CHAPTER I Subject matter, scope and definitions Section 1 Subject matter and scope Section 2 Definitions CHAPTER II Initial capital CHAPTER III Trading book CHAPTER IV Own funds CHAPTER VSection 1 Provisions against risks Section 2 Application of requirements on a consolidated basis Section 3 Calculation of consolidated requirements Section 4 Monitoring and control of large exposures Section 5 Valuation of positions for reporting purposes Section 6 Risk management and capital assessment Section 7 Reporting requirements CHAPTER VISection 1 Competent authorities Section 2 Supervision CHAPTER VII Disclosure CHAPTER VIIISection 1Section 2 Powers of execution Section 3 Transitional provisions Section 4 Final provisions
GENERAL PROVISIONS Netting 1.The excess of an institution's long (short) positions over its...2.No netting shall be allowed between a convertible and an...3.All net positions, irrespective of their signs, must be converted...Particular instruments4. Interest‐rate futures, forward‐rate agreements (FRAs) and forward commitments to...4.Interest‐rate futures, forward‐rate agreements (FRAs) and forward commitments to buy...5.Options on interest rates, debt instruments, equities, equity indices, financial...6.Warrants relating to debt instruments and equities shall be treated...7.Swaps shall be treated for interest‐rate risk purposes on the...A.TREATMENT OF THE PROTECTION SELLER 8.When calculating the capital requirement for market risk of the...B.TREATMENT OF THE PROTECTION BUYER 9.Institutions which mark to market and manage the interest‐rate risk...10.Institutions which do not use models under point 9 may, with...11.The transferor of securities or guaranteed rights relating to title...Specific and general risks 12.The position risk on a traded debt instrument or equity...TRADED DEBT INSTRUMENTS 13.Net positions shall be classified according to the currency in...Specific risk 14.The institution shall assign its net positions in the trading book,...15.For the purposes of point 14 qualifying items shall include: 16.The competent authorities shall require the institution to apply the...General risk (a)Maturity-based 17.The procedure for calculating capital requirements against general risk involves...18.The institution shall assign its net positions to the appropriate...19.It shall then work out the sum of the weighted...20.The institution shall compute the totals of the unmatched weighted...21.The amount of the unmatched weighted long (short) position in...22.The institution may, if it wishes, reverse the order in...23.The remainder of the unmatched weighted position in zone one...24.Residual positions, following the three separate matching calculations in points 21,...25.The institution's capital requirement shall be calculated as the sum...(b)Duration-based 26.The competent authorities may allow institutions in general or on...27.Under a system referred to in point 26 the institution shall...28.The institution shall then calculate the modified duration of each...29.The institution shall then allocate each debt instrument to the...30.The institution shall then calculate the duration‐weighted position for each...31.The institution shall calculate its duration-weighted long and its duration-weighted...32.The institution's capital requirement shall then be calculated as the...EQUITIES 33.The institution shall sum all its net long positions and...Specific risk 34.The institution shall sum all its net long positions and...35.By derogation from point 34, the competent authorities may allow the...General risk 36.Its capital requirement against general risk shall be its overall...Stock-index futures 37.Stock-index futures, the delta-weighted equivalents of options in stock-index futures...38.The competent authorities shall ensure that any institution which has...39.By derogation from points 37 and 38, stock-index futures which are...40.If a stock-index future is not broken down into its...UNDERWRITING 41.In the case of the underwriting of debt and equity...SPECIFIC RISK CAPITAL CHARGES FOR TRADING BOOK POSITIONS HEDGED BY...42.An allowance shall be given for protection provided by credit...43.Full allowance shall be given when the value of two...44.An 80 % offset will be applied when the value of...45.Partial allowance shall be given when the value of two...46.In all situations not falling under points 43 to 45,...Capital charges for CIUs in the trading book 47.The capital requirements for positions in CIUs which meet the...48.Without prejudice to other provisions in this section, positions in...49.Institutions may determine the capital requirement for positions in CIUs...50.Unless noted otherwise, no netting is permitted between the underlying...GENERAL CRITERIA 51.The general eligibility criteria for using the methods in points 53...52.Third country CIUs may be eligible if the requirements in...SPECIFIC METHODS 53.Where the institution is aware of the underlying investments of...54.Institutions may calculate the capital requirements for position risk (general...55.Where the institution is not aware of the underlying investments...56.Institutions may rely on a third party to calculate and...SETTLEMENT/DELIVERY RISK 1.In the case of transactions in which debt instruments, equities,...FREE DELIVERIES 2.An institution shall be required to hold own funds, as...3.In applying a risk weight to free delivery exposures treated...4.In cases of a system wide failure of a settlement...COUNTERPARTY CREDIT RISK (CCR) 5.An institution shall be required to hold capital against the...6.Subject to the provisions of points 7 to 10, exposure values...7.For the purposes of point 6: 8.For the purposes of point 6 , in calculating risk‐weighted...9.For the purposes of point 6 , in the case...10.For the purposes of point 6, in relation to the recognition...11.Where a credit derivative included in the trading book forms...12.The capital requirement shall be 8 % of the total risk‐weighted...1.If the sum of an institution's overall net foreign‐exchange position...2.A two‐stage calculation shall be used for capital requirements for...2.1.Firstly, the institution's net open position in each currency (including...2.2.Secondly, net short and long positions in each currency other...3.By derogation from points 1 and 2 and pending further coordination,...3.1.The competent authorities may allow institutions to provide lower capital...3.2.The competent authorities may allow institutions to remove positions in...4.Net positions in composite currencies may be broken down into...1.Each position in commodities or commodity derivatives shall be expressed...2.Positions in gold or gold derivatives shall be considered as...3.For the purposes of this Annex, positions which are purely...4.The interest‐rate and foreign‐exchange risks not covered by other provisions...5.When the short position falls due before the long position,...6.For the purpose of point 19, the excess of an institution's...7.The competent authorities may regard the following positions as positions...Particular instruments8.Commodity futures and forward commitments to buy or sell individual...9.Commodity swaps where one side of the transaction is a...10.Options on commodities or on commodity derivatives shall be treated...11.Warrants relating to commodities shall be treated in the same...12.The transferor of commodities or guaranteed rights relating to title...(a)Maturity ladder approach 13.The institution shall use a separate maturity ladder in line...14.Competent authorities may allow positions which are, or are regarded...15.The institution shall then calculate the sum of the long...16.That part of the unmatched long (short) position for a...17.The institution's capital requirement for each commodity shall be calculated...18.The institution's overall capital requirement for commodities risk shall be...(b)Simplified approach 19.The institution's capital requirement for each commodity shall be calculated...20.The institution's overall capital requirement for commodities risk shall be...(c)Extended Maturity ladder approach 21.Competent authorities may authorise institutions to use the minimum spread,...1.The competent authorities may, subject to the conditions laid down...2.Recognition shall only be given if the competent authority is...3.Institutions shall have processes in place to ensure that their...4.The institution shall monitor the accuracy and performance of its...5.For the purpose of calculating capital requirements for specific risk...6.Institutions using internal models which are not recognised in accordance...7.For the purposes of point 9(b), the results of the institution's...8.The multiplication factor shall be increased by a plus‐factor of...9.Each institution must meet a capital requirement expressed as the...10.The calculation of the value‐at‐risk measure shall be subject to...11.The competent authorities shall require that the model captures accurately...12.The risk‐measurement model shall capture a sufficient number of risk...Interest rate risk Foreign-exchange risk Equity risk Commodity risk 13.The competent authorities may allow institutions to use empirical correlations...1.The excess referred to in Article 31(b) shall be calculated by...2.Where the excess has not persisted for more than 10...3.As from 10 days after the excess has occurred, the...PART ATrading Intent1.Positions/portfolios held with trading intent shall comply with the following...PART BSystems and Controls1.Institutions shall establish and maintain systems and controls sufficient to...2.Systems and controls shall include at least the following elements:...Prudent Valuation Methods 3.Marking to market is the at least daily valuation of...4.When marking to market, the more prudent side of bid/offer...5.Where marking to market is not possible, institutions must mark...6.The following requirements must be complied with when marking to...7.Independent price verification should be performed in addition to daily...Valuation adjustments or reserves 8.Institutions shall establish and maintain procedures for considering valuation adjustments/reserves....General standards 9.The competent authorities shall require the following valuation adjustments/reserves to...Standards for less liquid positions 10.Less liquid positions could arise from both market events and...11.Institutions shall consider several factors when determining whether a valuation...12.When using third party valuations or marking to model, institutions...13.When valuation adjustments/reserves give rise to material losses of the...14.Other profits/losses originating from valuation adjustments/reserves shall be included in...15.Valuation adjustments/reserves which exceed those made under the accounting framework...PART CInternal Hedges1.An internal hedge is a position that materially or completely...2.The treatment referred to in point 1 applies without prejudice to...3.Notwithstanding points 1 and 2, when an institution hedges a...PART DInclusion In The Trading Book1.Institutions shall have clearly defined policies and procedures for determining...2.Institutions shall have clearly defined policies and procedures for overall...3.Competent authorities may allow institutions to treat positions that are...4.Term trading-related repo‐style transactions that an institution accounts for in...PART ARepealed directives together with their successive amendments(referred to in Article 52) PART BDeadlines for transposition(referred to in Article 52)

Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council

of 14 June 2006

on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (recast) (repealed)

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in particular Article 47(2) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,

Having regard to the Opinion of the European Economic and Social Committee1,

Having regard to the Opinion of the European Central Bank2,

After consulting the Committee of the Regions,

Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 251 of the Treaty3,

Whereas:

(1)

Council Directive 93/6/EEC of 15 March 1993 on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions4 has been significantly amended on several occasions. Now that new amendments are being made to the said Directive, it is desirable, in order to clarify matters, that it should be recast.

(2)

One of the objectives of Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on markets in financial instruments5 is to allow investment firms authorised by the competent authorities of their home Member State and supervised by the same authorities to establish branches and provide services freely in other Member States. That Directive accordingly provides for the coordination of the rules governing the authorisation and pursuit of the business of investment firms.

(3)

Directive 2004/39/EC does not, however, establish common standards for the own funds of investment firms nor indeed does it establish the amounts of the initial capital of such firms or a common framework for monitoring the risks incurred by them.

(4)

It is appropriate to effect only the essential harmonisation that is necessary and sufficient to secure the mutual recognition of authorisation and of prudential supervision systems; in order to achieve mutual recognition within the framework of the internal financial market, measures should be laid down to coordinate the definition of the own funds of investment firms, the establishment of the amounts of their initial capital and the establishment of a common framework for monitoring the risks incurred by investment firms.

(5)

Since the objectives of this Directive, namely the establishment of the capital adequacy requirements applying to investment firms and credit institutions, the rules for their calculation and the rules for their prudential supervision, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale and the effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Community level, the Community may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, as set out in that Article, this Directive does not go beyond what is necessary in order to achieve its objectives.

(6)

It is appropriate to establish different amounts of initial capital depending on the range of activities that investment firms are authorised to undertake.

(7)

Existing investment firms should be permitted, under certain conditions, to continue their business even if they do not comply with the minimum amount of initial capital fixed for new investment firms.

(8)

Member States should be able to establish rules stricter than those provided for in this Directive.

(9)

The smooth operation of the internal market requires not only legal rules but also close and regular cooperation and significantly enhanced convergence of regulatory and supervisory practices between the competent authorities of the Member States.

(10)

The Commission Communication of 11 May 1999 entitled ‘Implementing the framework for financial markets: Action Plan’ listed a number of goals that need to be achieved in order to complete the internal market in financial services. The Lisbon European Council of 23 and 24 March 2000 set the goal of implementing the action plan by 2005. Recasting of the provisions on own funds is a key element of the action plan.

(11)

Since investment firms face in respect of their trading book business the same risks as credit institutions, it is appropriate for the pertinent provisions of Directive 2006/48/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006 relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions6 to apply equally to investment firms.

(12)

The own funds of investment firms or credit institutions (hereinafter referred to collectively as ‘institutions’) can serve to absorb losses which are not matched by a sufficient volume of profits, to ensure the continuity of institutions and to protect investors. The own funds also serve as an important yardstick for the competent authorities, in particular for the assessment of the solvency of institutions and for other prudential purposes. Furthermore, institutions, engage in direct competition with each other in the internal market. Therefore, in order to strengthen the Community financial system and to prevent distortions of competition, it is appropriate to lay down common basic standards for own funds.

(13)

For the purposes of recital (12), it is appropriate for the definition of own funds as laid down in Directive 2006/48/EC to serve as a basis, and to provide for supplementary specific rules which take into account the different scope of market risk related capital requirements.

(14)

As regards credit institutions, common standards have already been established for the supervision and monitoring of different types of risks by Directive 2000/12/EC.

(15)

In that respect, the provisions on minimum capital requirements should be considered in conjunction with other specific instruments which also harmonise the fundamental techniques of the supervision of institutions.

(16)

It is necessary to develop common standards for market risks incurred by credit institutions and provide a complementary framework for the supervision of the risks incurred by institutions, in particular market risks, and more especially position risks, counterparty/settlement risks and foreign-exchange risks.

(17)

It is necessary to provide for the concept of a ‘trading book’ comprising positions in securities and other financial instruments which are held for trading purposes and which are subject mainly to market risks and exposures relating to certain financial services provided to customers.

(18)

With a view to reducing the administrative burden for institutions with negligible trading-book business in both absolute and relative terms, such institutions should be able to apply Directive 2006/48/EC, rather than the requirements laid down in Annexes I and II to this Directive.

(19)

It is important that monitoring of settlement/delivery risks should take account of the existence of systems offering adequate protection reducing those risks.

(20)

In any case, institutions should comply with this Directive as regards the coverage of the foreign-exchange risks on their overall business. Lower capital requirements should be imposed for positions in closely correlated currencies, whether statistically confirmed or arising out of binding intergovernmental agreements.

(21)

The capital requirements for commodity dealers, including those dealers currently exempt from the requirements of Directive 2004/39/EC, will be reviewed as appropriate in conjunction with the review of that exemption as set out in Article 65(3) of that Directive.

(22)

The goal of liberalisation of gas and electricity markets is both economically and politically important for the Community. With this in mind, the capital requirements and other prudential rules to be applied to firms active in those markets should be proportionate and should not unduly interfere with achievement of the goal of liberalisation. This goal should, in particular, be kept in mind when the reviews referred to in recital 21 are carried out.

(23)

The existence of internal systems for monitoring and controlling interest-rate risks on all business of institutions is a particularly important way of minimising such risks. Consequently, such systems should be supervised by the competent authorities.

(24)

Since Directive 2006/48/EC does not establish common rules for the monitoring and control of large exposures in activities which are principally subject to market risks, it is therefore appropriate to provide for such rules.

(25)

Operational risk is a significant risk faced by institutions and requires coverage by own funds. It is essential to take account of the diversity of institutions in the EU by providing alternative approaches.

(26)

Directive 2006/48/EC states the principle of consolidation. It does not establish common rules for the consolidation of financial institutions which are involved in activities principally subject to market risks.

(27)

In order to ensure adequate solvency of institutions within a group, it is essential that the minimum capital requirements apply on the basis of the consolidated financial situation of the group. In order to ensure that own funds are appropriately distributed within the group and are available to protect investments where needed, the minimum capital requirements should apply to individual institutions within a group, unless this objective can be effectively achieved by other means.

(28)

Directive 2006/48/EC does not apply to groups which include one or more investment firms but no credit institutions. A common framework for the introduction of the supervision of investment firms on a consolidated basis should therefore be provided for.

(29)

Institutions should ensure that they have internal capital which, having regard to the risks to which they are or might be exposed, is adequate in quantity, quality and distribution. Accordingly, institutions should have strategies and processes in place for assessing and maintaining the adequacy of their internal capital.

(30)

Competent authorities should evaluate the adequacy of own funds of institutions, having regard to the risks to which the latter are exposed.

(31)

In order for the internal banking market to operate effectively, the Committee of European Banking Supervisors should contribute to the consistent application of this Directive and to the convergence of supervisory practices throughout the Community, and should report on a yearly basis to the Community Institutions on progress made.

(32)

In order for the internal market to operate with increasing effectiveness it is essential that there should be significantly enhanced convergence in the implementation and application of the provisions of harmonising Community legislation.

(33)

For the same reason, and to ensure that Community institutions which are active in several Member States are not disproportionately burdened as a result of the continued responsibilities of individual Member State competent authorities for authorisation and supervision, it is essential significantly to enhance the cooperation between competent authorities. In this context the role of the consolidating supervisor should be strengthened.

(34)

In order for the internal market to operate with increasing effectiveness and for citizens of the Union to be afforded adequate levels of transparency, it is necessary that competent authorities disclose publicly and in a way which allows for meaningful comparison the manner in which the requirements of this Directive are implemented.

(35)

In order to strengthen market discipline and stimulate institutions to improve their market strategy, risk control and internal management organisation, appropriate public disclosures by institutions should be provided for.

(36)

The measures necessary for the implementation of this Directive should be adopted in accordance with Council Decision 1999/468/EC of 28 June 1999 laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission7.

(37)

In its Resolution of 5 February 2002 on the implementation of financial services legislation8, the Parliament requested that the Parliament and the Council should have an equal role in supervising the way in which the Commission exercises its executive role in order to reflect the legislative powers of Parliament under Article 251 of the Treaty. In the solemn declaration made before the Parliament the same day, by its President, the Commission supported this request. On 11 December 2002, the Commission proposed amendments to Decision 1999/468/EC and then submitted an amended proposal on 22 April 2004. The Parliament considers that this proposal does not preserve its legislative prerogatives. In the Parliament's view, the Parliament and the Council should have the opportunity of evaluating the conferral of implementing powers on the Commission within a determined period. It is therefore appropriate to limit the period during which the Commission may adopt implementing measures.

(38)

The Parliament should be given a period of three months from the first transmission of draft amendments and implementing measures to allow it to examine them and to give its opinion. However, in urgent and duly justified cases, it should be possible to shorten this period. If, within that period, a resolution is adopted by the Parliament, the Commission should re-examine the draft amendments or measures.

(39)

In order to avoid disruption to markets and to ensure continuity in overall levels of own funds, it is appropriate to provide for specific transitional arrangements.

(40)

This Directive respects fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union as general principles of Community law.

(41)

The obligation to transpose this Directive into national law should be confined to those provisions that represent a substantive change compared to earlier directives. The obligation to transpose the provisions that remain unchanged exists under the earlier directives.

(42)

This Directive should be without prejudice to the obligations of the Member States relating to the time-limits for transposition into national law of the Directives set out in Part B of Annex VIII,

HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: