to estimate this. For simplicity a methodology was applied of the average number of trustees per scheme multiplied by the number of schemes to calculate the total number of trustees. However, there are different types of trustees including lay and professional and many professional trustees offer services to more than one scheme. Therefore this methodology will give a higher estimate than a central figure. However, it is appreciated that the pensions landscape is complex and there are other people in the pensions system who will also need to familiarise with new regulations, such as consultants and legal advisers, and so this higher figure captures other affected people. It would be a disproportionate cost to estimate this in more depth. Therefore throughout this impact assessment references to trustees include other impacted parties as well.

29. It is estimated from TPR research that there are an average 3.4 trustees per scheme with more than 100 members^9 and 3.6 trustees in schemes with 100-999 members. This research also shows that small schemes with under 100 members have an average 2.4 trustees per scheme.

Wage assumptions

30. The average hourly wage for a trustee is £35.46^10. For the purposes of simplicity and being prudent in the presence of uncertainty it is assumed the same rate for a documenter as well.

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^6 Estimated from the PPF Purple Book 2017 and the DC Trust Statistics 2017/18, Table 1.8.
^7 PPF Purple Book 2017: [https://www.pensionprotectionfund.org.uk/Pages/ThePurpleBook.aspx](https://www.pensionprotectionfund.org.uk/Pages/ThePurpleBook.aspx)
^9 TPR 2015 research shows that there are an average of 3.6 trustees for schemes with 100 – 999 members and 3.0 trustees with 1,000+ schemes. We have created a weighted average using the volume of schemes in these brackets to get 3.4 average for schemes with 100+ members [http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20170712122409/http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/docs/trustee-landscape-quantitative-research-2015.pdf](http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20170712122409/http://www.thepensionsregulator.gov.uk/docs/trustee-landscape-quantitative-research-2015.pdf)
^10 The mean hourly wage for a corporate manager or director is £27.92 in the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 2017 provisional, Table 2.5. This is uplifted by 27% for overheads from the archived Green Book. [https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsandworkinghours/datasets/occupations2digitsoccahetab](https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peopleinwork/earningsandworkinghours/datasets/occupations2digitsoccahetab)
Length of regulations

31. The regulations, which all schemes with more than 14 members (incl. small ones – 15 to 99 members) will have to be familiar with, are estimated to be a total of 4-5 pages long. Schemes with 100 and more members will have more detailed requirements set out for them and will need to familiarize themselves with more pages of regulations – as discussed in the paragraphs below.

Calculation of familiarization costs

32. In principle, familiarisation costs are worked out by multiplying the assumed average hourly wage rate by the number of people involved in familiarisation and by the number of hours that each person, on average, will have to spend familiarising. The assumed numbers of hours to be spent is a judgement call based on considerations of number of pages to be read and expected level of complexity involved.
### Estimated direct costs – schemes with 15 to 99 members

**Table 2: estimated impacts for schemes with 15 to 99 members**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schemes</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>How often?</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>System of Governance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familiarisation with regulations</td>
<td>DB and DC (2,680)</td>
<td>£456,300</td>
<td>One-off</td>
<td>Estimated 4-5 pages of regulations and short time to consider these. As response should be proportionate and none of the further regulations apply to schemes of this size only a short time is estimated</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. Note that familiarisation with the system of governance regulations is required for schemes with 100+ members as well but there are more detailed requirements setting out what their system of governance must comprise. Therefore familiarisation costs have been allocated to these more detailed parts of the regulations, below.

### Estimated direct costs – schemes with 100 or more members

**Table 3: estimated impacts for schemes with 100 or more members.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schemes</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>How often?</th>
<th>Assumptions</th>
<th>Rationale</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Risk assessment function</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Familiarisation with regulations and appointing the risk assessment function holder</td>
<td>DB &amp; DC (4,038)</td>
<td>£486,800</td>
<td>One-off</td>
<td>All trustees to read one page of regulations with a short discussion to appoint the risk function holder. As all these schemes will have risk assessments in one form this is expected to be straightforward</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To document strategies on:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Underwriting and reserving; securitisations and similar commitments; asset-liability management; investment, in particular derivatives; liquidity and concentration risk management.</td>
<td>DB (3,638)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>Requirement to consider as part of the DB Funding Strategy already, so no cost to these regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Operational risks</td>
<td>DB &amp; DC (4,038)</td>
<td>£277,900</td>
<td>Every 3 years</td>
<td>Trustees (3.6) of 25% of smaller DB schemes (100-999 memberships) take half a day (3.5 hours)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Insurance and other risk - mitigation techniques</td>
<td>DB &amp; DC (4,038)</td>
<td>£35,800</td>
<td>Every 3 years</td>
<td>1 risk function holder taking 15 minutes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. ESG risks relating to the investment portfolio and the management thereof.</td>
<td>DB &amp; DC (4,038)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Transposed by the Pension Protection Fund (Pensionable Service) and Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment and Disclosure) (Amendment and Modification) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Where members bear risks, the risk management system must also consider those risks from their perspective.</td>
<td>DC (400)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Implicit in existing fiduciary duty so no additional cost. Schemes are not expected to go further than already required to in terms of assessing risk from the perspective of individual or segments of membership, beyond what is required to meet their existing fiduciary duty.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11 Number of smaller DB (100-999 members) schemes is 2,488.
**Documenting the risk assessment:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description of how risk assessment is part of scheme management &amp; decision making;</th>
<th>DB &amp; DC (4,038)</th>
<th>£150,300 (year 1)</th>
<th>Every 3 years</th>
<th>1 function holder</th>
<th>DB already has to consider this to some extent if taking an Integrated Risk Management approach to scheme funding. DC may or may not currently do this.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>£35,800 (every subsequent third year)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Sensitivity: 0% to 100% DC schemes taking 2 hours in the first year gives +/- £7,000 so small impact</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of the effectiveness of the risk-management system;</td>
<td>DB &amp; DC (4,038)</td>
<td>£1,573,800</td>
<td>Every 3 years</td>
<td>DB schemes, 3.4 trustees, 3 hours each plus one documenter taking 2 hours.</td>
<td>DC considered as chair statement review.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If the same person/provider carries out the same key function(s) at the employer, a description of how conflicts of interest are prevented</td>
<td>DB &amp; DC (4,038)</td>
<td>£11,900</td>
<td>Every 3 years</td>
<td>10 mins, 1 trustee, 50% have conflict of interest</td>
<td>It is not known how many conflicts of interest there will be (as it is not known how many schemes will choose to use a person carrying out the function at the employer) so 50% has been chosen. Sensitivity: If all schemes had a conflict of interest then the cost would be £17,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of the funding needs of the scheme, including a description of the recovery plan where applicable;</td>
<td>DB (3,638)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>Covered by part 4 of the Pensions (NI) Order 2005 or the scheme funding regulations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assessment of the risks to paying out member's retirement benefits and the effectiveness of any remedial action</td>
<td>DB (3,638)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td>Covered by part 4 of the Pensions (NI) Order 2005 or the scheme funding regulations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qualitative assessment of the operational risks;</td>
<td>DB &amp; DC (4,038)</td>
<td>£486,800</td>
<td>Every 3 years</td>
<td>3.4 trustees, 1 hour each</td>
<td>Short time needed for trustees to confirm in writing that operational risks have been assessed (identified above)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If ESG factors are considered in investment decisions, an assessment of risks related to climate change, use of resources and the environment, social risks and risks related to the depreciation of assets due to regulatory change.

### 2. Evaluating adequacy and effectiveness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Familiarisation with regulations and appointing the evaluation function holder</td>
<td>£486,800</td>
<td>One-off</td>
<td>3.4 trustees, 1 hour each</td>
<td>All trustees to read one page of regulations and jointly discuss and agree the approach they will take to evaluating the adequacy and effectiveness of their system of governance and then to appoint an appropriate function holder. This will involve considering the expectations for compliance that are illustrated in the Regulator’s Governance Code of Practice. Discussed below*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Discussed below

### 3. Actuarial function

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Familiarisation with regulations and appointing the actuarial function holder</td>
<td>£219,300</td>
<td>One-off</td>
<td>3.4 trustees per scheme, 30 mins</td>
<td>All trustees of DB schemes to read around 1 page of regulations. These schemes will already have an actuary to carry out these duties, so providing written confirmation of this should be straightforward and should not require any new appointment to provide actuarial services.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Documenting the policy | £21,500 | Every three years | 1 function holder per scheme, 10 mins | The actuarial function holder will only need to provide documentation pointing at the existing actuarial contract and terms. |

### 4. Outsourcing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Familiarisation with regulations</td>
<td>£243,400</td>
<td>One-off</td>
<td>3.4 trustees per scheme, 30 mins</td>
<td>All trustees to read, as schemes will already have decided which functions to outsource and why, so will not require discussion.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Documenting outsourcing | £143,200 | Every three years | 1 person per scheme, 1 hour | One person will need to identify the documents that exist for outsourcing |
5. **Remuneration**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Cost</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Note</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Familiarisation with regulations DB &amp; DC (4,038)</td>
<td>One-off</td>
<td>£365,100</td>
<td>3.4 trustees per scheme, 45 mins each</td>
<td>It is likely that all trustees would need to read the regulations and explanation and expectations set out in the Code of Practice, and discuss what it means for the scheme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documenting remuneration policy DB and DC (4,038)</td>
<td>Every three years</td>
<td>£143,200</td>
<td>1 person per scheme, 1 hour each</td>
<td>One person will need to document the remuneration policy and set out how outsourced providers also meet it, if applicable.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Cost - Central Scenario**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One-off costs</td>
<td>£2,372,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triennial Cost</td>
<td>£2,729,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EANDCB</td>
<td>£1,300,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Cost - Worst Case Scenario**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Costs</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One-off costs</td>
<td>£2,379,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triennial Cost</td>
<td>£3,568,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EANDCB</td>
<td>£1,600,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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12 = (456,300 + 486,800 + (150,300-35,800) + 486,800 + 219,300 + 243,400 + 365,100).

13 Note: This triennial cost occurs in the first year alongside the initial cost and then subsequently every three years.
Evaluating the adequacy and effectiveness of the system of governance

33. The previous IORP directive required adequate internal controls, and it also required actuarial work for on scheme valuations and funding strategies. UK domestic law has added requirements for UK pension schemes to carry out risk assessments on key areas of risk for each type of scheme.

34. The recast directive now positions such activities within an overarching system of governance, and it has set out three key functions to deliver parts of this system. The addition of a specific function to evaluate the system of governance represents the most material change for schemes and therefore further information about how it will be approached and costed is provided below. The three key functions are as follows:

- A function to assess and manage risk. Any changes to the existing risk management requirements will be set out in TPR’s Code of Practice.

- A function to provide actuarial work on scheme valuations, funding, and risk management. This requirement only applies to schemes that must already appoint a scheme actuary to carry out this work.

- A function to evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of the system of governance. This function requires trustees to evaluate the internal control system and other elements of the system of governance, including, where applicable, outsourced activities. Stakeholders have advised while that many large schemes already carry out such evaluations, there is currently no requirement in the UK’s regulatory framework for single-employer DC or DB schemes to do so.

35. Legislation will not prescribe the method pension schemes must use to conduct their evaluation. Guidance on appropriate approaches will be developed as part of the development of TPR’s code. This will enable a variety of proportionate and cost effective approaches to be used as appropriate by schemes.

36. The aim is to encourage consolidation of schemes and innovation in the development of new, targeted risk management and evaluation solutions. Some complex or larger schemes may already conduct formal internal audits, and others may need to do so in order to effectively fulfil this function. It would also be proportionate for less complex arrangements to satisfy themselves that they are achieving value for their members in this regard. For example, this might involve establishing whether their outsourced scheme administrator or other service providers have achieved recognised independent assurance standards.

37. Providing information about acceptable approaches to this function within the code of practice will enable the UK to support continued innovation in its pensions industry as the market continues to evolve over the next several years. It will also allow IORPs and the Pensions Regulator to determine the most proportionate and effective method of evaluating effective governance for the particular characteristics and risk profile of each scheme.

38. The code issued by TPR will be produced with the involvement of DWP and an industry working group to ensure cost appropriate solutions are developed and clearly explained,
so that IORPs understand what is expected of them. At this stage therefore no set of activities is available that will be required under the Code for which the cost can be estimated.

39. The impact of the Code of Practice will be estimated by The Pensions Regulator in due course and will be subject to scrutiny at that point.

Sensitivities

40. The table above discusses the sensitivities around the assumptions. In the worst case scenario the total one-off cost would be around £7,000 higher than in the central scenario; and the total cost incurred every 3 years would be around £839,000 higher than in the central scenario\textsuperscript{14}. EANDCB estimate in this worst case scenario would be equal to £1.6 million.

Small and Micro Business Assessment

41. Compliance with the regulations is expected to be proportionate to the size of the scheme. No schemes with fewer than 15 members are impacted. Those with between 15 and 99 members are expected to read the regulations but it is not expected they will need to take any further action unless they deem it proportionate to do so.

Monitoring and Evaluation

42. The importance of monitoring and evaluation is recognised, but for such a small measure it would be disproportionate to commit to a formal programme of evaluation. However, interested stakeholders across the pensions industry will continue to be engaged to keep this policy under review. Should any issue arise with the policy, the evidence will be assessed and, if appropriate, consideration will be given as to whether any changes may be necessary.

Other Impacts

Equality

43. In accordance with its duty under section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, the Department has conducted a screening exercise on these legislative proposals and, as they make mainly technical amendments to implement the EU Directive, has concluded that they would not have significant implications for equality of opportunity and considers that an Equality Impact Assessment is not necessary.

Environmental

44. There are no implications.

Rural proofing

45. There are no implications.

\textsuperscript{14} Every 3 years = (1,111,600 – 277,900) + (17,000 - 11,900) and costs being £7,000 higher in the first year if all DC schemes take 2 hours.
Health

46. There are no implications.

Human rights

47. The Department considers that the regulations are compliant with the Human Rights Act 1998.

Competition

48. There are no implications.

I have read the Regulatory Impact Assessment and I am satisfied that the benefits justify the costs.

Signed for the Department for Communities

Anne McCleary
Director of Social Security Policy and Legislation

22 October 2018

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E-mail: stuart.orr@communities-ni.gov.uk
TRANSPOSITION NOTE

THE OCCUPATIONAL PENSION SCHEMES
(GOVERNANCE) (AMENDMENT) REGULATIONS (NORTHERN IRELAND) 2018

Transposing that part of the Directive (EU) 2016/2341 on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational retirement provision which relates to systems of governance.

The Occupational Pension Schemes (Governance) (Amendment) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2018
Summary Transposition Note – DIRECTIVE (EU) 2016/2341 (14/12/16)
Articles 21, 23 to 28 and 31


The Department for Communities has implemented Articles 21, 23 to 28 and 31 of the above Directive by way of the provisions in the Occupational Pension Schemes (Governance) (Amendment) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2018 (S.R. 2018 No. 214) (“the Regulations”). Articles 21, 23 to 28 and 31 concern systems of governance.

The full transposition table for the other Articles of the Directive will be produced on 13 January 2019, which is the deadline for transposing Directive (EU) 2016/2341 and will be published on https://www.communities-ni.gov.uk/articles/pension-information.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Articles</th>
<th>Requirements</th>
<th>Implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>General governance requirements. Sets out the requirement that all IORPs must have an effective system of governance which includes consideration of environmental, social and governance factors related to investment assets in investment decisions. The governance system should be proportionate to the size, nature, scale and complexity of the activities of the IORP. It also requires IORPs to have written risk management policies and an effective internal control system.</td>
<td>Regulation 2 of the Regulations substitutes paragraph (1) of Article 226A of the Pensions (Northern Ireland) Order 200516 requiring IORPs to have an effective system of governance proportionate to the size, nature, scale and complexity of the activities of the scheme. Regulation 3(1) of the Regulations requires that the Code to be issued by the Pensions Regulator must address various aspects of the effective system of governance. The following legislation and Codes of Practice require equivalent systems in public service pensions and occupational pension schemes: Public Service Pensions Act (Northern Ireland) 201417.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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15 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32016L2341
17 Public Service Pensions Act (Northern Ireland) 2014
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>23</strong></th>
<th><strong>Remuneration policy.</strong> This sets out the requirements for IORPs to establish and apply a sound remuneration policy in a manner that is proportionate to their size and internal organisation, as well as to the size, nature, scale and complexity of their activities. It also sets out the specific principles required of the remuneration policy.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>24</strong></td>
<td><strong>Key functions.</strong> This sets out the general provisions for the key functions IORPs must have in place; a risk-management function, a function which internally evaluates adequacy and effectiveness of the system of governance internal audit function and where applicable an actuarial function and how and by whom these functions shall be carried out.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>25</strong></td>
<td><strong>Risk-management.</strong> This sets the requirement for the assessment and management of risks to the functioning of the scheme and to the members and beneficiaries where applicable. It should include the ways in which to mitigate those risks, and all other mitigations the trustees have in place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>26</strong></td>
<td><strong>Internal audit.</strong> Sets out the requirement for IORPS to have a function in place which internally evaluates adequacy and effectiveness of the system of governance including where applicable outsourced activities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Regulation 3(3), (5) and (6) of the Regulations requires that the Code to be issued by the Pensions Regulator must address the key functions, written policies in relation to them and the prior approval of those written policies and their review.

Regulation 3(3)(a) of the Regulations requires that the Code to be issued by the Pensions Regulator must address the key function of risk-management.

Regulation 3(3)(b) of the Regulations requires that the Code to be issued by the Pensions Regulator must address the function which internally evaluates adequacy and effectiveness of the system of governance.

There is corresponding provision in Code of Practice 09: Effective Scheme Governance.
| 27 | **Actuarial function.** Sets out what the requirements of an effective actuarial function for those IORPs that provide cover against biometric risks or guarantees either an investment performance or a given level of benefits. | Regulation 3(3)(c) of the Regulations requires that the Code to be issued by the Pensions Regulator must address the actuarial function. |
| 28 | **Own-risk assessment.** Sets out the requirements for IORPs to undertake and document their own risk assessments and that they should have in place methods to identify and assess the current and future risks that may impact on the ability to meet its obligations. It prescribes the requirements of the risk assessment including that it must be carried out at least every 3 years or following any significant change in the risk profile of the IORP or pension schemes operated by the IORP. | Regulation 3(8) of the Regulations requires that the Code to be issued by the Pensions Regulator must address the own-risk assessment. 

There is corresponding provision in Code of Practice 09: Effective Scheme Governance. |
| 31 | **Outsourcing.** Sets out how IORPs will be permitted to entrust any activities including key functions and the management of those IORPs to service providers whilst remaining fully responsible for compliance with their obligations under this Directive. There must be a written agreement, which is legally enforceable, between the IORP and the service provider clearly defining the rights and obligations of both parties. | Regulation 3(4) of the Regulations requires that the Code to be issued by the Pensions Regulator must address outsourcing and under paragraph (5) that there must be a written policy in relation to this, which is subject to prior approval and also reviewed. |